{"schema_version":1,"access":"public","rights":"Public-domain or compatibly licensed source editions; provenance is retained per record.","work":{"slug":"cicero-friendship","title":"Laelius on Friendship","author":"Marcus Tullius Cicero","tradition":"roman","language":"la","genre":"philosophical dialogue","period":"44 BCE","source_url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PerseusDL/canonical-latinLit/ea33cbdb10131fd319522426a70df0070d5b0b68/data/phi0474/phi052/phi0474.phi052.perseus-lat2.xml","original":{"text":"### Chapter 1\n\nSECTION 1\nQ. Mucius augur multa narrare de C. Laelio socero suo memoriter et iucunde solebat nec dubitare illum in omni sermone appellare sapientem. ego autem a patre ita eram deductus ad Scaevolam sumpta virili toga, ut, quoad possem et liceret, a senis latere numquam discederem. itaque multa ab eo prudenter disputata, multa etiam breviter et commode dicta memoriae mandabam, fierique studebam eius prudentia doctior. quo mortuo me ad pontificem Scaevolam contuli, quem unum nostrae civitatis et ingenio et iustitia praestantissimum audeo dicere. sed de hoc alias, nunc redeo ad augurem.\n\nSECTION 2\ncum saepe multa, tum memini domi in hemicyclio sedentem, ut solebat, cum et ego essem una et pauci admodum familiares, in eum sermonem illum incidere, qui tum fere multis erat in ore. meministi enim profecto, Attice, et eo magis, quod P. Sulpicio utebare multum, cum is tribunus plebis capitali odio a Q. Pompeio, qui tum erat consul, dissideret, quocum coniunctissime et amantissime vixerat, quanta esset hominum vel admiratio vel querella.\n\nSECTION 3\nitaque tum Scaevola, cum in eam ipsam mentionem incidisset, exposuit nobis sermonem Laeli de amicitia habitum ab illo secum et cum altero genero C. Fannio, Marci filio, paucis diebus post mortem Africani. eius disputationis sententias memoriae mandavi, quas hoc libro exposui arbitratu meo; quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentis, ne inquam et inquit saepius interponeretur atque ut tamquam a praesentibus coram haberi sermo videretur.\n\nSECTION 4\ncum enim saepe mecum ageres, ut de amicitia scriberem aliquid, digna mihi res cum omnium cognitione tum nostra familiaritate visa est; itaque feci non invitus ut prodessem multis rogatu tuo. sed ut in Catone maiore, qui est scriptus ad te de senectute, Catonem induxi senem disputantem, quia nulla videbatur aptior persona quae de illa aetate loqueretur, quam eius, qui et diutissime senex fuisset et in ipsa senectute praeter ceteros floruisset; sic, cum accepissemus a patribus maxime memorabilem C. Laeli et P. Scipionis familiaritatem fuisse, idonea mihi Laeli persona visa est quae de amicitia ea ipsa dissereret, quae disputata ab eo meminisset Scaevola. genus autem hoc sermonum positum in hominum veterum auctoritate et eorum illustrium plus nescio quo pacto videtur habere gravitatis: itaque ipse mea legens sic afficior interdum, ut Catonem, non me, loqui existimem.\n\nSECTION 5\nsed ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus scripsi de amicitia. tum est Cato locutus, quo erat nemo fere senior temporibus illis, nemo prudentior; nunc Laelius et sapiens, sic enim est habitus, et amicitiae gloria excellens de amicitia loquetur. tu velim a me animum parumper avertas, Laelium loqui ipsum putes. C. Fannius et Q. Mucius ad socerum veniunt post mortem Africani; ab his sermo oritur, respondet Laelius, cuius tota disputatio est de amicitia, quam legens te ipse cognosces\n\n### Chapter 2\n\nSECTION 6\nFANNIUS. Sunt ista, Laeli; nec enim melior vir fuit Africano quisquam nec clarior. sed existimare debes omnium oculos in te esse coniectos unum; te sapientem et appellant et existimant. Tribuebatur hoc modo M. Catoni, scimus L. Acilium apud patres nostros appellatum esse sapientem, sed uterque alio quodam modo: Acilius quia prudens esse in iure civili putabatur, Cato quia multarum rerum usum habebat et multa eius et in senatu et in foro vel provisa prudenter vel acta constanter vel responsa acute ferebantur; propterea quasi cognomen iam habebat in senectute sapientis.\n\nSECTION 7\nTe autem alio quodam modo non solum natura et moribus, verum etiam studio et doctrina esse sapientem, nec sicut volgus, sed ut eruditi solent appellare sapientem, qualem in Graecia reliqua neminem—nam qui septem appellantur, eos qui ista subtilius quaerunt in numero sapientium non habent—Athenis unum accepimus et eum quidem etiam Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum iudicatum. hanc esse in te sapientiam existimant, ut omnia tua in te posita esse ducas humanosque casus virtute inferiores putes. itaque ex me quaerunt, credo ex hoc item Scaevola, quonam pacto mortem Africani feras, eoque magis quod proximis Nonis, cum in hortos D. Bruti auguris commentandi causa, ut assolet, venissemus, tu non affuisti, qui diligentissime semper illum diem et illud munus solitus esses obire.\n\nSECTION 8\nSCAEVOLA. Quaerunt quidem, C. Laeli, multum, ut est a Fannio dictum, sed ego id respondeo, quod animum adverti, te dolorem quem acceperis cum summi viri tum amicissimi morte ferre moderate; nec potuisse non commoveri, nec fuisse id humanitatis tuae: quod autem Nonis in collegio nostro non affuisses, valetudinem respondeo causam, non maestitiam fuisse.\nLAELIUS. Recte tu quidem, Scaevola, et vere; nec enim ab isto officio, quod semper usurpavi cum valerem, abduci incommodo meo debui, nec ullo casu arbitror hoc constanti homini posse contingere, ut ulla intermissio fiat offici.\n\nSECTION 9\ntu autem, Fanni, quod mihi tantum tribui dicis, quantum ego nec agnosco nec postulo, facis amice, sed, ut mihi videris, non recte iudicas de Catone. aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo, aut, si quisquam, ille sapiens fuit. quo modo, ut alia omittam, mortem fili tulit! memineram Paulum, videram Gallum; sed hi in pueris, Cato in perfecto et spectato viro.\n\n### Chapter 3\n\nSECTION 10\nquam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur.\nDe me autem, ut iam cum utroque vestrum loquar, sic habetote: ego si Scipionis desiderio me moveri negem, quam id recte faciam viderint sapientes, sed certe mentiar. moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis, ut arbitror, nemo umquam erit, ut confirmare possum, nemo certe fuit. sed non egeo medicina: me ipse consolor et maxime illo solacio, quod eo errore careo, quo amicorum decessu plerique angi solent. nihil mali accidisse Scipioni puto; mihi accidit, si quid accidit; suis autem incommodis graviter angi non amicum, sed se ipsum amantis est.\n\nSECTION 11\ncum illo vero quis neget actum esse praeclare? nisi enim, quod ille minime putabat, immortalitatem optare vellet, quid non adeptus est, quod homini fas esset optare, qui summam spem civium, quam de eo iam puero habuerant, continuo adulescens incredibili virtute superavit; qui consulatum petivit numquam, factus consul est bis, primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo tempore, rei publicae paene sero; qui duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio non modo praesentia, verum etiam futura bella delevit? quid dicam de moribus facillimis, de pietate in matrem, liberalitate in sorores, bonitate in suos, iustitia in omnis? nota sunt vobis. quam autem civitati carus fuerit, maerore funeris indicatum est. quid igitur hunc paucorum annorum accessio iuvare potuisset? senectus enim quamvis non sit gravis, ut memini Catonem anno ante quam est mortuus, mecum et cum Scipione disserere, tamen aufert eam viriditatem, in qua etiam nunc erat Scipio.\n\nSECTION 12\nquam ob rem vita quidem talis fuit vel fortuna vel gloria, ut nihil posset accedere; moriendi autem sensum celeritas abstulit. quo de genere mortis difficile dictu est; quid homines suspicentur videtis: hoc vere tamen licet dicere, P. Scipioni ex multis diebus, quos in vita celeberrimos laetissimosque viderit, illum diem clarissimum fuisse, cum senatu dimisso domum reductus ad vesperum est a patribus conscriptis, populo Romano, sociis et Latinis, pridie quam excessit e vita, ut ex tam alto dignitatis gradu ad superos videatur deos potius quam ad inferos pervenisse.\n\n### Chapter 4\n\nSECTION 13\nneque enim adsentior eis, qui nuper haec disserere coeperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire atque omnia morte deleri. plus apud me antiquorum auctoritas valet, vel nostrorum maiorum, qui mortuis tam religiosa iura tribuerunt, quod non fecissent, profecto, si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur, vel eorum qui in hac terra fuerunt magnamque Graeciam, quae nunc quidem deleta est, tum florebat, institutis et praeceptis suis erudierunt, vel eius, qui Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus, qui non tum hoc tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem semper, animos hominum esse divinos eisque, cum ex corpore excessissent, reditum in caelum patere optimoque et iustissimo cuique expeditissimum.\n\nSECTION 14\nquod idem Scipioni videbatur, qui quidem, quasi praesagiret, perpaucis ante mortem diebus, cum et Philus et Manilius adesset et alii plures, tuque etiam Scaevola, mecum venisses, triduum disseruit de re publica, cuius disputationis fuit extremum fere de immortalitate animorum, quae se in quiete per visum ex Africano audisse dicebat. id si ita est, ut optimi cuiusque animus in morte facillime evolet tanquam e custodia vinclisque corporis, cui censemus cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni? quocirca maerere hoc eius eventu vereor ne invidi magis quam amici sit. sin autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus sit animorum et corporum nec ullus sensus maneat, ut nihil boni est in morte, sic certe nihil mali. sensu enim amisso fit idem, quasi natus non esset omnino, quem tamen osse natum et nos gaudemus et haec civitas, dum erit, laetabitur.\n\nSECTION 15\nquam ob rem cum illo quidem, ut supra dixi, actum optime est, mecum incommodius, quem fuerat aequius, ut prius introieram, sic prius exire de vita. sed tamen recordatione nostrae amicitiae sic fruor, ut beate vixisse videar, quia cum Scipione vixerim, quocum mihi coniuncta cura de publica re et de privata fuit, quocum et domus fuit et militia communis et, id in quo omnis vis est amicitiae, voluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio. itaque non tam ista me sapientiae, quam modo Fannius commemoravit, fama delectat, falsa praesertim, quam quod amicitiae nostrae memoriam spero sempiternam fore, idque eo mihi magis est cordi, quod ex omnibus saeculis vix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum, quo in genere sperare videor Scipionis et Laeli amicitiam notam posteritati fore.\n\nSECTION 16\nFANNIUS. Istuc quidem, Laeli, ita necesse est. sed quoniam amicitiae mentionem fecisti et sumus otiosi, pergratum mihi feceris—spero item Scaevolae —si, quem ad modum soles de ceteris rebus, cum ex te quaeruntur, sic de amicitia disputaris quid sentias, qualem existimes, quae praecepta des.\nSCAEVOLA. Mihi vero erit gratum, atque id ipsum cum tecum agere conarer, Fannius antevertit. quam ob rem utrique nostrum gratum admodum feceris.\n\n### Chapter 5\n\nSECTION 17\nLAELIUS. Ego vero non gravarer, si mihi ipse confiderem, nam et praeclara res est et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi. sed quis ego sum aut quae est in me facultas? doctorum est ista consuetudo eaque Graecorum, ut eis ponatur de quo disputent quamvis subito. magnum opus est egetque exercitatione non parva. quam ob rem quae disputari de amicitia possunt, ab eis censeo petatis, qui ista profitentur; ego vos hortari tantum possum, ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversas.\n\nSECTION 18\nsed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse; neque id ad vivum reseco, ut illi, qui haec subtilius disserunt, fortasse vere, sed ad communem utilitatem parum; negant enim quemquam esse virum bonum nisi sapientem. sit ita sane: sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus. nos autem ea quae sunt in usu vitaque communi, non ea quae finguntur aut optantur, spectare debemus. numquam ego dicam C. Fabricium, M’. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium, quos sapientis nostri maiores iudicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapientis. qua re sibi habeant sapientiae nomen et invidiosum et obscurum, concedant ut viri boni fuerint. ne id quidem facient; negabunt id nisi sapienti posse concedi.\n\nSECTION 19\nagamus igitur pingui, ut aiunt, Minerva. qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt, ut eorum probetur fides integritas aequitas liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas libido audacia, sintque magna constantia, ut ei fuerunt, modo quos nominavi, hos viros bonos, ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantur, quantum homines possunt, naturam optimam bene vivendi ducem.\nSic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos, ut inter omnis esset societas quaedam, maior autem, ut quisque proxime accederet. itaque cives potiores quam peregrini, propinqui quam alieni; cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit, sed ea non satis habet firmitatis. namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benevolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benevolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet.\n\n### Chapter 6\n\nSECTION 20\nquanta autem vis amicitiae sit ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est et adducta in angustum, ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur.\nest enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio, qua quidem haud scio an excepta sapientia nil quicquam melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum. divitias alii praeponunt, bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates. beluarum hoc quidem extremum, illa autem superiora caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis nostris quam in fortunae temeritate. qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, praeclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest.\n\nSECTION 21\niam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae nostrae sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur, virosque bonos eos qui habentur numeremus—Paulos Catones Gallos Scipiones Philos—his communis vita contenta est; eos autem omittamus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur.\n\nSECTION 22\ntalis igitur inter viros amicitia tantas opportunitates habet, quantas vix queo dicere. principio qui potest esse vita vitalis, ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescit? quid dulcius quam habere quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum? qui esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes qui illis aeque ac tu ipse gauderet? Adversas vero ferre difficile esset sine eo, qui illas gravius etiam quam tu ferret. denique ceterae res, quae expetuntur, opportunae sunt singulae rebus fere singulis—divitiae, ut utare; opes, ut colare; honores, ut laudere; voluptates, ut gaudeas; valetudo, ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis; amicitia res plurimas continet: quoquo te verteris praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempestiva, numquam molesta est. itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, pluribus locis utimur quam amicitia. neque ego nunc de volgari aut de mediocri, quae tamen ipsa et delectat et prodest, sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum, qui pauci nominantur, fuit. nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia, et adversas, partiens communicansque, leviores.\n\n### Chapter 7\n\nSECTION 23\ncumque plurimas et maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum praestat omnibus, quod bonam spem praelucet in posterum, nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur. verum etiam amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. quocirca et absentes adsunt et egentes abundant et imbecilli valent et, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt; tantus eos honos memoria desiderium prosequitur amicorum, ex quo illorum beata mors videtur, horum vita laudabilis. quod si exemeris ex rerum natura benevolentiae coniunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit, ne agri quidem cultus permanebit. id si minus intellegitur, quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque sit, ex dissensionibus atque discordiis percipi potest. quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis et discidiis funditus possit everti?\nex quo, quantum boni sit in amicitia, iudicari potest.\n\nSECTION 24\nagrigentinum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam. atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intellegunt et re probant. itaque, si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis, quis est qui id non maximis efferat laudibus? qui clamores tota cavea nuper in hospitis et amici mei M. Pacuvi nova fabula, cum ignorante rege uter Orestes esset, Pylades Orestem se esse diceret, ut pro illo necaretur, Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseveraret! stantes plaudebant in re ficta; quid arbitramur in vera facturos fuisse? facile indicabat ipsa natura vim suam, cum homines, quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero iudicarent.\nhactenus mihi videor de amicitia quid sentirem potuisse dicere; si quae praeterea sunt—credo autem esse multa—ab eis, si videbitur, qui ista disputant, quaeritote.\n\nSECTION 25\nFANNIUS. Nos autem a te potius. quamquam etiam ab istis saepe quaesivi et audivi non invitus equidem, sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae.\nSCAEVOLA. Tum magis id diceres, Fanni, si nuper in hortis Scipionis, cum est de re publica disputatum, affuisses. qualis tum patronus iustitiae fuit contra accuratam orationem Phili!\nFANNIUS. Facile id quidem fuit iustitiam iustissimo viro defendere.\nSCAEVOLA. Quid? amicitiam nonne facile ei, qui ob eam summa fide, constantia iustitiaque servatam maximam gloriam ceperit?\n\n### Chapter 8\n\nSECTION 26\nLAELIUS. Vim hoc quidem est afferre; quid enim refert qua me ratione cogatis? cogitis certe. studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est tum ne aequum quidem obsistere.\nsaepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis, quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa. amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam. nam utilitates quidem etiam ab eis percipiuntur saepe, qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et observantur temporis causa; in amicitia autem nihil fictum, nihil simulatum est et, quidquid est, id est verum et voluntarium.\n\nSECTION 27\nquapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quam indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura. quod quidem quale sit, etiam in bestiis quibusdam animadverti potest, quae ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus et ab eis ita amantur, ut facile earum sensus appareat. quod in homine multo est evidentius, primum ex ea caritate quae est inter natos et parentis, quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere non potest, deinde cum similis sensus exstitit amoris, si aliquem nacti sumus, cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspicere videamur.\n\nSECTION 28\nnihil est enim virtute amabilius, nihil quod magis alliciat ad diligendum, quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem etiam eos, quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. quis est qui C. Fabrici, M’. Curi non cum caritate aliqua benevola memoriam usurpet, quos numquam viderit? quis autem est qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp. Cassium, Sp. Maelium non oderit? cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale; ab altero propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus; alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit.\n\n### Chapter 9\n\nSECTION 29\nquod si tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in eis, quos numquam vidimus, et, quod maius est, in hoste etiam diligamus, quid mirum est, si animi hominum moveantur, cum eorum, quibuscum usu coniuncti esse possunt, virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videantur? quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine adiuncta, quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis admirabilis quaedam exardescit benevolentiae magnitudo.\nquam si qui putant ab imbecillitate proficisci, ut sit per quem adsequatur quod quisque desideret, humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam volunt. quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum esse in se arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus; quod longe secus est.\n\nSECTION 30\nut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit et ut quisque maxime virtute et sapientia sic munitus est, ut nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet, ita in amicitiis expetendis colendisque maxime excellit. quid enim? Africanus indigens mei? minime hercule! ac ne ego quidem illius, sed ego admiratione quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione fortasse non nulla quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit; auxit benevolentiam consuetudo. sed quamquam utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae.\n\nSECTION 31\nut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam—neque enim beneficium faeneramur, sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus—sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus.\n\nSECTION 32\nab his, qui pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia referunt, longe dissentiunt; nec mirum; nihil enim altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum suspicere possunt, qui suas omnis cogitationes abiecerunt in rem tam humilem tamque contemptam. quam ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus, ipsi autem intellegamus natura gigni sensum diligendi et benevolentiae caritatem facta significatione probitatis, quam qui appetiverunt, applicant sese et propius admovent, ut et usu eius, quem diligere coeperunt, fruantur et moribus, sintque pares in amore et aequales propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad reposcendum, atque haec inter eos sit honesta certatio. Sic et utilitates ex amicitia maximae capientur, et erit eius ortus a natura quam ab imbecillitate gravior et verior. nam si utilitas conglutinaret amicitias, eadem commutata dissolveret; sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco verae amicitiae sempiternae sunt.\nortum quidem amicitiae videtis, nisi quid ad haec forte vultis.\nFANNIUS. Tu vero perge, Laeli! pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo.\n\n### Chapter 10\n\nSECTION 33\nSCAEVOLA. Recte tu quidem: quam ob rem audiamus.\nLAELIUS. Audite vero, optimi viri, ea quae saepissime inter me et Scipionem de amicitia disserebantur. quamquam ille quidem nihil difficilius esse dicebat quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae diem permanere: nam vel ut non idem expediret incidere saepe, vel ut de re publica non idem sentiretur; mutari etiam mores hominum saepe dicebat, alias adversis rebus, alias aetate ingravescente. atque earum rerum exemplum ex similitudine capiebat ineuntis aetatis, quod summi puerorum amores saepe una cum praetexta toga deponerentur;\n\nSECTION 34\nsin autem ad adulescentiam perduxissent, dirimi tamen interdum contentione vel uxoriae condicionis vel commodi alicuius, quod idem adipisci uterque non posset. quod si qui longius in amicitia provecti essent, tamen saepe labefactari, si in honoris contentionem incidissent; pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitiis quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae, ex quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos exstitisse.\n\nSECTION 35\nmagna etiam discidia et plerumque iusta nasci, cum aliquid ab amicis quod rectum non esset postularetur, ut aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores essent ad iniuriam, quod qui recusarent, quamvis honeste id facerent, ius tamen amicitiae deserere arguerentur ab eis, quibus obsequi nollent; illos autem, qui quidvis ab amico auderent postulare, postulatione ipsa profiteri omnia se amici causa esse facturos. eorum querella inveterata non modo familiaritates exstingui solere, sed odia etiam gigni sempiterna. haec ita multa quasi fata impendere amicitiis, ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae, sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi videri.\n\n### Chapter 11\n\nSECTION 36\nquam ob rem id primum videamus, si placet, quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat. numne, si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam arma illi cum Coriolano debuerunt? num Vecellinum amici regnum appetentem, num Maelium debuerunt iuvare?\n\nSECTION 37\ntiberium quidem Gracchum rem publicam vexantem a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum videbamus. At C. Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiae vestrae, Scaevola, cum ad me, quod aderam Laenati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio, deprecatum venisset, hanc ut sibi ignoscerem causam afferebat, quod tanti Tib. Gracchum fecisset, ut quidquid ille vellet sibi faciendum putaret. tum ego, etiamne, inquam, si te in Capitolium faces ferre vellet? numquam voluisset id quidem, sed, si voluisset, paruissem. videtis, quam nefaria vox. et hercule ita fecit, vel plus etiam quam dixit; non enim paruit ille Tib. Gracchi temeritati, sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius furoris, sed ducem praebuit. itaque hac amentia, quaestione nova perterritus, in Asiam profugit, ad hostis se contulit, poenas rei publicae gravis iustasque persolvit.\nnulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris; nam, cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris.\n\nSECTION 38\nquod si rectum statuerimus vel concedere amicis quidquid velint vel impetrare ab eis quidquid velimus, perfecta quidem sapientia si simus, nihil habeat res viti; sed loquimur de eis amicis qui ante oculos sunt, quos videmus aut de quibus memoriam accepimus, quos novit vita communis. ex hoc numero nobis exempla sumenda sunt, et eorum quidem maxime, qui ad sapientiam proxime accedunt.\n\nSECTION 39\nvidemus Papum Aemilium C. Luscino familiarem fuisse (sic a patribus accepimus) bis una consules, collegas in censura; tum et cum eis et inter se coniunctissimos fuisse M’. Curium, Tib. Coruncanium memoriae proditum est. igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus quemquam horum ab amico quidpiam contendisse, quod contra fidem. contra ius iurandum, contra rem publicam esset. nam hoc quidem in talibus viris quid attinet dicere, si contendisset impetraturum non fuisse, cum illi sanctissimi viri fuerint, aeque autem nefas sit tale aliquid et facere rogatum et rogare? At vero Tib. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo, C. Cato, et minime tum quidem Gaius frater, nunc idem acerrimus.\n\n### Chapter 12\n\nSECTION 40\nhaec igitur lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpis nec faciamus rogati. turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaevola, locati sumus, ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros casus rei publicae. deflexit iam aliquantulum de spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum.\n\nSECTION 41\nTib. Gracchus regnum occupare conatus est, vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses. num quid simile populus Romanus audierat aut viderat? hunc etiam post mortem secuti amici et propinqui quid in P. Scipione effecerint, sine lacrimis non queo dicere. nam Carbonem, quocumque modo potuimus, propter recentem poenam Tib. Gracchi sustinuimus. De C. Gracchi autem tribunatu quid exspectem non libet augurari; serpit deinde res, quae proclivis ad perniciem, cum semel coepit, labitur. videtis in tabella iam ante quanta sit facta labes, primo Gabinia lege, biennio autem post Cassia. videre iam videor populum a senatu disiunctum, multitudinis arbitrio res maximas agi. plures enim discent quem ad modum haec fiant, quam quem ad modum his resistatur.\n\nSECTION 42\nquorsum haec? quia sine sociis nemo quicquam tale conatur. praecipiendum est igitur bonis, ut; si in eius modi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint, ne existiment ita se alligatos, ut ab amicis in magna aliqua re publica peccantibus non discedant; improbis autem poena statuenda est, nec vero minor eis qui secuti erunt alterum, quam eis qui ipsi fuerint impietatis duces. quis clarior in Graecia Themistocle, quis potentior? qui cum imperator bello Persico servitute Graeciam liberavisset propterque invidiam in exsilium expulsus esset, ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit, quam ferre debuit: fecit idem quod viginti annis ante apud nos fecerat Coriolanus. His adiutor contra patriam inventus est nemo; itaque mortem sibi uterque conscivit.