Section 100
Original German
100 Die Verletzung, die dem Verbrecher widerfährt, ist nicht nur an sich gerecht, — als gerecht ist sie zugleich sein an sich seyender Wille, ein Daseyn seiner Freyheit, sein Recht; sondern sie ist auch ein Recht an den Verbrecher selbst, d. i. in seinem daseyenden Willen, in seiner Handlung gesetzt. Denn in seiner als eines Vernünftigen Handlung liegt, daß sie etwas allgemeines, daß durch sie ein Gesetz aufgestellt ist, das er in ihr für sich anerkannt hat, unter welches er also, als unter sein Recht subsumirt werden darf.
Beccaria hat dem Staate das Recht zur Todesstrafe bekanntlich aus dem Grunde abgesprochen, weil nicht präsumirt werden könne, daß im gesellschaftlichen Vertrage die Einwilligung der Individuen, sich tödten zu lassen, enthalten sey, vielmehr das Gegentheil angenommen werden müsse. Allein der Staat ist überhaupt nicht ein Vertrag (s. §. 75.), noch ist der Schutz und die Sicherung des Lebens und Eigenthums der Individuen als Einzelner so unbedingt sein substantielles Wesen, vielmehr ist er das Höhere, welches dieses Leben und Eigenthum selbst auch in Anspruch nimmt und die Aufopferung desselben fodert. — Ferner ist nicht nur der Begriff des Verbrechens, das Vernünftige desselben an und für sich, mit oder ohne Einwilligung der Einzelnen, was der Staat geltend zu machen hat, sondern auch die formelle Vernünftigkeit, das Wollen des Einzelnen, liegt in der Handlung des Verbrechers. Daß die Strafe darin als sein eignes Recht enthaltend, angesehen wird, darin wird der Verbrecher als Vernünftiges geehrt. — Diese Ehre wird ihm nicht zu Theil, wenn aus seiner That selbst nicht der Begriff und der Maßstab seiner Strafe genommen wird; — eben so wenig auch, wenn er nur als schädliches Thier betrachtet wird, das unschädlich zu machen sey, oder in den Zwecken der Abschreckung und Besserung. — Ferner in Rücksicht auf die Weise der Existenz der Gerechtigkeit ist ohnehin die Form, welche sie im Staate hat, nehmlich als Strafe, nicht die einzige Form und der Staat nicht die bedingende Voraussetzung der Gerechtigkeit an sich.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
100 The violation that befalls the criminal is not only just in itself—as just it is at the same time his own inherently existing will, an existence of his freedom, his right; it is also a right in the criminal himself, that is, posited in his existent will, in his action. For in his action, as that of a rational being, it lies that it is something universal, that through it a law is set up, which he has recognized in it for himself, and under which he may therefore be subsumed as under his right.
Beccaria, as is well known, denied the state the right to the death penalty on the ground that it cannot be presumed that the consent of individuals to be put to death is contained in the social contract; rather the opposite must be assumed. But the state is not a contract at all (see § 75), nor is the protection and security of the life and property of individuals as single persons so unconditionally its substantial essence; rather it is the higher, which lays claim even to this life and property and demands their sacrifice.—Further, it is not only the concept of crime, its rational aspect in and for itself, with or without the consent of individuals, that the state has to make valid, but also the formal rationality, the willing of the individual, lies in the action of the criminal. That punishment is regarded as containing his own right—in this the criminal is honored as a rational being.—This honor is not accorded him if the concept and measure of his punishment is not taken from his deed itself; nor, equally, if he is regarded merely as a harmful animal that must be rendered harmless, or if punishment is placed in the purposes of deterrence and correction.—Further, with regard to the manner of the existence of justice, the form it has in the state, namely as punishment, is in any case not the only form, and the state is not the conditioning presupposition of justice in itself.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
100 The violation inflicted on the criminal is not only just in itself. As just, it is also the criminal's will as it is in itself, an existence of their freedom, their right. It is also a right in the criminal themselves, that is, established in their own existing will, in their action. Their action as a rational being implies that it is something universal: through it a law has been set up, which they have recognized for themselves in that action. They may therefore be brought under it as under their own right.
Beccaria, as is well known, denied the state the right to impose the death penalty. His reason was that the social contract cannot be presumed to contain individuals' consent to being killed; on the contrary, the opposite must be assumed. But the state is not a contract at all (see § 75). Nor is its substantial essence unconditionally the protection and security of individuals' lives and property as individuals. Rather, it is something higher, which also lays claim to this life and property themselves and demands their sacrifice. Further, what the state has to uphold, with or without the consent of individuals, is not only the concept of crime, its rational character in and for itself, but also the formal rationality: the individual's willing lies in the criminal's action. To regard punishment as containing the criminal's own right in this action is to honor the criminal as a rational being. They are denied this honor if the concept and measure of their punishment are not taken from their own deed. They are equally denied it if they are treated only as a harmful animal to be made harmless, or viewed only in terms of deterrence and reform. Further, as regards the way justice exists, the form it takes in the state—namely as punishment—is not its only form. Nor is the state a necessary precondition of justice in itself.
About this section
Section 100 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 102 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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