Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book III, Chapter 5
Book III, Chapter 5 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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De l’Aristocratie.
Nous avons ici deux personnes morales très distinctes, savoir le Gouvernement & le Souverain, & par conséquent deux volontés générales, l’une par rapport à tous les citoyens, l’autre seulement pour les membres de l’administration. Ainsi, bien que le Gouvernement puisse régler sa police intérieure comme il lui plait, il ne peut jamais parler au peuple qu’au nom du Souverain, c’est-à-dire au nom du peuple même; ce qu’il ne faut jamais oublier.
Les premieres sociétés se gouvernerent aristocratiquement. Les chefs des familles délibéroient entre eux des affaires publiques; Les jeunes gens cédoient sans peine à l’autorité de l’expérience. Delà les noms de Prêtres, d’anciens, de sénat, de Gérontes.. Les sauvages de l’amérique septentrionale se gouvernent encore ainsi de nos jours, & sont très bien gouvernés.
Mais à mésure que l’inégalité d’institution l’emporta sur l’inégalité naturelle, la richesse ou la puissance fut préférée à l’âge, & l’Aristocratie devint élective. Enfin la puissance transmise avec les biens du pere aux enfans, rendant les familles patriciennes, rendit le Gouvernement héréditaire, & l’on vit des Sénateurs de vingt ans.
Il y a donc trois sortes d’Aristocratie; naturelle, élective, héréditaire. La premiere ne convient qu’à des peuples simples; la troisieme est le pire de tous les Gouvernemens. La deuxieme est le meilleur: c’est l’Aristocratie proprement dite.
Outre l’avantage de la distinction des deux pouvoirs, elle a celui du choix de ses membres; car dans le Gouvernement populaire tous les Citoyens naissent magistrats, mais celui-ci les borne à un petit nombre, & ils ne le deviennent que par élection; moyen par lequel la probité, les lumieres, l’expérience, & toutes les autres raisons de préférence & d’estime publique, sont autant de nouveaux garants qu’on sera sagement gouverné.
De plus, les assemblées se font plus comodément, les affaires se discutent mieux s’expédient avec plus d’ordre & de diligence, le crédit de l’État est mieux soutenu chez l’étranger par de vénérables sénateurs que par une multitude inconnue ou méprisée.
En un mot, c’est l’ordre le meilleur & le plus naturel que les plus sages gouvernent la multitude, quand on est sûr qu’ils la gouverneront pour son profit & non pour le leur; il ne faut point multiplier en vain les ressorts, ni faire avec vingt mille hommes ce que cent hommes choisis peuvent encore mieux. Mais il faut remarquer que l’intérêt de corps commence à moins diriger ici la force publique — sur la regle de la volonté générale, & qu’une autre pente inévitable enlêve aux loix une partie de la puissance exécutive.
À l’egard des convenances particulieres, il ne faut ni un État si petit ni un peuple si simple & si droit que l’exécution des loix suive immédiatement de la volonté publique, comme dans une bonne Démocratie. Il ne faut pas non plus une si grande nation que les chefs épars pour la gouverner puissent trancher du Souverain chacun dans son département, & commencer par se rendre indépendans pour devenir enfin les maitres.
Mais si l’Aristocratie exige quelques vertus de moins que le Gouvernement populaire, elle en exige aussi d’autres qui lui sont propres; comme la modération dans les riches & le contentement dans les pauvres; car il semble qu’une égalité rigoureuse y seroit déplacée; elle ne fut pas même observée à Sparte.
Au reste, si cette forme comporte une certaine inégalité de fortune, c’est bien pour qu’en général l’administration des affaires publiques soit confiée à ceux qui peuvent les mieux y donner tout leur tems, mais non pas, comme prétend Aristote, pour que les riches soient toujours préférés. Au contraire, il importe qu’un choix opposé apprenne quelquefois au peuple qu’il y a dans le mérite des hommes des raisons de préférence plus importantes que la richesse.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On Aristocracy
Here we have two very distinct corporate persons, namely the government and the sovereign, and consequently two general wills: one with respect to all citizens, the other only with respect to the members of the administration. Thus, although the government may regulate its internal affairs as it pleases, it can never speak to the people except in the name of the sovereign—that is, in the name of the people themselves. This must never be forgotten.
The earliest societies governed themselves aristocratically. The heads of families deliberated together on public affairs; the young readily yielded to the authority of experience. Hence the names of priests, elders, senate, gerontes. The Indigenous peoples of North America still govern themselves this way today, and are very well governed.