\n\nSECTION 43\nqua re talis improborum consensio non modo excusatione amicitiae tegenda non est, sed potius supplicio omni vindicanda est, ut ne quis concessum putet amicum vel bellum patriae inferentem sequi. quod quidem, ut res ire coepit, haud scio an aliquando futurum sit; mihi autem non minori curae est, qualis res publica post mortem meam futura sit, quam qualis hodie sit.\n\n### Chapter 13\n\nSECTION 44\nhaec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem dum rogemur, studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit, consilium verum dare audeamus libere, plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur.\n\nSECTION 45\nnam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia, placuisse opinor mirabilia quaedam—sed nihil est, quod illi non persequantur argutiis—partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus; satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum; alienis nimis implicari molestum esse; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae, quas vel adducas cum velis vel remittas; caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem, qua frui non possit animus, si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus.\n\nSECTION 46\nalios autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanius, quem locum breviter paulo ante perstrinxi, praesidi adiumentique causa, non benevolentiae neque caritatis amicitias esse expetendas; itaque ut quisque minimum firmitatis haberet minimumque virium, ita amicitias appetere maxime: ex eo fieri ut mulierculae magis amicitiarum praesidia quaerant quam viri, et inopes quam opulenti, et calamitosi quam ei qui putentur beati.\n\nSECTION 47\nO praeclaram sapientiam! solem enim e mundo tollere videntur ei, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt, qua nihil a dis immortalibus melius habemus, nihil iucundius. quae est enim ista securitas? specie quidem blanda, sed reapse multis locis repudianda. neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere. quod si curam fugimus, virtus fugienda est, quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit, ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia libidinem, ignaviam fortitudo. itaque videas rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere, imbellibus fortis, flagitiosis modestos. ergo hoc proprium est animi bene constituti, et laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis.\n\n### Chapter 14\n\nSECTION 48\nquam ob rem si cadit in sapientem animi dolor, qui profecto cadit, nisi ex eius animo exstirpatam humanitatem arbitramur, quae causa est cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita, ne aliquas propter eam suscipiamus molestias? quid enim interest motu animi sublato, non dico inter pecudem et hominem, sed inter hominem et truncum aut saxum aut quidvis generis eiusdem? neque enim sunt isti audiendi, qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quandam volunt; quae quidem est cum multis in rebus tum in amicitia tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur et incommodis contrahatur. quam ob rem angor iste, qui pro amico saepe capiendus est, non tantum valet, ut tollat e vita amicitiam, non plus quam ut virtutes, quia non nullas curas et molestias afferunt, repudientur.\ncum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis eluceat, ad quam se similis animus applicet et adiungat, id cum contigit, amor exoriatur necesse est.\n\nSECTION 49\nquid enim tam absurdum quam delectari multis inanibus rebus, ut honore, ut gloria, ut aedificio, ut vestitu cultuque corporis, animante virtute praedito, eo qui vel amare vel, ut ita dicam, redamare possit, non admodum delectari? nihil est enim remuneratione benevolentiae, nihil vicissitudine studiorum officiorumque iucundius.\n\nSECTION 50\nquid? si illud etiam addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse quod ad se rem ullam tam illiciat et tam trahat quam ad amicitiam similitudo, concedetur profecto verum esse, ut bonos boni diligant asciscantque sibi quasi propinquitate coniunctos atque natura. nihil est enim appetentius similium sui nec rapacius quam natura. quam ob rem hoc quidem, Fanni et Scaevola, constet, ut opinor, bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam benevolentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus. sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudinem pertinet. non enim est inhumana virtus neque immunis neque superba, quae etiam populos universos tueri eisque optime consulere soleat, quod non faceret profecto, si a caritate volgi abhorreret.\n\nSECTION 51\natque etiam mihi quidem videntur, qui utilitatis causa fingunt amicitias, amabilissimum nodum amicitiae tollere. non enim tam utilitas parta per amicum quam amici amor ipse delectat, tumque illud fit, quod ab amico est profectum, iucundum, si cum studio est profectum. tantumque abest ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur, ut ei, qui opibus et copiis maximeque virtute, in qua plurimum est praesidi, minime alterius indigeant, liberalis simi sint et beneficentissimi. atque haud sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis. ubi enim studia nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset? non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est.\n\n### Chapter 15\n\nSECTION 52\nnon ergo erunt homines deliciis diffluentes audiendi, si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt. nam quis est, pro deorum fidem atque hominum! qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere? haec enim est tyrannorum vita, nimirum in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benevolentiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae.\n\nSECTION 53\nquis enim aut eum diligat, quem metuat, aut eum, a quo se metui putet? coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus. quod si forte, ut fit plerumque, ceciderint, tum intellegitur quam fuerint inopes amicorum. quod Tarquinium dixisse ferunt exulantem, tum se intellexisse, quos fidos amicos habuisset, quos infidos, cum iam neutris gratiam referre posset.\n\nSECTION 54\nquamquam miror, illa superbia et importunitate, si quemquam amicum habere potuit. atque ut huius, quem dixi, mores veros amicos parare non potuerunt, sic multorum opes praepotentium excludunt amicitias fidelis. non enim solum ipsa fortuna caeca est, sed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos, quos complexa est; itaque efferuntur fere fastidio et contumacia, nec quicquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest. atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos, qui antea commodis fuerint moribus, imperio potestate prosperis rebus immutari, sperni ab eis veteres amicitias, indulgeri novis.\n\nSECTION 55\nquid autem stultius quam, cum plurimum copiis facultatibus opibus possint, cetera parare, quae parantur pecunia, equos famulos vestem egregiam vasa pretiosa, amicos non parare, optimam et pulcherrimam vitae, ut ita dicam, supellectilem? etenim cetera cum parant, cui parent nesciunt nec cuius causa laborent; eius enim est istorum quidque qui vicit viribus; amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio, ut etiam si illa maneant, quae sunt quasi dona fortunae, tamen vita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse iucunda. sed haec hactenus.\n\n### Chapter 16\n\nSECTION 56\nconstituendi autem sunt, qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligendi. De quibus tris video sententias ferri, quarum nullam probo: unam, ut eodem modo erga amicum affecti simus quo erga nosmet ipsos; alteram, ut nostra in amicos benevolentia illorum erga nos benevolentiae pariter aequaliterque respondeat; tertiam, ut, quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis.\n\nSECTION 57\nharum trium sententiarum nulli prorsus assentior. nec enim illa prima vera est, ut, quem ad modum in se quisque, sic in amicum sit animatus. quam multa enim, quae nostra causa numquam faceremus, facimus causa amicorum! precari ab indigno, supplicare, tum acerbius in aliquem invehi insectarique vehementius, quae in nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum fiunt honestissime; multaeque res sunt, in quibus de suis commodis viri boni multa detrahunt detrahique patiuntur, ut eis amici potius quam ipsi fruantur.\n\nSECTION 58\naltera sententia est quae definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac voluntatibus. hoc quidem est nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum. divitior mihi et affluentior videtur esse vera amicitia nec observare restricte ne plus reddat quam acceperit: neque enim verendum est ne quid excidat aut ne quid in terram defluat aut ne plus aequo quid in amicitiam congeratur.\n\nSECTION 59\ntertius vero ille finis deterrimus, ut, quanti quisque se ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis. saepe enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est aut spes amplificandae fortunae fractior. non est igitur amici talem esse in eum, qualis ille in se est, sed potius eniti et efficere ut amici iacentem animum excitet inducatque spem cogitationemque meliorem. alius igitur finis verae amicitiae constituendus est, si prius, quid maxime reprehendere Scipio solitus sit, dixero. negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri quam eius qui dixisset ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus; nec vero se adduci posse ut hoc, quem ad modum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem; impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam. quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit ei, cui se putabit inimicum esse posse? quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare ut quam saepissime peccet amicus, quo pluris det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum: rursum autem recte factis commodisque amicorum necesse erit angi dolere invidere.\n\nSECTION 60\nqua re hoc quidem praeceptum, cuiuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet: illud potius praecipiendum fuit, ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiis comparandis, ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum, quem aliquando odisse possemus. quin etiam si minus felices in deligendo fuissemus, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat.\n\n### Chapter 17\n\nSECTION 61\nHis igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum consiliorum voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut etiam si qua fortuna accident ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur; est enim quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit. nec vero neglegenda est fama, nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet benevolentiam civium, quam blanditiis et assentando colligere turpe est; virtus, quam sequitur caritas, minime repudianda est.\n\nSECTION 62\nsed—saepe enim redeo ad Scipionem, cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia—querebatur quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent; capras et ovis quot quisque haberet dicere posse, amicos quot haberet non posse dicere; et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam, in amicis eligendis neglegentis esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas, quibus eos, qui ad amicitiam essent idonei, iudicarent. sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi, cuius generis est magna penuria; et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum, experiendum autem est in ipsa amicitia: ita praecurrit amicitia iudicium tollitque experiendi potestatem.\n\nSECTION 63\nest igitur prudentis sustinere ut cursum, sic impetum benevolentiae, quo utamur, quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia, aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. quidam saepe in parva pecunia perspiciuntur quam sint leves; quidam autem, quos parva movere non potuit, cognoscuntur in magna. sin vero erunt aliqui reperti qui pecuniam praeferre amicitiae sordidum existiment, ubi eos inveniemus, qui honores magistratus imperia potestates opes amicitiae non anteponant, ut, cum ex altera parte proposita haec sint, ex altera ius amicitiae, non multo illa malint? imbecilla enim est natura ad contemnendam potentiam, quam etiam si neglecta amicitia consecuti sint, obscuratum iri arbitrantur, quia non sine magna causa sit neglecta amicitia.\n\nSECTION 64\nitaque verae amicitiae difficillime reperiuntur in eis, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur. ubi enim istum invenias, qui honorem amici anteponat suo? quid? haec ut omittam, quam graves, quam difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatum societates, ad quas non est facile inventu qui descendant. quamquam Ennius recte: amicus certus in re incerta cernitur; tamen haec duo levitatis et infirmitatis plerosque convincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt aut in malis deserunt. qui igitur utraque in re gravem constantem stabilem se in amicitia praestiterit, hunc ex maxime raro genere hominum iudicare debemus et paene divino.\n\n### Chapter 18\n\nSECTION 65\nfirmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est eius quam in amicitia quaerimus fides est; nihil est enim stabile, quod infidum est. simplicem praeterea et communem et consentientem, id est, qui rebus isdem moveatur, elegi par est; quae omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem. neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum, neque vero, qui non isdem rebus movetur naturaque consentit, aut fidus aut stabilis potest esse. addendum eodem est, ut ne criminibus aut inferendis delectetur aut credat oblatis, quae pertinent omnia ad eam, quam iam dudum tracto, constantiam. ita fit verum illud, quod initio dixi, amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse.\nest enim boni viri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere, haec duo tenere in amicitia: primum, ne quid fictum sit neve simulatum; aperte enim vel odisse magis ingenui est quam fronte occultare sententiam; deinde non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum, semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse violatum.\n\nSECTION 66\naccedat huc suavitas quaedam oportet sermonum atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae. tristitia autem et in omni re severitas habet illa quidem gravitatem, sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior.\n\n### Chapter 19\n\nSECTION 67\nexsistit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis, num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis vetulis teneros anteponere solemus. indigna homine dubitatio; non enim debent esse amicitiarum, sicut aliarum rerum, satietates; veterrima quaeque, ut ea vina quae vetustatem ferunt, esse debent suavissima, verumque illud est, quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus expletum sit.\n\nSECTION 68\nnovitates autem, si spem afferunt, ut tamquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiandae, vetustas tamen suo loco conservanda; maxima est enim vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. quin in ipso equo, cuius modo feci mentionem, si nulla res impediat, nemo est quin eo, quo consuevit, libentius utatur quam intractato et novo; nec vero in hoc, quod est animal, sed in eis etiam, quae sunt inanima, consuetudo valet, cum locis ipsis delectemur, montuosis etiam et silvestribus, in quibus diutius commorati sumus.\n\nSECTION 69\nsed maximum est in amicitia superiorem parem esse inferiori. saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis. Q. vero Maximum fratrem, egregium virum omnino, sibi nequaquam parem, quod is anteibat aetate, tamquam superiorem colebat suosque omnis per se posse esse ampliores volebat.\n\nSECTION 70\nquod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus, ut, si quam praestantiam virtutis ingeni fortunae consecuti sunt, impertiant ea suis communicentque cum proximis; ut, si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant imbecilliore vel animo vel fortuna, eorum augeant opes eisque honori sint et dignitati. ut in fabulis, qui aliquamdiu propter ignorationem stirpis et generis in famulatu fuerunt, cum cogniti sunt et aut deorum aut regum filii inventi, retinent tamen caritatem in pastores, quos patres multos annos esse duxerunt. quod est multo profecto magis in veris patribus certisque faciendum. fructus enim ingeni et virtutis omnisque praestantiae tum maximus capitur, cum in proximum quemque confertur.\n\n### Chapter 20\n\nSECTION 71\nut igitur ei, qui sunt in amicitiae coniunctionisque necessitudine superiores, exaequare se cum inferioribus debent, sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari. quorum plerique aut queruntur semper aliquid aut etiam exprobrant, eoque magis si habere se putant quod officiose et amice et cum labore, aliquo suo factum queant dicere. odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobrantium, quae meminisse debet is, in quem collata sunt, non commemorare qui contulit.\n\nSECTION 72\nquam ob rem, ut ei, qui superiores sunt, submittere se debent in amicitia, sic quodam modo inferiores extollere. sunt enim quidam qui molestas amicitias faciunt cum ipsi se contemni putant—quod non fere contingit nisi eis qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur; qui hac opinione non modo verbis, sed etiam opera levandi sunt.\n\nSECTION 73\ntantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum quantum ipse efficere possis, deinde etiam quantum ille, quem diligas atque adiuves, sustinere. non enim neque tu possis, quamvis excellas, omnis tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere, ut Scipio P. Rupilium potuit consulem efficere, fratrem eius Lucium non potuit. quod si etiam possis quidvis deferre ad alterum, videndum est tamen quid ille possit sustinere.\n\nSECTION 74\nomnino amicitiae corroboratis iam confirmatisque et ingeniis et aetatibus iudicandae sunt; nec, si qui ineunte aetate venandi aut pilae studiosi fuerunt, eos habere necessarios, quos tum eodem studio praeditos dilexerunt. isto enim modo nutrices et paedagogi iure vetustatis plurimum benevolentiae postulabunt. qui neglegendi quidem non sunt, sed alio quodam modo aestimandi; aliter amicitiae stabiles permanere non possunt. disparis enim mores disparia studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias; nec ob aliam causam ullam boni improbis, improbi bonis amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima potest esse, morum studiorumque distantia.\n\nSECTION 75\nrecte etiam praecipi potest in amicitiis, ne intemperata quaedam benevolentia, quod persaepe fit, impediat magnas utilitates amicorum. nec enim, ut ad fabulas redeam, Troiam Neoptolemus capere potuisset, si Lycomedem, apud quem erat educatus, multis cum lacrimis iter suum impedientem audire voluisset. et saepe incidunt magnae res, ut discedendum sit ab amicis; quas qui impedire volt, quod desiderium non facile ferat, is et infirmus est mollisque natura et ob eam ipsam causam in amicitia parum iustus.\n\n### Chapter 21\n\nSECTION 76\natque in omni re considerandum est et quid postules ab amico et quid patiare a te impetrari.\nest etiam quaedam calamitas in amicitiis dimittendis non numquam necessaria—iam enim a sapientium familiaritatibus ad volgaris amicitias oratio nostra delabitur. erumpunt saepe vitia amicorum tum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos, quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. tales igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usus eluendae et, ut Catonem dicere audivi, dissuendae magis quam discindendae, nisi quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque facienda sit.\n\nSECTION 77\nsin autem aut morum aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, facta erit, aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit (loquor enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium, sed de communibus amicitiis) cavendum erit ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur. nihil enim est turpius quam cum eo bellum gerere, quocum familiariter vixeris. ab amicitia Q. Pompei meo nomine se removerat, ut scitis, Scipio; propter dissensionem autem, quae erat in re publica, alienatus est a collega nostro Metello; utrumque egit graviter ac moderate et offensione animi non acerba.\n\nSECTION 78\nquam ob rem primum danda opera est ne qua amicorum discidia fiant, sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut exstinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae esse videantur. cavendum vero ne etiam in gravis inimicitias convertant se amicitiae ex quibus iurgia maledicta contumeliae gignuntur. quae tamen si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt et hic honos veteri amicitiae tribuendus, ut is in culpa sit qui faciat, non is qui patiatur, iniuriam.\nomnino omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodorum una cautio est atque una provisio, ut ne nimis cito diligere incipiant neve non dignos.\n\nSECTION 79\ndigni autem sunt amicitia, quibus in ipsis inest causa cur diligantur. rarum genus! et quidem omnia praeclara, rara, nec quicquam difficilius quam reperire quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum. sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quicquam bonum norunt nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam pecudes eos potissimum diligunt, ex quibus sperant se maximum fructum esse capturos.\n\nSECTION 80\nita pulcherrima illa et maxime naturali carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita,nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, haec vis amicitiae et qualis et quanta sit. ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suae, sed quod per se quisque sibi carus est; quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur, verus amicus numquam reperietur: est enim is qui est tamquam alter idem.\n\nSECTION 81\nquod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucribus nantibus agrestibus, cicuribus feris, primum ut se ipsae diligant—id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur —deinde, ut requirant atque appetant ad quas se applicent eiusdem generis animantis—idque faciant cum desiderio et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani—quanto id magis in homine fit natura, qui et se ipse diligit et alterum anquirit, cuius animum ita cum suo misceat, ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus!\n\n### Chapter 22\n\nSECTION 82\nsed plerique perverse, ne dicam impudenter, habere talem amicum volunt, quales ipsi esse non possunt, quaeque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab eis desiderant. par est autem primum ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem sui quaerere. in talibus ea, quam iam dudum tractamus, stabilitas amicitiae confirmari potest, cum homines benevolentia coniuncti primum cupiditatibus eis quibus ceteri serviunt imperabunt; deinde aequitate iustitiaque gaudebunt omniaque alter pro altero suscipiet; neque quicquam umquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit, neque solum colent inter se ac diligent, sed etiam verebuntur. nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit, qui ex ea tollit verecundiam.\n\nSECTION 83\nitaque in eis perniciosus est error, qui existimant libidinum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam. virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea quae summa sunt pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret. quae si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura est, eorum est habendus ad summum naturae bonum optimus beatissimusque comitatus.\n\nSECTION 84\nhaec est, inquam, societas, in qua omnia insunt, quae putant homines expetenda—honestas gloria tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas; ut et, cum haec adsint, beata vita sit, et sine his esse non possit\nquod cum optimum maximumque sit, si id volumus adipisci, virtuti opera danda est, sine qua nec amicitiam neque ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus; ea vero neglecta qui se amicos habere arbitrantur, tum se denique errasse sentiunt, cum eos gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit.\n\nSECTION 85\nquocirca, dicendum est enim saepius, cum iudicaris, diligere oportet; non, cum dilexeris, iudicare. sed cum multis in rebus neglegentia plectimur, tum maxime in amicis et diligendis et colendis; praeposteris enim utimur consiliis et acta agimus, quod vetamur vetere proverbio. nam, implicati ultro et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam officiis, repente in medio cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione disrumpimus.\n\n### Chapter 23\n\nSECTION 86\nquo etiam magis vituperanda est rei maxime necessariae tanta incuria. una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis, de cuius utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt; quamquam a multis virtus ipsa contemnitur et venditatio quaedam atque ostentatio esse dicitur; multi divitias despiciunt, quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat; honores vero, quorum cupiditate quidam inflammantur, quam multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius, nihil esse levius existiment! itemque cetera, quae quibusdam admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt qui pro nihilo putent. De amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt; et ei qui ad rem publicam se contulerunt, et ei qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur, et ei qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi; postremo ei qui se totos tradiderunt voluptatibus, sine amicitia vitam esse nullam, si modo velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter vivere.\n\nSECTION 87\nserpit enim nescio quo modo per omnium vitas amicitia nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui.\nquin etiam si quis asperitate ea est et immanitate naturae, congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus, tamen is pati non possit, ut non anquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat virus acerbitatis suae. atque hoc maxime iudicaretur, si quid tale possit contingere, ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam collocaret atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum quas natura desiderat, abundantiam et copiam, hominis omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet—quis tam esset ferreus qui eam vitam ferre posset cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo?\n\n### Chapter 24\n\nSECTION 88\nverum ergo illud est, quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi ab aliis senibus auditum: si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore, quae iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem cui narraret habuisset. Sic natura solitarium nihil amat semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum adnititur, quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.\nsed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret quid velit anquirat desideret, tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo modo nec ea, quae ab ea monemur, audimus. est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur, quas tum evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est. una illa subeunda est offensio ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur; nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt.\n\nSECTION 89\nsed nescio quo modo verum est, quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit: obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit. molesta veritas, siquidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiae, sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit; maxima autem culpa in eo, qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio impellitur.\nomni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, primum ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat. in obsequio autem, quoniam Terentiano verbo lubenter utimur, comitas adsit, assentatio vitiorum adiutrix procul amoveatur, quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est; aliter enim cur tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur.\n\nSECTION 90\nCuius autem aures clausae veritati sunt, uta ab amico verum audire nequeat, huius salus desperanda est. scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa: melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri, quam eos amicos, qui dulces videantur; illos verum saepe dicere, hos numquam. atque illud absurdum, quod ei, qui monentur, eam molestiam quam debent capere non capiunt, ear capiunt qua debent vacare. peccasse enim se non anguntur, obiurgari moleste ferunt; quod contra oportebat delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.