Section 101
Original German
101 Das Aufheben des Verbrechens ist insofern Wiedervergeltung, als sie dem Begriffe nach Verletzung der Verletzung ist und dem Daseyn nach das Verbrechen einen bestimmten, qualitativen und quantitativen Umfang, hiemit auch dessen Negation als Daseyn einen eben solchen hat. Diese auf dem Begriffe beruhende Identität ist aber nicht die Gleichheit in der specifischen, sondern in der an sich seyenden Beschaffenheit der Verletzung, — nach dem Werthe derselben.
Da in der gewöhnlichen Wissenschaft die Definition einer Bestimmung, hier der Strafe, aus der allgemeinen Vorstellung der psychologischen Erfahrung des Bewußtseyns genommen werden soll, so würde diese wohl zeigen, daß das allgemeine Gefühl der Völker und Individuen bey dem Verbrechen ist und gewesen ist, daß es Strafe verdiene und dem Verbrecher geschehen solle, wie er gethan hat. Es ist nicht abzusehen, wie diese Wissenschaften, welche die Quelle ihrer Bestimmungen in der allgemeinen Vorstellung haben, das anderemal einer solchen auch sogenannten allgemeinen Thatsache des Bewußtseyns widersprechende Sätze annehmen. — Eine Hauptschwierigkeit hat aber die Bestimmung der Gleichheit in die Vorstellung der Wiedervergeltung hereingebracht; die Gerechtigkeit der Strafbestimmungen nach ihrer qualitativen und quantitativen Beschaffenheit ist aber ohnehin ein späteres, als das Substantielle der Sache selbst. Wenn man sich auch für dieses weitere Bestimmen nach andern Principien umsehen müßte, als für das Allgemeine der Strafe, so bleibt dieses, was es ist. Allein der Begriff selbst muß überhaupt das Grundprincip auch für das Besondere enthalten. Diese Bestimmung des Begriffs ist aber eben jener Zusammenhang der Nothwendigkeit, daß das Verbrechen als der an sich nichtige Wille, somit seine Vernichtung, — die als Strafe erscheint, in sich selbst enthält. Die innere Identität ist es, die am äußerlichen Daseyn sich für den Verstand als Gleichheit reflectirt. Die qualitative und quantitative Beschaffenheit des Verbrechens und seines Aufhebens fällt nun in die Sphäre der Aeußerlichkeit; in dieser ist ohnehin keine absolute Bestimmung möglich; (vergl. §. 49.) diese bleibt im Felde der Endlichkeit nur eine Foderung, die der Verstand immer mehr zu begrenzen hat, was von der höchsten Wichtigkeit ist, die aber ins- Unendliche fortgeht und nur eine Annäherung zuläßt, die perennirend ist. — Uebersieht man nicht nur diese Natur der Endlichkeit, sondern bleibt man auch vollends bey der abstracten, specifischen Gleichheit stehen, so entsteht nicht nur eine unübersteigliche Schwierigkeit, die Strafen zu bestimmen (vollends wenn noch die Psychologie die Größe der sinnlichen Triebfedern, und die damit verbundene, — wie man will, entweder um so größere Stärke des bösen Willens, oder auch die um so geringere Stärke und Freyheit des Willens überhaupt herbeybringt) sondern es ist sehr leicht, die Wiedervergeltung der Strafe, (als Diebstahl um Diebstahl, Raub um Raub, Aug um Aug, Zahn um Zahn, wobey man sich vollends den Thäter als einäugig oder zahnlos vorstellen kann,) als Absurdität darzustellen, mit der aber der Begriff nichts zu thun hat, sondern die allein jener herbeygebrachten specifischen Gleichheit zu Schulden kommt. Der Werth als das innere Gleiche von Sachen, die in ihrer Existenz specifisch ganz verschieden sind, ist eine Bestimmung, die schon bey den Verträgen (s. oben) ingleichen in der Civilklage gegen Verbrechen (§. 95.) vorkommt, und wodurch die Vorstellung aus der unmittelbaren Beschaffenheit der Sache in das Allgemeine hinübergehoben wird. Bey dem Verbrechen, als in welchem das Unendliche der That die Grundbestimmung ist, verschwindet das blos äußerlich Specifische um so mehr und die Gleichheit bleibt nur die Grundregel für das Wesentliche, was der Verbrecher verdient hat, aber nicht für die äußere specifische Gestalt dieses Lohns. Nur nach der letztern sind Diebstahl, Raub und Geld-, Gefängnißstrafe u. s. f. schlechthin Ungleiche, aber nach ihrem Werthe, ihrer allgemeinen Eigenschaft, Verletzungen zu seyn, sind die Vergleichbare. Es ist dann, wie bemerkt, die Sache des Verstandes, die Annäherung an die Gleichheit dieses ihres Werths zu suchen. Wird der an sich seyende Zusammenhang des Verbrechens und seiner Vernichtung und dann der Gedanke des Werthes und der Vergleichbarkeit beyder nach dem Werthe nicht gefaßt, so kann es dahin kommen, daß man (Klein Grunds. des peinl. Rechts §. 9.) in einer eigentlichen Strafe eine nur willkührliche Verbindung eines Uebels mit einer unerlaubten Handlung sieht.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
101 The cancelation of crime is retribution insofar as it is, according to the concept, a violation of the violation, and, according to existence, crime has a determinate qualitative and quantitative extent, and its negation as existence has the same. This identity, resting on the concept, is not however equality in the specific character, but in the inherent character of the violation—according to its value.
