Section 107
Original German
107 Die Selbstbestimmung des Willens ist zugleich Moment seines Begriffes und die Subjectivität nicht nur die Seite seines Daseyns, sondern seine eigene Bestimmung. (§. 104.) Der als subjectiv bestimmte, für sich freye Wille, zunächst als Begriff, hat, um als Idee zu seyn, selbst Daseyn. Der moralische Standpunkt ist daher in seiner Gestalt das Recht des subjectiven Willens. Nach diesem Rechte anerkennt und ist der Wille nur etwas, insofern es das Seinige, er darin sich als subjectives ist.
Derselbe Prozeß des moralischen Standpunkts (s. Anmerk. zum vor. §.) hat nach dieser Seite die Gestalt, die Entwickelung des Rechtes des subjectiven Willens zu seyn — oder der Weise seines Daseyns, — so daß er das, was er als das Seinige in seinem Gegenstande erkennt, dazu fortbestimmt, sein wahrhafter Begriff, das Objective im Sinne seiner Allgemeinheit zu seyn.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
107 The self-determination of the will is at the same time a moment of its concept, and subjectivity is not merely the side of its existence but its own determination. (§ 104.) The will, determined as subjective, free for itself, at first as concept, must itself have existence in order to be as Idea. The moral standpoint is therefore in its shape the right of the subjective will. According to this right the will recognizes and is only something insofar as it is its own, insofar as in it the will is itself as subjective.
The same process of the moral standpoint (see the remark to the preceding §) has, on this side, the shape of being the development of the right of the subjective will—or of the manner of its existence—so that it determines what it knows as its own in its object further, to be its true concept, to be the objective in the sense of its universality.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
107 The will's self-determination is also an aspect of its concept. Subjectivity is not only the side of its existence but its own determination (§ 104). The will, determined as subjective and free for itself, is initially concept. To be as Idea, it itself has existence. In its form, the moral standpoint is therefore the right of the subjective will. Under this right, the will recognizes and is something only insofar as it is its own, so that in it the will is itself as subjective.
Viewed from this side, the same process of the moral standpoint (see the Remark to the preceding section) takes the form of the development of the subjective will's right, or of the way it exists. The will further determines what it recognizes as its own in its object, so that this is its true concept: the objective in the sense of its universality.
About this section
Section 107 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 109 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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