\n\n### Chapter 25\n\nSECTION 91\nut igitur et monere et moneri proprium est verae amicitiae, et alterum libere facere, non aspere, alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter, sic habendum est nullam in amicitiis pestem esse maiorem quam adulationem blanditiam assentationem: quamvis enim multis nominibus est hoc vitium notandum levium hominum atque fallacium, ad voluptatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem.\n\nSECTION 92\ncum autem omnium rerum simulatio vitiosa est, tollit enim iudicium veri idque adulterat, tum amicitiae repugnat maxime; delet enim veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest. nam cum amicitiae vis sit in eo ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus, qui id fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit idemque semper, sed varius commutabilis multiplex?\n\nSECTION 93\nquid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam devium, quam animus eius, qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam voltum atque nutum convertitur? negat quis, nego; ait, aio; postremo imperavi egomet mihi omnia assentari, ut ait idem Terentius, sed ille in Gnathonis persona, quod amici genus adhibere omnino levitatis est.\n\nSECTION 94\nmulti autem Gnathonum similes, cum sint loco fortuna fama superiores, quorum est assentatio molesta, cum ad vanitatem accessit auctoritas.\n\nSECTION 95\nsecerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita diligentia, quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris. contio, quae ex imperitissimis constat, tamen iudicare solet, quid intersit inter popularem, id est assentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem et verum et gravem.\n\nSECTION 96\nquibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuper influebat in auris contionis, cum ferret legem de tribunis plebis reficiendis! dissuasimus nos, sed nihil de me, de Scipione dicam libentius. quanta illi, di immortales, fuit gravitas, quanta in oratione maiestas! ut facile ducem populi Romani, non comitem diceres. sed affuistis, et est in manibus oratio. itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est.\natque, ut ad me redeam, meministis Q. Maximo fratre Scipionis et L. Mancino consulibus, quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis C. Licini Crassi videbatur; cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium transferebatur. (Atque is primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo.) Tamen illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum immortalium nobis defendentibus facile vincebat. atque id actum est praetore me, quinquennio ante quam consul sum factus. ita re magis quam summa auctoritate causa illa defensa est.\n\n### Chapter 26\n\nSECTION 97\nquod si in scena, id est in contione, in qua rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum est, tamen verum valet, si modo id patefactum et illustratum est, quid in amicitia fieri oportet, quae tota veritate perpenditur? in qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas, ne amare quidem aut amari, cum id quam vere fiat ignores. quamquam ista assentatio, quamvis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen nemini potest nisi ei, qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur. ita fit ut is assentatoribus patefaciat auris suas maxime, qui ipse sibi assentetur et se maxime ipse delectet.\n\nSECTION 98\nomnino est amans sui virtus; optime enim se ipsa novit quamque amabilis sit intellegit: ego autem non de virtute nunc loquor, sed de virtutis opinione. virtute enim ipsa non tam multi praediti esse quam videri volunt. hos delectat assentatio, his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo cum adhibetur, orationem illam vanam testimonium esse laudum suarum putant. nulla est igitur haec amicitia, cum alter verum audire non volt, alter ad mentiendum paratus est. nec parasitorum in comoediis assentatio faceta nobis videretur, nisi essent milites gloriosi. magnas vero agere gratias Thais mihi? satis erat respondere magnas. ingentis, inquit Semper auget assentator id, quod is, cuius ad voluntatem dicitur, volt esse magnum.\n\nSECTION 99\nquam ob rem, quamquam blanda ista vanitas apud eos valet, qui ipsi illam adlectant et invitant, tamen etiam graviores constantioresque admonendi sunt, ut animadvertant ne callida assentatione capiantur.\naperte enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui admodum est excors: callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet studiose cavendum est. nec enim facillime agnoscitur, quippe qui etiam adversando saepe assentetur et litigare se simulans blandiatur atque ad extremum det manus vincique se patiatur, ut is, qui illusus sit, plus vidisse videatur. quid autem turpius quam illudi? quod ut ne accidat magis cavendum est: ut me hodie ante omnis comicos stultos sense versaris atque illusseris lautissime!\n\n### Chapter 27\n\nSECTION 100\nhaec enim etiam in fabulis stultissima persona est improvidorum et credulorum senum.\nsed nescio quo pacto ab amicitiis perfectorum hominum, id est sapientium—de hac dico sapientia, quae videtur in hominem cadere posse—ad levis amicitias defluxit oratio. quam ob rem ad illa prima redeamus eaque ipsa concludamus aliquando.\nvirtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et tu, Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conservat. in ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia; quae cum se extulit et ostendit suum lumen et idem aspexit agnovitque in alio, ad id se admovet vicissimque accipit illud, quod in altero est, ex quo exardescit sive amor sive amicitia; utrumque enim dictum est ab amando, Amare autem nihil est aliud nisi eum ipsum diligere quem ames, nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate quaesita. quae tamen ipsa ecflorescit ex amicitia, etiam si tu eam minus secutus sis.\n\nSECTION 101\nhac nos adulescentes benevolentia senes illos, L. Paulum, M. Catonem, C. Gallum, P. Nasicam, Ti. Gracchum Scipionis nostri socerum dileximus. haec etiam magis elucet inter aequalis, ut inter me et Scipionem, L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp. Mummium; vicissim autem senes in adulescentium caritate acquiescimus, ut in vestra, ut in Q. Tuberonis; equidem etiam admodum adulescentis P. Rutili, A. Vergini familiaritate delector. quoniamque ita ratio comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae, ut alia aetas oriatur, maxime quidem optandum est ut cum aequalibus possis, quibuscum tamquam e carceribus emissus sis, cum isdem ad calcem, ut dicitur, pervenire.\n\nSECTION 102\nsed quoniam res humanae fragiles caducaeque sunt, semper aliqui anquirendi sunt quos diligamus et a quibus diligamur; caritate enim benevolentiaque sublata omnis est e vita sublata iucunditas. mihi quidem Scipio, quamquam est subito ereptus, vivit tamen semperque vivet; virtutem enim amavi illius viri, quae exstincta non est. nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos, qui illam semper in manibus habui, sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis. nemo umquam animo aut spe maiora suscipiet qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam putet.\n\nSECTION 103\nequidem ex omnibus rebus, quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare. in hac mihi de re publica consensus; in hac rerum privatarum consilium, in eadem requies plena oblectationis fuit. numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, quod quidem senserim, nihil audivi ex eo ipse quod nollem; una domus erat, idem victus isque communis, neque solum militia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque communes.\n\nSECTION 104\nnam quid ego de studiis dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi, in quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus contrivimus? quarum rerum recordatio et memoria si una cum illo occidisset, desiderium coniunctissimi atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo modo possem. sed nec illa exstincta sunt alunturque potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria mea, et, si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum tamen affert mihi aetas ipsa solacium; diutius enim iam in hoc desiderio esse non possum; omnia autem brevia tolerabilia esse debent, etiam si magna sunt.\nhaec habui de amicitia quae dicerem; vos autem hortor ut ita virtutem locetis (sine qua amicitia esse non potest) ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis.","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/cicero-friendship/original.txt"},"translations":[{"id":"trn_cicero_friendship_mouseia","translator":"Mouseia","kind":"curated","note":"Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections for fidelity, philosophical precision, rhetorical clarity, structure, and cadence.","text":"### Chapter 1\n\nSECTION 1\nQuintus Mucius the augur often used to recount, from memory and with great charm, many stories about his father-in-law, Gaius Laelius, and never hesitated in any conversation to call him a wise man. As for me, when I had assumed the toga of manhood, my father placed me under Scaevola’s care with the understanding that, so far as I could and was permitted, I should never leave the old man’s side. Accordingly, I committed to memory many arguments judiciously developed by him, as well as many sayings of his, brief and aptly expressed, and I strove to become wiser through his wisdom. After his death, I attached myself to Scaevola the pontiff, whom I venture to call the one man in our commonwealth most distinguished both for intellect and for justice. But of him another time; I now return to the augur.\n\nSECTION 2\nAmong the many occasions I remember, there was one when he was sitting at home, as was his custom, on the semicircular bench, with me and only a very few close friends present, and he happened upon a subject that was then on nearly everyone’s lips. You surely remember, Atticus—and all the more because you were closely associated with Publius Sulpicius—how great was the astonishment or indignation of the public when Sulpicius, as tribune of the plebs, became divided by a deadly hatred from Quintus Pompeius, who was then consul, though he had lived with him in the closest and most affectionate intimacy.\n\nSECTION 3\nAnd so, when Scaevola happened to mention that very affair, he related to us a conversation on friendship held by Laelius with himself and with Laelius’s other son-in-law, Gaius Fannius, son of Marcus, a few days after the death of Africanus. I committed the substance of that discussion to memory and have set it forth in this book in my own fashion; for I have introduced the speakers as though they themselves were talking, so that “I said” and “he said” need not be inserted too often, and so that the conversation might seem to be taking place face-to-face, among persons actually present.\n\nSECTION 4\nFor since you often urged me to write something about friendship, the subject appeared to me worthy both of universal consideration and of our own intimacy; and so I willingly complied, that at your request I might benefit many. But just as in the Cato the Elder, which was written for you on old age, I introduced the aged Cato as the speaker, because no person seemed better suited to speak about that time of life than one who had remained an old man for so long and in old age itself had flourished beyond all others, so, since we had learned from our fathers that the friendship of Gaius Laelius and Publius Scipio was especially memorable, the person of Laelius seemed to me a fitting one to discuss friendship in the very terms that Scaevola remembered him using. Moreover, this form of discourse, resting on the authority of men of former times—and illustrious men at that—somehow seems to possess greater dignity. Thus, when I read my own work, I am sometimes so affected that I imagine Cato, not myself, is speaking.\n\nSECTION 5\nBut as I, then an old man, wrote to an old man about old age, so in this book, as a most devoted friend, I have written to a friend about friendship. Then it was Cato who spoke, a man than whom scarcely anyone in those days was older and no one wiser; now Laelius, both a wise man—for so he was regarded—and a man eminent for the glory of his friendship, will speak about friendship. I should like you to turn your attention away from me for a little while and imagine that Laelius himself is speaking. Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius come to their father-in-law after the death of Africanus; they begin the conversation, and Laelius replies. His entire discourse concerns friendship, which, as you read it, you will recognize for yourself.\n\n### Chapter 2\n\nSECTION 6\nFANNIUS. That is true, Laelius; for no man was better than Africanus, nor more illustrious. But you ought to realize that the eyes of everyone are fixed upon you alone: they both call you and consider you a wise man. This distinction used to be accorded to Marcus Cato; and we know that Lucius Acilius was called wise in our fathers’ time, though each was so called in a somewhat different sense: Acilius because he was considered learned in civil law, Cato because he possessed experience in many affairs, and because many instances were recounted of things that he had either prudently foreseen, resolutely carried out, or shrewdly answered, both in the Senate and in the Forum. For that reason, in his old age he already bore “the Wise” almost as a surname.\n\nSECTION 7\nBut you are considered wise in still another sense—not only by nature and character, but also through study and learning—and not as the common people use the word, but as educated men commonly apply the name “wise.” Such a man, we are told, existed nowhere else in Greece—for those who investigate these matters more precisely do not count the men called the Seven among the truly wise—but at Athens there was one, and he indeed was judged by Apollo’s oracle to be the wisest of men. They believe that your wisdom consists in regarding all that is yours as resting within yourself, and in considering the accidents of human life inferior to virtue. And so they ask me—and, I suppose, they likewise ask Scaevola here—how you bear the death of Africanus, especially because on the last Nones, when, as usual, we came to the gardens of Decimus Brutus the augur for the purpose of study, you were not present, although you had always been most scrupulous in observing that day and performing that duty.\n\nSECTION 8\nSCAEVOLA. They do indeed ask me often, Gaius Laelius, as Fannius has said. But I answer according to what I have observed: that you bear with moderation the grief you have suffered through the death of a man who was at once most eminent and your dearest friend; that you could not have remained unmoved, nor would such insensibility have accorded with your humanity; but that the reason you were absent from our college on the Nones was ill health, not sorrow.\nLAELIUS. Your answer, Scaevola, is both correct and true. For no personal affliction should have kept me from that duty, which I always performed when my health permitted; nor do I think that any mischance can cause a steadfast man to leave a duty unperformed.\n\nSECTION 9\nAs for you, Fannius, when you say that people accord me a distinction I neither recognize nor claim for myself, you speak as a friend; but in my opinion you do not judge Cato rightly. Either no one was ever wise—which I am more inclined to believe—or, if anyone was, he was. How he bore his son’s death, to say nothing of everything else! I remembered Paulus; I had seen Gallus; but their sons were boys, while Cato’s was a mature and proven man.\n\n### Chapter 3\n\nSECTION 10\nTherefore take care not to rank above Cato even that very man whom Apollo, as you say, judged the wisest of all; for in Cato it is deeds that are praised, in the other only words.\nBut as for myself, now that I am speaking to you both, let me tell you how matters stand. If I were to deny that I am moved by longing for Scipio, let wise men judge how rightly I should act—but I should certainly be lying. I am indeed moved, bereft as I am of such a friend as, in my judgment, no one will ever be, and, as I can confidently affirm, no one certainly ever was. Yet I need no medicine. I console myself, above all with the consolation that I am free from the error that commonly torments men when their friends die. I believe that no evil has befallen Scipio; it has befallen me, if it has befallen anyone. But to be deeply distressed by one’s own misfortunes is the mark not of a man who loves his friend, but of one who loves himself.\n\nSECTION 11\nWho, indeed, can deny that all went splendidly with him? Unless he had wished for immortality—a thing he thought least of all desirable—what blessing that it was lawful for a human being to desire did he fail to attain? While still a young man, by his incredible valor, he at once surpassed the highest hopes that his fellow citizens had formed of him even in his boyhood. He never sought the consulship, yet was made consul twice: the first time before the legal age, the second at the proper time for himself, though almost too late for the commonwealth. By destroying two cities bitterly hostile to this empire, he put an end not only to wars then being waged, but also to wars yet to come. What need have I to speak of his most gracious manners, his devotion to his mother, his generosity toward his sisters, his kindness to his household, his justice toward all? These things are known to you. How dear he was to the state was shown by the mourning at his funeral. What benefit, then, could the addition of a few years have brought him? For though old age is not burdensome—as I remember Cato discussing with Scipio and me a year before his death—it nevertheless takes away that youthful vigor which Scipio retained even to the end.\n\nSECTION 12\nTherefore, whether in fortune or in glory, his life was such that nothing could have been added to it; and the suddenness of his death spared him all sensation of dying. Of the manner of that death it is difficult to speak; you see what men suspect. Yet this may truthfully be said: of all the many days Publius Scipio saw in his life, days of the greatest distinction and happiness, the most glorious was that day when, after the Senate had adjourned, he was escorted home toward evening by the conscript fathers, the Roman people, the allies, and the Latins—the day before he departed from life—so that from so lofty a pinnacle of dignity he seems to have passed to the gods above rather than to those below.\n\n### Chapter 4\n\nSECTION 13\nFor I do not agree with those who have lately begun to maintain that souls perish together with bodies and that death destroys everything. With me the authority of the ancients carries greater weight: either that of our own ancestors, who accorded such sacred rites to the dead—which they certainly would not have done had they thought those rites in no way concerned them—or that of those who once lived in this land and, by their institutions and teachings, educated Magna Graecia, which now indeed has been destroyed but then was flourishing; or else the authority of that man whom Apollo’s oracle judged the wisest of all. He did not say one thing at one time and another at another, as most men do, but always maintained the same doctrine: that the souls of human beings are divine; that when they have departed from the body, the return to heaven lies open to them; and that the path is swiftest for every soul that is best and most just.\n\nSECTION 14\nScipio held this same belief. Indeed, as though he had a presentiment, a very few days before his death, when Philus and Manilius and several others were present, and you too, Scaevola, had come with me, he discoursed for three days on the commonwealth; and almost the final subject of that discussion was the immortality of souls, a doctrine that he said he had heard from Africanus in a dream. If it is true that at death the soul of every good man most readily flies forth, as from the prison and fetters of the body, whose journey to the gods can we suppose to have been easier than Scipio’s? Therefore I fear that to mourn his fate would be the part of one who envies him rather than of one who loves him. But if the other view is nearer the truth, and souls and bodies suffer the same destruction and no consciousness remains, then, just as there is nothing good in death, there is surely nothing evil. For when sensation is lost, a man becomes just as though he had never been born at all; and yet we rejoice that Scipio was born, and this state, for as long as it endures, will rejoice in it.\n\nSECTION 15\nTherefore, as I said above, all went exceedingly well with him, but less happily with me, since it would have been more fitting that, as I entered life before him, so I should have departed from it before him. Yet I take such pleasure in the recollection of our friendship that I seem to have lived a blessed life because I lived with Scipio. With him I shared concern for public and private affairs; with him I shared both home and military service; and between us there existed that in which the whole power of friendship lies: the most complete harmony of purposes, pursuits, and opinions. And so I take less pleasure in that reputation for wisdom which Fannius mentioned a moment ago—especially since it is undeserved—than in the hope that the memory of our friendship will be everlasting. This is all the dearer to me because, through all the ages, scarcely three or four pairs of friends are named; and among them, I seem justified in hoping that the friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be known to posterity.\n\nSECTION 16\nFANNIUS. That must surely be so, Laelius. But since you have mentioned friendship and we have leisure, you would do me a very great kindness—and, I hope, Scaevola as well—if, just as you are accustomed to discuss other subjects when questions are put to you, you would now discuss friendship: what you think of it, what you judge its nature to be, and what precepts you would give concerning it.\nSCAEVOLA. It would indeed give me pleasure; and just as I was about to make that very request of you, Fannius anticipated me. Therefore you would do us both a very great kindness.\n\n### Chapter 5\n\nSECTION 17\nLAELIUS. I should certainly not be reluctant, if I had confidence in my own ability; for the subject is noble, and, as Fannius has said, we have leisure. But who am I, and what ability have I? It is the custom of learned men—and especially of the Greeks—to have a subject proposed to them on which they may discourse, however suddenly. That is a great undertaking and requires no little practice. Therefore I think you should seek whatever can be formally argued about friendship from those who profess such arts. I can only exhort you to place friendship above all other human things; for nothing is so well suited to nature, nothing so fitting alike in prosperity and adversity.\n\nSECTION 18\nBut this is my first conviction: friendship can exist only among good men. I do not press the definition to the quick, as those do who discuss these matters more subtly—perhaps with truth, but with too little regard for common usefulness. For they deny that anyone is a good man unless he is wise. Let that be so. But by wisdom they mean a perfection that no mortal has yet attained. We, however, must look to what is found in practice and in ordinary life, not to what is imagined or wished for. I shall never say that Gaius Fabricius, Manius Curius, and Tiberius Coruncanius, whom our ancestors judged to be wise, were wise according to the standard of those philosophers. Let them therefore keep for themselves that title of wisdom, invidious and obscure as it is, but let them concede that these men were good. Yet they will not do even that; they will deny that goodness can be conceded to anyone but the wise man.\n\nSECTION 19\nLet us proceed, then, with what they call plain common sense. Men who conduct themselves and live in such a way that their good faith, integrity, fairness, and generosity are approved, who are free from all greed, lust, and recklessness, and who possess great steadfastness—as did those whom I named just now—should, I think, be called good men, just as they have been regarded as good, because, so far as human beings can, they follow nature, the best guide to a good life.\nFor this, I believe, is plainly to be seen: we were born in such a way that there is a certain fellowship among all human beings, but a closer one in proportion as each person stands nearer to us. Thus fellow citizens are dearer than foreigners, and relatives than strangers; for with them nature herself has engendered friendship, though that friendship does not possess sufficient strength. Friendship, indeed, has this advantage over kinship: goodwill may be removed from kinship, but not from friendship; for if goodwill is removed, the name of friendship is removed, while the name of kinship remains.\n\n### Chapter 6\n\nSECTION 20\nHow great the power of friendship is may best be understood from this: out of the boundless fellowship of the human race, which nature herself has brought into being, the relationship has been so contracted and narrowed that every bond of affection is joined either between two persons or among only a few.\nFriendship is nothing other than complete harmony in all things, divine and human, joined with goodwill and affection; and with the possible exception of wisdom, I hardly know whether anything better than friendship has been given to man by the immortal gods. Some prefer riches, others good health, others power, others public honors, and many even pleasures. This last is the aim of beasts; the former are fleeting and uncertain, resting not so much on our own judgment as on the caprice of fortune. Those, however, who place the highest good in virtue are indeed right to do so; but it is this very virtue that both engenders and sustains friendship, nor can friendship exist in any way without virtue.\n\nSECTION 21\nNow let us interpret virtue according to the practice of our own lives and the usage of our own speech, and not measure it, as certain learned men do, by grandiloquent definitions. Let us count as good men those who are commonly so regarded—the Pauli, the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios, the Phili. Ordinary life is content with such men; let us leave aside those who are nowhere to be found at all.\n\nSECTION 22\nFriendship between men of this kind, then, contains advantages so great that I can scarcely express them. To begin with, how can life be “a life worth living,” as Ennius says, if it does not find repose in the mutual goodwill of a friend? What is sweeter than having someone with whom you dare to speak of everything as freely as with yourself? What great enjoyment would there be in prosperity if you had no one to rejoice in it as much as you yourself? And adversity would be difficult to bear without someone who bore it even more heavily than you. Finally, all the other things that people seek are each useful for almost one purpose alone: riches, that you may use them; influence, that you may be courted; public honors, that you may be praised; pleasures, that you may rejoice; health, that you may be free from pain and perform the functions of the body. Friendship embraces the greatest number of purposes. Wherever you turn, it is at hand; it is excluded from no place; it is never untimely, never burdensome. Thus, as the saying goes, we do not use water or fire on more occasions than we use friendship. And I am not now speaking of the ordinary or commonplace kind of friendship, which nevertheless gives both pleasure and benefit, but of friendship true and perfect, such as belonged to those few whose friendships are renowned. For friendship makes prosperity more splendid and adversity lighter by sharing and dividing it.