Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book III, Chapter 4
Book III, Chapter 4 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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De la Démocratie.
Celui qui fait la loi sait mieux que personne comment elle doit être éxecutée & interprêtée. Il semble donc qu’on ne sauroit avoir une meilleure constitution que celle où le pouvoir exécutif est joint au législatif: Mais c’est cela même qui rend ce Gouvernement insuffisant à certains égards, parce que les choses qui doivent être distinguées ne le sont pas, & que le Prince & le Souverain n’étant que la même personne, ne forment, pour ainsi dire, qu’un Gouvernement sans Gouvernement.
Il n’est pas bon que celui qui fait les loix les éxécute, ni que le corps du peuple détourne son attention des vues générales, pour les donner aux objets particuliers. Rien n’est plus dangereux que l’influence des intérêts privés dans les affaires publiques, & l’abus des loix par le Gouvernement est un mal moindre que la corruption du Législateur, suite infaillible des vues particulieres. Alors l’Etat étant altéré dans sa substance, toute réforme devient impossible. Un peuple qui n’abuseroit jamais du Gouvernement n’abuseroit pas non plus de l’indépendance; un peuple qui gouverneroit toujours bien n’auroit pas besoin d’être gouverné.
A prendre le terme dans la rigueur de l’acception, il n’a jamais existé de véritable Démocratie, & il n’en existera jamais. Il est contre l’ordre naturel que le grand nombre gouverne & que le petit soit gouverné. On ne peut imaginer que le peuple reste incessamment assemblé pour vaquer aux affaires publiques, & l’on voit aisément qu’il ne sauroit établir pour cela des commissions sans que la forme de l’administration change.
En effet, je crois pouvoir poser en principes que quand les fonctions du Gouvernement sont partagées entre plusieurs tribunaux, les moins nombreux acquierent tôt ou tard la plus grande autorité; ne fut-ce qu’à cause de la facilité d’expédier les affaires, qui les y amene naturellement.
D’ailleurs que de choses difficiles à réunir ne suppose pas ce Gouvernement? Premierement, un État très petit où le peuple soit facile à rassembler & où chaque citoyen puisse aisément connoitre tous les autres: secondement, une grande simplicité de mœurs qui prévienne la multitude d’affaires & les discussions épineuses: Ensuite beaucoup d’égalité dans les rangs & dans les fortunes, sans quoi l’égalité ne sauroit subsister longtems dans les droits & l’autorité: Enfin peu ou point de luxe; car, ou le luxe est l’effet des richesses, ou il les rend nécessaires; il corrompt à la fois le riche & le pauvre, l’un par la possession l’autre par la convoitise; il vend la patrie à la molesse à la vanité; il ôte à l’État tous ses Citoyens pour les asservir les uns aux autres, & tous à l’opinion.
Voilà pourquoi un Auteur célebre a donné la vertu pour principe à la République; car toutes ces conditions ne sauroient subsister sans la vertu: mais, faute d’avoir fait les distinctions nécessaires, ce beau génie a manqué souvent de justesse, quelquefois de clarté, & n’a pas vu que l’autorité Souveraine étant par tout la même, le même principe doit avoir lieu dans tout État bien constitué, plus ou moins, il est vrai, selon la forme du Gouvernement.
Ajoutons qu’il n’y a pas de Gouvernement si sujet aux guerres civiles & aux agitations intestines que le Démocratique ou populaire, parce qu’il n’y en a aucun qui tende si fortement & si continuellement à changer de forme, ni qui demande plus de vigilance & de courage pour être maintenu dans la sienne. C’est sur-tout dans cette constitution que le Citoyen doit s’armer de force & de constance, & dire chaque jour de sa vie au fond de son cœur ce que disoit un vertueux Palatin dans la Diete de Pologne: Malo periculosam libertatem quam quietum servitium.
S’il y avoit un peuple de Dieux, il se gouverneroit Démocratiquement. Un Gouvernement si parfait ne convient pas à des hommes.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On Democracy
The maker of a law knows better than anyone how it should be carried out and interpreted. It seems, then, that there could be no better constitution than one in which executive power is joined to legislative power. But this very thing makes such a government inadequate in certain respects: things that ought to be kept distinct are not, and the prince and the sovereign, being one and the same person, form, so to speak, a government without government.
It is not good for the maker of the laws to execute them, or for the body of the people to turn its attention from general aims to particular objects. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public affairs, and the government's abuse of the laws is a lesser evil than the corruption of the legislator, the inevitable consequence of particular interests. Once the state is altered in its very substance, all reform becomes impossible. A people that would never abuse government would not abuse independence either; a people that would always govern well would have no need to be governed.
