Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book IV, Chapter 5
Book IV, Chapter 5 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
Open the complete readerOriginal French
Du Tribunat.
Quand on ne peut établir une exacte proportion entre les parties constitutives de l’Etat, ou que des causes indestructibles en alterent sans cesse les rapports, alors on institue une magistrature particuliere qui ne fait point corps avec les autres, qui replace chaque terme dans son vrai rapport, & qui fait une liaison ou un moyen terme soit entre le Prince & le Peuple, soit entre le Prince & le Souverain, soit à la fois des deux côtés s’il est nécessaire.
Ce corps, que j’appellerai Tribunat, est le conservateur des loix & du pouvoir législatif. Il sert quelquefois à protéger le Souverain contre le Gouvernement, comme faisoient à Rome les Tribuns du peuple, quelquefois à soutenir le Gouvernement contre le Peuple, comme fait maintenant à Venise le conseil des Dix, & quelquefois à maintenir l’équilibre de part & d’autre, comme faisoient les Ephores à Sparte.
Le Tribunat n’est point une partie constitutive de la Cité, & ne doit avoir aucune portion de la puissance législative ni de l’exécutive, mais c’est en cela même que la sienne est plus grande: car ne pouvant rien faire il peut tout empêcher. Il est plus sacré & plus révéré comme défenseur des Loix, que le Prince qui les exécute & que le Souverain qui les donne. C’est ce qu’on vit bien clairement à Rome quand ces fiers Patriciens, qui mépriserent toujours le peuple entier, furent forcés de fléchir devant un simple officier du peuple, qui n’avoit ni auspices ni juridiction.
Le tribunat sagement tempéré est le plus ferme appui d’une bonne constitution; mais pour peu de force qu’il ait de trop il renverse tout: A l’égard de la foiblesse, elle n’est pas dans sa nature, & pourvu qu’il soit quelque chose, il n’est jamais moins qu’il ne faut.
Il degenere en tirannie quand il usurpe la puissance exécutive dont il n’est que le modérateur, & qu’il veut dispenser des loix qu’il ne doit que protéger. L’énorme pouvoir des Ephores qui fut sans danger tant que Sparte conserva ses mœurs, en accélera la corruption commencée. Le sang d’Agis égorgé par ces tirans fut vengé par son successeur: le crime & le châtiment des Ephores hâterent également la perte de la République, & après Cléomene Sparte ne fut plus rien. Rome périt encore par la même voye, & le pouvoir excessif des Tribuns usurpé par degrés servit enfin, à l’aide des loix faites pour la liberté, de sauvegarde aux Empereurs qui la détruisirent. Quant au Conseil des Dix à Venise; c’est un Tribunal de sang, horrible également aux Patriciens & au Peuple, & qui, loin de protéger hautement les loix, ne sert plus, après leur avilissement, qu’à porter dans les ténebres des coups qu’on n’ose appercevoir.
Le Tribunat s’affoiblit comme le Gouvernement par la multiplication de ses membres. Quand les Tribuns du peuple romain, d’abord au nombre de deux, puis de cinq, voulurent doubler ce nombre, le Sénat les laissa faire, bien sûr de contenir les uns par les autres; ce qui ne manqua pas d’arriver.
Le meilleur moyen de prevenir les usurpations d’un si redoutable corps, moyen dont nul Gouvernement ne s’est avisé jusqu’ici, seroit de ne pas rendre ce corps permanent, mais de regler les intervalles durant lesquels il resteroit supprimé. Ces intervalles qui ne doivent pas être assez grands pour laisser aux abus le tems de s’affermir, peuvent être fixés par la loi, de maniere qu’il soit aisé de les abréger au besoin par des commissions extraordinaires.
Ce moyen me paroit sans inconvénient, parce que, comme je l’ai dit, le Tribunat ne faisant point partie de la constitution peut être ôté sans qu’elle en souffre; & il me paroit efficace, parce qu’un magistrat nouvellement rétabli ne part point du pouvoir qu’avoit son prédecesseur, mais de celui que la loi lui donne.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On the Tribunate.
When no exact proportion can be established among the constituent parts of the state, or when indestructible causes continually alter their relations, a special magistracy is instituted that forms no body with the others, restores each term to its true relation, and provides a link or intermediate term between the prince and the people, or between the prince and the sovereign, or on both sides at once if necessary.
This body, which I shall call the tribunate, preserves the laws and the legislative power. At times it protects the sovereign against the government, as the people’s tribunes did at Rome; at times it supports the government against the people, as the Council of Ten now does at Venice; and at times it maintains the balance on both sides, as the ephors did at Sparta.
