Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book III, Chapter 1
Book III, Chapter 1 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
Open the complete readerOriginal French
Avant de parler des diverses formes de Gouvernement, tâchons de fixer le sens précis de ce mot, qui n’a pas encore été fort bien expliqué.
CHAPITRE I.
Du Gouvernement en général.
J’avertis le lecteur que ce chapitre doit être lû posément, & que je ne sais pas l’art d’être clair pour qui ne veut pas être attentif.
Toute action libre a deux causes qui concourent à la produire, l’une morale, savoir la volonté qui détermine l’acte, l’autre physique, savoir la puissance qui l’exécute. Quand je marche vers un objet, il faut premierement que j’y veuille aller; en second lieu, que mes pieds m’y portent. Qu’un paralytique veuille courir, qu’un homme agile ne le veuille pas, tous deux resteront en place. Le corps politique a les mêmes mobiles; on y distingue de même la force & la volonté; Celle-ci sous le nom de puissance législative, l’autre sous le nom de puissance exécutive. Rien ne s’y fait ou ne s’y doit faire sans leur concours.
Nous avons vu que la puissance législative appartient au peuple, & ne peut appartenir qu’à lui. Il est aisé de voir au contraire, par les principes ci-devant établis, que la puissance exécutive ne peut appartenir à la généralité comme Législatrice ou Souveraine; parce que cette puissance ne consiste qu’en des actes particuliers qui ne sont point du ressort de la loi, ni par conséquent de celui du Souverain, dont tous les actes ne peuvent être que des loix.
Il faut donc à la force publique un agent propre qui la réunisse & la mette en œuvre selon les directions de la volonté générale, qui serve à la communication de l’Etat & du Souverain, qui fasse en quelque sorte dans la personne publique ce que fait dans l’homme l’union de l’ame & du corps. Voilà quelle est dans l’Etat la raison du Gouvernement, confondu mal à propos avec le Souverain, dont il n’est que le ministre.
Qu’est-ce donc que le Gouvernement? Un corps intermédiaire établi entre les sujets & le Souverain pour leur mutuelle correspondance, chargé de l’exécution des loix, & du maintien de la liberté, tant civile que politique.
Les membres de ce corps s’appellent Magistrats ou Rois, c’est-à-dire Gouverneurs, & le corps entier porte le nom de Prince. Ainsi ceux qui prétendent que l’acte par lequel un peuple se soumet à des chefs n’est point un contract, ont grande raison. Ce n’est absolument qu’une commission, un emploi dans lequel, simples officiers du Souverain, ils exercent en son nom le pouvoir dont il les a faits dépositaires, & qu’il peut limiter, modifier & reprendre quand il lui plait, l’aliénation d’un tel droit étant incompatible avec la nature du corps social, & contraire au but de l’association.
J’appelle donc Gouvernement ou suprême administration l’exercice légitime de la puissance exécutive, & Prince ou magistrat l’homme ou le corps chargé de cette administration.
C’est dans le Gouvernement que se trouvent les forces intermédiaires, dont les rapports composent celui du tout au tout ou du Souverain à l’Etat. On peut réprésenter ce dernier rapport par celui des extrêmes d’une proportion continue, dont la moyenne proportionnelle est le Gouvernement. Le Gouvernement reçoit du Souverain les ordres qu’il donne au peuple, & pour que l’Etat soit dans un bon équilibre il faut, tout compensé, qu’il y ait égalité entre le produit ou la puissance du Gouvernement pris en lui-même & le produit ou la puissance des citoyens, qui sont souverains d’un côté & sujets de l’autre.
De plus, on ne sauroit altérer aucun des trois termes sans rompre à l’instant la proportion. Si le Souverain veut gouverner, ou si le magistrat veut donner des loix, ou si les sujets refusent d’obéir, le désordre succede à la regle, la force & la volonté n’agissent plus de concert, & l’Etat dissout tombe ainsi dans le despotisme ou dans l’anarchie. Enfin comme il n’y a qu’une moyenne proportionnelle entre chaque rapport, il n’y a non plus qu’un bon gouvernement possible dans un État: Mais comme mille événemens peuvent changer les rapports d’un peuple, non seulement différens Gouvernemens peuvent être bons à divers peuples, mais au même peuple en différens tems.