But as inequality established by convention prevailed over natural inequality, wealth or power came to be preferred to age, and aristocracy became elective. Finally, power passed down with a father's property to his children, making families patrician and government hereditary; and senators of twenty years of age appeared.
There are, then, three kinds of aristocracy: natural, elective, and hereditary. The first is suited only to simple peoples; the third is the worst of all governments. The second is the best: it is aristocracy properly so called.
Besides the advantage of separating the two powers, it has that of choosing its members. For in popular government all citizens are born magistrates, whereas this form confines the office to a small number, who become magistrates only through election. In this way integrity, enlightenment, experience, and every other reason for public preference and esteem become so many fresh guarantees of wise government.
Moreover, assemblies can be held more conveniently, affairs are better discussed and dispatched with greater order and speed, and the state's standing abroad is better upheld by venerable senators than by an unknown or despised multitude.
In a word, it is the best and most natural order for the wisest to govern the multitude, when we are sure they will govern for its benefit and not their own. We must not multiply the machinery to no purpose, or employ twenty thousand people to do what a hundred chosen people can do better. But we must note that corporate interest begins here to direct the public force less closely according to the rule of the general will, and that another inevitable tendency takes from the laws a portion of executive power.
As to particular circumstances, the state must not be so small nor the people so simple and upright that the execution of the laws follows immediately from the public will, as in a sound democracy. Nor must the nation be so large that its leaders, scattered in order to govern it, can each play the sovereign in his own district and begin by making themselves independent, only to become masters in the end.
But if aristocracy demands somewhat fewer virtues than popular government, it also demands others peculiar to itself, such as moderation among the rich and contentment among the poor. For strict equality would seem out of place here; it was not observed even in Sparta.
For the rest, if this form permits a certain inequality of fortune, it is only so that, in general, public affairs may be entrusted to those who can best devote all their time to them, not so that the rich should always be preferred, as Aristotle claims. On the contrary, it matters that an opposite choice should sometimes teach the people that human merit offers grounds for preference more important than wealth.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On aristocracy.
Here we have two very distinct collective persons: the government and the sovereign. So there are two general wills, one concerning all citizens and the other concerning only the members of the administration. The government can set its internal rules as it likes. But it can never speak to the people except in the sovereign's name—that is, in the name of the people themselves. We must never forget this.
The earliest societies governed themselves aristocratically. Heads of families discussed public affairs with one another. Young people readily accepted the authority of experience. This is where the names priests, elders, senate, and gerontes come from. The peoples of northern America still govern themselves this way today, and are very well governed.
But as inequality created by institutions came to outweigh natural inequality, wealth or power took precedence over age. Aristocracy then became elective. Finally, when power passed with a father's property to his children, families became patrician and the government became hereditary. Senators of twenty years of age appeared.
There are therefore three kinds of aristocracy: natural, elective, and hereditary. The first suits only simple peoples. The third is the worst of all governments. The second is the best; it is aristocracy in the proper sense.
Besides keeping the two powers separate, elective aristocracy has the advantage of choosing its members. Under popular government, all citizens are born magistrates. Here, the magistrates are limited to a small number and reach office only by election. This means that honesty, knowledge, experience, and all the other grounds for preference and public respect provide additional guarantees of wise government.
Also, assemblies are easier to hold. Business is discussed more thoroughly and handled with more order and speed. Respected senators uphold the state's standing abroad better than an unknown or despised crowd can.
In short, it is best and most natural for the wisest people to govern the many, when we can be sure they govern for the people's benefit rather than their own. There is no need to add needless machinery or to do with twenty thousand people what a hundred chosen people can do even better. But we must note that here the interest of the governing body begins to direct public power less closely by the rule of the general will. Another unavoidable tendency takes away some of the laws' executive power.
As for the particular conditions needed, the state should not be so small, or its people so simple and upright, that the public will leads directly to enforcement of the laws, as it does in a good democracy. Nor should the nation be so large that its leaders, scattered across it to govern, can each act like the sovereign in their own district, first making themselves independent and then becoming masters.
Aristocracy may require fewer of the virtues needed under popular government, but it requires other virtues of its own. The rich must be moderate and the poor content. Strict equality would seem out of place here; it was not even observed in Sparta.
Finally, if this form allows some inequality of wealth, it does so in order to entrust public administration, as a rule, to those who can best devote all their time to it. It is not, as Aristotle claims, so that the rich will always be favored. On the contrary, it matters that an occasional choice in the opposite direction teaches the people that personal merit gives stronger grounds for preference than wealth does.