Section 113
Original German
113 Die Aeußerung des Willens als subjectiven oder moralischen ist Handlung. Die Handlung enthält die aufgezeigten Bestimmungen, α) von mir in ihrer Aeußerlichkeit als die Meinige gewußt zu werden, β) die wesentliche Beziehung auf den Begriff als ein Sollen und γ) auf den Willen Anderer zu seyn.
Erst die Aeußerung des moralischen Willens ist Handlung. Das Daseyn, das der Wille im formellen Rechte sich giebt, ist in einer unmittelbaren Sache, ist selbst unmittelbar und hat für sich zunächst keine ausdrückliche Beziehung auf den Begriff, der als noch nicht gegen den subjectiven Willen, von ihm nicht unterschieden ist, noch eine positive Beziehung auf den Willen Anderer; das Rechtsgebot ist seiner Grundbestimmung nach nur Verbot (§. 38.). Der Vertrag und das Unrecht fangen zwar an, eine Beziehung auf den Willen Anderer zu haben — aber die Uebereinstimmung, die in jenem zu Stande kommt, gründet sich auf die Willkühr und die wesentliche Beziehung, die darin auf den Willen des Andern ist, ist als rechtliche das Negative, mein Eigenthum, (dem Werthe nach) zu behalten und dem Andern das Seinige zu lassen. Die Seite des Verbrechens dagegen als aus dem subjectiven Willen kommend und nach der Art und Weise, wie es in ihm seine Existenz hat, kommt hier erst in Betracht. — Die gerichtliche Handlung (actio) als mir nicht nach ihrem Inhalt, der durch Vorschriften bestimmt ist, imputabel, enthält nur einige Momente der moralischen eigentlichen Handlung und zwar in äußerlicher Weise; eigentliche moralische Handlung zu seyn ist daher eine von ihr als gerichtlicher unterschiedene Seite.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
113 The expression of the will as subjective or moral is action. Action contains the determinations that have been shown: α) that it be known by me in its externality as mine; β) the essential relation to the concept as an ought; and γ) that it be in relation to the will of others.
Only the expression of the moral will is action. The being-there that the will gives itself in formal right lies in an immediate thing, is itself immediate, and at first has for itself no explicit relation to the concept, which, being not yet set against the subjective will, is not distinguished from it, nor yet a positive relation to the will of others; the commandment of right is, by its fundamental determination, only a prohibition (§ 38). Contract and wrong do indeed begin to have a relation to the will of others — but the agreement that comes about in the former rests on arbitrary choice, and the essential relation to the will of the other that lies in it is, as a relation of right, the negative one: to keep my property (in terms of its value) and to leave the other what is his. The side of crime, on the other hand, as coming from the subjective will, and according to the manner in which it has its existence in that will, comes into consideration here for the first time. — The judicial act (actio), as not imputable to me in its content, which is determined by prescriptions, contains only some moments of properly moral action, and these in an external fashion; being properly moral action is therefore a side distinct from it as judicial.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
113 The expression of the will as subjective or moral is action. Action contains the determinations already shown: α) that I know it, in its externality, as mine; β) that it essentially refers to the concept as an ought; and γ) that it refers to the will of others.
Only the expression of the moral will is action. The existence the will gives itself in formal right lies in an immediate thing. It is itself immediate, and to begin with it has no explicit relation to the concept, which, since it does not yet stand against the subjective will, is not distinguished from it, nor any positive relation to the will of others. The command of right is, in its basic character, only a prohibition (§ 38). Contract and wrong do begin to have a relation to the will of others. But the agreement reached in contract rests on arbitrary choice, and the essential relation to the other's will that lies in it, as a matter of right, is the negative one: to keep my property (in value) and to leave the other what is his. The side of crime, by contrast, comes into consideration only here, as coming from the subjective will and in the way it has its existence in that will. — Legal action (actio) cannot be imputed to me for its content, which is fixed by rules. It contains only some moments of properly moral action, and only in an external way. Being properly moral action is therefore a side that differs from it as legal action.
About this section
Section 113 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 115 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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