Pour tâcher de donner une idée des divers rapports qui peuvent regner entre ces deux extrêmes, je prendrai pour exemple le nombre du peuple, comme un rapport plus facile à exprimer.
Supposons que l’État soit composé de dix-mille Citoyens. Le Souverain ne peut être considéré que collectivement & en corps: Mais chaque particulier en qualité de sujet est considéré comme individu: Ainsi le Souverain est au sujet comme dix-mille est à un: C’est-à-dire que chaque membre de l’Etat n’a pour sa part que la dix-millieme partie de l’autorité souveraine, quoi qu’il lui soit soumis tout entier. Que le peuple soit composé de cent-mille hommes, l’état des sujets ne change pas, & chacun porte également tout l’empire des loix, tandis que son suffrage, réduit à un cent-millieme, a dix fois moins d’influence dans leur rédaction. Alors le sujet restant toujours un, le rapport du Souverain augmente en raison du nombre des Citoyens. D’où il suit que plus l’Etat s’agrandit, plus la liberté diminue.
Quand je dis que le rapport augmente, j’entends qu’il s’éloigne de l’égalité. Ainsi plus le rapport est grand dans l’acception des Géometres, moins il y a de rapport dans l’acception commune; dans la premiere le rapport considéré selon la quantité se mésure par l’exposant, & dans l’autre, considéré selon l’identité, il s’estime par la similitude.
Or moins les volontés particulieres se rapportent à la volonté générale, c’est-à-dire les mœurs aux loix, plus la force réprimante doit augmenter. Donc le Gouvernement, pour être bon, doit être rélativement plus fort à mésure que le peuple est plus nombreux.
D’un autre côté, l’aggrandissement de l’Etat donnant aux dépositaires de l’autorité publique plus de tentations & de moyens d’abuser de leur pouvoir, plus le Gouvernement doit avoir de force pour contenir le peuple, plus le Souverain doit en avoir à son tour pour contenir le Gouvernement. Je ne parle pas ici d’une force absolue, mais de la force rélative des diverses parties de l’Etat.
Il suit de ce double rapport que la proportion continue entre le Souverain le Prince & le peuple, n’est point une idée arbitraire, mais une conséquence nécessaire de la nature du corps politique. Il suit encore que l’un des extrêmes, savoir le peuple comme sujet, étant fixe & représenté par l’unité, toutes les fois que la raison doublée augmente ou diminue, la raison simple augmente ou diminue semblablement, & que par conséquent le moyen terme est changé. Ce qui fait voir qu’il n’y a pas une constitution de Gouvernement unique & absolue, mais qu’il peut y avoir autant de Gouvernemens différens en nature que d’Etats différens en grandeur.
Si, tournant ce sistême en ridicule, on disoit que pour trouver cette moyenne proportionnelle & former le corps du Gouvernement il ne faut, selon moi, que tirer la racine quarrée du nombre du peuple; je répondrois que je ne prends ici ce nombre que pour un exemple, que les rapports dont je parle ne se mésurent pas seulement par le nombre des hommes, mais en général par la quantité d’action, laquelle se combine par des multitudes de causes, qu’au reste si, pour m’exprimer en moins de paroles, j’emprunte un moment des termes de géométrie, je n’ignore pas, cependant, que la précision géométrique n’a point lieu dans les quantités morales.
Le Gouvernement est en petit ce que le corps politique qui le renferme est en grand. C’est une personne morale douée de certaines facultés, active comme le Souverain, passive comme l’Etat, & qu’on peut décomposer en d’autres rapports semblables, d’où nait par conséquent une nouvelle proportion, une autre encore dans celle-ci selon l’ordre des tribunaux, jusqu’à ce qu’on arrive à un moyen terme indivisible, c’est-à-dire à un seul chef ou magistrat suprême, qu’on peut se représenter au milieu de cette progression, comme l’unité entre la série des fractions & celles des nombres.
Sans nous embarrasser dans cette multiplication de termes, contentons-nous de considérer le Gouvernement comme un nouveau corps dans l’Etat, distinct du peuple & du Souverain, & intermédiaire entre l’un & l’autre.