\n\n### Chapter 7\n\nSECTION 23\nAlthough friendship embraces advantages of the greatest number and magnitude, this one unquestionably surpasses them all: it shines before us with bright hope for the future and does not allow our spirits to grow weak or fall. Indeed, he who looks upon a true friend looks, as it were, upon an image of himself. Therefore the absent are present, the needy have abundance, the weak are strong, and—what is harder to say—the dead live: so great are the honor, remembrance, and longing of their friends that attend them. From this, the death of the departed seems blessed, while the life of those who remain is worthy of praise. But if you remove from the universe the bond of goodwill, no household and no city will be able to stand; not even the cultivation of the fields will endure. If it is not sufficiently understood how great the power of friendship and concord is, that power may be perceived from dissension and discord. For what household is so stable, what state so secure, that it cannot be utterly overthrown by hatred and division?\nFrom this one may judge how much good there is in friendship.\n\nSECTION 24\nThey say that a certain learned man of Acragas proclaimed in Greek verse that, among all the things which stand firm or move in nature and throughout the universe, friendship draws them together and discord scatters them. All mortals both understand this and confirm it by their conduct. Thus, whenever a friend has performed some duty by facing dangers or sharing them, who does not exalt that deed with the highest praise? What cries of applause rang through the entire theater not long ago at the new play of my guest-friend and friend Marcus Pacuvius, when, the king not knowing which of the two was Orestes, Pylades declared himself to be Orestes so that he might be killed in his place, while Orestes, as he truly was Orestes, persisted in declaring that he was! The audience stood and applauded a fictitious deed; what do we suppose they would have done at a real one? Nature herself readily revealed her power when men judged that something was rightly done by another which they could not have done themselves.\nThus far, I think I have been able to tell you what I myself believe about friendship. If there are further questions—and I believe there are many—ask them, if you please, of those who make such matters the subject of formal debate.\n\nSECTION 25\nFANNIUS. No, we would rather ask you. Though I have often questioned those men too, and have heard them with no reluctance, to be sure; but the thread of your discourse is of a different kind.\nSCAEVOLA. You would say so all the more, Fannius, if you had recently been present in Scipio’s gardens when the commonwealth was under discussion. What a champion of justice he proved himself then against Philus’s carefully prepared speech!\nFANNIUS. It was easy, certainly, for the most just of men to defend justice.\nSCAEVOLA. Well, then? Is it not easy for him to defend friendship, when he has won the greatest glory by preserving it with the utmost fidelity, steadfastness, and justice?\n\n### Chapter 8\n\nSECTION 26\nLAELIUS. This is force indeed. For what difference does it make how you compel me? You certainly do compel me. To resist the earnest wishes of my sons-in-law, especially in a good cause, is not only difficult but unfair.\nWhenever, then, I reflect upon friendship, this question generally seems to me the one that most deserves consideration: whether friendship has been sought because of weakness and need, so that by giving and receiving services each person might obtain from another whatever he could not accomplish by himself, and repay the favor in turn; or whether this is indeed a property of friendship, while another cause, more ancient, more beautiful, and more directly arising from nature herself, lies beneath it. For love, from which friendship takes its name, is the chief force in binding goodwill together. Advantages, indeed, are often obtained even from men who are cultivated and treated with deference under a pretense of friendship to suit the needs of the moment; but in friendship nothing is false, nothing feigned, and whatever exists in it is genuine and voluntary.\n\nSECTION 27\nTherefore friendship seems to me to have arisen from nature rather than from need, through an inclination of the soul joined with a certain feeling of love, rather than through calculation of how much advantage the relationship would bring. The character of this feeling may be observed even in certain animals: for a time they so love the offspring born from them, and are so loved in return, that their feelings are readily apparent. In human beings this is far more evident: first, from the affection that exists between children and parents, which cannot be severed except by some abominable crime; and then, when a similar feeling of love arises, if we have found someone whose character and nature accord with our own, because we seem to discern in him something like a light of goodness and virtue.\n\nSECTION 28\nFor nothing is more lovable than virtue, nothing more powerfully attracts us to affection, since it is because of virtue and goodness that we feel in some measure affection even for men whom we have never seen. Who can mention Gaius Fabricius or Manius Curius, though he never saw them, without some benevolent affection for their memory? And who does not hate Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius, and Spurius Maelius? Against two commanders, Pyrrhus and Hannibal, we fought for supremacy in Italy. Toward the former, because of his uprightness, we bear no great hostility; the latter, because of his cruelty, this state will always hate.\n\n### Chapter 9\n\nSECTION 29\nBut if the power of goodness is so great that we love it even in those whom we have never seen and, what is more, even in an enemy, what wonder is it if the hearts of men are moved when they seem to discern virtue and goodness in those with whom they may be joined by familiar association? Yet love is strengthened by a kindness received, by devotion clearly perceived, and by the addition of habitual companionship. When these are added to that first impulse of the heart and of love, an astonishing greatness of goodwill blazes forth.\nIf there are those who think this goodwill arises from weakness, so that each person may have someone through whom he can obtain what he desires, they assign to friendship a thoroughly low and, so to speak, ignoble origin, since they would have it born of poverty and need. If that were so, the less a man believed he possessed within himself, the better fitted he would be for friendship. But the truth is far otherwise.\n\nSECTION 30\nFor the more confidence a man has in himself, and the more thoroughly he is fortified by virtue and wisdom, so that he needs no one and judges all his resources to lie within himself, the more he excels in seeking and cultivating friendships. What, then? Was Africanus in need of me? Not in the least, by Hercules! Nor was I in need of him. But I loved him from a certain admiration for his virtue, and he in turn loved me perhaps because of some opinion he had formed of my character; close companionship increased our goodwill. Yet although many great advantages followed, the causes of our affection did not arise from the hope of obtaining them.\n\nSECTION 31\nFor just as we are kindly and generous not in order to exact gratitude—for we do not put a kindness out at interest, but are inclined by nature toward generosity—so we believe that friendship should be sought not because we are led by the hope of reward, but because the whole fruit of friendship lies in love itself.\n\nSECTION 32\nWe differ widely from those who, in the manner of cattle, refer everything to pleasure; and no wonder. Men who have cast down all their thoughts upon a thing so low and contemptible can look up to nothing lofty, nothing magnificent or divine. Let us therefore remove such men from this discussion, and let us ourselves understand that the feeling of love and the affection of goodwill are engendered by nature when goodness has given some sign of itself. Those who are drawn to goodness attach themselves to it and move nearer, so that they may enjoy the companionship and character of the person whom they have begun to love; so that they may be equal and evenly matched in affection, and more inclined to confer benefits than to demand repayment; and so that this honorable rivalry may exist between them. In this way the greatest advantages will be obtained from friendship, and its origin in nature rather than in weakness will be nobler and truer. For if advantage were what cemented friendships, then a change in that advantage would dissolve them; but because nature cannot be changed, true friendships are therefore everlasting.\nYou now see the origin of friendship, unless perhaps you wish to say something in reply.\nFANNIUS. No, do go on, Laelius! For in behalf of Scaevola here, who is younger than I, I answer by my senior’s right.\n\n### Chapter 10\n\nSECTION 33\nSCAEVOLA. Quite right. Let us therefore listen.\nLAELIUS. Then listen, excellent friends, to the things most frequently discussed between Scipio and me concerning friendship. He used to say, however, that nothing was more difficult than for a friendship to endure until the final day of life: for it often happened either that the same course ceased to be advantageous to both, or that they no longer held the same views about the commonwealth. He also said that men’s characters often changed, sometimes through adversity, sometimes under the increasing burden of age. He drew an example of these changes from the likeness of early youth, because the strongest affections among boys were often laid aside together with the bordered toga;\n\nSECTION 34\nand even if those affections continued into young manhood, they were nevertheless sometimes severed by rivalry over a marriage match or over some advantage that both could not obtain. And if some men advanced still farther in friendship, their bond was nevertheless often shaken if they became rivals for public office. For no plague, he said, was more destructive to friendships than greed for money in most men, and, in the very best, competition for office and glory—a source from which the bitterest enmities had often arisen between the closest of friends.\n\nSECTION 35\nSerious and generally just divisions also arose when something dishonorable was demanded of friends—for example, that they become agents of another’s lust or accomplices in wrongdoing. Those who refused, however honorably they acted, were nevertheless accused of abandoning the obligations of friendship by the men whose wishes they would not obey; while those who dared to demand anything whatever from a friend professed by the very demand that they themselves would do everything for a friend’s sake. Their long-standing grievance commonly destroyed not only intimacy but also engendered everlasting hatred. So many dangers, he said, hung over friendships like so many decrees of fate that to escape them all seemed to him a matter not merely of wisdom but also of good fortune.\n\n### Chapter 11\n\nSECTION 36\nTherefore let us first consider, if you please, how far affection ought to advance in friendship. If Coriolanus had friends, should they have borne arms with Coriolanus against their country? Should the friends of Vecellinus have aided him when he sought to make himself king, or those of Maelius have aided him?\n\nSECTION 37\nWe saw Tiberius Gracchus, when he was convulsing the republic, abandoned by Quintus Tubero and the friends of his own age. But Gaius Blossius of Cumae, a guest-friend of your family, Scaevola, came to me to plead for pardon—for I sat on the council of the consuls Laenas and Rupilius—and offered this as his excuse: that he had valued Tiberius Gracchus so highly that he thought himself bound to do whatever Gracchus wished. Then I said, “Even if he had wished you to carry torches against the Capitol?” “He would never have wished that,” he replied; “but if he had, I should have obeyed.” You see what an impious declaration that was. And, by Hercules, he acted accordingly—or even went beyond what he had said; for he did not merely obey the recklessness of Tiberius Gracchus, but took command of it, presenting himself not as the companion of his madness but as its leader. And so, in consequence of this frenzy, terrified by the special inquiry, he fled to Asia, joined the enemies of Rome, and paid to the republic the heavy and just penalty he owed.\n\nThere is therefore no excuse for wrongdoing if you have done wrong for a friend’s sake; for since an esteem for virtue has been the bond that first creates friendship, friendship can scarcely endure if you forsake virtue.\n\nSECTION 38\nNow if we were to establish as right the principle that we should grant our friends whatever they wish, and obtain from them whatever we ourselves wish, the matter would indeed contain no fault—provided that we possessed perfect wisdom. But we are speaking of those friends who stand before our eyes, whom we see, or of whom tradition has given us knowledge, men known to ordinary life. From their number we must take our examples, and especially from those who approach most nearly to wisdom.\n\nSECTION 39\nWe know that Papus Aemilius was an intimate friend of Gaius Luscinus—for so we have learned from our fathers—and that they were twice consuls together and colleagues in the censorship. Tradition also records that Manius Curius and Tiberius Coruncanius were most closely united both with them and with each other. We cannot, therefore, even suspect that any one of these men ever demanded from a friend anything contrary to good faith, contrary to his oath, or contrary to the republic. Indeed, what need is there to say of such men that, had one made such a demand, he would not have obtained it, when they were men of the most scrupulous integrity, and when it is equally impious either to do such a thing when asked or to ask it? Tiberius Gracchus, however, was followed by Gaius Carbo and Gaius Cato—and, least of all at that time, by his brother Gaius, who is now his most ardent partisan.\n\n### Chapter 12\n\nSECTION 40\nLet this law, then, be established in friendship: that we neither ask for dishonorable things nor do them when asked. For it is a shameful excuse, and one that must by no means be accepted in any wrongdoing, least of all when a man admits that for a friend’s sake he has acted against the republic. For we, Fannius and Scaevola, have been placed in such a position that we are bound to look far ahead to the future dangers of the republic. The practice of our ancestors has already swerved somewhat from its proper course and track.\n\nSECTION 41\nTiberius Gracchus attempted to seize royal power—or rather, he actually reigned for a few months. Had the Roman people ever heard or seen anything like it? What his friends and kinsmen, continuing his course even after his death, did to Publius Scipio I cannot tell without tears. As for Carbo, we tolerated him as best we could because the punishment of Tiberius Gracchus was still fresh. But what I anticipate from the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus I do not care to prophesy. The evil then creeps onward, and once it has begun, it glides down the slope toward destruction. You see how great a corruption has already been caused by the ballot tablet: first through the Gabinian law, and two years later through the Cassian. I already seem to see the people estranged from the Senate and the gravest matters conducted at the caprice of the multitude. For more men will learn how such things are done than how they may be resisted.\n\nSECTION 42\nTo what end do I say this? Because no one attempts any such thing without accomplices. Good men must therefore be warned that, if through ignorance or some accident they fall into friendships of that kind, they must not think themselves so bound that they cannot withdraw from friends who are committing some grave offense against the republic. The wicked, moreover, must be assigned their punishment, and those who follow another should be punished no less severely than those who themselves have been the leaders in impiety. Who in Greece was more illustrious than Themistocles, who more powerful? Yet after, as commander in the Persian War, he had freed Greece from slavery, and had then been driven into exile through envy, he did not endure the injustice of his ungrateful country, though he ought to have endured it. He did the same thing that Coriolanus had done among us twenty years before. Neither man found anyone to assist him against his country; and so each took his own life.\n\nSECTION 43\nSuch a conspiracy among wicked men, therefore, must not merely be denied the shelter of friendship as an excuse; rather, it must be punished with every penalty, so that no one may suppose himself permitted to follow a friend who makes war upon his country. And indeed, considering the course events have begun to take, I am not sure that this may not happen someday. For my concern about what the republic will be after my death is no less than my concern about what it is today.\n\n### Chapter 13\n\nSECTION 44\nLet this, then, be established as the first law of friendship: that we ask honorable things of our friends and do honorable things for their sake; that we do not even wait until we are asked; that eagerness should always be present and hesitation absent; that we dare freely to give honest counsel; that in friendship the authority of friends who offer sound advice should have the greatest weight; that such authority should be employed in admonition, not only openly but even sternly if the occasion demands; and that, once employed, it should be obeyed.\n\nSECTION 45\nFor certain men whom I hear were regarded as wise in Greece seem to me to have adopted some astonishing opinions—though there is nothing they will not pursue with their subtle arguments. Some held that excessively close friendships should be avoided, lest one man be forced to bear anxiety for many; that each man has enough and more than enough to do with his own concerns; that it is troublesome to become too deeply entangled in those of others; and that the most convenient course is to keep the reins of friendship as loose as possible, so that one may draw them tight or slacken them whenever one wishes. For, they say, the chief requirement for a happy life is freedom from care, which the mind cannot enjoy if one man is, as it were, in labor for many.\n\nSECTION 46\nOthers, they say, speak even more inhumanly, touching upon a point I briefly mentioned a little while ago: that friendships should be sought for the sake of protection and assistance, not from goodwill or affection. Therefore, the less firmness and strength a man possessed, the more eagerly he sought friendships. From this it followed, they said, that weak women seek the protection of friendships more than men do, the poor more than the rich, and the unfortunate more than those who are thought prosperous.\n\nSECTION 47\nWhat glorious wisdom! For those who remove friendship from life seem to remove the sun from the world; and from the immortal gods we possess nothing better than friendship, nothing more delightful. For what is this freedom from care? In appearance, indeed, it is alluring, but in reality it must be rejected in many circumstances. It is not reasonable to refuse to undertake any honorable affair or action, or to abandon it once undertaken, merely to avoid anxiety. If we flee from care, we must flee from virtue, for virtue must necessarily reject and hate, with some degree of concern, those things that are opposed to it: goodness, for example, hates malice; temperance, sensuality; and courage, cowardice. Thus you may observe that just men are most distressed by injustice, brave men by cowardice, and modest men by disgraceful conduct. It is therefore the mark of a rightly ordered mind both to rejoice in good things and to grieve at their opposites.\n\n### Chapter 14\n\nSECTION 48\nTherefore, if sorrow of mind falls upon the wise man—and assuredly it does, unless we suppose that all humanity has been torn from his soul—what reason is there for removing friendship utterly from life, merely to avoid taking upon ourselves some troubles on its account? For if all emotion is taken away, what difference remains—not merely between a beast and a human being, but between a human being and a tree trunk, a stone, or anything else of that kind? Nor should we listen to those who would have virtue be something hard and almost ironlike. In many matters, and especially in friendship, virtue is tender and responsive, so that it expands, as it were, at a friend’s good fortune and contracts at his misfortunes. Therefore, the anguish that must often be borne for a friend is not powerful enough to abolish friendship from life, any more than the cares and troubles brought by the virtues are sufficient reason for rejecting the virtues themselves.\n\nBut since friendship is formed, as I said above, when some indication of virtue shines forth and a kindred spirit draws near and attaches itself to it, then, whenever that occurs, love must necessarily arise.\n\nSECTION 49\nFor what could be more absurd than to delight greatly in many empty things—honor, fame, buildings, clothing, and bodily adornment—and yet take little delight in a living being endowed with virtue, one who can love or, so to speak, return love? For nothing is more delightful than goodwill repaid, nothing more pleasing than the mutual exchange of devotion and service.\n\nSECTION 50\nAnd what if we also add—and rightly may it be added—that there is nothing which so entices and draws one thing to another as likeness draws men into friendship? It will surely be granted as true that good men love other good men and attach them to themselves as though united by kinship and nature. For nothing is more eager or more grasping in its pursuit of what resembles itself than nature. Therefore, Fannius and Scaevola, this much, I think, must be accepted as certain: among good men there exists an almost necessary goodwill toward other good men, and this goodwill is the fountain of friendship established by nature. But the same goodness also extends to the multitude. For virtue is not inhuman, selfish, or arrogant; it is accustomed to protect whole nations and to consult their welfare in the best possible way, which it certainly would not do if it shrank from affection for the common people.\n\nSECTION 51\nIndeed, those who invent friendships for the sake of advantage seem to me to destroy the most lovable bond of friendship. For it is not so much the advantage obtained through a friend that gives us pleasure as the friend’s love itself; and what comes from a friend becomes delightful only if it has sprung from devotion. So far are friendships from being cultivated because of need that those who, by reason of wealth, resources, and above all virtue—in which lies the greatest protection—have the least need of another are the most generous and beneficent. Indeed, I am inclined to think that it is not even desirable for friends never to lack anything at all. For when would my devotion have had the opportunity to exert itself if Scipio had never needed my advice or assistance, either at home or in war? Friendship, therefore, did not follow advantage; rather, advantage followed friendship.\n\n### Chapter 15\n\nSECTION 52\nWe should not, therefore, listen to men dissolved in luxury if they ever discourse upon friendship, which they know neither from experience nor from reason. For who is there, in the name of gods and men, who would choose to overflow with every resource and live amid an abundance of all things, on the condition that he love no one and himself be loved by no one? Such, of course, is the life of tyrants, in which there can be no good faith, no affection, no settled confidence in goodwill: everything is always suspicious and anxious, and there is no place for friendship.\n\nSECTION 53\nFor who can love a man whom he fears, or one by whom he believes himself to be feared? Yet tyrants are courted in pretense, at least for a time. But if they happen to fall, as generally happens, it is then understood how destitute of friends they were. Thus Tarquinius is said to have declared in exile that only then did he understand which of his friends had been faithful and which unfaithful, when he was no longer able to repay either kind.\n\nSECTION 54\nAnd yet, considering his arrogance and brutality, I wonder whether he could ever have had any friend at all. Just as the character of the man I have mentioned made it impossible for him to acquire true friends, so the wealth of many men of overwhelming power excludes faithful friendships. For not only is Fortune herself blind, but she also generally makes blind those whom she embraces. Consequently, they are commonly carried away by disdain and insolence; and nothing can be more intolerable than a fortunate fool. Indeed, one may observe that men whose characters were formerly agreeable are changed by command, power, and prosperity: old friendships are scorned by them, while new ones are indulged.\n\nSECTION 55\nWhat, moreover, could be more foolish than for men who possess the greatest abundance of resources, means, and wealth to procure everything else that money can procure—horses, servants, splendid clothing, costly vessels—yet fail to procure friends, the best and fairest furniture, so to speak, of life? For when they acquire those other things, they do not know for whom they are acquiring them or for whose sake they labor; since each of those possessions belongs to whoever proves strongest, while every man’s possession of his friendships remains stable and secure. Thus, even if those things which are, as it were, the gifts of Fortune should remain, life, if uncultivated and bereft of friends, still could not be pleasant. But enough on this point.\n\n### Chapter 16\n\nSECTION 56\nWe must now determine what the bounds of friendship are, and what may be called the limits of affection. On this subject I see three opinions advanced, none of which I approve: first, that we should feel toward a friend exactly as we feel toward ourselves; second, that our goodwill toward our friends should correspond precisely and equally to their goodwill toward us; and third, that a man should be valued by his friends at exactly the value he sets upon himself.\n\nSECTION 57\nI assent to none of these three opinions at all. For the first is not true—that a man should feel toward his friend just as he feels toward himself. How many things we do for our friends that we would never do for our own sake! We make requests of an unworthy man, we resort to entreaty, we assail someone more bitterly and pursue him more vehemently—acts that would be hardly honorable in our own affairs, but become entirely honorable when done for our friends. And there are many circumstances in which good men surrender, and allow to be taken from them, much of their own advantage, so that their friends rather than they themselves may enjoy it.\n\nSECTION 58\nThe second opinion defines friendship as an equal exchange of services and goodwill. But this is to reduce friendship to far too narrow and meager an accounting, insisting that the balance of receipts and payments must be even. True friendship seems to me richer and more abundant, and it does not keep a strict watch lest it give back more than it has received. For there is no reason to fear that something will spill over, or run to waste upon the ground, or that more than is fair will be heaped into friendship.\n\nSECTION 59\nThe third limit, however, is the worst of all: that a man should be valued by his friends exactly as highly as he values himself. For often in some men the spirit is too downcast, or their hope of improving their fortunes too broken. It is therefore not the part of a friend to feel toward such a man as he feels toward himself, but rather to strive to raise his friend’s prostrate spirit and lead him to better hopes and thoughts. Some other limit must therefore be established for true friendship, after I have first related what saying Scipio was accustomed above all to condemn. He maintained that no utterance more hostile to friendship could possibly have been devised than that of the man who said that one ought to love as if one were someday going to hate. Nor could he be persuaded to believe, as was commonly supposed, that Bias had said this—Bias, who was counted one of the Seven Sages. It was the maxim, he thought, of some impure or ambitious man, or of one who made everything serve his own power. For how can anyone be a friend to a man whom he believes he may someday be able to hate? Indeed, he will necessarily wish and hope that his friend may do wrong as often as possible, so as to give him, as it were, more handles for reproach; and conversely, he will necessarily be distressed, grieved, and envious at his friends’ right actions and successes.