Section 115
Original German
115 Erster Abschnitt.
Der Vorsatz und die Schuld.
Die Endlichkeit des subjectiven Willens in der Unmittelbarkeit des Handelns besteht unmittelbar darin, daß er für sein Handeln einen vorausgesetzten äußerlichen Gegenstand mit mannichfaltigen Umständen hat. Die That setzt eine Veränderung an diesem vorliegenden Daseyn und der Wille hat Schuld überhaupt daran, insofern in dem veränderten Daseyn das abstracte Prädicat des Meinigen liegt.
Eine Begebenheit, ein hervorgegangener Zustand ist eine concrete äußere Wirklichkeit, die deswegen unbestimmbar viele Umstände an ihr hat. Jedes einzelne Moment, das sich als Bedingung, Grund, Ursache eines solchen Umstandes zeigt, und somit das Seinige beygetragen hat, kann angesehen werden, daß es Schuld daran sey oder wenigstens Schuld daran habe. Der formelle Verstand hat daher bey einer reichen Begebenheit (z. B. der französischen Revolution) an einer unzähligen Menge von Umständen die Wahl, welchen er als einen, der Schuld sey, behaupten will.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
115 First Section.
Resolve and Guilt.
The finitude of the subjective will in the immediacy of acting consists immediately in this, that for its acting it has a presupposed external object with manifold circumstances. The deed posits a change in this existing being-there, and the will has guilt in it in general, insofar as the abstract predicate of the mine lies in the altered being-there.
An event, a state of affairs that has come about, is a concrete external actuality, which for that reason has an indeterminable number of circumstances in it. Each single moment that shows itself as the condition, ground, or cause of such a circumstance, and has thus contributed its share, can be regarded as guilty of it, or at least as having guilt in it. In the case of a rich event (the French Revolution, for example), the formal understanding therefore has the choice, among an innumerable multitude of circumstances, of which one it will assert to be the guilty one.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
115 First Section.
Purpose and Guilt.
The finitude of the subjective will in the immediacy of acting lies directly in this: that for its action it has an external object that is presupposed and has many circumstances. The deed produces a change in this existing situation, and the will has guilt for it in general, insofar as the abstract predicate mine lies in the changed situation.
An event, or a state of affairs that has come about, is a concrete external actuality, and for that reason it has countless circumstances that cannot be fixed in number. Any single moment that shows itself as a condition, ground or cause of such a circumstance, and so has contributed its share, can be regarded as guilty of it, or at least as having guilt in it. So when an event is rich, such as the French Revolution, the formal understanding can choose among an innumerable mass of circumstances which one it wants to declare guilty.
About this section
Section 115 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 117 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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