Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book IV, Chapter 6
Book IV, Chapter 6 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
Open the complete readerOriginal French
De la Dictature.
L’inflexibilité des loix, qui les empêche de se plier aux événemens, peut en certains cas les rendre pernicieuses, & causer par elles la perte de l’Etat dans sa crise. L’ordre & la lenteur des formes demandent un espace de tems que les circonstances refusent quelquefois. Il peut se présenter mille cas auxquels le Législateur n’a point pourvu, & c’est une prévoyance très-nécessaire de sentir qu’on ne peut tout prévoir.
Il ne faut donc pas vouloir affermir les institutions politiques jusqu’à s’ôter le pouvoir d’en suspendre l’effet. Sparte elle-même a laissé dormir ses loix.
Mais il n’y a que les plus grands dangers qui puissent balancer celui d’altérer l’ordre public, & l’on ne doit jamais arrêter le pouvoir sacré des loix que quand il s’agit du salut de la patrie. Dans ces cas rares & manifestes on pourvoit à la sûreté publique par un acte particulier qui en remet la charge au plus digne. Cette commission peut se donner de deux manieres selon l’espece du danger.
Si pour y remédier il suffit d’augmenter l’activité du gouvernement, on le concentre dans un ou deux de ses membres; Ainsi ce n’est pas l’autorité des loix qu’on altere mais seulement la forme de leur administration. Que si le péril est tel que l’appareil des loix soit un obstacle à s’en garantir, alors on nomme un chef suprême qui fasse taire toutes les loix & suspende un moment l’autorité Souveraine; en pareil cas la volonté générale n’est pas douteuse, & il est évident que la premiere intention du peuple est que l’Etat ne périsse pas. De cette maniere la suspension de l’autorité législative ne l’abolit point; le magistrat qui la fait taire ne peut la faire parler, il la domine sans pouvoir la représenter; il peut tout faire, excepté des loix.
Le premier moyen s’employoit par le Sénat Romain quand il chargeoit les Consuls par une formule consacrée de pourvoir au salut de la République; le second avoit lieu quand un des deux Consuls nommoit un Dictateur; usage dont Albe avoit donné l’exemple à Rome.
Dans les commencemens de la République on eut très souvent recours à la Dictature, parce que l’Etat n’avoit pas encore une assiette assez fixe pour pouvoir se soutenir par la seule force de sa constitution. Les mœurs rendant alors superflues bien des précautions qui eussent été nécessaires dans un autre tems, on ne craignoit ni qu’un Dictateur abusât de son autorité, ni qu’il tentât de la garder au delà du terme. Il sembloit, au contraire, qu’un si grand pouvoir fut à charge à celui qui en étoit revêtu, tant il se hâtoit de s’en défaire; comme si c’eut été un poste trop pénible & trop périlleux de tenir la place des loix!
Aussi n’est-ce pas le danger de l’abus mais celui de l’avilissement qui me fait blâmer l’usage indiscret de cette suprême magistrature dans les premiers tems. Car tandis qu’on la prodigoit à des Elections, à des Dédicaces, à des choses de pure formalité, il étoit à craindre qu’elle ne devînt moins redoutable au besoin, & qu’on ne s’accoutumât à regarder comme un vain titre celui qu’on n’employoit qu’à de vaines cérémonies.
Vers la fin de la République, les Romains, devenus plus circonspects, ménagerent la Dictature avec aussi peu de raison qu’ils l’avoient prodiguée autrefois. Il étoit aisé de voir que leur crainte étoit mal fondée, que la foiblesse de la capitale faisoit alors sa sûreté contre les Magistrats qu’elle avoit dans son sein, qu’un Dictateur pouvoit en certains cas défendre la liberté publique sans jamais y pouvoir attenter, & que les fers de Rome ne seroient point forgés dans Rome même, mais dans ses armées: le peu de résistance que firent Marius à Sylla, & Pompée à César, montra bien ce qu’on pouvoit attendre de l’autorité du dedans contre la force du dehors.
Cette erreur leur fit faire de grandes fautes. Telle, par exemple, fut celle de n’avoir pas nommé un Dictateur dans l’affaire de Catilina; car comme il n’étoit question que du dedans de la ville, & tout au plus, de quelque province d’Italie, avec l’autorité sans bornes que les Loix donnoient au Dictateur il eut facilement dissipé la conjuration, qui ne fut étouffée que par un concours d’heureux hazards que jamais la prudence humaine ne devoit attendre.