\n\nSECTION 60\nTherefore this precept, whoever its author may be, serves only to destroy friendship. The rule that ought rather to have been given is that we should exercise such care in forming friendships that we never begin to love a man whom we might someday come to hate. Indeed, even if we had been less fortunate in our choice, Scipio thought that this should be endured rather than that we should look ahead to a time of enmity.\n\n### Chapter 17\n\nSECTION 61\nThese, then, are the limits that I believe should be observed: when the characters of friends are morally sound, there should be between them, without any exception, a complete community of interests, purposes, and desires. Even if by some chance it should happen that we must assist desires of our friends that are not altogether just, in cases where their life or reputation is at stake, we may have to depart from the straight path, provided that utter disgrace does not follow; for there is a certain point up to which friendship may be granted indulgence. Yet reputation must not be neglected, nor should we regard the goodwill of our fellow citizens as an insignificant weapon in the conduct of affairs. To gather it by flattery and servile assent is shameful; but virtue, which is followed by affection, must by no means be rejected.\n\nSECTION 62\nBut—for I often return to Scipio, whose entire conversation was about friendship—he used to complain that men were more careful in every other matter: each could say how many goats and sheep he owned, but could not say how many friends he had. They exercised care in acquiring the former, yet were negligent in choosing friends, and possessed no marks or signs, as it were, by which to judge who was fit for friendship. We must therefore choose men who are firm, steady, and constant, a kind of which there is a great scarcity. Yet it is certainly difficult to judge a man without testing him, and the test must be made within friendship itself. Thus friendship outruns judgment and takes away the opportunity for testing.\n\nSECTION 63\nIt is therefore the part of a prudent man to check the rush of goodwill, as he would check a runner’s course, so that we may enter upon friendship only after putting our friends’ characters to the test in some degree, just as we use horses only after testing them. Some men are often revealed in a small matter of money, showing how unstable they are; while others, whom a small sum could not move, are exposed when a great sum is involved. But even if some are found who consider it sordid to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find men who do not place honors, magistracies, military commands, civil authority, and power above friendship—men who, when these things are offered on one side and the claims of friendship on the other, will not greatly prefer the former? For human nature is too weak to despise power; and even if men attain it by disregarding friendship, they suppose that their conduct will be obscured because friendship cannot have been disregarded without some weighty cause.\n\nSECTION 64\nThus true friendships are especially difficult to find among those engaged in the pursuit of public office and affairs of state. For where will you find the man who prefers his friend’s advancement to his own? And, to pass over this point, how burdensome and how difficult most men find it to share in another’s misfortunes! It is not easy to find one who will descend into them. Although Ennius rightly says, “A sure friend is discerned in an unsure hour,” still these two circumstances convict most men of fickleness and weakness: either they scorn their friends in prosperity or desert them in adversity. The man, therefore, who in both conditions has shown himself serious, constant, and steadfast in friendship must be judged to belong to a supremely rare and almost divine class of men.\n\n### Chapter 18\n\nSECTION 65\nThe foundation of that stability and constancy which we seek in friendship is good faith, for nothing that is faithless can be stable. We should also choose a man who is frank, sociable, and sympathetic—that is, one who is moved by the same things as ourselves; and all these qualities belong to fidelity. For a devious and tortuous nature cannot be faithful; nor can a man who is not moved by the same things and is not congenial in nature be either faithful or steadfast. To this must be added that he should neither delight in bringing accusations nor believe them when they are brought to him; and all these qualities belong to that constancy which I have been discussing for some time. Thus the statement I made at the beginning proves true: friendship can exist only among good men.\nFor it is the mark of a good man, whom we may equally call a wise man, to observe these two principles in friendship: first, that there be nothing false or feigned in it, since it is more honorable even to hate openly than to hide one’s opinion behind one’s countenance; and second, not merely to reject accusations brought by another, but also to refrain from being suspicious himself, forever imagining that his friend has somehow wronged him.\n\nSECTION 66\nTo these qualities there should be added a certain sweetness of speech and manners, by no means an insignificant seasoning of friendship. Gloom and unrelenting sternness do indeed possess a certain dignity, but friendship should be more relaxed, more free, and more agreeable, and more readily inclined toward every form of courtesy and affability.\n\n### Chapter 19\n\nSECTION 67\nAt this point, however, there arises a somewhat difficult question: whether new friends who are worthy of friendship should ever be preferred to old ones, just as we are accustomed to prefer young horses to aged ones. The doubt is unworthy of a human being. For there should be no satiety in friendships, as there is in other things. The oldest friendships, like wines that bear aging, should be the sweetest; and the saying is true that many bushels of salt must be eaten together before the full duty of friendship has been discharged.\n\nSECTION 68\nNew friendships, however, if they offer hope that fruit will appear, as it does on plants that do not disappoint us, are certainly not to be rejected; yet old friendship must be preserved in its proper place, for the power of age and habit is very great. Indeed, in the case of the very horse I mentioned just now, if nothing stands in the way, everyone would rather use the one to which he is accustomed than one that is untrained and new. Nor does habit exert its force only upon this, which is a living creature, but also upon inanimate things, since we take delight in the very places—even mountainous and wooded places—in which we have long resided.\n\nSECTION 69\nBut the most important thing in friendship is that the superior should make himself equal to the inferior. For there are often certain distinctions of eminence, such as Scipio possessed within our little circle, so to speak. Yet he never placed himself above Philus, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or any of his friends of lower rank. His brother Quintus Maximus, indeed, an altogether excellent man but by no means his equal, Scipio treated as his superior because he was older; and he wished all his friends to become more distinguished through his support.\n\nSECTION 70\nThis is what all men should do and imitate: if they have attained any excellence of character, intellect, or fortune, they should share it with their own people and impart it to those nearest them. Thus, if they were born of humble parents, or if they have relatives weaker either in spirit or in fortune, they should increase their resources and bring them honor and dignity. So in the stories, those who for some time lived in servitude because their stock and lineage were unknown, when they are recognized and discovered to be the sons of gods or kings, nevertheless retain their affection for the shepherds whom for many years they regarded as their fathers. Surely this ought to be done far more in the case of real and acknowledged fathers. For the greatest fruit of intellect, virtue, and every kind of excellence is reaped when it is bestowed upon each of those nearest to us.\n\n### Chapter 20\n\nSECTION 71\nTherefore, just as those who hold the higher place in the bonds of friendship and close association ought to put themselves on an equal footing with those below them, so the latter ought not to resent being surpassed by their friends in intellect, fortune, or rank. Yet most of them are forever complaining about something, or even making reproaches, especially if they think they can claim to have performed some act dutifully, affectionately, and with effort on their part. A truly odious breed of men are those who reproach others with their services—services which the recipient ought to remember, but which the giver ought not to mention.\n\nSECTION 72\nTherefore, just as those who are superior ought to lower themselves in friendship, so they ought in a certain sense to raise up those who are inferior. For some men make friendships burdensome because they imagine that they are being despised—something that generally happens only to those who think themselves deserving of contempt. Such men must be relieved of this belief not only by words, but also by deeds.\n\nSECTION 73\nMoreover, each person should be granted only so much as, first, you yourself are able to accomplish, and, second, the person whom you love and assist is able to bear. For however eminent you may be, you cannot advance all your friends to the highest offices. Scipio, for example, was able to make Publius Rupilius consul, but he could not do the same for Rupilius’s brother Lucius. Even if you could bestow anything whatever upon another, you must still consider what he is capable of bearing.\n\nSECTION 74\nAs a general rule, friendships should be judged only after both character and age have grown settled and mature. If some men in early youth shared a passion for hunting or ball-playing, they need not therefore regard as intimate friends all those whom they loved at the time because they shared the same enthusiasm. On that principle, nurses and tutors would, by right of long acquaintance, claim the greatest share of our affection. They should not, indeed, be neglected, but they must be valued in a different way; otherwise stable friendships cannot endure. For unlike characters lead to unlike pursuits, and this dissimilarity severs friendships. Nor is there any other reason why good men cannot be friends with the wicked, or the wicked with the good, except that the distance between their characters and pursuits is as great as it can possibly be.\n\nSECTION 75\nIt may also rightly be laid down as a rule in friendship that an unrestrained affection must not, as very often happens, obstruct a friend’s great opportunities. To return to the legends, Neoptolemus could not have captured Troy if he had chosen to heed Lycomedes, at whose court he had been reared, when with many tears the king tried to prevent his departure. And important occasions often arise when one must part from friends. Whoever seeks to prevent this because he cannot easily endure the longing is weak and soft by nature, and for that very reason is less than just in friendship.\n\n### Chapter 21\n\nSECTION 76\nIn every matter, therefore, one must consider both what one asks of a friend and what one allows a friend to obtain from oneself.\n\nThere is also a certain misfortune sometimes unavoidable in dissolving friendships—for now our discourse is descending from the intimate relations of the wise to ordinary friendships. The faults of friends often burst forth, sometimes against their friends themselves, sometimes against strangers, though the resulting disgrace spills over upon their friends. Friendships of this kind should therefore be effaced by gradually relaxing the intimacy and, as I heard Cato say, should be unstitched rather than torn apart—unless some utterly intolerable wrong has blazed forth, making it neither right nor honorable, nor indeed possible, to avoid an immediate estrangement and separation.\n\nSECTION 77\nBut if, as commonly happens, some change has taken place either in character or in pursuits, or if disagreement has arisen over political allegiance—I am speaking now, as I said a little earlier, not of friendships among the wise but of ordinary friendships—care must be taken that it not appear that friendship has merely been laid aside and hostility taken up in its place. For nothing is more shameful than to wage war against a man with whom one has lived on intimate terms. Scipio, as you know, had withdrawn from friendship with Quintus Pompeius on my account; and because of the political disagreement between them, he became estranged from our colleague Metellus. In both cases he acted with dignity and restraint, and without bitter resentment.\n\nSECTION 78\nFor this reason, our first care must be to prevent any breach between friends; but if such a thing does occur, we should make it seem that the friendship has died out rather than been violently destroyed. We must also take care that friendships do not turn into bitter enmities, from which quarrels, abuse, and insults arise. Yet if these are bearable, they must be endured, and this honor must be paid to the old friendship: the blame for the wrong should rest upon the man who commits it, not upon the man who suffers it.\n\nIn general, there is one safeguard and one precaution against all these faults and troubles: people must not begin to love too quickly, nor love those who are unworthy.\n\nSECTION 79\nThose, however, are worthy of friendship who possess within themselves the reason why they should be loved. A rare breed! Yet all excellent things are rare, and nothing is more difficult than to find something wholly perfect of its kind in every respect. But most men recognize no good in human affairs except what is profitable, and they prize as friends, much as they do livestock, those from whom they hope to reap the greatest gain.\n\nSECTION 80\nThus they are deprived of that loveliest and most natural friendship, sought for its own sake and because of itself; nor do they take themselves as an example from which to learn the nature and magnitude of friendship’s power. For every man loves himself, not because he demands some payment from himself in return for his affection, but because each man is dear to himself for his own sake. Unless this same principle is carried over into friendship, a true friend will never be found; for a true friend is, as it were, a second self.\n\nSECTION 81\nIf this is evident among animals—birds, creatures of the water, beasts of the field, tame and wild—first, that they love themselves, for this instinct is born alike in every living creature; and then, that they seek and desire other animals of their own kind to which they may attach themselves, doing so with longing and with something resembling human love—how much more naturally does this happen in man, who both loves himself and seeks another whose soul he may so mingle with his own as to make almost one soul out of two!\n\n### Chapter 22\n\nSECTION 82\nYet most men perversely—not to say shamelessly—wish to have the sort of friend they themselves are incapable of being, and they demand from their friends what they do not give to them. It is only fair that a man should first be good himself and then seek another like himself. Among such men the stability in friendship that we have long been discussing can be made secure: united by mutual affection, they will first master the desires to which other men are enslaved; then they will delight in fairness and justice, each will undertake everything for the other, and neither will ever ask of the other anything that is not honorable and right. Nor will they merely respect and love each other; they will also stand in awe of one another. For whoever removes a sense of shame from friendship strips it of its greatest adornment.\n\nSECTION 83\nTherefore, those who believe that friendship gives free license to every passion and every sin are dangerously mistaken. Friendship was given us by nature as the helper of virtue, not as the companion of vice, so that virtue, since it could not reach the highest goals in isolation, might reach them when joined and allied with another. If such a partnership exists between any men, or has existed, or ever will exist, theirs must be considered the best and happiest companionship on the journey toward nature’s highest good.\n\nSECTION 84\nThis, I say, is the partnership that contains everything men deem desirable—honor, glory, tranquility of mind, and delight—so that when these are present life is happy, and without them it cannot be happy.\n\nSince this is the best and greatest end, if we wish to attain it we must devote ourselves to virtue, without which we can obtain neither friendship nor anything else worth desiring. Those who neglect virtue yet imagine that they have friends discover at last that they were mistaken when some grave misfortune compels them to put those friends to the test.\n\nSECTION 85\nFor this reason—for it must be said again and again—you ought to love after you have judged, not judge after you have loved. But though we are punished for carelessness in many matters, we are punished most of all for carelessness in choosing and cherishing our friends. For we reverse the proper order of deliberation and try to undo what is already done, though an ancient proverb forbids it. After we have become entangled with one another through long association or even through mutual services, we suddenly break off our friendships in midcourse when some offense arises.\n\n### Chapter 23\n\nSECTION 86\nAll the more blameworthy, therefore, is such great carelessness in a matter of the greatest necessity. For friendship is the one thing in human affairs whose usefulness everyone affirms with one voice. Virtue itself, indeed, is despised by many, who call it a kind of advertising and display. Many men scorn riches and, content with little, take pleasure in modest food and a simple manner of life. As for public honors, which set some men ablaze with desire, how many despise them so utterly that they regard nothing as emptier or more frivolous! Likewise, many men count as worthless the other things that seem marvelous to some. But about friendship everyone, without exception, thinks alike: those who have devoted themselves to public affairs, those who delight in the knowledge and study of the world, those who attend to their own business in a life of leisure, and, finally, those who have surrendered themselves wholly to pleasure—all agree that without friendship life is no life at all, provided they wish to live in some measure as free and cultivated men.\n\nSECTION 87\nFor friendship somehow winds its way through every human life and permits no manner of passing one’s days to remain wholly without it.\n\nIndeed, even if a man were so harsh and savage by nature that he shunned and hated all contact with mankind—such a man as we are told that a certain Timon was at Athens—even he could not endure without seeking someone into whose presence he might spew the venom of his bitterness. This truth would be most clearly tested if something of the following sort could happen: suppose some god were to remove us from this crowded world of men and set us somewhere in complete solitude, supplying us there with abundance and plenty of everything nature desires, yet depriving us utterly of the power to see another human being. Who would be so hard as to endure such a life? From whom would solitude not rob every pleasure of its fruit?\n\n### Chapter 24\n\nSECTION 88\nTrue, then, is that saying which, as I recall, our elders used to attribute to Archytas of Tarentum, having heard it from elders of their own: if a man ascended into heaven and beheld the structure of the universe and the beauty of the stars, his wonder would give him no delight, though it would have been supremely delightful if he had had someone to whom he could tell of it. Thus nature loves nothing solitary and always leans upon something as though upon a supporting prop; and the sweetest support is found in one’s closest friend.\n\nYet although nature makes clear by so many signs what she wills, seeks, and desires, somehow we grow deaf and do not hear her warnings. For the practice of friendship is varied and complex, and many occasions for suspicion and offense arise; it is the part of a wise man sometimes to avoid them, sometimes to lessen them, and sometimes to endure them. One kind of offense alone must be risked if usefulness and loyalty are to be preserved in friendship: friends must often be admonished and rebuked, and such admonitions, when kindly meant, must be received in a friendly spirit.\n\nSECTION 89\nBut somehow it is true, as my friend says in The Woman of Andros:\n\n“Complaisance wins friends; truth breeds hatred.”\n\nTruth is troublesome if hatred, the poison of friendship, springs from it; but complaisance is much more troublesome, since by indulging his faults it allows a friend to rush headlong to ruin. The greatest blame, however, belongs to the man who both rejects the truth and is driven into deception by complaisance.\n\nIn this whole matter, therefore, judgment and care must be exercised: first, admonition must be free of bitterness; second, rebuke must be free of insult. In complaisance—since we are glad to use Terence’s word—let courtesy be present, but let flattery, the accomplice of vice, be banished far away; for flattery is unworthy not merely of a friend but even of a free man. One lives with a tyrant in one manner, with a friend in another.\n\nSECTION 90\nBut if a man’s ears are closed to the truth so that he cannot bear to hear it from a friend, his salvation must be despaired of. For that saying of Cato’s, like many of his sayings, is shrewd: bitter enemies serve some men better than friends who seem agreeable; the former often speak the truth, the latter never. And it is absurd that those who are admonished do not feel the distress they ought to feel, but do feel the distress from which they ought to be free. They are not anguished because they have done wrong; they resent being rebuked. Yet the reverse would be proper: they should grieve at the offense and rejoice at the correction.\n\n### Chapter 25\n\nSECTION 91\nJust as it is the mark of true friendship both to admonish and to be admonished—the one to be done frankly, though not harshly, and the other to be received patiently, without resentment—so we must hold that no plague in friendship is greater than flattery, cajolery, and servile assent. For, however many names one gives it, this vice belongs to shallow and deceitful men, who say everything to please and nothing for the sake of truth.\n\nSECTION 92\nNow, while pretense is vicious in every matter, because it destroys and corrupts our judgment of what is true, it is most of all opposed to friendship; for it abolishes truth, without which the very name of friendship can have no force. For since the power of friendship consists in this, that a single mind is formed, as it were, from several, how can that come to pass if even within each person there is not one and the same mind at all times, but one that is shifting, changeable, and manifold?\n\nSECTION 93\nWhat, indeed, can be so pliant, so wayward, as the mind of a man who adjusts himself not merely to another’s feelings and wishes, but even to his expression and his nod? “He says no; I say no. He says yes; I say yes. In short, I have ordered myself to assent to everything,” as the same Terence says—but he puts the words into the mouth of Gnatho. To admit such a sort of man as a friend is sheer folly.\n\nSECTION 94\nYet there are many men like Gnatho who surpass others in rank, fortune, and reputation; and their assent becomes especially offensive when authority is added to their vanity.\n\nSECTION 95\nBut with due care a flattering friend can be distinguished and discerned from a true one, just as everything painted and counterfeit can be distinguished from what is genuine and true. Even a public assembly, though composed of the most inexperienced men, is usually able to judge the difference between a demagogue—that is, a flattering and frivolous citizen—and one who is steadfast, sincere, and serious.\n\nSECTION 96\nWith what flatteries Gaius Papirius lately flooded the ears of the assembly when he proposed his law permitting tribunes of the plebs to be reelected! We spoke against it; but I shall say nothing of myself—I would rather speak of Scipio. Immortal gods, what dignity he possessed, what majesty in his speech! You could readily have called him the leader of the Roman people, not their follower. But you were present, and the speech is in everyone’s hands. And so a popular law was rejected by the votes of the people.\n\nAnd, to return to myself, you remember, when Quintus Maximus, Scipio’s brother, and Lucius Mancinus were consuls, how popular Gaius Licinius Crassus’s law concerning the priesthoods appeared to be; for the right of filling vacancies in the colleges was being transferred to the favor of the people. He, incidentally, was the first to establish the practice of addressing the people while facing toward the Forum. Yet, when I spoke in defense of it, reverence for the immortal gods easily overcame his marketable oratory. This occurred while I was praetor, five years before I was elected consul. Thus that cause was defended more by its own merits than by the highest personal authority.\n\n### Chapter 26\n\nSECTION 97\nBut if truth prevails even upon the stage—that is, in a public assembly, where there is ample scope for fiction and mere semblance—provided only that the truth is laid bare and brought into the light, what ought to happen in friendship, which is measured wholly by truth? Unless in friendship, as the saying goes, you see an open heart and reveal your own, you can have nothing trustworthy, nothing certain—not even the assurance that you love or are loved, since you do not know how genuine that love is. And yet this flattery, pernicious though it may be, can harm no one except the man who welcomes it and takes pleasure in it. Thus it happens that the man who most readily opens his ears to flatterers is the one who flatters himself and takes the greatest delight in himself.\n\nSECTION 98\nVirtue, to be sure, loves itself; for it knows itself perfectly and understands how lovable it is. But I am not now speaking of virtue, but of the reputation for virtue. For many wish not so much to possess virtue itself as to appear to possess it. Such men delight in flattery; when a feigned speech is fashioned to suit their wishes, they take that hollow language as testimony to their own praises. There is no friendship, then, when one man is unwilling to hear the truth and the other is prepared to lie. Nor would the flattery of parasites in comedies seem witty to us if there were no swaggering soldiers.\n\n“Does Thais truly offer me great thanks?”\n\nIt would have been enough to answer, “Great thanks.”\n\n“No—enormous thanks,” he says.\n\nThe flatterer always magnifies whatever the man whose wishes he is serving wants to be considered great.\n\nSECTION 99\nTherefore, although this flattering falsehood has its power chiefly over those who themselves entice and invite it, even men of greater seriousness and constancy must be warned to take care lest they be caught by cunning flattery.\n\nFor no one fails to recognize open adulation unless he is utterly witless; but great care must be taken that the subtle and secret flatterer does not insinuate himself. He is not at all easy to recognize, since he often flatters even while opposing us, cajoles us while pretending to quarrel, and at last surrenders and allows himself to be defeated, so that the man who has been made a fool of may seem to have shown the greater insight. But what is more shameful than to be made a fool of? All the more care must be taken that this does not happen:\n\n“How splendidly today you have handled and fooled me,\nMore than all the foolish old men of comedy!”\n\n### Chapter 27\n\nSECTION 100\nFor even in plays the most foolish character is that of the shortsighted and credulous old man.