Il y a cette différence essentielle entre ces deux corps, que l’Etat existe par lui-même, & que le Gouvernement n’existe que par le Souverain. Ainsi la volonté dominante du Prince n’est ou ne doit être que la volonté générale ou la loi, sa force n’est que la force publique concentrée en lui, sitôt qu’il veut tirer de lui-même quelque acte absolu & indépendant, la liaison du tout commence à se relâcher. S’il arrivoit enfin que le Prince eut une volonté particuliere plus active que celle du Souverain, & qu’il usât pour obéir à cette volonté particuliere de la force publique qui est dans ses mains, en sorte qu’on eut, pour ainsi dire, deux Souverains, l’un de droit & l’autre de fait; à l’instant l’union sociale s’évanouiroit, & le corps politique seroit dissout.
Cependant pour que le corps du Gouvernement ait une existence une vie réelle qui le distingue du corps de l’Etat, pour que tous ses membres puissent agir de concert & répondre à la fin pour laquelle il est institué, il lui faut un moi particulier, une sensibilité commune à ses membres, une force une volonté propre qui tende à sa conservation. Cette existence particuliere suppose des assemblées, des conseils, un pouvoir de délibérer de résoudre, des droits, des titres, des privileges qui appartiennent au Prince exclusivement, & qui rendent la condition du magistrat plus honorable à proportion qu’elle est plus pénible. Les difficultés sont dans la maniere d’ordonner dans le tout ce tout subalterne, de sorte qu’il n’altere point la constitution générale en affermissant la sienne, qu’il distingue toujours sa force particuliere destinée à sa propre conservation de la force publique destinée à la conservation de l’Etat, & qu’en un mot il soit toujours prêt à sacrifier le Gouvernement au peuple & non le peuple au Gouvernement.
D’ailleurs, bien que le corps artificiel du Gouvernement soit l’ouvrage d’un autre corps artificiel, & qu’il n’ait en quelque sorte qu’une vie empruntée & subordonnée, cela n’empêche pas qu’il ne puisse agir avec plus ou moins de vigueur ou de célérité, jouir, pour ainsi dire d’une santé plus ou moins robuste. Enfin, sans s’éloigner directement du but de son institution, il peut s’en écarter plus ou moins, selon la maniere dont il est constitué.
C’est de toutes ces différences que naissent les rapports divers que le Gouvernement doit avoir avec le corps de l’État, selon les rapports accidentels & particuliers par lesquels ce même État est modifié. Car souvent le Gouvernement le meilleur en soi deviendra le plus vicieux, si ses rapports ne sont altérés selon les défauts du corps politique auquel il appartient.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Before speaking of the various forms of government, let us try to fix the precise meaning of this word, which has not yet been very well explained.
Chapter I.
On Government in General.
I warn the reader that this chapter must be read deliberately, and that I do not know how to be clear to anyone unwilling to pay attention.
Every free action has two causes that work together to produce it: one moral, namely the will that determines the act; the other physical, namely the power that executes it. When I walk toward an object, I must first wish to go there and, second, my feet must carry me. Let a paralyzed man wish to run and an agile man have no wish to: both will stay where they are. The body politic has the same moving forces; here too we distinguish strength and will, the latter under the name of legislative power, the former under the name of executive power. Nothing is or should be done within it without their cooperation.
We have seen that legislative power belongs to the people, and can belong only to them. It is easy to see, on the other hand, from the principles established above, that executive power cannot belong to the people as a whole in their capacity as legislator or sovereign; for this power consists only in particular acts, which lie outside the province of law and consequently of the sovereign, whose every act can only be a law.
The public force therefore needs an agent of its own to bring it together and set it to work according to the directions of the general will, to serve as the means of communication between the State and the sovereign, to perform in the public person something like the function performed in man by the union of soul and body. This is the reason for government in the State, wrongly confused with the sovereign, of which it is only the minister.
What, then, is government? An intermediate body established between the subjects and the sovereign for their mutual communication, charged with executing the laws and maintaining liberty, both civil and political.
The members of this body are called magistrates or kings, that is, governors, and the body as a whole bears the name of prince. Thus those who maintain that the act by which a people submits to leaders is not a contract are quite right. It is nothing more than a commission, an office in which they, as mere officers of the sovereign, exercise in its name the power it has entrusted to them, and which it may limit, modify, and reclaim at its pleasure; for to alienate such a right would be incompatible with the nature of the social body and contrary to the purpose of association.