Au lieu de cela, le Sénat se contenta de remettre tout son pouvoir aux Consuls; d’où il arriva que Ciceron, pour agir efficacement, fut contraint de passer ce pouvoir dans un point capital, & que, si les premiers transports de joye firent approuver sa conduite, ce fut avec justice que dans la suite on lui demanda compte du sang des Citoyens versé contre les loix; reproche qu’on n’eut pu faire à un Dictateur. Mais l’éloquence du Consul entraîna tout; & lui-même, quoique Romain, aimant mieux sa gloire que sa patrie, ne cherchoit pas tant le moyen le plus légitime & le plus sûr de sauver l’Etat, que celui d’avoir tout l’honneur de cette affaire. Aussi fut-il honoré justement comme libérateur de Rome, & justement puni comme infracteur des loix. Quelque brillant qu’ait été son rappel, il est certain que ce fut une grace.
Au reste, de quelque maniere que cette importante commission soit conférée, il importe d’en fixer la durée à un terme très court qui jamais ne puisse être prolongé; dans les crises qui la font établir l’Etat est bientôt détruit ou sauvé, &, passé le besoin pressant, la Dictature devient tirannique ou vaine. A Rome les Dictateurs ne l’étant que pour six mois, la plupart abdiquerent avant ce terme. Si le terme eut été plus long, peut-être eussent-ils été tentés de le prolonger encore, comme firent les Décemvirs celui d’une année. Le Dictateur n’avoit que le tems de pourvoir au besoin qui l’avoit fait élire, il n’avoit pas celui de songer à d’autres projets.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On the Dictatorship.
The inflexibility of laws, which prevents them from bending to events, can in certain cases make them harmful and cause the state’s destruction in a crisis. The order and slowness of formal procedures demand a span of time that circumstances sometimes deny. A thousand cases may arise for which the legislator has made no provision; and it is a most necessary form of foresight to recognize that one cannot foresee everything.
We must not, then, seek to make political institutions so rigid that we deprive ourselves of the power to suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its laws to sleep.
But only the greatest dangers can counterbalance the danger of disturbing public order, and the sacred power of the laws must never be arrested except when the salvation of the country is at stake. In such rare and unmistakable cases, public safety is provided for by a special act entrusting its care to the worthiest man. This commission can be granted in two ways, according to the nature of the danger.
If greater activity on the government’s part is enough to meet it, the government is concentrated in one or two of its members. In this way it is not the authority of the laws that is altered, but only the manner of their administration. But if the peril is such that the machinery of the laws obstructs protection against it, then a supreme chief is appointed to silence all the laws and suspend sovereign authority for a moment. In such a case the general will is not in doubt, and it is evident that the people’s first intention is that the state should not perish. Thus suspending legislative authority does not abolish it: the magistrate who silences it cannot make it speak; he dominates it without being able to represent it. He can do everything except make laws.
The first means was employed by the Roman senate when, in a prescribed formula, it charged the consuls to provide for the republic’s safety. The second came into play when one of the two consuls appointed a dictator, a practice for which Alba had set Rome an example.
In the early days of the republic the dictatorship was resorted to very often, because the state had not yet acquired a footing stable enough to sustain itself by the force of its constitution alone. Since morals then made many precautions superfluous that would have been necessary at another time, no one feared that a dictator would abuse his authority or try to retain it beyond his term. On the contrary, such great power seemed a burden to the man invested with it, so eager was he to lay it down—as though taking the place of the laws were too arduous and perilous a post!
Thus it is not the danger of abuse but the danger of debasing it that makes me condemn the indiscriminate use of this supreme magistracy in the early days. For while it was lavished on elections, dedications, and matters of mere formality, there was reason to fear it would become less formidable when needed and that people would grow used to regarding as an empty title one used only for empty ceremonies.
Toward the end of the republic, the Romans, grown more circumspect, husbanded the dictatorship with as little reason as they had formerly lavished it. It was easy to see that their fear was ill-founded; that the weakness of the capital then protected it against the magistrates within its walls; that a dictator could in certain cases defend public freedom without ever being able to attack it; and that Rome’s chains would not be forged in Rome itself, but in its armies. The slight resistance Marius offered Sulla, and Pompey offered Caesar, plainly showed what could be expected from authority within against force from without.
This error led them to commit grave mistakes. One, for example, was their failure to appoint a dictator in the affair of Catiline. Since the danger was confined to the city and, at most, some province of Italy, a dictator, with the unlimited authority the laws gave him, would easily have dispersed the conspiracy; instead, it was stifled only by a combination of fortunate chances that human prudence should never have counted on.
Instead, the senate contented itself with handing all its power to the consuls. As a result, Cicero, in order to act effectively, was forced to overstep that power on a crucial point; and although the first transports of joy won approval for his conduct, he was rightly called to account afterward for citizens’ blood shed in violation of the laws—a reproach that could not have been made against a dictator. But the consul’s eloquence swept all before it; and he himself, though a Roman, loved his own glory more than his country, seeking not so much the most lawful and certain means of saving the state as a means of securing all the honor of the affair for himself. Thus he was rightly honored as the liberator of Rome and rightly punished as a violator of the laws. However glorious his recall, it is certain that it was an act of grace.
