Section 117
Original German
117 Der selbst handelnde Wille hat in seinem auf das vorliegende Daseyn gerichteten Zwecke die Vorstellung der Umstände desselben. Aber weil er, um dieser Voraussetzung willen, endlich ist, ist die gegenständliche Erscheinung für ihn zufällig und kann in sich etwas anderes enthalten, als in seiner Vorstellung. Das Recht des Willens aber ist, in seiner That nur dieß als seine Handlung anzuerkennen, und nur an dem Schuld zu haben, was er von ihren Voraussetzungen in seinem Zwecke weiß, was davon in seinem Vorsatze lag. — Die That kann nur als Schuld des Willens zugerechnet werden; — das Recht des Wissens.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
117 The will that itself acts has, in its purpose directed to the existing being-there, the representation of its circumstances. But because, on account of this presupposition, it is finite, the objective appearance is contingent for it and can contain within itself something other than what is in its representation. The right of the will, however, is to recognize as its action in its deed only this, and to have guilt only in what it knows of the presuppositions in its purpose, in what of them lay in its resolve. — The deed can only be imputed to the will as its guilt; — the right of knowing.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
117 The will that acts itself has, in its aim directed at the existing situation, an idea of the circumstances of that situation. But because the will is finite on account of this presupposition, the objective appearance is contingent for it and can contain something different from what is in its idea. The right of the will, however, is to recognize as its action only what it knows of the presuppositions in its aim, and to have guilt only for what of them lay in its purpose. — A deed can only be imputed to the will as its guilt. This is the right of knowing.
About this section
Section 117 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 119 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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