Section 106
Original German
106 Indem die Subjectivität nunmehr die Bestimmtheit des Begriffs ausmacht und von ihm als solchem, dem an sich seyenden Willen, unterschieden und zwar indem der Wille des Subjects als des für sich seyenden Einzelnen zugleich ist, (die Unmittelbarkeit auch noch an ihm hat,) macht sie das Daseyn des Begriffes aus. — Es hat sich damit für die Freyheit ein höherer Boden bestimmt; an der Idee ist itzt die Seite der Existenz oder ihr reales Moment, die Subjectivität des Willens. Nur im Willen, als subjectivem, kann die Freyheit oder der an sich seyende Wille wirklich seyn.
Die zweyte Sphäre, die Moralität, stellt daher im Ganzen die reale Seite des Begriffs der Freyheit dar, und der Prozeß dieser Sphäre ist, den zunächst nur für sich seyenden Willen, der unmittelbar nur an sich identisch ist mit dem an sich seyenden oder allgemeinen Willen, nach diesem Unterschiede, in welchem er sich in sich vertieft, aufzuheben, und ihn für sich als identisch mit dem an sich seyenden Willen zu setzen. Diese Bewegung ist sonach die Bearbeitung dieses nunmehrigen Bodens der Freyheit, der Subjectivität, die zunächst abstract nämlich vom Begriffe unterschieden ist, ihm gleich und dadurch für die Idee ihre wahrhafte Realisation zu erhalten, — daß der subjective Wille sich zum ebenso objectiven hiemit wahrhaft concreten bestimmt.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
106 Since subjectivity now constitutes the determinacy of the concept and is distinguished from it as such, from the will existing in itself, and indeed since the will is at the same time that of the subject as of the single being existing for itself (it still has immediacy in it as well), it constitutes the existence of the concept.—Thereby a higher ground has been determined for freedom; in the Idea there is now the side of existence, or its real moment, the subjectivity of the will. Only in the will as subjective can freedom, or the will existing in itself, be actual.
The second sphere, morality, therefore presents on the whole the real side of the concept of freedom, and the process of this sphere is to cancel, according to this distinction in which it deepens itself into itself, the will that at first exists only for itself and is immediately identical only in itself with the will existing in itself, or universal, and to posit it for itself as identical with the will existing in itself. This movement is accordingly the cultivation of this now present ground of freedom, of subjectivity, which at first is abstractly distinguished from the concept, in order to make it equal to the concept and so to obtain for the Idea its true realization—that the subjective will determine itself to be equally objective and thus truly concrete.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
106 Subjectivity now constitutes the determination of the concept and is distinct from the concept as such, the will as it is in itself. It is also the will of the subject as an individual existing for itself, so it still has immediacy within it. It therefore constitutes the existence of the concept. This establishes a higher ground for freedom. In the Idea, the side of existence, or its real aspect, is now the subjectivity of the will. Only in the will as subjective can freedom, or the will as it is in itself, be actual.
The second sphere, morality, therefore presents the real side of the concept of freedom as a whole. The process within this sphere begins with the will existing only for itself. This will is immediately identical only in itself with the will as it is in itself, or the universal will. The process cancels the will in respect of this difference, through which it goes deeper into itself, and posits it for itself as identical with the will as it is in itself. This movement thus works on freedom's present ground, subjectivity, which is initially abstract—that is, distinct from the concept—to make it equal to the concept and so obtain the Idea's true realization. The subjective will determines itself as equally objective and thus as truly concrete.
About this section
Section 106 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 108 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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