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Section 103

105 of 362 sections in Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Original German

103 Die Foderung, daß dieser Widerspruch, (wie der Widerspruch beym andern Unrecht) (§. 86. 89.) der hier an der Art und Weise des Aufhebens des Unrechts vorhanden ist, aufgelöst sey, ist die Foderung einer vom subjectiven Interesse und Gestalt, so wie von der Zufälligkeit der Macht befreyten, so nicht rächenden, sondern strafenden Gerechtigkeit. Darin liegt zunächst die Foderung eines Willens, der als besonderer subjectiver Wille das Allgemeine als solches wolle. Dieser Begriff der Moralität aber ist nicht nur ein gefodertes, sondern in dieser Bewegung selbst hervorgegangen.

Musean translation

Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.

103 The demand that this contradiction (like the contradiction in the other kinds of wrong) (§ 86, 89), which is present here in the manner of canceling wrong, be resolved, is the demand for a justice freed from subjective interest and form, as well as from the contingency of power, a justice that is thus not avenging but punishing. In this there lies at first the demand for a will that, as a particular subjective will, wills the universal as such. But this concept of morality is not merely demanded; it has emerged in this very movement itself.

Plain English translation

Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.

103 This contradiction lies in the way wrong is canceled here. The demand that it be resolved—like the contradiction in the other kinds of wrong (§§ 86, 89)—is the demand for a justice freed from subjective interest and form, and from the contingency of power: a justice that punishes rather than takes revenge. This initially includes the demand for a will that, as a particular subjective will, wills the universal as such. But this concept of morality is not just something demanded. It has emerged from this movement itself.

About this section

Section 103 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 105 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.

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