Section 99
Original German
99 Die Verletzung aber, welche dem an sich seyenden Willen (und zwar hiemit eben so diesem Willen des Verletzers, als des Verletzten und Aller) widerfahren, hat an diesem an sich seyenden Willen als solchem keine positive Existenz, so wenig als an dem bloßen Producte. Für sich ist dieser an sich seyende Wille (das Recht, Gesetz an sich) vielmehr das nicht äußerlich existirende und insofern das Unverletzbare. Eben so ist die Verletzung für den besondern Willen des Verletzten und der Uebrigen nur etwas Negatives. Die positive Existenz der Verletzung ist nur als der besondere Wille des Verbrechers. Die Verletzung dieses als eines daseyenden Willens also ist das Aufheben des Verbrechens, das sonst gelten würde und ist die Wiederherstellung des Rechts.
Die Theorie der Strafe ist eine der Materien, die in der positiven Rechtswissenschaft neuerer Zeit am schlechtesten weggekommen sind, weil in dieser Theorie der Verstand nicht ausreicht, sondern es wesentlich auf den Begriff ankommt. — Wenn das Verbrechen und dessen Aufhebung, als welche sich weiterhin als Strafe bestimmt, nur als ein Uebel überhaupt betrachtet wird, so kann man es freylich als unvernünftig ansehen, ein Uebel blos deswegen zu wollen, weil schon ein anderes Uebel vorhanden ist. (Klein Grunds. des peinlichen Rechts §. 9. f.) Dieser oberflächliche Charakter eines Uebels wird in den verschiedenen Theorieen über die Strafe der Verhütungs-Abschreckungs-Androhungs-Besserungs- u. s. w. Theorie, als das Erste vorausgesetzt, und was dagegen herauskommen soll, ist eben so oberflächlich als ein Gutes bestimmt. Es ist aber weder blos um ein Uebel, noch um dieß oder jenes Gute zu thun, sondern es handelt sich bestimmt um Unrecht und um Gerechtigkeit. Durch jene oberflächlichen Gesichtspunkte aber wird die objective Betrachtung der Gerechtigkeit, welche der erste und substantielle Gesichtspunkt bey dem Verbrechen ist, bey Seite gestellt, und es folgt von selbst, daß der moralische Gesichtspunkt, die subjective Seite des Verbrechens, vermischt mit trivialen psychologischen Vorstellungen von den Reizen und der Stärke sinnlicher Triebfedern gegen die Vernunft, von psychologischem Zwang und Einwirkung auf die Vorstellung (als ob eine solche nicht durch die Freyheit eben sowohl zu etwas nur zufälligem herabgesetzt würde) — zum Wesentlichen wird. Die verschiedenen Rücksichten, welche zu der Strafe als Erscheinung und ihrer Beziehung auf das besondere Bewußtseyn gehören, und die Folgen auf die Vorstellung (abzuschrecken, zu bessern u. s. f.) betreffen, sind an ihrer Stelle, und zwar vornehmlich blos in Rücksicht der Modalität der Strafe, wohl von wesentlicher Betrachtung, aber setzen die Begründung voraus, daß das Strafen an und für sich gerecht sey. In dieser Erörterung kommt es allein darauf an, daß das Verbrechen und zwar nicht als die Hervorbringung eines Uebels, sondern als Verletzung des Rechts als Rechts aufzuheben ist, und dann welches die Existenz ist, die das Verbrechen hat und die aufzuheben ist; sie ist das wahrhafte Uebel, das wegzuräumen ist, und worin sie liege, der wesentliche Punkt; so lange die Begriffe hierüber nicht bestimmt erkannt sind, so lange muß Verwirrung in der Ansicht der Strafe herrschen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
99 But the violation that has befallen the will existing in itself (and so equally this will of the violator as of the one violated and of all) has in this inherently existing will as such no positive existence, any more than in the mere product. For itself, this inherently existing will (right, law in itself) is rather what does not exist externally, and to that extent the inviolable. Likewise the violation is for the particular will of the one violated and of the rest only something negative. The positive existence of the violation is only as the particular will of the criminal. The violation of this will as an existent will is therefore the cancelation of the crime, which otherwise would count as valid, and is the restoration of right.