Taking the word in its strict sense, a true democracy has never existed and never will. It is contrary to the natural order for the many to govern and the few to be governed. We cannot imagine the people remaining constantly assembled to attend to public affairs; and we readily see that they cannot set up committees for this purpose without changing the form of administration.
Indeed, I believe I can lay down as a principle that when the functions of government are divided among several tribunals, the least numerous sooner or later acquire the greatest authority, if only because the ease with which they dispatch business naturally brings it to them.
Besides, how many difficult conditions must such a government bring together! First, a very small state where the people can easily assemble and each citizen can readily know all the others; second, great simplicity of manners to forestall a multitude of affairs and thorny disputes; then a large measure of equality in rank and fortune, without which equality of rights and authority cannot long endure; and finally little or no luxury. For luxury is either the effect of wealth or makes wealth necessary; it corrupts rich and poor alike, one through possession and the other through covetousness; it sells the fatherland to softness and vanity; it strips the state of all its citizens, making them slaves to one another and all of them slaves to opinion.
This is why a celebrated author made virtue the principle of the republic, for none of these conditions could endure without virtue. But for want of the necessary distinctions, that fine mind often lacked precision, sometimes clarity, and failed to see that sovereign authority is everywhere the same, and that the same principle must hold in every well-constituted state, though in greater or lesser measure according to its form of government.
Let us add that no government is so exposed to civil wars and internal upheavals as democratic or popular government, because none has so strong and constant a tendency to change its form, or demands more vigilance and courage to preserve it. Above all under this constitution, the citizen must arm himself with strength and steadfastness, and say every day of his life in his heart what a virtuous Palatine said in the Diet of Poland: “I prefer a dangerous freedom to a peaceful servitude.”
If there were a people of gods, they would govern themselves democratically. So perfect a government is not suited to human beings.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On democracy.
The person who makes a law knows better than anyone how it should be carried out and interpreted. So it seems that the best constitution would join executive power to legislative power. But that very arrangement makes this government inadequate in some ways. It fails to separate things that should be separate. Because the prince and the sovereign are the same person, they form, so to speak, a government without a government.
It is not good for the maker of laws to carry them out, or for the people as a whole to turn their attention away from general matters and toward particular ones. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests on public affairs. The government's misuse of the laws is a lesser evil than the corruption of the legislator, which inevitably follows from a focus on particular interests. Once the state is corrupted at its core, reform becomes impossible. A people who would never misuse the government would not misuse independence either. A people who always governed themselves well would not need to be governed.
If we use the word in its strict sense, a true democracy has never existed and never will. It goes against the natural order for the many to govern and the few to be governed. We cannot imagine the people remaining continually assembled to attend to public affairs. And it is easy to see that they cannot set up committees to do so without changing the form of administration.
In fact, I think I can state this as a principle: when government functions are divided among several bodies, those with the fewest members sooner or later acquire the most authority. If nothing else, they get it because they can handle business more easily, which naturally brings them authority.
Besides, how many difficult conditions must come together for this government to exist! First, the state must be very small, so the people can easily assemble and every citizen can easily know all the others. Second, customs must be very simple, so that many matters and difficult disputes do not arise. Then there must be a high degree of equality in rank and wealth. Otherwise equality of rights and authority cannot last long. Finally, there must be little or no luxury. Luxury either comes from wealth or makes wealth necessary. It corrupts rich and poor alike: the rich through owning things and the poor through wanting them. It sells out the country to comfort and vanity. It takes every citizen away from the state and makes them servants to one another, and all of them servants to public opinion.
That is why a famous author made virtue the guiding principle of the republic: none of these conditions can last without virtue. But this brilliant man failed to make the necessary distinctions. He was often inaccurate and sometimes unclear. He did not see that sovereign authority is the same everywhere, so the same principle must apply to every well-constituted state, though to different degrees depending on its form of government.
Let me add that no government is more exposed to civil wars and internal unrest than a democratic or popular one. None has such a strong and constant tendency to change its form, or needs more vigilance and courage to maintain it. In this constitution above all, the citizen must arm himself with strength and resolve. Every day of his life he must say in his heart what a virtuous Palatine said in the Diet of Poland: "I prefer dangerous freedom to peaceful slavery."
If there were a people of gods, they would govern themselves democratically. Such a perfect government is not suited to human beings.