I therefore call government, or supreme administration, the legitimate exercise of executive power, and prince or magistrate the man or body charged with this administration.
It is in government that we find the intermediate forces whose relations compose the relation of the whole to the whole, or of the sovereign to the State. This last relation can be represented by that between the extremes of a continued proportion, of which government is the mean proportional. Government receives from the sovereign the commands it passes on to the people; and for the State to be properly balanced, all things considered, the product or power of the government taken in itself must equal the product or power of the citizens, who are sovereigns on one side and subjects on the other.
Moreover, none of these three terms can be altered without immediately breaking the proportion. If the sovereign wishes to govern, or the magistrate to make laws, or the subjects refuse to obey, disorder succeeds order, force and will no longer act in concert, and the State, dissolved, thus falls into despotism or anarchy. Finally, just as there is only one mean proportional between any given terms, so there is only one good government possible in any given State. But as a thousand events can change the relations within a people, not only may different governments be good for different peoples, but different governments may be good for the same people at different times.
To try to give some idea of the various relations that can prevail between these two extremes, I shall take the number of the people as an example, since this relation is easier to express.
Suppose that the State is composed of ten thousand citizens. The sovereign can be considered only collectively and as a body; but each private person, in his capacity as subject, is considered individually. Thus the sovereign stands to the subject as ten thousand stands to one: that is, each member of the State has as his share only the ten-thousandth part of sovereign authority, although he is wholly subject to it. Let the people be composed of a hundred thousand men: the condition of the subjects does not change, and each bears the full force of the laws equally, while his vote, reduced to a hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in framing them. The subject thus always remaining one, the ratio of the sovereign increases with the number of citizens. It follows that the larger the State grows, the more liberty diminishes.
When I say that the ratio increases, I mean that it moves farther from equality. Thus the greater the ratio in the mathematicians' sense, the less relation there is in the ordinary sense; in the first, relation considered as quantity is measured by its exponent, while in the second, considered as identity, it is judged by similarity.
Now the less particular wills accord with the general will, that is, customs with laws, the more the power of restraint must increase. Therefore government, to be good, must be relatively stronger as the people grow more numerous.
On the other hand, as the enlargement of the State gives those entrusted with public authority more temptations and means to abuse their power, the greater the strength government must have to restrain the people, the greater the strength the sovereign must have in turn to restrain the government. I am not speaking here of absolute strength, but of the relative strength of the various parts of the State.
It follows from this double relation that the continued proportion between the sovereign, the prince, and the people is no arbitrary notion but a necessary consequence of the nature of the body politic. It also follows that since one of the extremes, namely the people as subject, is fixed and represented by unity, whenever the compound ratio increases or diminishes, the simple ratio increases or diminishes in like manner, and consequently the middle term changes. This shows that there is no one unique and absolute constitution of government, but that there may be as many governments differing in kind as there are States differing in size.
If anyone, turning this system to ridicule, were to say that according to me finding this mean proportional and forming the body of government requires nothing more than taking the square root of the number of the people, I would reply that I take this number only as an example; that the relations I speak of are measured not merely by the number of men but, more generally, by the quantity of action, which depends on a multitude of causes; and that, moreover, if for a moment I borrow the terms of geometry to express myself more briefly, I am nevertheless well aware that geometrical precision has no place in moral quantities.
Government is on a small scale what the body politic that contains it is on a large one. It is a corporate person endowed with certain faculties, active like the sovereign, passive like the State, and capable of being broken down into further similar relations. Consequently a new proportion arises, then another within it according to the order of the courts, until we arrive at an indivisible middle term, that is, a single leader or supreme magistrate, whom we may picture in the middle of this progression as unity between the series of fractions and the series of whole numbers.
Without entangling ourselves in this multiplication of terms, let us be content to regard government as a new body within the State, distinct from the people and the sovereign and intermediate between them.
There is this essential difference between the two bodies: the State exists through itself, while government exists only through the sovereign. Thus the ruling will of the prince is, or ought to be, nothing but the general will or law; its strength is nothing but the public force concentrated within it. As soon as it tries to perform on its own some absolute and independent act, the bond uniting the whole begins to loosen. If the prince should ultimately have a particular will more active than that of the sovereign, and should use the public force in its hands to obey that particular will, so that there were, as it were, two sovereigns, one by right and the other in fact, the social union would vanish at once and the body politic would be dissolved.
