Section 111
Original German
111 b) Der Inhalt, ob er zwar ein Besonderes enthält (dieß sey sonst genommen, woher es wolle), hat als Inhalt des in seiner Bestimmtheit in sich reflectirten, hiemit mit sich identischen und allgemeinen Willens, α) die Bestimmung in ihm selbst, dem an sich seyenden Willen angemessen zu seyn oder die Objectivität des Begriffes zu haben aber β) indem der subjective Wille als für sich seyender zugleich noch formell ist (§. 108.) ist dieß nur Foderung, und er enthält eben so die Möglichkeit, dem Begriffe nicht angemessen zu seyn.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
111 b) The content, although it contains something particular (let this be taken from wherever it may), has, as the content of the will that is reflected into itself in its determinacy, and is thereby identical with itself and universal, α) the determination within it of being adequate to the will that is in itself, that is, of having the objectivity of the concept; but β) since the subjective will, as being for itself, is at the same time still formal (§ 108), this is only a demand, and the content equally contains the possibility of not being adequate to the concept.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
111 b) The content may include something particular, whatever its origin. But it is the content of a will that has reflected into itself in its determinacy, and so is identical with itself and universal. As such, α) it is determined to fit the will that is in itself, that is, to have the objectivity of the concept. And β) since the subjective will, as a will that exists for itself, is at the same time still only formal (§ 108), this is merely a demand, and the content equally holds the possibility of not fitting the concept.
About this section
Section 111 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 113 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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