Since in ordinary science the definition of a determination, here of punishment, is to be taken from the general representation of the psychological experience of consciousness, this would show that the universal feeling of peoples and individuals regarding crime is and has been that it deserves punishment, and that what the criminal has done should be done to him. It is not clear how those sciences, which have the source of their determinations in the general representation, at other times adopt propositions that contradict such a so-called universal fact of consciousness.—A principal difficulty, however, has been brought into the notion of retribution by the determination of equality; but the justice of the determinations of punishment, in their qualitative and quantitative character, is in any case something later than the substantial core of the matter itself. Even if one had to look around for other principles for this further determining than for the universal of punishment, the latter remains what it is. But the concept itself must contain the fundamental principle for the particular as well. This determination of the concept is precisely that connection of necessity, that crime, as the will null in itself, contains within itself its own annihilation, which appears as punishment. It is the inner identity that reflects itself, in external existence, for the understanding as equality. The qualitative and quantitative character of crime and of its cancelation now falls in the sphere of externality; in this, in any case, no absolute determination is possible (compare § 49); in the field of finitude it remains only a demand, which the understanding has constantly to limit more closely, which is of the highest importance, but which goes on to infinity and permits only an approximation that is perennial.—If one overlooks not only this nature of finitude, but also stops entirely at abstract, specific equality, there arises not only an insurmountable difficulty in determining punishments (above all if psychology further brings in the magnitude of the sensuous motives, and with it, as one likes, either the so much greater strength of the evil will, or else the so much lesser strength and freedom of the will in general), but it is also very easy to present the retribution of punishment (as theft for theft, robbery for robbery, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, where one can go so far as to imagine the perpetrator one-eyed or toothless) as an absurdity, with which the concept, however, has nothing to do, and which is due solely to that imported specific equality. Value, as the inner equal of things that in their existence are specifically wholly different, is a determination that already occurs in contracts (see above), and likewise in the civil suit against crimes (§ 95), and by which the representation is lifted from the immediate character of the thing into the universal. In crime, in which the infinite of the deed is the fundamental determination, the merely external specific disappears all the more, and equality remains only the fundamental rule for the essential thing that the criminal has deserved, but not for the external specific shape of this reward. Only according to the latter are theft, robbery, and fines, imprisonment, and so on, absolutely unequal, but according to their value, their universal property of being violations, they are comparable. It is then, as remarked, the business of the understanding to seek the approximation to equality of this their value. If the inherent connection of crime and its annihilation, and then the thought of value and of the comparability of both according to value, is not grasped, it can come about that one sees (Klein, Grundsätze des peinlichen Rechts, § 9) in an actual punishment only an arbitrary connection of an evil with a forbidden action.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
101 Canceling crime is retribution insofar as, in its concept, it is the violation of a violation. In its existence, the crime has a definite qualitative and quantitative extent. Its negation, as an existence, therefore also has such an extent. But this identity, grounded in the concept, is not equality in the specific character of the violation. It is equality in its character as it is in itself—in its value.
In ordinary scholarship, the definition of a determination—here, punishment—is supposed to come from the general representation drawn from the psychological experience of consciousness. That experience would surely show that the general feeling of peoples and individuals about crime is, and has been, that it deserves punishment and that what the criminal has done should be done to them. It is hard to see how these sciences, which derive their determinations from general representation, can at other times accept propositions contradicting what is also called a general fact of consciousness of this kind. But the determination of equality has introduced a major difficulty into the idea of retribution. Whether punishments are just in their qualitative and quantitative character is, in any case, a later issue than the substance of the matter itself. Even if we had to look for different principles to settle these further details than those applying to punishment in general, that general principle would remain what it is. But the concept itself must, in fact, also contain the basic principle for the particular. This determination of the concept is precisely the necessary connection whereby crime, as the will that is null in itself, contains its own destruction, which appears as punishment. It is the inner identity that is reflected for understanding as equality in external existence. The qualitative and quantitative character of crime and its cancellation belongs to the sphere of externality. No absolute determination is possible in that sphere anyway (cf. § 49). In the field of finitude, this remains only a demand that understanding must define more and more closely, a task of the highest importance. But it goes on indefinitely and permits only a continuing approximation. If we not only overlook this nature of finitude but even stop at abstract, specific equality, an insuperable difficulty arises in determining punishments. This is all the more so if psychology also introduces the magnitude of sensory motives and connects it—as one prefers—either with a correspondingly greater strength of the evil will, or with a correspondingly lesser strength and freedom of will in general. It then becomes very easy to portray retribution in punishment as an absurdity: theft for theft, robbery for robbery, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth—especially if we imagine the offender as one-eyed or toothless. But this absurdity has nothing to do with the concept. It results solely from the specific equality that has been brought in. Value, as the inner equality of things that differ completely in their specific existence, is a determination already encountered in contracts (see above), and also in civil actions concerning crimes (§ 95). It lifts representation from the immediate character of the thing to the universal. In crime, the infinite aspect of the deed is the basic determination. Its merely external, specific character therefore disappears all the more. Equality remains the basic rule only for the essential issue of what the criminal has deserved, not for the specific external form of this reward. Only in this latter respect are theft and robbery utterly unlike fines, imprisonment, and so on. But in their value—their universal quality of being violations—they are comparable. As noted, it is then the business of understanding to seek an approximation to equality in their value. If we fail to grasp the connection, as it is in itself, between crime and its destruction, and then the thought of value and the comparability of both in terms of value, we may end up seeing punishment proper as merely an arbitrary linking of an evil to an unlawful action (Klein Grunds. des peinl. Rechts § 9.).
About this section
Section 101 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 103 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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