Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book IV, Chapter 7
Book IV, Chapter 7 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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De la Censure.
De meme que la déclaration de la volonté générale se fait par la loi, la déclaration du jugement public se fait par la censure; l’opinion publique est l’espece de loi dont le Censeur est le Ministre, & qu’il ne fait qu’appliquer aux cas particuliers, à l’exemple du Prince.
Loin donc que le tribunal censorial soit l’arbitre de l’opinion du peuple, il n’en est que le déclarateur, & sitôt qu’il s’en écarte, ses décisions sont vaines & sans effet.
Il est inutile de distinguer les mœurs d’une nation des objets de son estime; car tout cela tient au même principe & se confond nécessairement. Chez tous les peuples du monde, ce n’est point la nature mais l’opinion qui décide du choix de leurs plaisirs. Redressez les opinions des hommes & leurs mœurs s’épureront d’elles mêmes. On aime toujours ce qui est beau ou ce qu’on trouve tel, mais c’est sur ce jugement qu’on se trompe; c’est donc ce jugement qu’il s’agit de regler. Qui juge des mœurs juge de l’honneur, & qui juge de l’honneur prend sa loi de l’opinion.
Les opinions d’un peuple naissent de sa constitution; quoique la loi ne regle pas les mœurs, c’est la législation qui les fait naitre; quand la législation s’affoiblit les mœurs dégénerent, mais alors le jugement des Censeurs ne fera pas ce que la force des loix n’aura pas fait.
Il suit de-là que la Censure peut être utile pour conserver les mœurs, jamais pour les rétablir. Etablissez des Censeurs durant la vigueur des Loix; sitôt qu’elles l’ont perdue, tout est désespéré; rien de légitime n’a plus de force lorsque les loix n’en ont plus.
La Censure maintient les mœurs en empêchant les opinions de se corrompre, en conservant leur droiture par de sages applications, quelquefois même en les fixant lorsqu’elles sont encore incertaines. L’usage des seconds dans les duels, porté jusqu’à la fureur dans le Royaume de France, y fut aboli par ces seuls mots d’un Edit du Roi; quant à ceux qui ont la lâcheté d’appeller des Seconds. Ce jugement prevenant celui du public le détermina tout d’un coup. Mais quand les mêmes Edits voulurent prononcer que c’étoit aussi une lâcheté de se battre en duel; ce qui est très-vrai, mais contraire à l’opinion commune; le public se moqua de cette décision sur laquelle son jugement étoit déjà porté.
J’ai dit ailleurs que l’opinion publique n’étant point soumise à la contrainte, il n’en faloit aucun vestige dans le tribunal établi pour la représenter. On ne peut trop admirer avec quel art ce ressort, entierement perdu chez les modernes, étoit mis en œuvre chez les Romains & mieux chez les Lacédémoniens.
Un homme de mauvaises mœurs ayant ouvert un bon avis dans le conseil de Sparte, les Ephores sans en tenir compte firent proposer le même avis par un Citoyen vertueux. Quel honneur pour l’un, quelle note pour l’autre, sans avoir donné ni louange ni blâme à aucun des deux! Certains ivrognes de Samos souillerent le Tribunal des Ephores: le lendemain par Edit public il fut permis aux Samiens d’être des vilains. Un vrai châtiment eut été moins severe qu’une pareille impunité? Quand Sparte a prononcé sur ce qui est ou n’est pas honnête, la Grèce n’appelle pas de ses jugemens.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On the Censorship.
Just as the general will is declared through law, public judgment is declared through the censorship. Public opinion is the kind of law of which the censor is the minister, applying it, like the prince, only to particular cases.
Far from being the arbiter of the people’s opinion, then, the censorial tribunal merely declares it; as soon as it departs from that opinion, its decisions are empty and without effect.
There is no use distinguishing a nation’s morals from the things it esteems, for all this springs from the same principle and necessarily merges together. Among all the peoples of the world, it is not nature but opinion that decides which pleasures they choose. Set people’s opinions right and their morals will purify themselves. We always love what is beautiful, or what we find beautiful, but we may be mistaken in that judgment; it is therefore that judgment which must be guided. Whoever judges morals judges honor, and whoever judges honor takes his law from opinion.
