Section 108
Original German
108 Der subjective Wille als unmittelbar für sich und von dem an sich seyenden unterschieden (§. 106. Anmerk.) ist daher abstract, beschränkt und formell. Die Subjectivität ist aber nicht nur formell, sondern macht als das unendliche Selbstbestimmen des Willens das Formelle desselben aus. Weil es in diesem seinem ersten Hervortreten am einzelnen Willen noch nicht als identisch mit dem Begriffe des Willens gesetzt ist, so ist der moralische Standpunkt der Standpunkt des Verhältnisses und des Sollens oder der Foderung. — Und indem die Differenz der Subjectivität ebenso die Bestimmung gegen die Objectivität als äußerliches Daseyn enthält, so tritt hier auch der Standpunkt des Bewußtseyns ein, (§. 8.) — überhaupt der Standpunkt der Differenz, Endlichkeit und Erscheinung des Willens.
Das Moralische ist zunächst nicht schon als das dem Unmoralischen Entgegengesetzte bestimmt, wie das Recht nicht unmittelbar das dem Unrecht Entgegengesetzte, sondern es ist der allgemeine Standpunkt des Moralischen sowohl, als des Unmoralischen, der auf der Subjectivität des Willens beruht.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
108 The subjective will, as immediately for itself and distinguished from the will existing in itself (§ 106, remark), is therefore abstract, limited, and formal. But subjectivity is not merely formal; as the infinite self-determining of the will it constitutes the formal aspect of the will. Because in this its first emergence it is not yet posited in the single will as identical with the concept of the will, the moral standpoint is the standpoint of relation, of the ought, or of the demand.—And since the difference of subjectivity equally contains the determination against objectivity as external existence, the standpoint of consciousness also enters here (§ 8)—in general the standpoint of difference, finitude, and appearance of the will.
The moral is not at first already determined as the opposite of the immoral, just as right is not immediately the opposite of wrong; rather it is the universal standpoint of the moral as well as of the immoral, which rests on the subjectivity of the will.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
108 The subjective will, as immediately existing for itself and distinct from the will as it is in itself (§ 106, Remark), is therefore abstract, limited, and formal. But subjectivity is not merely formal. As the will's infinite self-determining, it constitutes the will's formal aspect. In its first appearance in the individual will, this aspect is not yet posited as identical with the concept of the will. The moral standpoint is therefore the standpoint of relation and of what ought to be, or of a demand. And since the difference of subjectivity also includes its determination in opposition to objectivity as external existence, the standpoint of consciousness also enters here (§ 8). It is, in general, the standpoint of the will's difference, finitude, and appearance.
At first, the moral is not already determined as the opposite of the immoral, just as right is not immediately the opposite of wrong. Rather, it is the general standpoint of both the moral and the immoral, based on the subjectivity of the will.
About this section
Section 108 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 110 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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