\n\nBut somehow my discourse has drifted away from the friendships of perfect men—that is, of the wise, by which I mean the kind of wisdom that seems attainable by a human being—and descended to the friendships of frivolous men. Let us therefore return to those first principles and at last bring them to a conclusion.\n\nVirtue, I say, Gaius Fannius and you, Quintus Mucius, both creates friendships and preserves them. In virtue there is harmony, in virtue stability, in virtue constancy. When virtue has raised itself up and displayed its light, and has beheld and recognized that same light in another, it draws near to it and in turn receives what is present in the other. From this either love or friendship bursts into flame—for both words are derived from loving. And to love is nothing other than to cherish the very person whom one loves, without any need to be supplied or any advantage to be sought. Yet advantage itself blossoms from friendship, even if you have made little effort to pursue it.\n\nSECTION 101\nWith this affection, when we were young, we loved those old men Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Gaius Gallus, Publius Nasica, and Tiberius Gracchus, the father-in-law of our Scipio. Such affection shines still more brightly among contemporaries, as it did between Scipio and me, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, and Spurius Mummius. In turn, we old men find repose in the affection of the young, as I do in yours and in that of Quintus Tubero. Indeed, I take pleasure even in the close friendship of the very young Publius Rutilius and Aulus Verginius. And since the course of our life and nature is so ordered that one generation succeeds another, the greatest blessing of all is surely to be able to reach the finish line, as the saying goes, together with the contemporaries with whom one was released from the starting barriers.\n\nSECTION 102\nBut since human affairs are frail and fleeting, we must always seek out people whom we may love and by whom we may be loved; for if affection and goodwill are taken away, all delight is taken out of life. To me, indeed, Scipio, though he was suddenly snatched away, still lives and always will live; for I loved the virtue of that man, and that virtue has not been extinguished. It stands not only before my eyes, who always had it close at hand, but will also remain bright and illustrious to generations yet to come. No one will ever undertake great deeds in spirit or in hope without believing that Scipio’s memory and image should be set before him.\n\nSECTION 103\nOf all the gifts that fortune or nature has bestowed upon me, I have nothing that I can compare with Scipio’s friendship. In it I found agreement concerning the republic; in it counsel concerning my private affairs; in it, too, repose filled with delight. Never, so far as I was aware, did I offend him even in the smallest matter, and never did I myself hear from him anything I did not wish to hear. We shared one house, the same way of life, and a common table; and not only military service, but journeys abroad and stays in the country as well, were shared between us.\n\nSECTION 104\nAnd what am I to say of our eager pursuit of always learning and discovering something new, upon which, far from the eyes of the people, we spent all our leisure? If the recollection and memory of those pursuits had died together with him, I could in no way endure my longing for a man so closely bound to me and so deeply loving. But those memories have not been extinguished; rather, they are nourished and increased by my reflection and remembrance. And even if I had been wholly bereft of them, my age itself would nevertheless bring me great consolation; for I cannot now remain much longer in this state of longing, and everything brief ought to be endurable, even if it is severe.\n\nThis is what I had to say about friendship. But I urge you to assign virtue such a place that, apart from virtue itself—without which friendship cannot exist—you consider nothing more excellent than friendship.","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/cicero-friendship/translations/trn_cicero_friendship_mouseia.txt"},{"id":"trn_cicero_friendship_plain","translator":"Mouseia","kind":"plain","note":"Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections.","text":"### Chapter 1\n\nSECTION 1\nQuintus Mucius the augur used to tell many stories about his father-in-law, Gaius Laelius, from memory and with great charm, and he never hesitated to call him “the Wise” in every conversation. My own father, after I had assumed the toga of manhood, placed me under Scaevola’s guidance with the understanding that, as far as I could and was permitted, I should never leave the old man’s side. And so I committed to memory many arguments he presented wisely, as well as many things he said briefly and aptly, and I tried to become better educated through his wisdom. After his death, I attached myself to Scaevola the pontiff, whom I venture to call the one man in our state most outstanding in both intellect and justice. But I will speak of him another time; now I return to the augur.\n\nSECTION 2\nAmong the many occasions on which he spoke at length, I particularly remember him sitting at home in his semicircular seat, as was his custom, when I was with him along with only a very few close friends, and falling into a discussion of a subject that was then on nearly everyone’s lips. For you surely remember, Atticus—and all the more because you were very close to Publius Sulpicius—how much astonishment and complaint there was among the people when Sulpicius, as tribune of the plebs, became divided by deadly hatred from Quintus Pompeius, who was then consul, although he had lived with him in the closest and most affectionate friendship.\n\nSECTION 3\nAnd so, when Scaevola happened to mention that very subject, he recounted to us a conversation on friendship that Laelius had held with him and with his other son-in-law, Gaius Fannius, son of Marcus, a few days after Africanus’s death. I committed the substance of that discussion to memory and have set it out in this book in my own manner. For I have presented the men themselves as speaking, so that I would not have to keep inserting “I said” and “he said,” and so that the conversation might appear to be taking place face-to-face among people actually present.\n\nSECTION 4\nFor you often urged me to write something about friendship, and the subject seemed to me worthy both of everyone’s attention and of our own close relationship. So I willingly did as you asked, in the hope of benefiting many people. But just as in Cato the Elder, the book on old age that was written for you, I presented the aged Cato conducting the discussion, because no character seemed better suited to speak about that period of life than a man who had lived to a very advanced age and had flourished in old age beyond all others, so too, since we had learned from our fathers that the friendship of Gaius Laelius and Publius Scipio had been especially memorable, Laelius seemed to me a suitable character to discuss the very points about friendship that Scaevola remembered him discussing. Somehow, this form of dialogue, founded on the authority of distinguished men of earlier times, seems to carry greater weight. Indeed, when I read my own work, I am sometimes so affected that I think it is Cato speaking, not I.\n\nSECTION 5\nBut just as I, an old man, then wrote to an old man about old age, so in this book I, a most devoted friend, have written to a friend about friendship. Then the speaker was Cato, than whom almost no one in those days was older or wiser; now Laelius, who was regarded as wise and was renowned for the glory of his friendship, will speak about friendship. I would like you to turn your attention away from me for a little while and imagine that Laelius himself is speaking. Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius come to their father-in-law after the death of Africanus. They begin the conversation, and Laelius responds. His entire discussion concerns friendship, and as you read it, you will recognize yourself.\n\n### Chapter 2\n\nSECTION 6\nFANNIUS. That is true, Laelius; for no man was better or more illustrious than Africanus. But you should realize that everyone’s eyes are fixed on you alone. They both call you wise and consider you so. This distinction was once given to Marcus Cato, and we know that Lucius Acilius was called “the Wise” in our fathers’ time, but each of them was called so in a different sense. Acilius was thought to be skilled in civil law, while Cato possessed experience in many fields, and people repeated many examples of how, both in the Senate and in the Forum, he had either foreseen things wisely, acted resolutely, or answered incisively. For that reason, in his old age “the Wise” had already become virtually a surname for him.\n\nSECTION 7\nBut you are considered wise in another sense—not only by nature and character, but also through study and learning—and not in the way the general public uses the word, but as educated people normally apply the name “wise.” We have heard that in all the rest of Greece there was no one like that, for those who examine these matters more precisely do not count the men called the Seven among the wise. At Athens, we have heard of only one, and he was even judged the wisest of men by Apollo’s oracle. People believe that your wisdom consists in regarding everything that concerns you as depending on yourself and in considering the accidents of human life inferior to virtue. And so they ask me—and, I suppose, they similarly ask Scaevola here—how you are bearing the death of Africanus, especially because on the most recent Nones, when we came, as usual, to the gardens of Decimus Brutus the augur for our regular meeting, you were not present, although you had always been most conscientious in observing that day and performing that duty.\n\nSECTION 8\nSCAEVOLA. They do indeed ask frequently, Gaius Laelius, just as Fannius has said. But I answer according to what I have observed: that you are bearing with moderation the grief you have suffered from the death of both a supremely great man and your dearest friend; that you could not have remained unmoved, and that it would not have been consistent with your humanity to do so. As for your not being present at our college’s meeting on the Nones, I answer that ill health, not grief, was the reason.\nLAELIUS. Your answer, Scaevola, is both correct and true. For my personal sorrow should not have kept me from that duty, which I have always performed when my health allowed; nor do I think that any circumstance could ever cause a steadfast man to interrupt the performance of a duty.\n\nSECTION 9\nAs for you, Fannius, when you say that people attribute so much to me—more than I either acknowledge or claim—you speak like a friend, but, as it seems to me, you do not judge Cato correctly. Either no one was ever wise, which I am more inclined to believe, or, if anyone was, he was. To pass over everything else, consider how he bore his son’s death! I remembered Paulus and had seen Gallus; but their sons died as boys, while Cato’s son was a mature and distinguished man.\n\n### Chapter 3\n\nSECTION 10\nTherefore be careful not to place above Cato even that very man whom Apollo, as you say, judged the wisest of all. For Cato’s deeds are praised, but the other man’s words.\nAs for me—and now I am speaking to both of you—this is how you should understand the matter: if I were to deny that I am affected by my longing for Scipio, let wise men judge how rightly I would be acting, but I would certainly be lying. For I am affected by being deprived of such a friend as I believe no one will ever have and, as I can confidently affirm, no one certainly ever had. But I do not need a remedy. I console myself, especially with the comfort that I am free from the mistaken belief that causes most people anguish when their friends die. I do not think that anything bad has happened to Scipio; if anything has happened, it has happened to me. But to be deeply distressed by one’s own misfortunes is the mark of a man who loves himself, not his friend.\n\nSECTION 11\nWho could deny that things turned out splendidly for him? Unless he wished for immortality—which was the last thing he expected—what did he fail to attain that a human being might rightfully desire? While still a young man, through his incredible excellence he immediately surpassed the highest hopes that his fellow citizens had formed of him when he was only a boy. He never sought the consulship, yet he was made consul twice: the first time before the legal age, the second at the proper time for himself but almost too late for the republic. By destroying two cities that were bitterly hostile to this empire, he put an end not only to existing wars but also to wars of the future. Why should I speak of his most gracious character, his devotion to his mother, his generosity toward his sisters, his kindness to his own people, or his justice toward everyone? You know these things. How dear he was to the state was shown by the mourning at his funeral. What benefit, then, could the addition of a few more years have brought him? For although old age is not burdensome, as I remember Cato arguing with Scipio and me a year before his death, it nevertheless takes away that youthful vigor which Scipio still possessed even then.\n\nSECTION 12\nTherefore, whether measured by fortune or by glory, his life was such that nothing could have been added to it, while the suddenness of his death took away all sensation of dying. It is difficult to say anything about the manner of his death; you see what people suspect. Yet this may truly be said: of all the many days of extraordinary distinction and happiness that Publius Scipio experienced in his life, the most glorious was the day when, after the Senate had adjourned, he was escorted home toward evening by the senators, the Roman people, the allies, and the Latins—the day before he departed from life. Thus, from so lofty a height of dignity, he seems to have gone upward to the gods above rather than downward to the dead below.\n\n### Chapter 4\n\nSECTION 13\nFor I do not agree with those who have recently begun to argue that souls perish together with bodies and that death destroys everything. The authority of the ancients carries more weight with me: either that of our own ancestors, who assigned such sacred rites to the dead—something they certainly would not have done if they had believed that those rites did not concern them at all—or that of the men who lived in this land and educated with their institutions and teachings the region of Magna Graecia, which has now been destroyed but was flourishing then—or that of the man whom Apollo’s oracle judged the wisest of all. Unlike most people, he did not say one thing at one time and something else at another, but always maintained the same position: that human souls are divine, that when they have departed from the body a return to heaven lies open to them, and that this return is easiest for each person who has been best and most just.\n\nSECTION 14\nScipio held the same view. Indeed, as though he had a foreknowledge of what was coming, only a very few days before his death, when Philus and Manilius and several others were present and you too, Scaevola, had come with me, he spent three days discussing the republic. Almost the final subject of that discussion was the immortality of souls, a teaching that he said he had heard from Africanus in a vision during sleep. If it is true that at death the soul of each excellent person flies away most easily, as though escaping from the prison and chains of the body, whose journey to the gods can we suppose was easier than Scipio’s? Therefore I fear that to mourn his fate would be the conduct of an envious person rather than a friend. But if the other view is truer—that souls and bodies undergo the same destruction and no sensation remains—then, just as there is nothing good in death, there is certainly nothing bad either. For when sensation is lost, the result is the same as if he had never been born at all. Yet we rejoice that he was born, and this state too will celebrate his birth for as long as it exists.\n\nSECTION 15\nTherefore, as I said above, things turned out as well as possible for him, but less favorably for me, since it would have been fairer for me, having entered life first, also to leave it first. Nevertheless, I take such pleasure in the memory of our friendship that I believe I have lived a blessed life because I lived with Scipio. With him I shared concern for both public and private affairs; with him I shared both home and military service; and between us there was that in which the entire power of friendship consists: complete agreement in wishes, interests, and opinions. And so I am not as pleased by that reputation for wisdom which Fannius mentioned just now—especially since it is false—as I am by my hope that the memory of our friendship will last forever. This matters all the more to me because from all the ages scarcely three or four pairs of friends are named; and among that company, I seem able to hope that the friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be known to posterity.\n\nSECTION 16\nFANNIUS. That certainly must be so, Laelius. But since you have mentioned friendship and we have time to spare, you would do me a great favor—and, I hope, Scaevola as well—if, just as you usually do with other subjects when you are asked about them, you would now discuss friendship: what you think about it, what you believe its nature to be, and what principles you would offer.\nSCAEVOLA. It would indeed please me, and when I was just about to make this same request of you, Fannius anticipated me. Therefore you would do both of us a very great favor.\n\n### Chapter 5\n\nSECTION 17\nLAELIUS. I would certainly not be reluctant, if I had confidence in my own ability. For the subject is an excellent one, and, as Fannius said, we have time to spare. But who am I, and what ability do I possess? It is the custom of learned men—and especially of the Greeks—to have a subject assigned to them about which they must argue, no matter how suddenly it is proposed. That is a considerable task and requires no small amount of practice. Therefore, as for the points that can be argued about friendship, I think you should seek them from those who profess expertise in such matters. I can only urge you to place friendship above all other human concerns; for nothing is so well suited to nature or so appropriate to circumstances, whether favorable or adverse.\n\nSECTION 18\nBut this is my first belief: friendship can exist only among good men. I do not cut the definition to the quick, as those do who discuss these matters with greater precision—perhaps correctly, but with too little regard for practical usefulness. For they deny that anyone is a good man unless he is wise. Let that be so. But by wisdom they mean a kind that no mortal has yet attained. We, however, ought to consider what is found in ordinary practice and everyday life, not what is merely imagined or wished for. I will never say that Gaius Fabricius, Manius Curius, and Tiberius Coruncanius, whom our ancestors judged to be wise, were wise according to the standard of those philosophers. So let them keep for themselves the name of wisdom, a term both pretentious and obscure, and let them grant that those men were good. But they will not even do that; they will deny that this description can be granted to anyone except the wise man.\n\nSECTION 19\nLet us proceed, then, with plain common sense, as they say. Those who conduct themselves and live in such a way that their loyalty, integrity, fairness, and generosity are approved; who are free from all greed, lust, and recklessness; and who possess great steadfastness, as did the men I named just now—these men, since they have been regarded as good, should also, I think, be called good, because, as far as human beings can, they follow nature, the best guide to living well.\n\nFor this is how the matter seems clear to me: we were born in such a way that there is a certain bond among all human beings, but the bond is stronger the closer each person is to us. Thus fellow citizens are more important to us than foreigners, and relatives than strangers, for nature itself has created friendship with them, though that friendship is not sufficiently firm. Friendship is superior to kinship in this respect: goodwill can be removed from kinship, but not from friendship. For when goodwill is removed, the name of friendship is removed, while the name of kinship remains.\n\n### Chapter 6\n\nSECTION 20\nThe great power of friendship can be understood most clearly from this fact: out of the boundless fellowship of the human race, which nature herself has created, the matter has been so contracted and narrowed that every bond of affection is joined between two people or among only a few.\n\nFriendship is nothing other than complete agreement, accompanied by goodwill and affection, on all things divine and human; and with the possible exception of wisdom, I hardly know whether anything better than friendship has been given to humanity by the immortal gods. Some people prefer riches, others good health, others power, others public office, and many even prefer pleasures. This last belongs to beasts, while the things mentioned before it are fleeting and uncertain, dependent not so much on our own judgment as on the caprice of fortune. Those who place the highest good in virtue are certainly right to do so, but this very virtue both creates and preserves friendship, and without virtue friendship cannot possibly exist.\n\nSECTION 21\nLet us interpret virtue according to the ordinary practice of our lives and our everyday way of speaking, and not measure it, as certain learned men do, by grandiose language. Let us count as good men those who are commonly regarded as such—the Pauli, Catos, Galli, Scipios, and Phili. Ordinary life is content with them; let us leave aside those perfect men who are found nowhere at all.\n\nSECTION 22\nFriendship between men of this kind, then, offers advantages so great that I can scarcely describe them. To begin with, how can a life be truly alive, as Ennius says, if it does not find rest in the mutual goodwill of a friend? What is sweeter than having someone with whom you dare to speak about everything as freely as you speak with yourself? What great enjoyment would there be in prosperity if you had no one who rejoiced in it as much as you yourself? And adversity would be hard to bear without someone who took it even more heavily than you did. In short, the other things people seek are each useful for generally only one particular purpose: riches, so that you may use them; influence, so that you may be courted; public offices, so that you may be praised; pleasures, so that you may enjoy yourself; health, so that you may be free from pain and perform the functions of the body. Friendship embraces a great many purposes. Wherever you turn, it is at hand. It is excluded from no place; it is never untimely and never troublesome. And so, as the saying goes, we do not use water or fire on more occasions than we use friendship. I am not now speaking of ordinary or moderate friendship, though even that brings pleasure and benefit, but of true and perfect friendship, such as belonged to those few whose friendships are famous. Friendship makes prosperity more splendid, and by sharing and dividing adversity, makes it lighter.\n\n### Chapter 7\n\nSECTION 23\nAlthough friendship embraces advantages of the greatest number and importance, this unquestionably surpasses them all: it shines the light of good hope into the future and does not allow our spirits to weaken or collapse. Indeed, whoever looks upon a friend looks, as it were, upon a reflection of himself. Therefore, friends who are absent are present; those in need have abundance; the weak are strong; and, what is harder to say, the dead are alive. So great are the honor, remembrance, and longing of their friends that attend them. Because of this, the death of the former seems blessed, while the life of the latter is worthy of praise. But if you remove from the natural world the bond of goodwill, no household and no city will be able to stand; not even the cultivation of the fields will continue. If it is not sufficiently understood from this how great the power of friendship and harmony is, it can be grasped from dissensions and conflicts. For what household is so stable, or what state so secure, that it cannot be utterly overthrown by hatred and division?\n\nFrom this it can be judged how much good there is in friendship.\n\nSECTION 24\nWe are told that a certain learned man of Acragas proclaimed in Greek verse that, among the things that exist and move in nature and throughout the entire universe, friendship draws them together and discord scatters them. All mortals both understand this and prove it by their actions. And so, whenever a friend has performed some service by facing dangers or sharing them, who does not extol it with the highest praise? What shouts recently filled the entire theater at the new play by my guest-friend and friend Marcus Pacuvius, when, because the king did not know which man was Orestes, Pylades declared that he was Orestes so that he might be killed in Orestes’ place, while Orestes, as he truly was Orestes, persisted in declaring that he was Orestes! The audience stood and applauded at a fictional event. What do we suppose they would have done at a real one? Nature herself easily revealed her power, since people judged that something was rightly done by another even though they could not have done it themselves.\n\nUp to this point, I think I have been able to say what I believe about friendship. If there are further questions—and I believe there are many—then, if you wish, ask them of those who discuss such subjects.\n\nSECTION 25\nFANNIUS. No, we would rather ask you. Although I have often asked those men too, and have certainly listened to them willingly, your discourse has a different sort of thread.\n\nSCAEVOLA. You would say that all the more, Fannius, if you had recently been present in Scipio’s gardens when the republic was discussed. What an advocate of justice he was then against Philus’ carefully reasoned speech!\n\nFANNIUS. It was certainly easy for the most just of men to defend justice.\n\nSCAEVOLA. What about friendship? Is it not easy for a man who has won the highest glory by preserving it with the greatest loyalty, steadfastness, and justice to defend that as well?\n\n### Chapter 8\n\nSECTION 26\nLAELIUS. This really is using force. For what difference does it make how you compel me? You certainly are compelling me. To resist the wishes of my sons-in-law, especially in a good cause, is not only difficult but also unfair.\n\nTherefore, when I have very often thought about friendship, the question that has usually seemed most important to consider is whether friendship is desired because of weakness and need, so that by giving and receiving services each person might obtain from another what he could not accomplish by himself, and repay it in turn; or whether this exchange is indeed a characteristic of friendship, but friendship has another cause, more fundamental, more noble, and arising more directly from nature herself. For love, from which friendship takes its name, is the principal force in joining people together in goodwill. Benefits are often obtained even from those who are courted and treated with deference through a pretense of friendship to suit the needs of the moment; but in friendship nothing is false, nothing is pretended, and whatever exists in it is genuine and voluntary.\n\nSECTION 27\nFor that reason, friendship seems to me to have arisen from nature rather than need, from an inclination of the heart accompanied by a certain feeling of love, rather than from a calculation of how much practical benefit it would provide. The nature of this can be observed even in certain animals. For a time, they love the offspring born from them, and are loved by them in return, in such a way that their feelings are readily apparent. This is much more evident in human beings: first, from the affection that exists between children and parents, which cannot be broken except by a detestable crime; and then, when a similar feeling of love arises because we have found someone whose character and nature harmonize with our own, since we seem to perceive in that person something like a light of integrity and virtue.