Section 112
Original German
112 c) Indem ich meine Subjectivität in Ausführung meiner Zwecke erhalte, (§. 110.) hebe ich darin als der Objectivirung derselben diese Subjectivität zugleich als unmittelbare, somit als diese meine einzelne auf. Aber die so mit mir identische äußerliche Subjectivität ist der Wille Anderer. (§. 73.) — Der Boden der Existenz des Willens ist nun die Subjectivität, (§. 106.) und der Wille Anderer die zugleich, mir andere, Existenz, die ich meinem Zwecke gebe. — Die Ausführung meines Zwecks hat daher diese Identität meines und anderer Willen in sich, — sie hat eine positive Beziehung auf den Willen Anderer.
Die Objectivität des ausgeführten Zwecks schließt daher die drey Bedeutungen in sich, oder enthält vielmehr in Einem die drey Momente: α) Aeusserliches unmittelbares Daseyn, (§. 109.) β) dem Begriffe angemessen (§. 112.) γ) allgemeine Subjectivität zu seyn. Die Subjectivität, die sich in dieser Objectivität erhält, ist α) daß der objective Zweck der Meinige sey, so daß Ich mich als Diesen darin erhalte (§. 110.) β) und γ) der Subjectivität ist schon mit den Momenten β) und γ) der Objectivität zusammengefallen. — Daß diese Bestimmungen so, auf dem moralischen Standpunkte sich unterscheidend, nur zum Widerspruche vereinigt sind, macht näher das Erscheinende oder die Endlichkeit dieser Sphäre aus (§. 108.) und die Entwicklung dieses Standpunkts ist die Entwicklung dieser Widersprüche und deren Auflösungen, die aber innerhalb desselben nur relativ seyn können.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
112 c) In that I preserve my subjectivity in carrying out my purposes (§ 110), I at the same time cancel in this, as the objectification of that subjectivity, the same subjectivity as immediate, and thus as this single subjectivity of mine. But the external subjectivity that is thus identical with me is the will of others (§ 73). — The ground of the existence of the will is now subjectivity (§ 106), and the will of others is the existence, at once other to me, which I give to my purpose. — The carrying out of my purpose therefore has within it this identity of my will and the wills of others; it has a positive relation to the will of others.
The objectivity of the executed purpose therefore includes three meanings, or rather contains in one the three moments: α) external immediate being-there (§ 109); β) being adequate to the concept (§ 112); γ) being universal subjectivity. The subjectivity that preserves itself in this objectivity is α) that the objective purpose be mine, so that I preserve myself in it as this one (§ 110); and β) and γ) of the subjectivity have already coincided with the moments β) and γ) of the objectivity. — That these determinations, distinguishing themselves in this way on the moral standpoint, are united only into a contradiction constitutes more closely the appearing, or the finitude, of this sphere (§ 108); and the development of this standpoint is the development of these contradictions and their resolutions, which within it, however, can only be relative.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
112 c) When I keep my subjectivity in carrying out my aims (§ 110), I at the same time cancel it, in the act of making it objective, as immediate subjectivity, and so as this individual subjectivity of mine. But the external subjectivity that is in this way identical with me is the will of others (§ 73). — The ground on which the will exists is subjectivity (§ 106), and the will of others is the existence, at once other than me, that I give to my aim. — Carrying out my aim therefore holds within it this identity of my will and the will of others. It has a positive relation to the will of others.
The objectivity of the aim once carried out therefore includes three meanings, or rather holds three moments in one: α) external, immediate existence (§ 109); β) fitting the concept (§ 112); γ) being universal subjectivity. The subjectivity that keeps itself in this objectivity is α) that the objective aim is mine, so that I keep myself in it as this person (§ 110); and β) and γ) of subjectivity have already coincided with moments β) and γ) of objectivity. — That these determinations, distinguishing themselves in this way on the moral standpoint, are united only in a contradiction is what more closely makes up the appearance, or finitude, of this sphere (§ 108). The development of this standpoint is the development of these contradictions and of their resolutions, which within the standpoint can only be relative.
About this section
Section 112 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 114 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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