Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book III, Chapter 2
Book III, Chapter 2 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Du principe qui constitue les diverses formes de Gouvernement.
Pour exposer la cause générale de ces différences, il faut distinguer ici le Prince & le Gouvernement, comme j’ai distingué ci-devant l’Etat & le Souverain.
Le corps du magistrat peut être composé d’un plus grand ou moindre nombre de membres. Nous avons dit que le rapport du Souverain aux sujets étoit d’autant plus grand que le peuple étoit plus nombreux, & par une évidente analogie nous en pouvons dire autant du Gouvernement à l’égard des Magistrats.
Or la force totale du Gouvernement étant toujours celle de l’Etat, ne varie point: d’où il suit que plus il use de cette force sur ses propres membres, moins il lui en reste pour agir sur tout le peuple.
Donc plus les Magistrats sont nombreux, plus le Gouvernement est foible. Comme cette maxime est fondamentale, appliquons-nous à la mieux éclaircir.
Nous pouvons distinguer dans la personne du magistrat trois volontés essentiellement différentes. Premierement la volonté propre de l’individu, qui ne tend qu’à son avantage particulier; secondement la volonté commune des magistrats, qui se rapporte uniquement à l’avantage du Prince, & qu’on peut appeller volonté de corps, laquelle est générale par rapport au Gouvernement, & particuliere par rapport à l’Etat, dont le Gouvernement fait partie; en troisieme lieu la volonté du peuple ou la volonté souveraine, laquelle est générale, tant par rapport à l’Etat considéré comme le tout, que par rapport au Gouvernement considéré comme partie du tout.
Dans une législation parfaite, la volonté particuliere ou individuelle doit être nulle, la volonté de corps propre au Gouvernement très subordonnée, & par conséquent la volonté générale ou souveraine toujours dominante & la regle unique de toutes les autres.
Selon l’ordre naturel, au contraire, ces différentes volontés deviennent plus actives à mesure qu’elles se concentrent. Ainsi la volonté générale est toujours la plus foible, la volonté de corps a le second rang, & la volonté particuliere le premier de tous: de sorte que dans le Gouvernement, chaque membre est premierement soi-même, & puis Magistrat, & puis citoyen. Gradation directement opposée à celle qu’exige l’ordre social.
Cela posé: que tout le Gouvernement soit entre les mains d’un seul homme. Voilà la volonté particuliere & la volonté de corps parfaitement réunies, & par conséquent celle-ci au plus haut dégré d’intensité qu’elle puisse avoir. Or comme c’est du dégré de la volonté que dépend l’usage de la force, & que la force absolue du Gouvernement ne varie point, il s’ensuit que le plus actif des Gouvernemens est celui d’un seul.
Au contraire, unissons le Gouvernement à l’autorité législative; faisons le Prince du Souverain, & de tous les Citoyens autant de magistrats: Alors la volonté de corps, confondue avec la volonté générale, n’aura pas plus d’activité qu’elle, & laissera la volonté particuliere dans toute sa force. Ainsi le Gouvernement, toujours avec la même force absolue, sera dans son minimum de force rélative ou d’activité.
Ces rapports sont incontestables, & d’autres considérations servent encore à les confirmer. On voit, par exemple, que chaque magistrat est plus actif dans son corps que chaque citoyen dans le sien, & que par conséquent la volonté particuliere a beaucoup plus d’influence dans les actes du Gouvernement que dans ceux du Souverain; car chaque magistrat est presque toujours chargé de quelque fonction du Gouvernement, au lieu que chaque citoyen pris à part n’a aucune fonction de la souveraineté. D’ailleurs, plus l’Etat s’étend, plus sa force réelle augmente, quoiqu’elle n’augmente pas en raison de son étendue: mais l’Etat restant le même, les magistrats ont beau se multiplier, le Gouvernement n’en acquiert pas une plus grande force réelle, parce que cette force est celle de l’Etat, dont la mésure est toujours égale. Ainsi la force rélative ou l’activité du Gouvernement diminue, sans que sa force absolue ou réelle puisse augmenter.