The theory of punishment is one of the subjects that have fared worst in the positive science of right of recent times, because in this theory the understanding does not suffice, and what matters essentially is the concept.—If crime and its cancelation, which is further determined as punishment, is regarded merely as an evil in general, one can certainly consider it unreasonable to will an evil merely because another evil is already present. (Klein, Grundsätze des peinlichen Rechts, § 9 f.) This superficial character of an evil is presupposed as the first thing in the various theories of punishment, the theories of prevention, deterrence, threat, correction, and so on, and what is to come out of it, on the other side, is determined, just as superficially, as a good. But the concern is neither merely with an evil, nor with this or that good; it is determinately a matter of wrong and of justice. Through those superficial points of view, however, the objective consideration of justice, which is the first and substantial point of view in regard to crime, is set aside, and it follows of itself that the moral point of view, the subjective side of crime, mixed with trivial psychological notions of the stimuli and strength of sensuous motives as against reason, of psychological compulsion and influence on representation (as if such influence were not likewise reduced by freedom to something merely contingent)—becomes the essential thing. The various considerations that belong to punishment as appearance and to its relation to the particular consciousness, and that concern the consequences for representation (deterring, correcting, and so on), have their place, and are of essential consideration chiefly with regard to the modality of punishment alone, but they presuppose the foundation that punishing is in and for itself just. In this discussion the only point is that crime, and not as the production of an evil but as a violation of right as right, is to be canceled, and then what the existence is that crime has and that is to be canceled; this is the true evil that is to be removed, and where it lies is the essential point; so long as the concepts about this are not determinately known, confusion must prevail in the view of punishment.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
99 But the violation suffered by the will as it is in itself—and therefore by this will in the offender as well as in the injured person and everyone else—has no positive existence in that will as such, any more than it does in the mere product. For itself, this will as it is in itself—right, or law, in itself—is instead what does not exist externally and, to that extent, cannot be violated. For the particular will of the injured person and of the others, too, the violation is only something negative. The violation has a positive existence only as the criminal's particular will. To violate this will as an existing will therefore cancels the crime, which would otherwise remain valid, and restores right.
The theory of punishment is one of the subjects that has fared worst in recent positive legal scholarship. Understanding is not enough for this theory; what essentially matters is the concept. If crime and its cancellation—which is subsequently determined as punishment—are considered only as an evil in general, it can certainly seem irrational to want one evil merely because another evil already exists. (Klein Grunds. des peinlichen Rechts § 9 f.) The various theories of punishment—prevention, deterrence, threats, reform, and so on—start by assuming this superficial characterization of an evil. What is to come out of it, in contrast, is just as superficially characterized as a good. But the issue is neither merely an evil nor this or that good. It is specifically wrong and justice. Those superficial approaches set aside the objective consideration of justice, which is the first and substantial standpoint in dealing with crime. As a result, the moral standpoint, the subjective side of crime, becomes the essential thing. It is mixed with trivial psychological ideas about the attractions and strength of sensory motives against reason, and about psychological coercion and influence on representations—as if freedom could not just as well reduce such a representation to something merely contingent. The various considerations concerning punishment as an appearance and its relation to the particular consciousness, and concerning its effects on representations—deterring, reforming, and so on—certainly deserve essential consideration in their proper place. This is primarily only in relation to the modality of punishment. But they presuppose that punishing has been established as just in and for itself. The sole issue in this discussion is that crime must be canceled, not as the production of an evil, but as the violation of right as right. Then we must ask what existence crime has that must be canceled. This is the true evil to be removed, and where it lies is the essential point. Until the concepts involved are clearly understood, views of punishment must remain confused.
About this section
Section 99 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 101 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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