The tribunate is not a constituent part of the city and ought to have no share of either legislative or executive power; but precisely in this lies the greatness of its own power: for while it can do nothing, it can prevent everything. As defender of the laws it is more sacred and more revered than the prince who executes them or the sovereign who gives them. This was seen most clearly at Rome, when those proud patricians, who had always despised the entire people, were forced to bend before a mere officer of the people who had neither auspices nor jurisdiction.
The tribunate, wisely kept within bounds, is the strongest support of a good constitution; but give it even a little too much strength and it overturns everything. As for weakness, it is not in its nature: provided it has any power at all, it never has less than it needs.
It degenerates into tyranny when it usurps the executive power it is meant only to restrain, and seeks to dispense with the laws it ought only to protect. The immense power of the ephors, harmless as long as Sparta preserved its morals, hastened its corruption once begun. The blood of Agis, slaughtered by these tyrants, was avenged by his successor: the crime and the punishment of the ephors equally hastened the republic’s downfall, and after Cleomenes Sparta was nothing. Rome perished by the same road; and the excessive power gradually usurped by the tribunes finally served, with the aid of laws made for freedom, as a safeguard for the emperors who destroyed it. As for the Council of Ten at Venice, it is a tribunal of blood, equally horrifying to the patricians and the people, which, far from openly protecting the laws, now serves, after their degradation, only to strike in the darkness blows that no one dares to see.
The tribunate, like the government, is weakened by multiplying its members. When the tribunes of the Roman people, at first two in number and then five, wished to double that number, the senate let them do it, quite certain it could contain some by means of the others; and so it did.
The best way to prevent usurpation by so formidable a body—a way no government has yet considered—would be not to make this body permanent, but to regulate the intervals during which it would remain suspended. These intervals, which must not be long enough to give abuses time to take hold, could be fixed by law so as to make them easy to shorten, when needed, by extraordinary commissions.
This means seems to me free of drawbacks because, as I have said, the tribunate, not being part of the constitution, can be removed without harm to it; and it seems effective because a newly restored magistrate does not start with the power his predecessor possessed, but with the power the law gives him.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On the Tribunate.
When we cannot establish an exact balance among the parts of the state, or when lasting causes constantly change their relations, we create a special office that is not part of the other bodies. It puts each part back in its proper relation to the others. It serves as a link or intermediary between the ruler and the people, between the ruler and the sovereign, or on both sides at once if necessary.
This body, which I will call the tribunate, protects the laws and legislative power. Sometimes it protects the sovereign against the government, as the tribunes of the people did in Rome. Sometimes it supports the government against the people, as the Council of Ten now does in Venice. And sometimes it maintains the balance on both sides, as the ephors did in Sparta.
The tribunate is not one of the constituent parts of the state. It should have no share of legislative or executive power. Yet that very fact makes its own power greater: because it can do nothing, it can stop anything. As the defender of the laws, it is more sacred and more respected than the ruler who carries them out or the sovereign who makes them. This was plain in Rome. The proud patricians, who always despised the people as a whole, were forced to bow before a mere officer of the people who had neither the authority to take auspices nor judicial authority.
A tribunate kept within sensible limits is the strongest support for a good constitution. But give it even a little too much power and it overturns everything. Weakness, on the other hand, is not in its nature. As long as it has any power at all, it never has less than it needs.
It turns into tyranny when it seizes the executive power it is supposed only to restrain and wants to grant exemptions from laws it is supposed only to protect. The ephors' enormous power was harmless as long as Sparta kept its customs, but it sped up the corruption once it began. Agis was slaughtered by these tyrants, and his successor avenged his death. Both the ephors' crime and their punishment hastened the republic's fall. After Cleomenes, Sparta was nothing. Rome also perished in the same way. The tribunes gradually seized excessive power. In the end, with the help of laws made for freedom, that power shielded the emperors who destroyed freedom. As for the Council of Ten in Venice, it is a bloodstained court, as terrifying to the patricians as to the people. Far from openly protecting the laws, now that the laws have been degraded it serves only to strike in the dark, where no one dares see its blows.
The tribunate, like the government, becomes weaker as its membership grows. The Roman people's tribunes originally numbered two, then five. When they wanted to double that number, the Senate let them. It knew it could use some to keep the others in check, and that is exactly what happened.
The best way to prevent a body so formidable from seizing power is one no government has yet thought of: do not make it permanent. Instead, set intervals during which it will be suspended. These intervals must not be long enough for abuses to become entrenched. They can be fixed by law in a way that lets special commissions shorten them easily when needed.
I see no drawback to this method. As I said, the tribunate is not part of the constitution, so it can be removed without harming the constitution. And the method seems effective to me: an official who has just been reinstated starts not with the power his predecessor held, but with the power the law gives him.