Il est sûr encore que l’expédition des affaires devient plus lente à mésure que plus de gens en sont chargés, qu’en donnant trop à la prudence on ne donne pas assez à la fortune, qu’on laisse échapper l’occasion, & qu’à force de délibérer on perd souvent le fruit de la délibération.
Je viens de prouver que le Gouvernement se relâche à mésure que les magistrats se multiplient, & j’ai prouvé ci-devant que plus le peuple est nombreux, plus la force réprimante doit augmenter. D’où il suit que le rapport des magistrats au Gouvernement doit être inverse du rapport des sujets au Souverain: C’est-à-dire que, plus l’Etat s’aggrandit, plus le Gouvernement doit se resserrer; tellement que le nombre des chefs diminue en raison de l’augmentation du peuple.
Au reste je ne parle ici que de la force rélative du Gouvernement, & non de sa rectitude: Car, au contraire, plus le magistrat est nombreux, plus la volonté de corps se rapproche de la volonté générale; au lieu que, sous un magistrat unique cette même volonté de corps n’est, comme je l’ai dit, qu’une volonté particuliere. Ainsi l’on perd d’un côté ce qu’on peut gagner de l’autre, & l’art du Législateur est de savoir fixer le point où la force & la volonté du Gouvernement, toujours en proportion réciproque, se combinent dans le rapport le plus avantageux à l’Etat.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On the Principle That Determines the Different Forms of Government
To explain the general cause of these differences, we must distinguish here between the prince and the government, as I distinguished earlier between the state and the sovereign.
The body of magistrates may comprise a greater or smaller number of members. We have said that the ratio of the sovereign to its subjects grows as the people grows more numerous; and by an evident analogy we may say the same of the government in relation to its magistrates.
Now the government's total force, being always that of the state, does not vary. It follows that the more of this force it uses upon its own members, the less it has left to act upon the people as a whole.
Thus the more numerous the magistrates, the weaker the government. Since this principle is fundamental, let us take pains to make it clearer.
We can distinguish in the person of a magistrate three essentially different wills. First, the individual's own will, which seeks only his particular advantage; second, the common will of the magistrates, directed solely to the advantage of the prince, and which may be called the corporate will: general in relation to the government, but particular in relation to the state of which the government forms a part; third, the will of the people, or sovereign will, which is general both in relation to the state considered as a whole and in relation to the government considered as part of that whole.
Under perfect legislation, the particular or individual will must count for nothing, the corporate will proper to the government must be strictly subordinate, and consequently the general or sovereign will must always prevail and be the sole rule for all the others.
In the natural order, on the contrary, these different wills become more active as they become more concentrated. Thus the general will is always the weakest, the corporate will comes second, and the particular will first of all: so that within the government each member is first himself, then a magistrate, then a citizen. This gradation is directly opposed to what the social order requires.
With that established, suppose the whole government is placed in the hands of a single man. The particular will and the corporate will are now perfectly united, and the latter consequently attains the highest intensity it can have. Since the use of force depends on the intensity of the will, while the absolute force of the government does not vary, it follows that government by one is the most active of all.
Conversely, let us unite the government with legislative authority; let us make the sovereign the prince, and every citizen a magistrate. Then the corporate will, merged with the general will, will have no more activity than the latter and will leave the particular will in full strength. Thus the government, still possessing the same absolute force, will be at its minimum of relative force or activity.
These relations are beyond dispute, and further considerations confirm them. We see, for example, that each magistrate is more active in his body than each citizen is in his, and that the particular will therefore has much more influence on acts of government than on acts of the sovereign. For nearly every magistrate has some function of government to perform, whereas the individual citizen has no function of sovereignty. Besides, the more extensive a state becomes, the more its real force increases, although not in proportion to its extent. But with the state remaining the same, the magistrates may multiply as much as they please without giving the government any greater real force, since that force belongs to the state and its measure remains unchanged. Thus the relative force or activity of the government diminishes without any possible increase in its absolute or real force.
It is equally certain that business proceeds more slowly as more people are charged with it; that in allowing too much to prudence we allow too little to fortune; that opportunities slip away; and that prolonged deliberation often costs us the fruit of deliberation itself.