\n\nSECTION 28\nNothing is more lovable than virtue, and nothing does more to attract us to love, since it is because of virtue and integrity that we feel a kind of love even for people we have never seen. Who can mention the memory of Gaius Fabricius or Manius Curius without some affectionate goodwill, though he has never seen them? And who does not hate Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius, and Spurius Maelius? We fought for supremacy in Italy against two commanders, Pyrrhus and Hannibal. Because of Pyrrhus’ integrity, our feelings toward him are not entirely hostile; because of Hannibal’s cruelty, this state will always hate him.\n\n### Chapter 9\n\nSECTION 29\nBut if integrity has such great power that we love it even in people we have never seen and, what is still more remarkable, even in an enemy, what wonder is it if people’s hearts are moved when they seem to perceive virtue and goodness in those with whom they can be personally connected? Love is, however, strengthened by receiving a kindness, by recognizing another’s devotion, and by the addition of familiarity. When these things are added to that first impulse of the heart and of love, there blazes up an astonishing intensity of goodwill.\n\nIf anyone thinks this goodwill arises from weakness, so that each person may have someone through whom he can obtain what he desires, he leaves friendship with a thoroughly low and, so to speak, ignoble origin by claiming that it was born from poverty and need. If that were so, then the more deficient a person thought himself to be, the better suited he would be for friendship. But the exact opposite is true.\n\nSECTION 30\nFor the more confidence a person has in himself, and the more thoroughly he is fortified by virtue and wisdom, so that he needs no one and judges that all his resources lie within himself, the more he excels in seeking and cultivating friendships. What, then? Did Africanus need me? Not at all, by Hercules! Nor did I need him. But I loved him from a certain admiration for his virtue, and he in turn loved me perhaps because of some favorable opinion he held of my character. Familiarity increased our goodwill. But although many great advantages followed from our friendship, the causes of our affection did not arise from the expectation of those advantages.\n\nSECTION 31\nFor just as we are kind and generous not in order to demand repayment—for we do not lend out a kindness at interest, but are naturally inclined toward generosity—so we believe friendship should be sought not because we are led by hope of reward, but because its entire reward is contained in the love itself.\n\nSECTION 32\nSuch people differ widely from those who, in the manner of cattle, relate everything to pleasure; and no wonder. Those who have cast down all their thoughts upon something so low and contemptible cannot look up to anything lofty, magnificent, or divine. Let us therefore exclude them from this discussion, and let us ourselves understand that the feeling of affection and the loving bond of goodwill are produced by nature when integrity reveals itself. Those who are drawn to integrity attach themselves to it and move nearer, so that they may enjoy the company and character of the person they have begun to love; so that they may be matched and equal in love; so that they may be more inclined to render services than to demand repayment; and so that an honorable rivalry in doing good may exist between them. In this way the greatest benefits will be gained from friendship, and its origin in nature rather than weakness will be more dignified and genuine. For if practical advantage bound friendships together, a change in that advantage would dissolve them. But because nature cannot be changed, true friendships are therefore everlasting.\n\nYou now see the origin of friendship, unless by chance you have something to say about it.\n\nFANNIUS. No, please continue, Laelius! I answer on behalf of Scaevola here, since he is younger, as is my right.\n\n### Chapter 10\n\nSECTION 33\nSCAEVOLA. You are quite right. So let us listen.\n\nLAELIUS. Then listen, my excellent friends, to the things that Scipio and I very often discussed about friendship. He used to say that nothing was more difficult than for a friendship to endure until the final day of life. For it often happened either that the same course was no longer advantageous to both friends, or that they did not hold the same political opinions. He also said that people’s characters often changed, sometimes because of adversity, sometimes because of the increasing burdens of age. He drew an illustration of these changes from the corresponding experience of early life: the most intense affections among boys were often put aside together with the toga praetexta.\n\nSECTION 34\nBut even if those friendships continued into young adulthood, they were nevertheless sometimes broken apart by rivalry over a prospective marriage or over some other advantage that both friends could not obtain. And even if some people had advanced further in friendship, their friendships were often shaken if they became rivals for public office. For he said that no plague was more destructive to friendships than greed for money among most people and competition for office and glory among the very best, and that from this the bitterest enmities had often arisen between the closest friends.\n\nSECTION 35\nHe also said that serious and generally justified divisions arose when something morally wrong was demanded of friends—for example, that they become agents of another’s lust or accomplices in an injustice. Those who refused, although they acted honorably in doing so, were nevertheless accused of abandoning the obligations of friendship by the people whose wishes they would not obey. But those who dared to demand anything at all from a friend were, by that very demand, declaring that they themselves would do anything for the sake of a friend. Their long-standing resentment tended not only to destroy close relationships but also to produce everlasting hatred. So many of these dangers, he said, hung over friendships like so many decrees of fate that to escape them all seemed to him a matter not only of wisdom but also of good fortune.\n\n### Chapter 11\n\nSECTION 36\nTherefore, let us first consider, if you please, how far affection ought to go in friendship. If Coriolanus had friends, were they obliged to bear arms with Coriolanus against their country? Were the friends of Vecellinus obliged to help him when he sought royal power, or those of Maelius to help him?\n\nSECTION 37\nWe saw Tiberius Gracchus, when he was throwing the republic into turmoil, abandoned by Quintus Tubero and his other friends of the same age. But Gaius Blossius of Cumae, a family friend of yours, Scaevola, came to me to plead his case, since I was serving on the council of the consuls Laenas and Rupilius. He offered this as his excuse and asked me to forgive him: that he had valued Tiberius Gracchus so highly that he thought he was bound to do whatever Gracchus wished. Then I said, “Even if he had wanted you to carry torches to the Capitol?” “He would never have wanted that,” he replied, “but if he had, I would have obeyed.” You see what an abominable statement that was. And, by Hercules, he acted accordingly—or even went beyond what he had said. For he did not merely obey the reckless designs of Tiberius Gracchus; he took the lead in them. He presented himself not as a companion in Gracchus’s madness, but as its leader. And so, in consequence of this insanity, terrified by the special court of inquiry, he fled to Asia, joined the enemies of Rome, and paid the republic a severe and just penalty.\nThere is therefore no excuse for wrongdoing if you have done wrong for a friend’s sake. For since a belief in someone’s virtue is what brings friendship into being, friendship can hardly survive if you abandon virtue.\n\nSECTION 38\nNow, if we were to establish as a rule that it is right either to grant our friends whatever they want or to obtain from them whatever we want, the principle would indeed be faultless if we possessed perfect wisdom. But we are speaking of the friends before our eyes, whom we actually see or about whom tradition has informed us—the kind familiar from ordinary life. We must take our examples from this group, and especially from those who come closest to wisdom.\n\nSECTION 39\nWe know that Papus Aemilius was an intimate friend of Gaius Luscinus—this is what we have learned from our fathers—and that they were consuls together twice and colleagues in the censorship. Tradition also tells us that Manius Curius and Tiberius Coruncanius were extremely close both to them and to each other. We cannot even suspect, therefore, that any one of these men ever pressed a friend to do anything contrary to good faith, contrary to his oath, or contrary to the republic. Indeed, in the case of such men, what is the point of saying that, if one of them had made such a demand, he would not have obtained it? They were men of the highest integrity, and it is equally wicked either to do such a thing when asked or to ask it of someone else. Tiberius Gracchus, however, was followed by Gaius Carbo and Gaius Cato, and also by his brother Gaius—though at that time less ardently than the others, while now he is the fiercest of them all.\n\n### Chapter 12\n\nSECTION 40\nLet this law therefore be established in friendship: we must neither ask for dishonorable things nor do them when asked. For it is a shameful and wholly unacceptable excuse in wrongdoing generally, and especially when someone admits that he acted against the republic for a friend’s sake. Fannius and Scaevola, we have been placed in such a position that we must look far ahead and anticipate the future dangers of the republic. The customs of our ancestors have already strayed somewhat from their proper course and path.\n\nSECTION 41\nTiberius Gracchus attempted to seize royal power—or rather, he actually reigned for a few months. Had the Roman people ever heard or seen anything like it? I cannot say without tears what his friends and relatives, following his example even after his death, did to Publius Scipio. As for Carbo, we endured him as best we could because the punishment of Tiberius Gracchus was still so recent. But I do not care to predict what I expect from the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus. The movement then creeps onward, and once it has begun, it slides easily downhill toward destruction. You see how much corruption has already been caused by the ballot—first by the Gabinian law, and then two years later by the Cassian law. I already seem to see the people separated from the Senate and the most important affairs conducted at the will of the multitude. For more people will learn how these things are done than how they may be resisted.\n\nSECTION 42\nWhat is the point of all this? It is that no one attempts such a thing without associates. Honorable men must therefore be instructed that, if through ignorance or some accident they fall into friendships of this kind, they must not think themselves so tightly bound that they cannot withdraw from friends who are committing some grave offense against the republic. As for the wicked, a punishment must be fixed for them—and certainly no lighter a punishment for those who follow another than for those who themselves become leaders in treason. Who in Greece was more famous than Themistocles, or more powerful? After he had served as commander in the Persian War and freed Greece from slavery, he was driven into exile because of envy. Yet he failed to endure the injustice of his ungrateful country, as he ought to have done. He did the same thing that Coriolanus had done among us twenty years earlier. Neither man found anyone willing to help him against his country, and so each took his own life.\n\nSECTION 43\nTherefore, such an alliance among wicked men must not merely be denied the shelter of friendship as an excuse; rather, it must be punished with every penalty, so that no one may think he is permitted to follow a friend who is making war on his country. And indeed, judging from the way things have begun to go, I am not sure that this may not happen someday. For my part, I am no less concerned about what the republic will be like after my death than about what it is like today.\n\n### Chapter 13\n\nSECTION 44\nLet this, then, be established as the first law of friendship: we must ask honorable things of our friends and do honorable things for their sake. We should not even wait until we are asked; eagerness should always be present, hesitation absent. We must dare to give true advice freely. In friendship, the authority of friends who give good counsel should carry the greatest weight. That authority should be employed in offering advice not only openly but even sharply, if circumstances require it, and when it is exercised, it should be obeyed.\n\nSECTION 45\nFor I believe that certain men whom I hear were considered wise in Greece adopted some astonishing views—though there is nothing those people will not pursue through clever argument. Some of them held that excessively close friendships should be avoided, so that one person would not have to be anxious on behalf of many; that each person already has more than enough concerns of his own; that it is troublesome to become too deeply involved in those of others; and that the most convenient course is to keep the reins of friendship as loose as possible, so that you may tighten or slacken them whenever you wish. For, they said, the chief requirement for a happy life is freedom from anxiety, which the mind cannot enjoy if one person is, as it were, in labor on behalf of many.\n\nSECTION 46\nOthers, I am told, speak far more inhumanly—a position I touched on briefly a little earlier. They say that friendships should be sought for protection and assistance, not from goodwill or affection. Accordingly, the less firmness and strength a person possesses, the more eagerly he seeks friendships. That is why, they claim, weak women seek the protection of friendships more than men, the poor more than the rich, and the unfortunate more than those who are considered prosperous.\n\nSECTION 47\nWhat splendid wisdom! Those who remove friendship from life seem to remove the sun from the world, for the immortal gods have given us nothing better or more delightful than friendship. What, after all, is this freedom from anxiety? It is attractive in appearance, certainly, but in reality it must be rejected in many situations. For it is unreasonable to refuse to undertake any honorable action or enterprise, or to abandon it once undertaken, merely to avoid anxiety. If we flee from concern, we must also flee from virtue, for virtue must necessarily feel some concern when it despises and hates what is opposed to it: goodness hates wickedness, self-control hates lust, and courage hates cowardice. And so you may see that the just are most deeply pained by injustice, the brave by cowardice, and the honorable by disgraceful conduct. It is therefore characteristic of a properly ordered mind both to rejoice in good things and to grieve at their opposites.\n\n### Chapter 14\n\nSECTION 48\nTherefore, if mental pain can befall a wise person—and it certainly can, unless we suppose that all humanity has been rooted out of his mind—what reason is there to remove friendship entirely from life merely to avoid undergoing certain troubles because of it? If emotional responsiveness is taken away, what difference is there—not merely between a human being and an animal, but between a human being and a tree trunk, a stone, or anything else of that kind? Nor should we listen to those who want virtue to be something hard and almost made of iron. In many matters, and especially in friendship, virtue is tender and responsive: it expands, so to speak, at a friend’s good fortune and contracts at his misfortunes. Therefore, the anguish that must often be endured for a friend is not powerful enough to justify removing friendship from life, any more than the cares and troubles brought by the virtues justify rejecting virtue.\nMoreover, as I said above, friendship is formed when some evidence of virtue shines forth and a similar mind attaches and unites itself to it. When that happens, affection necessarily arises.\n\nSECTION 49\nFor what could be more absurd than to take pleasure in many empty things—such as public office, fame, buildings, clothing, and bodily adornment—yet take little pleasure in a living being endowed with virtue, someone capable of loving and, so to speak, loving in return? Nothing is more delightful than the repayment of goodwill, nothing more delightful than a mutual exchange of devotion and services.\n\nSECTION 50\nWhat if we also add—and we may rightly do so—that nothing attracts and draws anything else to itself as strongly as similarity draws people into friendship? It will surely be admitted as true that good people love other good people and take them into their lives as though united by kinship and nature. For nothing is more eager or more insistent than nature in seeking what resembles itself. Therefore, Fannius and Scaevola, this point, I think, may be regarded as settled: among good people there exists an almost necessary goodwill toward one another, and this is the source of friendship established by nature. Yet that same goodness also extends to the multitude. For virtue is not inhuman, selfish, or arrogant; it is accustomed to protect entire peoples and to serve their interests in the best possible way, something it certainly would not do if it recoiled from affection for ordinary people.\n\nSECTION 51\nMoreover, those who invent friendships for the sake of advantage seem to me to remove the most lovable bond of friendship. For it is not so much the advantage gained through a friend that gives pleasure as the friend’s love itself; and what comes from a friend becomes delightful when it proceeds from devotion. So far is it from being true that friendships are cultivated because of need that those who, because of their resources, wealth, and especially virtue—in which the greatest protection lies—have the least need of another person are the most generous and beneficent. Indeed, I am not sure it is even desirable for friends never to lack anything at all. For when would my devotion have had an opportunity to show its strength if Scipio had never needed my advice or assistance, either at home or in military service? Friendship, therefore, did not follow advantage; advantage followed friendship.\n\n### Chapter 15\n\nSECTION 52\nWe must not, therefore, listen to people softened by excessive luxury if they ever discuss friendship, which they understand neither from experience nor from reason. For, in the name of the good faith of gods and men, who would want to possess an overflowing abundance of every resource and live amid a profusion of everything, on condition that he neither love anyone nor be loved by anyone himself? This, of course, is the life of tyrants—a life in which there can be no good faith, no affection, and no secure confidence in lasting goodwill. Everything is always suspicious and anxious; there is no place for friendship.\n\nSECTION 53\nFor who can love a man whom he fears, or a man by whom he believes himself feared? Tyrants are nevertheless courted, but only with pretense and only for a time. If they happen to fall, as they generally do, it then becomes clear how destitute of friends they were. This is what Tarquin is said to have declared in exile: that only then did he understand which of his friends had been loyal and which disloyal, when he was no longer able to repay either group.\n\nSECTION 54\nStill, considering his arrogance and brutality, I am amazed that he could have had any friend at all. And just as the character of the man I have mentioned made it impossible for him to acquire true friends, so the wealth of many extremely powerful men excludes faithful friendships. For fortune is not only blind herself; she generally makes blind those whom she embraces as well. Thus they are commonly carried away by disdain and insolence, and nothing can become more unbearable than a fortunate fool. Indeed, one may observe that people who were formerly agreeable in character are changed by command, power, and prosperity: they scorn their old friendships and indulge their new ones.\n\nSECTION 55\nWhat could be more foolish than for people who possess the greatest resources, means, and wealth to acquire everything else that money can buy—horses, servants, splendid clothing, precious vessels—but not acquire friends, the best and most beautiful furnishing of life, so to speak? For when they acquire those other things, they do not know for whom they are acquiring them or for whose sake they are laboring; each of those things belongs to whoever proves strongest, but each person’s possession of his friendships remains stable and secure. Even if those things that are, as it were, gifts of fortune remain, a life uncultivated and deserted by friends still cannot be pleasant. But enough of this.\n\n### Chapter 16\n\nSECTION 56\nWe must now determine what the boundaries of friendship are, and, so to speak, the limits of affection. I see three opinions offered about them, none of which I approve: first, that we should feel toward a friend exactly as we feel toward ourselves; second, that our goodwill toward our friends should correspond precisely and equally to their goodwill toward us; and third, that a person should be valued by his friends as highly as he values himself.\n\nSECTION 57\nI agree completely with none of these three opinions. The first is not true—that a person should feel toward a friend just as he feels toward himself. How many things we do for our friends that we would never do for ourselves! We make requests of an unworthy person, resort to entreaties, attack someone more bitterly and pursue him more vehemently. Actions that would not be entirely honorable in our own affairs become thoroughly honorable when done for our friends. And there are many situations in which good men sacrifice much of their own advantage, and allow it to be sacrificed, so that their friends rather than they themselves may enjoy it.\n\nSECTION 58\nThe second opinion defines friendship in terms of equal services and equal goodwill. But this is to reduce friendship to an excessively narrow and meager accounting, so that the balance of what is received and what is given must be equal. True friendship seems to me richer and more abundant than that, and it does not keep a strict watch to avoid giving back more than it has received. There is no need to fear that something will spill out, or run onto the ground, or that more than the proper amount will be poured into friendship.\n\nSECTION 59\nThe third limit is the worst of all: that a person should be valued by his friends as highly as he values himself. For some people often have too low an opinion of themselves, or too little hope of improving their fortunes. A friend, therefore, should not treat such a person as that person treats himself, but should instead strive to raise his friend’s dejected spirit and lead him to greater hope and better thoughts. We must therefore establish another limit for true friendship, after I first tell you what saying Scipio used to condemn above all. He maintained that no statement more hostile to friendship could ever have been devised than the saying that one should love as if one might someday come to hate. He could not bring himself to believe that Bias, as was commonly thought, had said this, since Bias was regarded as one of the Seven Sages. It was, he said, the opinion of some corrupt or ambitious man, or of someone who made everything serve his own power. For how can anyone be a friend to a person whom he thinks he may become an enemy? Indeed, he will inevitably wish and hope that his friend makes mistakes as often as possible, so as to provide him with more handles, as it were, for criticism; and, conversely, he will inevitably be distressed, grieved, and envious at his friends’ right actions and successes.\n\nSECTION 60\nTherefore this maxim, whoever its author may be, is effective only in destroying friendship. What should have been advised instead was that we use such care in forming friendships that we never begin to love someone whom we might someday be able to hate. Indeed, even if we had been less fortunate in our choice, Scipio thought we should endure it rather than contemplate a time of hostility.\n\n### Chapter 17\n\nSECTION 61\nI therefore believe that the proper limits are these: when friends have morally sound characters, there should be between them, without any exception, complete sharing of all matters, plans, and desires. Even if it should happen by some misfortune that we must support wishes of our friends that are not entirely just, in cases where their life or reputation is at stake, we may deviate from the straight path, provided that utter disgrace does not follow; for there is a limit to the pardon that can be granted for friendship’s sake. Reputation, however, must not be neglected, nor should we suppose that the goodwill of our fellow citizens is an insignificant weapon in conducting public affairs. To obtain that goodwill by flattery and servile agreement is shameful; but virtue, which is followed by affection, must by no means be rejected.\n\nSECTION 62\nBut—since I often return to Scipio, whose whole conversation was about friendship—he used to complain that people were more careful in every other matter. Each person could say how many goats and sheep he owned, but could not say how many friends he had. They took care in acquiring the former, but were negligent in choosing friends and had, as it were, no particular signs and marks by which they might judge those who were fit for friendship. We must therefore choose people who are firm, steady, and constant, but there is a great shortage of that kind. And it is certainly difficult to judge a person without putting him to the test, yet the testing must take place within the friendship itself. Thus friendship outruns judgment and takes away the opportunity for testing.\n\nSECTION 63\nA prudent person, therefore, should restrain the impulse of affection just as he would restrain a runner’s pace, so that we may enter into friendship only after our friends’ characters have been tested to some degree, just as we use horses only after they have been tried. Some people are often revealed by a small sum of money to be utterly unreliable; others, whom a small sum could not influence, are exposed when a large sum is involved. But even if some people are found who consider it sordid to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find those who do not place honors, public offices, military commands, positions of power, and wealth ahead of friendship, so that, when these things are offered on one side and the claims of friendship on the other, they do not much prefer the former? For human nature is too weak to despise power; and even if people attain it by neglecting friendship, they think that neglect will be obscured because friendship could not have been neglected without some weighty reason.\n\nSECTION 64\nAnd so true friendships are hardest to find among those who are engaged in the pursuit of office and in public life. For where can you find a man who puts his friend’s advancement ahead of his own? And, to leave that aside, how burdensome and difficult most people find it to share in another’s misfortunes, which few can readily be found willing to enter. Although Ennius rightly says, “A sure friend is discerned in unsure circumstances,” these two situations expose most people as fickle and weak: they either despise their friends in prosperity or desert them in adversity. Therefore, anyone who in both situations has shown himself serious, constant, and steadfast in friendship must be regarded as belonging to an exceedingly rare, almost divine class of human beings.