Moreover, however this important commission is conferred, its duration must be fixed at a very short term that can never be prolonged. In the crises for which it is instituted, the state is soon destroyed or saved; and once the pressing need has passed, the dictatorship becomes tyrannical or useless. At Rome, dictators being appointed for only six months, most resigned before their term expired. Had the term been longer, perhaps they would have been tempted to prolong it further, as the decemvirs did their term of a year. The dictator had only the time to meet the need for which he was chosen, not the time to contemplate other projects.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On Dictatorship.
Laws cannot bend to fit events. In some cases this rigidity can make them harmful and cause the state to perish during a crisis. Orderly procedures take time, and circumstances do not always allow it. A thousand situations can arise that the legislator did not plan for. Recognizing that we cannot foresee everything is itself a necessary form of foresight.
So we should not make political institutions so rigid that we deprive ourselves of the power to suspend their operation. Even Sparta let its laws lie dormant.
But only the gravest dangers can outweigh the danger of disturbing public order. We should never stop the sacred power of the laws unless the country's survival is at stake. In these rare and obvious cases, a special act provides for public safety by entrusting it to the person most worthy of the task. This responsibility can be assigned in two ways, depending on the kind of danger.
If a more active government is enough to deal with it, power is concentrated in one or two of its members. In that case, it is not the authority of the laws that changes, only the way they are administered. But if the danger is such that the machinery of the laws prevents us from protecting ourselves, a supreme leader is appointed to silence all the laws and briefly suspend the sovereign's authority. In such a case there can be no doubt about the general will. Clearly the people's first intention is that the state should not perish. Suspending legislative authority in this way does not abolish it. The magistrate who silences it cannot make it speak. He controls it but cannot represent it. He can do anything except make laws.
The Roman Senate used the first method when it charged the consuls, in an established formula, with securing the republic's safety. The second was used when one of the two consuls appointed a dictator, following an example that Alba had given Rome.
At the beginning of the republic, dictators were appointed very often. The state was not yet firmly settled enough to sustain itself by the strength of its constitution alone. At the time, customary behavior made many precautions unnecessary that would have been needed in another age. No one feared that a dictator would abuse his power or try to keep it beyond his term. On the contrary, such great power seemed to burden its holder: he hurried to give it up, as if taking the place of the laws were too difficult and dangerous a position.
So it is not the danger of abuse that makes me criticize the careless use of this supreme office in the early days. It is the danger of making the office lose respect. While it was handed out for elections, dedications, and purely formal matters, there was reason to fear that it would be less formidable when really needed. People might get used to regarding as an empty title one used only for empty ceremonies.
Toward the end of the republic, the Romans became more cautious. They made as little sense in holding the dictatorship back as they had once made in granting it freely. It was easy to see that their fear was unfounded. The capital's weakness then made it safe from the magistrates within it. A dictator could, in some cases, defend public freedom without ever being able to attack it. The chains that would bind Rome would be forged not in Rome itself but in its armies. The little resistance Marius offered Sulla, and Pompey offered Caesar, clearly showed what power inside the city could do against force outside it.
This mistake led them to make serious errors. One was failing to appoint a dictator during the affair of Catiline. The danger lay only within the city and, at most, in some part of Italy. A dictator, with the unlimited authority the laws gave him, could easily have broken up the conspiracy. Instead, it was put down only through a run of fortunate accidents that human prudence should never have expected.
The Senate instead settled for handing over all its power to the consuls. As a result, Cicero had to exceed that power on a crucial point in order to act effectively. At first, an outburst of joy brought approval for his actions. But later he was rightly called to account for the blood of citizens shed against the laws. That reproach could not have been made against a dictator. The consul's eloquence, however, carried everyone along. Though a Roman, Cicero himself preferred his own glory to his country. He sought less the most lawful and safest means of saving the state than a way to take all the credit for the affair. So he was rightly honored as Rome's liberator and rightly punished as a breaker of the laws. However splendid his recall from exile was, it was certainly an act of grace.
In any case, however this important responsibility is assigned, it is essential to set a very short term that can never be extended. In the crises that require it, the state is soon either destroyed or saved. Once the urgent need has passed, a dictatorship becomes either tyrannical or useless. At Rome, dictators served for only six months, and most resigned before their term was up. If the term had been longer, they might have been tempted to extend it further, as the decemvirs did with their one-year term. A dictator had only enough time to deal with the need for which he had been chosen, not enough to think up other plans.