I have just proved that the government weakens as its magistrates multiply; and I proved earlier that the more numerous the people, the greater the restraining force must be. It follows that the ratio of magistrates to government must be the inverse of the ratio of subjects to sovereign: that is, as the state grows larger, the government must grow more concentrated, so that the number of its chiefs diminishes in proportion as the people increases.
For the rest, I am speaking here only of the government's relative force, not of its rectitude. For, conversely, the more numerous the magistrates, the closer the corporate will comes to the general will, whereas under a single magistrate that same corporate will, as I have said, is merely a particular will. What may be gained on one side is thus lost on the other; and the legislator's art lies in finding the point where the force and the will of the government, always in inverse proportion, combine in the relation most advantageous to the state.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On the principle that determines the different forms of government.
To explain the general cause of these differences, we must distinguish the prince from the government here, just as I distinguished the state from the sovereign earlier.
The body of magistrates can have more or fewer members. We said that the relationship of the sovereign to the subjects grows greater as the population grows. By an obvious analogy, we can say the same about the government in relation to the magistrates.
Now the government's total strength is always the strength of the state, so it does not change. It follows that the more of this strength the government uses on its own members, the less it has left to act on the whole people.
So the more magistrates there are, the weaker the government is. Since this principle is fundamental, let us make it clearer.
We can distinguish three essentially different wills in a magistrate. First comes the individual's own will, which aims only at personal advantage. Second comes the shared will of the magistrates, which looks only to the prince's advantage. We can call it the will of the body. It is general in relation to the government, but particular in relation to the state, of which the government is a part. Third comes the will of the people, or the sovereign will. It is general in relation both to the state as a whole and to the government as part of that whole.
Under perfect laws, the particular or individual will must count for nothing. The will belonging to the government as a body must be strictly subordinate. The general or sovereign will must therefore always prevail and be the sole rule for all the others.
In the natural order, by contrast, these different wills become more active the more concentrated they are. Thus the general will is always the weakest, the will of the body comes second, and the particular will comes first. In the government, then, each member is first himself, then a magistrate, and then a citizen. This order is exactly the reverse of what the social order requires.
With that established, put the whole government in the hands of one man. The particular will and the will of the body then come together completely. The latter is therefore as strong as it can possibly be. The use of strength depends on the strength of the will, while the government's absolute strength does not change. It follows that government by one person is the most active kind.
Conversely, let us unite the government with legislative authority. Let the sovereign be the prince, and make every citizen a magistrate. The will of the body then merges with the general will and will be no more active than it is. It leaves the particular will at full strength. So the government, still possessing the same absolute strength, has the least possible relative strength or activity.
These relationships are beyond dispute, and other considerations confirm them. For example, each magistrate is more active in his body than each citizen is in his. The particular will therefore has much more influence on acts of government than on acts of the sovereign. Almost every magistrate has some government function, whereas an individual citizen has no function of sovereignty. Besides, as the state grows, its real strength increases, though not in proportion to its size. But if the state stays the same, multiplying the magistrates does not give the government more real strength. That strength belongs to the state, whose measure stays the same. Thus the government's relative strength, or activity, decreases, while its absolute or real strength cannot increase.
It is also certain that business gets done more slowly as more people become responsible for it. By placing too much trust in caution, we leave too little to chance. We miss opportunities, and by deliberating too long we often lose the benefit of deliberation.
I have just shown that government grows weaker as magistrates become more numerous. Earlier I showed that as the population grows, the force needed to keep it in check must increase. It follows that the number of magistrates relative to the government must move in the opposite direction from the number of subjects relative to the sovereign. That is, the larger the state grows, the smaller the government must become, so that the number of leaders falls as the number of people rises.
But I am speaking here only of the government's relative strength, not of how rightly it acts. In fact, the more numerous the magistrates, the closer their shared will comes to the general will. Under a single magistrate, as I said, that same shared will is nothing but a particular will. So what is gained on one side may be lost on the other. The legislator's skill lies in finding the point where the government's strength and will, which always vary in opposite directions, combine in the way most favorable to the state.