Nevertheless, for the body of government to have a real life and existence distinguishing it from the body of the State, for all its members to act in concert and fulfill the end for which it was established, it needs a self of its own, a sensibility common to its members, and a strength and will of its own tending toward its preservation. This separate existence presupposes assemblies, councils, a power to deliberate and decide, rights, titles, and privileges belonging exclusively to the prince and making the magistrate's position more honorable in proportion as it is more arduous. The difficulties lie in ordering this subordinate whole within the whole so that, while strengthening its own constitution, it does not alter the general one; so that it always distinguishes its own particular strength, intended for its own preservation, from the public force intended for the preservation of the State; and, in a word, so that it is always ready to sacrifice government to the people rather than the people to government.
Besides, although the artificial body of government is the work of another artificial body and in a sense has only a borrowed and subordinate life, that does not prevent it from acting with greater or lesser vigor or speed, or enjoying, so to speak, more or less robust health. Finally, without departing directly from the end for which it was established, it may stray farther or less far from it, depending on the way it is constituted.
From all these differences arise the various relations government must have with the body of the State, according to the accidental and particular relations that modify the State itself. For the government best in itself will often become the worst if its relations are not altered to suit the defects of the body politic to which it belongs.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
Before discussing the different forms of government, let us try to establish the exact meaning of that word, which has not yet been explained very well.
Chapter I.
On Government in General.
I warn the reader to read this chapter carefully. I do not know how to make things clear to anyone unwilling to pay attention.
Every free action has two causes that work together to produce it. One is moral: the will that decides on the act. The other is physical: the power that carries it out. If I walk toward something, first I must want to go there, and second my feet must carry me. A paralyzed person may want to run, and an agile person may not want to; both will stay where they are. The body politic works in the same way. We can likewise distinguish force from will in it: will is called legislative power, and force executive power. Nothing happens or should happen there unless they work together.
We have seen that legislative power belongs to the people, and can belong only to them. By contrast, the principles already established make it easy to see that executive power cannot belong to the people as a whole in their role as legislator or sovereign. Executive power consists entirely of particular acts, which fall outside the province of law and therefore of the sovereign, whose acts can only be laws.
The public force therefore needs its own agent to bring it together and put it to work as the general will directs. This agent must provide communication between the state and the sovereign. In the public body, it must do something like what the union of soul and body does in a human being. This is why a state needs government. Government is wrongly confused with the sovereign, for it is only the sovereign's servant.
What, then, is government? It is an intermediate body established between the subjects and the sovereign so that they can communicate with each other. It is responsible for enforcing laws and maintaining both civil and political freedom.
Members of this body are called magistrates or kings, that is, governors. The body as a whole is called the prince. Those who argue that the act by which a people places itself under leaders is not a contract are therefore quite right. It is simply an appointment to an office. As mere officials of the sovereign, the leaders exercise in its name the power it has entrusted to them. The sovereign can limit, change, or take back that power whenever it wishes. Giving up such a right would be incompatible with the nature of the social body and contrary to the purpose of association.
I therefore call the legitimate exercise of executive power government or supreme administration, and the person or body entrusted with that administration the prince or magistrate.
The intermediate forces are found in government. Their relationships make up the relationship of whole to whole, or sovereign to state. We can represent this last relationship as the two extremes of a continued proportion, with government as the middle term. Government receives from the sovereign the orders it gives to the people. For the state to be in proper balance, when everything is taken into account, the power of government considered on its own must equal the power of the citizens, who are sovereigns in one respect and subjects in another.
Furthermore, we cannot change any one of these three terms without immediately upsetting the proportion. If the sovereign tries to govern, the magistrate tries to make laws, or the subjects refuse to obey, order gives way to disorder. Force and will no longer work together, and the dissolved state falls into despotism or anarchy. Finally, just as there is only one middle term for any given relationship, there is only one possible good government in a given state. But countless events can change a people's relationships. Different governments can therefore suit different peoples, and can even suit the same people at different times.
To give some idea of the different relationships that can exist between these two extremes, I will use the number of people as an example, since it is easier to express.
