Section 109
Original German
109 Dieses Formelle enthält seiner allgemeinen Bestimmung nach zuerst die Entgegensetzung der Subjectivität und Objectivität und die sich darauf beziehende Thätigkeit (§. 8.) deren Momente näher diese sind: Daseyn und Bestimmtheit ist im Begriffe identisch (vergl. §. 104.) und der Wille als subjectiv ist selbst dieser Begriff, — beydes und zwar für sich zu unterscheiden und sie als identisch zu setzen. Die Bestimmtheit ist im sich selbst bestimmenden Willen α) zunächst als durch ihn selbst in ihm gesetzt; — die Besonderung seiner in ihm selbst, ein Inhalt, den er sich giebt. Dieß ist die erste Negation und deren formelle Gränze, nur ein gesetztes, subjectives zu seyn. Als die unendliche Reflexion in sich ist diese Gränze für ihn selbst und er β) das Wollen, diese Schranke aufzuheben, — die Thätigkeit, diesen Inhalt aus der Subjectivität in die Objectivität überhaupt, in ein unmittelbares Daseyn zu übersetzen. γ) Die einfache Identität des Willens mit sich in dieser Entgegensetzung ist der sich in beyden gleichbleibende, und gegen diese Unterschiede der Form gleichgültige Inhalt, der Zweck.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
109 This formal aspect contains, according to its universal determination, first the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity and the activity relating to it (§ 8), whose moments are more closely these: existence and determinacy are identical in the concept (compare § 104), and the will as subjective is itself this concept—to distinguish both, and indeed for itself, and to posit them as identical. The determinacy in the self-determining will is α) at first posited by itself in it—the particularization of itself within itself, a content that it gives itself. This is the first negation, and its formal limit, to be only something posited, subjective. As the infinite reflection into itself, this limit is for the will itself, and it is β) the willing to cancel this barrier—the activity of translating this content from subjectivity into objectivity in general, into an immediate existence. γ) The simple identity of the will with itself in this opposition is the content, remaining the same in both and indifferent to these differences of form, the purpose.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
109 In its general determination, this formal aspect first contains the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity and the activity relating to it (§ 8). More specifically, its aspects are these: existence and determination are identical in the concept (cf. § 104). The will as subjective is itself this concept: to distinguish the two, specifically for itself, and to posit them as identical. In the will that determines itself, α) determination is first posited by the will itself in itself. This is the will making itself particular within itself, a content it gives itself. This is the first negation, whose formal limit is to be only something posited, something subjective. As infinite reflection into itself, this limit exists for the will itself, and β) the will is the willing to cancel this restriction: the activity of transferring this content from subjectivity into objectivity in general, into an immediate existence. γ) The will's simple identity with itself in this opposition is the content that remains the same in both and is indifferent to these differences of form: the end.
About this section
Section 109 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 111 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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