Chapter 5

SECTION 17LAELIUS. I should certainly not be reluctant, if I had confidence in my own ability; for the subject is noble, and, as Fannius has said, we have leisure. But who am I, and what ability have I? It is the custom of learned men—and especially of the Greeks—to have a subject proposed to them on which they may discourse, however suddenly. That is a great undertaking and requires no little practice. Therefore I think you should seek whatever can be formally argued about friendship from those who profess such arts. I can only exhort you to place friendship above all other human things; for nothing is so well suited to nature, nothing so fitting alike in prosperity and adversity.

SECTION 18But this is my first conviction: friendship can exist only among good men. I do not press the definition to the quick, as those do who discuss these matters more subtly—perhaps with truth, but with too little regard for common usefulness. For they deny that anyone is a good man unless he is wise. Let that be so. But by wisdom they mean a perfection that no mortal has yet attained. We, however, must look to what is found in practice and in ordinary life, not to what is imagined or wished for. I shall never say that Gaius Fabricius, Manius Curius, and Tiberius Coruncanius, whom our ancestors judged to be wise, were wise according to the standard of those philosophers. Let them therefore keep for themselves that title of wisdom, invidious and obscure as it is, but let them concede that these men were good. Yet they will not do even that; they will deny that goodness can be conceded to anyone but the wise man.

SECTION 19Let us proceed, then, with what they call plain common sense. Men who conduct themselves and live in such a way that their good faith, integrity, fairness, and generosity are approved, who are free from all greed, lust, and recklessness, and who possess great steadfastness—as did those whom I named just now—should, I think, be called good men, just as they have been regarded as good, because, so far as human beings can, they follow nature, the best guide to a good life.For this, I believe, is plainly to be seen: we were born in such a way that there is a certain fellowship among all human beings, but a closer one in proportion as each person stands nearer to us. Thus fellow citizens are dearer than foreigners, and relatives than strangers; for with them nature herself has engendered friendship, though that friendship does not possess sufficient strength. Friendship, indeed, has this advantage over kinship: goodwill may be removed from kinship, but not from friendship; for if goodwill is removed, the name of friendship is removed, while the name of kinship remains.

SECTION 17LAELIUS. I would certainly not be reluctant, if I had confidence in my own ability. For the subject is an excellent one, and, as Fannius said, we have time to spare. But who am I, and what ability do I possess? It is the custom of learned men—and especially of the Greeks—to have a subject assigned to them about which they must argue, no matter how suddenly it is proposed. That is a considerable task and requires no small amount of practice. Therefore, as for the points that can be argued about friendship, I think you should seek them from those who profess expertise in such matters. I can only urge you to place friendship above all other human concerns; for nothing is so well suited to nature or so appropriate to circumstances, whether favorable or adverse.

SECTION 18But this is my first belief: friendship can exist only among good men. I do not cut the definition to the quick, as those do who discuss these matters with greater precision—perhaps correctly, but with too little regard for practical usefulness. For they deny that anyone is a good man unless he is wise. Let that be so. But by wisdom they mean a kind that no mortal has yet attained. We, however, ought to consider what is found in ordinary practice and everyday life, not what is merely imagined or wished for. I will never say that Gaius Fabricius, Manius Curius, and Tiberius Coruncanius, whom our ancestors judged to be wise, were wise according to the standard of those philosophers. So let them keep for themselves the name of wisdom, a term both pretentious and obscure, and let them grant that those men were good. But they will not even do that; they will deny that this description can be granted to anyone except the wise man.

SECTION 19Let us proceed, then, with plain common sense, as they say. Those who conduct themselves and live in such a way that their loyalty, integrity, fairness, and generosity are approved; who are free from all greed, lust, and recklessness; and who possess great steadfastness, as did the men I named just now—these men, since they have been regarded as good, should also, I think, be called good, because, as far as human beings can, they follow nature, the best guide to living well.

For this is how the matter seems clear to me: we were born in such a way that there is a certain bond among all human beings, but the bond is stronger the closer each person is to us. Thus fellow citizens are more important to us than foreigners, and relatives than strangers, for nature itself has created friendship with them, though that friendship is not sufficiently firm. Friendship is superior to kinship in this respect: goodwill can be removed from kinship, but not from friendship. For when goodwill is removed, the name of friendship is removed, while the name of kinship remains.