A people’s opinions arise from its constitution. Although law does not regulate morals, legislation gives rise to them; when legislation weakens, morals degenerate, but then the censors’ judgment cannot accomplish what the force of the laws has failed to do.
It follows that censorship can be useful in preserving morals, never in restoring them. Establish censors while the laws are vigorous; once they have lost their vigor, all hope is gone. Nothing legitimate retains its force when the laws have none.
Censorship sustains morals by preventing opinions from growing corrupt, preserving their soundness through judicious applications, and sometimes even settling them when they are still uncertain. The practice of using seconds in duels, carried to a frenzy in the Kingdom of France, was abolished there by these words alone in an edict of the king: “As for those who are cowardly enough to call upon seconds.” This judgment anticipated the public’s and settled it at once. But when the same edicts sought to pronounce it cowardly to fight a duel as well—a very true judgment, but one contrary to common opinion—the public mocked this decision, on which its own judgment had already been made.
I have said elsewhere that, since public opinion is not subject to coercion, there must be no trace of coercion in the tribunal established to represent it. One cannot too greatly admire the skill with which this instrument, wholly lost among the moderns, was put to work among the Romans, and still better among the Lacedaemonians.
When a man of bad morals proposed sound advice in the council of Sparta, the ephors, disregarding him, had the same advice proposed by a virtuous citizen. What honor for the one, what disgrace for the other, without bestowing either praise or blame on either man! Certain drunkards from Samos defiled the tribunal of the ephors; the next day a public edict permitted the Samians to be scoundrels. A real punishment would have been less severe than such impunity. When Sparta has pronounced on what is or is not honorable, Greece does not appeal its judgments.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On Censorship.
The law expresses the general will, and censorship similarly expresses public judgment. Public opinion is a kind of law. The censor is its officer and, like the ruler, only applies it to particular cases.
So the court of censors is far from being the judge of what the people think. It only states their opinion. As soon as it departs from that opinion, its decisions are empty and ineffective.
There is no point in distinguishing a nation's customs from what its people hold in esteem. Both come from the same source and necessarily go together. Among every people in the world, opinion, not nature, determines what pleasures they choose. Set people's opinions right, and their customs will improve on their own. We always love what is beautiful or what we think is beautiful. But it is this judgment that can be mistaken, so this judgment is what needs to be guided. Whoever judges customs judges honor, and whoever judges honor takes the standard for that judgment from opinion.
A people's opinions arise from its constitution. Although the law does not govern customs, legislation gives rise to them. When legislation grows weak, customs decline. But then the censors' judgment cannot accomplish what the force of the laws failed to accomplish.
It follows that censorship can help preserve customs, but can never restore them. Appoint censors while the laws are strong. Once the laws have lost their strength, there is no hope. Nothing legitimate has any force when the laws no longer have it.
Censorship maintains customs by keeping opinions from becoming corrupt and preserving sound judgment through wise applications. Sometimes it even settles opinions that are still uncertain. The use of seconds in duels had become a frenzy in the Kingdom of France. It was abolished there by just these words in a royal edict: “As for those who are cowardly enough to call on seconds.” This judgment anticipated the public's and immediately shaped it. But when the same edicts declared that fighting a duel was also cowardly—which is quite true, but went against common opinion—the public laughed at the decision. It had already made up its mind on that point.
I have said elsewhere that public opinion cannot be forced. The court established to express it must therefore have no trace of force. We cannot admire too much the skill with which this tool, completely lost among modern peoples, was put to work by the Romans and even better by the Spartans.
A man of bad character offered good advice in the council of Sparta. The ephors ignored him and had an upstanding citizen offer the same advice. What an honor for the second man, and what a mark of disgrace for the first, though neither had been praised or blamed! Some drunk men from Samos defiled the ephors' court. The next day a public edict gave the Samians permission to behave like scoundrels. Would a real punishment have been as severe as that kind of impunity? When Sparta has decided what is or is not honorable, Greece does not appeal its judgments.