Section 104
Original German
104 Uebergang vom Recht in Moralität.
Das Verbrechen und die rächende Gerechtigkeit stellt nemlich die Gestalt der Entwickelung des Willens, als in die Unterscheidung des allgemeinen an sich und des einzelnen für sich gegen jenen seyenden, hinausgegangen dar und ferner, daß der an sich seyende Wille durch Aufheben dieses Gegensatzes in sich zurückgekehrt und damit selbst für sich und wirklich geworden ist. So ist und gilt das Recht, gegen den blos für sich seyenden einzelnen Willen bewährt, als durch seine Nothwendigkeit wirklich. — Diese Gestaltung ist ebenso zugleich die fortgebildete innere Begriffsbestimmtheit des Willens. Nach seinem Begriffe ist seine Verwirklichung an ihm selbst dieß, das Ansichseyn und die Form der Unmittelbarkeit, in welcher er zunächst ist und diese als Gestalt am abstracten Rechte hat, aufgehoben, (§. 21.) — somit sich zunächst in dem Gegensatze des allgemeinen an sich und des einzelnen für sich seyenden Willens zu setzen, und dann durch das Aufheben dieses Gegensatzes, die Negation der Negation, sich als Wille in seinem Daseyn, daß er nicht nur freyer Wille an sich, sondern für sich selbst ist, als sich auf sich beziehende Negativität zu bestimmen. Seine Persönlichkeit, als welche der Wille im abstracten Rechte nur ist, hat derselbe so nunmehr zu seinem Gegenstande; die so für sich unendliche Subjectivität der Freyheit macht das Princip des moralischen Standpunkts aus.
Sehen wir näher auf die Momente zurück, durch welche der Begriff der Freyheit sich aus der zunächst abstracten zur sich auf sich selbst beziehenden Bestimmtheit des Willens, hiemit zur Selbstbestimmung der Subjectivität fortbildet, so ist diese Bestimmtheit im Eigenthum das abstracte Meinige und daher in einer äußerlichen Sache, — im Vertrage das durch Willen vermittelte und nur gemeinsame Meinige, — im Unrecht ist der Wille der Rechtssphäre, sein abstractes Ansichseyn oder Unmittelbarkeit als Zufälligkeit durch den einzelnen selbst zufälligen Willen gesetzt. Im moralischen Standpunkt ist sie so überwunden, daß diese Zufälligkeit selbst als in sich reflectirt und mit sich identisch die unendliche in sich seyende Zufälligkeit des Willens, seine Subjectivität ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
104 Transition from right to morality.
Crime and avenging justice present, namely, the shape of the development of the will as having gone out into the distinction of the universal in itself and the single for itself standing against that; and further, that the will existing in itself, by canceling this opposition, has returned into itself and has thereby itself become for itself and actual. Thus right, vindicated against the single will existing merely for itself, is and counts as actual through its necessity.—This shaping is equally at the same time the further formed inner determinateness of the concept of the will. According to its concept, its realization consists, in the will itself, in this, that being-in-itself and the form of immediacy, in which it at first is and which it has as its shape in abstract right, is canceled (§ 21)—thus at first posits itself in the opposition of the will universal in itself and the will single for itself, and then, through the cancelation of this opposition, the negation of the negation, determines itself as will in its existence, so that it is not only free will in itself but for itself, as negativity relating itself to itself. Its personality, which is all that the will is in abstract right, it now has as its object; the subjectivity of freedom, thus infinite for itself, constitutes the principle of the moral standpoint.
If we look back more closely at the moments through which the concept of freedom develops from the at first abstract determinacy of the will to the determinacy relating itself to itself, and so to the self-determination of subjectivity, this determinacy is in property the abstract mine, and therefore in an external thing; in contract it is the mine mediated by will and merely common; in wrong the will of the sphere of right, its abstract being-in-itself or immediacy, is posited as contingency by the single will, itself contingent. In the moral standpoint it is so overcome that this contingency itself, as reflected into itself and identical with itself, is the infinite contingency of the will existing in itself, its subjectivity.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
104 Transition from Right to Morality.
For crime and avenging justice show the form of the will's development as it moves out into the distinction between the universal will as it is in itself and the individual will existing for itself in opposition to it. They also show that the will as it is in itself has returned into itself by canceling this opposition, and has thereby itself become for itself and actual. Right thus is and holds good as actual through its necessity, having proved itself against the individual will existing merely for itself. At the same time, this formation is also the further development of the will's inner conceptual determination. According to its concept, the will's realization within itself consists in canceling its being-in-itself and the form of immediacy in which it first exists, and which it has as its form in abstract right (§ 21). It therefore first sets itself in the opposition between the universal will as it is in itself and the individual will existing for itself. Then, by canceling this opposition—the negation of the negation—it determines itself as a will in its existence that is not only free will in itself but is also for itself: a negativity that relates to itself. The will now has its personality as its object, whereas in abstract right it is only this personality. The subjectivity of freedom, which is in this way infinite for itself, is the principle of the moral standpoint.
Looking back more closely at the stages by which the concept of freedom develops from the initially abstract determination of the will to one that relates to itself, and thus to the self-determination of subjectivity, we find the following. In property, this determination is what is abstractly mine, and therefore lies in an external thing. In contract, it is what is mine mediated by will and only common. In wrong, the will of the sphere of right—its abstract being-in-itself or immediacy—is posited as contingency by the individual will, itself contingent. At the moral standpoint, this contingency is overcome in such a way that, reflected into itself and identical with itself, it is the will's infinite contingency within itself: its subjectivity.
About this section
Section 104 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 106 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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