Suppose a state has ten thousand citizens. We can consider the sovereign only collectively, as a body. But each person as a subject is considered individually. Thus the sovereign stands to the subject as ten thousand stands to one. In other words, each member of the state has only a ten-thousandth share of sovereign authority, although they are subject to all of it. If the people number one hundred thousand, the position of each subject does not change. Each is equally subject to the full force of the laws, while each person's vote, reduced to a hundred-thousandth share, has ten times less influence on making them. With the subject still counting as one, the sovereign's relative size grows in proportion to the number of citizens. It follows that as the state grows, freedom decreases.
When I say that the ratio grows, I mean that it moves farther from equality. The greater a ratio is in the mathematical sense, the weaker the relationship is in the ordinary sense. In mathematics, a ratio considered in terms of quantity is measured by its numerical value. In ordinary speech, a relationship considered in terms of identity is judged by similarity.
Now the less private wills agree with the general will, that is, the less customs agree with the laws, the greater the restraining force must be. For government to be good, then, it must become relatively stronger as the population grows.
On the other hand, as the state grows, those entrusted with public authority face more temptations and have more means to abuse their power. The more strength the government needs to restrain the people, the more strength the sovereign needs in turn to restrain the government. Here I am speaking not of absolute strength but of the relative strength of the different parts of the state.
It follows from these two relationships that the continued proportion between sovereign, prince, and people is not an arbitrary idea. It is a necessary result of the nature of the body politic. It follows further that one extreme, the people as subjects, is fixed and represented by one. Whenever the ratio between the extremes increases or decreases, the ratio between neighboring terms also increases or decreases in the same way, so the middle term changes. This shows that there is no single, absolute constitution for government. Governments can differ in kind as much as states differ in size.
Someone might mock this system and say that, on my account, all one need do to find this middle term and form the body of government is take the square root of the number of people. I would reply that I use that number only as an example. The relationships I discuss are measured not merely by the number of people but more generally by the amount of activity, which depends on many causes. Besides, though I briefly borrow terms from geometry to express myself in fewer words, I know very well that mathematical precision does not apply to moral quantities.
On a small scale, government is what the body politic containing it is on a large one. It is a corporate body with certain powers, active like the sovereign and passive like the state. It can be broken down into other similar relationships. From these comes a new proportion, then another within it according to the ranking of the courts, until we reach an indivisible middle term: a single leader or supreme magistrate. We may picture that leader in the middle of this series as one stands between the series of fractions and the series of whole numbers.
Rather than get tangled up in this multiplication of terms, let us consider government simply as a new body within the state, distinct from the people and from the sovereign, and standing between them.
There is a basic difference between these two bodies. The state exists on its own, while government exists only through the sovereign. The prince's ruling will is, or ought to be, nothing but the general will or the law. Its force is only the public force concentrated in its hands. As soon as it tries to act with independent, unlimited authority of its own, the bond uniting the whole begins to loosen. If the prince finally develops a private will more active than the sovereign's and uses the public force in its hands to carry out that private will, there will be, so to speak, two sovereigns: one by right and the other in fact. At that instant the social union will vanish and the body politic will dissolve.
Nevertheless, the body of government needs a real life of its own, distinct from the life of the state, so that all its members can work together and fulfill the purpose for which it was established. It needs its own sense of self, shared feelings among its members, and its own force and will directed toward its preservation. This separate existence requires assemblies and councils, the power to deliberate and decide, and rights, titles, and privileges belonging exclusively to the prince. These make a magistrate's position more honorable in proportion to its hardships. The difficulty lies in arranging this subordinate whole within the greater whole so that, in strengthening its own structure, it does not weaken the state's constitution. It must always distinguish the special force needed for its own preservation from the public force needed for the state's preservation. In short, it must always be ready to sacrifice the government for the people, not the people for the government.
Besides, although the artificial body of government is the work of another artificial body, and its life is, in a sense, borrowed and dependent, it can still act with greater or lesser energy or speed. It can enjoy, so to speak, more or less robust health. Finally, it can move farther or less far from the aim of its founding without moving directly away from that aim. How far it moves depends on how it is constituted.
These differences give rise to the different relationships that government must have with the body of the state, depending on the particular and changing conditions that shape that state. For the government best in itself will often become the worst if its relationships are not adjusted to the flaws of the body politic to which it belongs.