Section 102
Original German
102 Das Aufheben des Verbrechens ist in dieser Sphäre der Unmittelbarkeit des Rechts zunächst Rache, dem Inhalte nach gerecht, insofern sie Wiedervergeltung ist. Aber der Form nach ist sie die Handlung eines subjectiven Willens, der in jede geschehene Verletzung seine Unendlichkeit legen kann und dessen Gerechtigkeit daher überhaupt zufällig, so wie er auch für den anderen nur als besonderer ist. Die Rache wird hiedurch, daß sie als positive Handlung eines besondern Willens ist, eine neue Verletzung: sie verfällt als dieser Widerspruch in den Progreß ins Unendliche und erbt sich von Geschlechtern zu Geschlechtern ins Unbegrenzte fort.
Wo die Verbrechen nicht als crimina publica, sondern privata (wie bey den Juden, bey den Römern Diebstahl, Raub, bey den Engländern noch in einigem u. s. f.) verfolgt und bestraft werden, hat die Strafe wenigstens noch einen Theil von Rache an sich. Von der Privat-Rache ist die Racheübung der Heroen, abentheuernder Ritter u. s. f. verschieden, die in die Entstehung der Staaten fällt.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
102 The cancelation of crime in this sphere of the immediacy of right is at first revenge, just in its content insofar as it is retribution. But in its form it is the action of a subjective will, which can place its infinity in every violation that has taken place, and whose justice is therefore in general contingent, just as it exists for the other also only as a particular will. By being the positive action of a particular will, revenge becomes a new violation: as this contradiction it falls into the progress to infinity, and is inherited from generation to generation without limit.
Where crimes are prosecuted and punished not as crimina publica but as privata (as among the Jews, among the Romans theft and robbery, and still in some respects among the English, and so on), punishment still has at least a part of revenge about it. Distinct from private revenge is the exercise of vengeance by heroes, by knights-errant, and so on, which falls in the origin of states.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
102 In this sphere of right in its immediacy, canceling crime initially takes the form of revenge. Its content is just insofar as it is retribution. But its form is the action of a subjective will, which can put its own infinity into every injury it suffers. Its justice is therefore contingent in general, and for the other person, too, this will is only a particular will. Because revenge is a positive act of a particular will, it becomes a new violation. As this contradiction, it falls into an infinite progression and is passed down without limit from generation to generation.
Where crimes are prosecuted and punished not as public crimes but as private ones—as among the Jews; among the Romans, in cases of theft and robbery; and among the English still in some matters, and so on—punishment retains at least some element of revenge. Private revenge differs from the vengeance carried out by heroes, knights on adventures, and so on, which belongs to the emergence of states.
About this section
Section 102 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 104 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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