\n\n### Chapter 18\n\nSECTION 65\nThe foundation of the stability and constancy we seek in friendship is loyalty, for nothing disloyal is stable. We should also choose someone who is straightforward, sociable, and congenial—that is, someone who is moved by the same things as we are. All these qualities contribute to loyalty. A complicated and devious nature cannot be loyal, and a person who is not moved by the same things and is not congenial by nature can be neither loyal nor steadfast. We must add that he should neither take pleasure in making accusations nor believe accusations that are brought to him; all of this belongs to the constancy I have now been discussing for some time. Thus the claim I made at the beginning proves true: friendship can exist only among good people.\n\nFor it is the mark of a good man, whom we may also call a wise man, to observe these two rules in friendship. First, there must be nothing false or pretended; for it is more honorable even to hate openly than to conceal one’s true opinion behind one’s expression. Second, he must not only reject accusations brought by others, but must not himself be suspicious, always imagining that his friend has committed some offense against him.\n\nSECTION 66\nTo this must be added a certain pleasantness in conversation and manner, by no means an insignificant seasoning of friendship. Gloominess and severity in every matter do indeed possess a certain dignity, but friendship ought to be more relaxed, more unrestrained, and more agreeable, and more inclined toward every kind of courtesy and affability.\n\n### Chapter 19\n\nSECTION 67\nAt this point, however, a rather difficult question arises: whether new friends who are worthy of friendship should ever be preferred to old ones, just as we are accustomed to prefer young horses to old ones. The doubt is unworthy of a human being. There should be no weariness of friendships, as there is of other things. The oldest friendships, like wines that improve with age, ought to be the sweetest. And the saying is true that many bushels of salt must be eaten together before the duties of friendship are fulfilled.\n\nSECTION 68\nNew friendships, however, if they offer hope—if the prospect of fruit appears in them, as it does in plants that will not disappoint us—should certainly not be rejected. Yet old friendship must be preserved in its proper place, for age and familiarity have very great power. Indeed, in the case of the very horse I mentioned just now, if nothing prevents it, everyone would rather use the one he is accustomed to than an untrained and unfamiliar one. And familiarity has power not only in the case of an animal, but even in the case of inanimate things, since we delight in the very places, even mountainous and wooded ones, where we have lived for a long time.\n\nSECTION 69\nBut the most important thing in friendship is for the superior to make himself equal to the inferior. For there are often certain forms of preeminence, such as Scipio possessed within our circle, so to speak. He never placed himself above Philus, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or any of his friends of lower rank. He treated his brother Q. Maximus, a thoroughly distinguished man but by no means his equal, as his superior because Maximus was older; and he wanted all his friends to be able to become more distinguished through his help.\n\nSECTION 70\nEveryone should act in this way and imitate this example: if they have attained some superiority in virtue, ability, or fortune, they should share it with their own people and make it available to those closest to them. If they were born to parents of humble station, or have relatives weaker in either spirit or fortune, they should increase their resources and bring them honor and dignity. So in stories, those who have spent some time in servitude because they did not know their ancestry and family, when they are recognized and discovered to be the children of gods or kings, nevertheless retain their affection for the shepherds whom for many years they regarded as their fathers. This should certainly be done far more for one’s true and acknowledged parents. For the greatest benefit from ability, virtue, and every kind of excellence is gained when it is bestowed on each of those closest to us.\n\n### Chapter 20\n\nSECTION 71\nJust as those who are superior in a close bond of friendship and association ought to make themselves equal to their inferiors, so the inferiors ought not to resent being surpassed by their friends in ability, fortune, or rank. Most of them are always complaining about something or even making reproaches, especially if they think they can say that they have done something dutifully and affectionately, with some effort of their own. People who reproach others for their services are certainly an offensive class of human beings: the person on whom a service has been bestowed ought to remember it, but the person who bestowed it ought not to mention it.\n\nSECTION 72\nTherefore, just as those who are superior ought to lower themselves in friendship, so those who are inferior ought in a certain sense to raise themselves up. For some people make friendships burdensome by imagining that they are being looked down on—something that generally happens only to those who also think themselves worthy of contempt. They must be relieved of this belief not only by words but also by actions.\n\nSECTION 73\nEach person should be given, first, as much as you yourself are able to accomplish, and then as much as the person you love and assist is able to bear. For no matter how distinguished you may be, you cannot bring all your friends to the highest public offices. Scipio, for example, was able to make Publius Rupilius consul, but he could not do the same for Rupilius’s brother Lucius. And even if you could confer any honor at all upon another person, you would still have to consider what he was capable of bearing.\n\nSECTION 74\nIn general, friendships should be judged only after both character and age have matured and become settled. If some men in their youth were devoted to hunting or ball games, they should not therefore regard as intimate friends those whom they loved at that time because they shared the same enthusiasm. On that principle, nurses and tutors would have the strongest claim upon our affection by right of long acquaintance. They certainly should not be neglected, but they must be valued in a different way; otherwise, stable friendships cannot endure. For unlike characters are accompanied by unlike interests, and the difference between them breaks friendships apart. Nor is there any other reason why good people cannot be friends with the wicked, or the wicked with the good, except that the distance between them in character and interests is as great as it can possibly be.\n\nSECTION 75\nIt can also rightly be laid down as a rule in friendship that an excessive affection, as very often happens, must not obstruct a friend’s great advantages. To return to the stories, Neoptolemus could not have captured Troy if he had chosen to listen to Lycomedes, in whose household he had been raised, when Lycomedes tried with many tears to prevent his departure. And important circumstances often arise that require us to leave our friends. Anyone who tries to prevent this because he cannot easily bear the separation is weak and soft by nature and, for that very reason, not sufficiently fair in friendship.\n\n### Chapter 21\n\nSECTION 76\nIn every situation, moreover, you must consider both what you ask of a friend and what you allow a friend to obtain from you.\n\nThere is also a certain misfortune, sometimes unavoidable, in bringing friendships to an end—for our discussion is now descending from the friendships of the wise to ordinary friendships. Friends’ faults often burst out, sometimes against their friends themselves and sometimes against strangers, though the resulting disgrace still reflects upon their friends. Such friendships, therefore, must be dissolved by a gradual relaxation of contact and, as I heard Cato say, should be unstitched rather than torn apart—unless some utterly intolerable wrong has flared up, making it neither right nor honorable, nor even possible, to avoid an immediate estrangement and separation.\n\nSECTION 77\nBut if, as often happens, some change has occurred either in character or in interests, or if a disagreement over political allegiance has intervened—I am speaking now, as I said a little earlier, not of the friendships of the wise but of ordinary friendships—we must take care that it does not appear that not only has the friendship been laid aside, but hostility has also been assumed. For nothing is more shameful than waging war against someone with whom you have lived on intimate terms. Scipio, as you know, withdrew from his friendship with Quintus Pompeius on my account; and because of the political disagreement between them, he became estranged from our colleague Metellus. In both cases he acted with dignity and moderation, and without bitter resentment.\n\nSECTION 78\nFor this reason, our first effort should be to prevent any breach between friends; but if something of that kind does occur, we should make it appear that the friendship died out rather than that it was violently crushed. We must certainly take care that friendships do not turn into bitter hostilities, which give rise to quarrels, abuse, and insults. Yet if these are tolerable, they must be endured, and this honor must be paid to the former friendship: the person who commits the wrong, not the person who suffers it, should be the one at fault.\n\nIn general, there is one safeguard and one precaution against all these faults and troubles: people should not begin to love too quickly, and they should not love those who are unworthy.\n\nSECTION 79\nThose worthy of friendship are people who possess within themselves the reason why they should be loved. They are a rare class! Indeed, everything excellent is rare, and nothing is more difficult than finding something that is perfect in every respect within its kind. But most people recognize nothing good in human affairs unless it is profitable, and, like livestock, they particularly value those friends from whom they hope to obtain the greatest return.\n\nSECTION 80\nThus they are deprived of that most beautiful and most natural friendship, sought for its own sake and because of itself; nor do they themselves provide their own example of the nature and magnitude of friendship’s power. For every person loves himself, not in order to demand from himself some payment for his affection, but because each person is dear to himself in and of himself. Unless this same feeling is transferred to friendship, a true friend will never be found; for a true friend is, as it were, another self.\n\nSECTION 81\nIf this is apparent among animals—birds, fish, land animals, tame and wild—first, in their loving themselves, since that feeling is born equally in every living creature, and then in their seeking and pursuing other living creatures of their own kind to which they may attach themselves, doing so with longing and with something resembling human love, how much more does this occur by nature in a human being, who both loves himself and seeks another person whose mind he may so blend with his own as to make almost one person out of two!\n\n### Chapter 22\n\nSECTION 82\nBut most people perversely, not to say shamelessly, want to have a friend of a kind that they themselves are incapable of being, and they demand from their friends the very things that they do not give them. It is fair, however, first to be a good person oneself, and then to seek another person like oneself. Among such people, that stability of friendship which we have now been discussing for so long can be secured. When people are joined by mutual affection, they will first rule the desires that enslave everyone else; then they will delight in fairness and justice and will undertake everything for one another. Neither will ever ask anything of the other unless it is honorable and right, and they will not only respect and love each other, but also feel reverence for each other. For anyone who removes reverence from friendship removes its greatest adornment.\n\nSECTION 83\nTherefore, those who think that friendship gives free license to every lust and wrongdoing are making a ruinous error. Friendship was given by nature as an assistant to virtues, not as a companion to faults, so that, since virtue could not reach the highest goals in isolation, it might reach them when joined and allied with another. If such a partnership exists, has existed, or will exist between any people, their companionship must be regarded as the best and happiest possible journey toward nature’s highest good.\n\nSECTION 84\nThis, I say, is the partnership that contains everything people think desirable—honor, glory, peace of mind, and pleasure—so that when these things are present, life is happy, and without them it cannot be happy.\n\nSince this is the best and greatest thing, if we wish to attain it, we must devote ourselves to virtue, without which we can obtain neither friendship nor anything else worth desiring. But those who neglect virtue and still think they have friends finally realize their mistake when some serious misfortune forces them to put those friends to the test.\n\nSECTION 85\nFor this reason—for it must be said repeatedly—you should love someone after you have judged him, not judge him after you have loved him. But although we are punished for carelessness in many matters, we are most careless of all in choosing and cherishing our friends. We form our plans backward and try to undo what has already been done, although an old proverb forbids this. For after we have become mutually entangled, either through long association or even through obligations, we suddenly break off our friendships in midcourse when some offense arises.\n\n### Chapter 23\n\nSECTION 86\nAll the more blameworthy, therefore, is such great carelessness in a matter of the greatest necessity. Friendship is the one thing in human affairs whose usefulness everyone unanimously acknowledges. Virtue itself, to be sure, is despised by many and is said to be a kind of self-promotion and display. Many people scorn riches and, content with little, take pleasure in modest food and a simple way of life. As for public honors, the desire for which inflames some people, how many despise them so completely that they consider nothing emptier or more trivial! Likewise, there are very many who regard as worthless the other things that seem wonderful to some. But on friendship everyone, without exception, holds the same opinion: those who have devoted themselves to public life; those who delight in knowledge and learning; those who attend to their private affairs while remaining out of public life; and, finally, those who have surrendered themselves entirely to pleasure. They all believe that life is no life without friendship, provided that they wish to live with some degree of dignity.\n\nSECTION 87\nFor friendship somehow winds its way through everyone’s life and permits no way of spending our years to be entirely without it.\n\nIndeed, even if someone were so harsh and savage by nature that he avoided and hated all contact with other people—the sort of person we are told some Timon was at Athens—even he could not endure without seeking someone in whose presence he could spew out the venom of his bitterness. This would be judged most clearly if something like the following could happen: suppose some god removed us from this crowded human world and placed us somewhere in solitude, supplying us there with an abundance and plenty of everything nature desires, but taking away every possibility of ever seeing another human being. Who would be so hardhearted that he could endure such a life, and from whom would solitude not take away the enjoyment of every pleasure?\n\n### Chapter 24\n\nSECTION 88\nWhat Archytas of Tarentum used to say, then, is true, as I believe. I heard our elders repeat it after hearing it from other elders: “If someone had ascended into the sky and beheld the structure of the universe and the beauty of the stars, his wonder at them would give him no pleasure, though it would have been most delightful if he had had someone to whom he could describe it.” Thus nature loves nothing solitary and always leans upon something as a kind of support, and that support is sweetest in one’s closest friend.\n\nBut although nature makes clear by so many signs what she wants, seeks, and desires, somehow we grow deaf and do not hear her warnings. The practice of friendship is varied and complex, and many causes of suspicion and offense arise. It is the part of a wise person sometimes to avoid them, sometimes to lessen them, and sometimes to endure them. One kind of offense must be faced if both usefulness and good faith are to be preserved in friendship: friends must often be advised and reproved, and these things must be received in a friendly spirit when they are done out of goodwill.\n\nSECTION 89\nBut somehow what my friend says in The Woman of Andros is true:\n\n“Compliance makes friends; truth breeds hatred.”\n\nTruth is troublesome if hatred, the poison of friendship, springs from it; but compliance is far more troublesome, because by indulging a friend’s faults it allows him to be carried headlong toward ruin. The greatest blame, however, lies with the person who both scorns the truth and is driven into deception by compliance.\n\nIn this whole matter, therefore, care and diligence must be used: first, so that advice is free from harshness, and then so that reproof is free from insult. In compliance, since I gladly use Terence’s word, let there be courtesy, but let flattery, the assistant of faults, be kept far away. Flattery is unworthy not only of a friend but even of a free person; for one lives in one way with a tyrant and in another with a friend.\n\nSECTION 90\nBut if a person’s ears are closed to the truth so that he cannot bear to hear the truth from a friend, there is no hope for his well-being. That saying of Cato’s, like many of his sayings, is perceptive: “Bitter enemies render some people better service than friends who seem pleasant; the former often tell the truth, the latter never do.” And it is absurd that those who are being advised do not feel the distress they ought to feel, but do feel the distress from which they ought to be free. They are not troubled that they have done wrong, but they resent being reproved, whereas they ought, on the contrary, to grieve over their offense and rejoice at their correction.\n\n### Chapter 25\n\nSECTION 91\nJust as it is characteristic of true friendship both to give advice and to receive it—to give it frankly, but not harshly, and to receive it patiently, not resentfully—so we must hold that no plague in friendship is greater than flattery, fawning, and servile agreement. For although this vice of shallow and deceitful people, who say everything to please and nothing for the sake of truth, can be described by many names, it must always be condemned.\n\nSECTION 92\nPretense is wrong in all things, because it removes our ability to judge the truth and corrupts that judgment, but it is especially incompatible with friendship, for it destroys truth, without which the very name of friendship has no meaning. The power of friendship lies in this: that a single mind is formed, so to speak, from several. But how can that happen if there is not even in each individual a single mind, always the same, but instead one that is shifting, changeable, and many-sided?\n\nSECTION 93\nFor what can be as pliable and wayward as the mind of a man who adjusts himself not only to another’s feelings and wishes, but even to his expression and nod? “Someone says no; I say no. He says yes; I say yes. In short, I have ordered myself to agree with everything,” as the same Terence says, though he says it in the character of Gnatho. To employ such a kind of friend is a mark of utter shallowness.\n\nSECTION 94\nYet there are many men like Gnatho who are superior in position, wealth, and reputation; their flattery is especially troublesome when authority is added to insincerity.\n\nSECTION 95\nWith careful attention, however, a flattering friend can be distinguished and recognized apart from a true one, just as everything artificial and counterfeit can be distinguished from what is genuine and true. A public assembly, though composed of the most inexperienced people, is nevertheless usually able to judge the difference between a demagogue—that is, a flattering and shallow citizen—and a steadfast, truthful, and serious one.\n\nSECTION 96\nWith what flatteries Gaius Papirius was recently pouring into the ears of the assembly when he proposed his law allowing tribunes of the plebs to be reelected! We spoke against it—but I will say nothing about myself; I would rather speak about Scipio. Immortal gods, what dignity he possessed, what majesty in his speech! You could easily have called him the leader of the Roman people, not one of their followers. But you were there, and the speech is in everyone’s hands. And so a popular law was rejected by the votes of the people.\n\nAnd, to return to myself, you remember how popular Gaius Licinius Crassus’s law concerning the priesthoods appeared when Quintus Maximus, Scipio’s brother, and Lucius Mancinus were consuls. The right of the priestly colleges to choose their own members was being transferred to the people as a privilege. He was also the first to introduce the practice of turning toward the Forum when addressing the people. Nevertheless, while I spoke in defense of it, reverence for the immortal gods easily prevailed over his appealing speech. This occurred while I was praetor, five years before I was made consul. Thus that cause was defended more by its own merits than by the highest personal authority.\n\n### Chapter 26\n\nSECTION 97\nBut if truth has power even on the stage—that is, in a public assembly, where there is so much room for fiction and mere outlines of reality—provided only that the truth is uncovered and brought to light, what must happen in friendship, which is judged entirely by truth? Unless, as the saying goes, you see your friend’s heart laid open and show him your own, you can have nothing trustworthy, nothing certain—not even the assurance that you love or are loved, since you do not know how sincerely either is being done. Yet although such flattery is destructive, it can harm no one except the person who accepts it and takes pleasure in it. And so the man who opens his ears widest to flatterers is the man who flatters himself and takes the greatest pleasure in himself.\n\nSECTION 98\nVirtue certainly loves itself, for it knows itself perfectly and understands how lovable it is. But I am not now speaking about virtue; I am speaking about the belief that one possesses virtue. Far more people wish to appear endowed with virtue than actually possess it. Such people delight in flattery. When fabricated words adapted to their wishes are offered to them, they consider that empty speech testimony to their own praises. This, then, is no friendship at all, when one man does not want to hear the truth and the other is ready to lie. Nor would the flattery of parasites in comedies seem amusing to us if there were no swaggering soldiers.\n\n“Does Thais really give me great thanks?”\n\nIt would have been enough to answer, “Great thanks.”\n\n“Enormous thanks,” he says.\n\nThe flatterer always magnifies whatever the person whose wishes he is serving wants to be considered great.\n\nSECTION 99\nTherefore, although this flattering insincerity has influence with those who themselves attract and invite it, even more serious and steadfast people must be warned to take care not to be caught by clever flattery.\n\nEveryone except a complete fool can recognize an open flatterer. Careful attention is needed to keep the clever and concealed flatterer from insinuating himself into one’s favor. He is not at all easy to recognize, since he often flatters even by disagreeing: pretending to argue, he fawns, and in the end he throws up his hands and allows himself to be defeated, so that the man who has been made a fool of may appear to have shown greater insight. But what is more shameful than being made a fool of? All the greater care must therefore be taken to prevent that from happening:\n\n“How splendidly today, beyond all the foolish old men of comedy, you have manipulated and mocked me!”\n\n### Chapter 27\n\nSECTION 100\nFor even in plays, the very most foolish character is the shortsighted and credulous old man.\n\nBut somehow my discussion has drifted from the friendships of perfect men—that is, of wise men, though I mean the kind of wisdom that seems attainable by a human being—to shallow friendships. Let us therefore return to those first principles and finally bring the discussion itself to a conclusion.\n\nVirtue, I say, Gaius Fannius and you, Quintus Mucius, both forms and preserves friendships. In virtue there is harmony in all things, stability, and constancy. When virtue has risen to prominence and revealed its own light, and has seen and recognized the same light in another, it draws near to that other virtue and in turn receives what is in the other. From this either love or friendship bursts into flame, for both words are derived from “loving.” To love is nothing other than to cherish the very person whom you love, with no need to be satisfied and no advantage sought. Yet advantage itself blossoms from friendship, even if you have not particularly pursued it.\n\nSECTION 101\nWith this kind of affection, when we were young, we loved those older men Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Gaius Gallus, Publius Nasica, and Tiberius Gracchus, the father-in-law of our Scipio. This affection shines even more brightly among people of the same age, as it did between Scipio and me, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, and Spurius Mummius. In turn, we old men find comfort in the affection of the young, as I do in yours and in that of Quintus Tubero. Indeed, I also take pleasure in my close friendship with the very young Publius Rutilius and Aulus Verginius. And since the course of our life and nature has been arranged so that one generation follows another, it is especially desirable to be able to reach the finish line, as the saying goes, together with the same companions of your own age with whom you were released from the starting gates.\n\nSECTION 102\nBut because human affairs are fragile and fleeting, we must always seek out people whom we may love and by whom we may be loved; for if affection and goodwill are removed, all pleasure is removed from life. As for me, although Scipio was suddenly taken away, he nevertheless lives for me and always will live. For I loved that man’s virtue, and that has not been extinguished. It remains before the eyes not only of me, who always had it close at hand, but it will also be bright and distinguished for later generations. No one will ever undertake great things in spirit or aspiration without thinking that he should set Scipio’s memory and image before himself.\n\nSECTION 103\nOf all the things that either fortune or nature has given me, I have nothing that I can compare with my friendship with Scipio. In it I found agreement about public affairs; in it, counsel concerning private matters; and in that same friendship, repose filled with delight. I never offended him even in the smallest matter, so far as I was aware, and I myself never heard anything from him that I did not wish to hear. We shared one home, the same way of life, and a common table; and we shared not only military service, but also journeys abroad and stays in the country.\n\nSECTION 104\nWhy should I speak of our constant eagerness to discover and learn something, pursuits in which, away from the public eye, we spent all our leisure time? If the recollection and memory of these things had died together with him, I could not possibly endure my longing for so closely attached and loving a man. But those memories have not been extinguished; instead, they are nourished and strengthened by my thought and remembrance. And even if I had been entirely deprived of them, my age itself nevertheless brings me great comfort, for I cannot now remain in this state of longing much longer. Everything brief ought to be bearable, even if it is great.\n\nThis is what I had to say about friendship. I urge you, however, to assign virtue such a high place—for without it friendship cannot exist—that, with virtue alone excepted, you consider nothing more excellent than friendship.","download_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/cicero-friendship/translations/trn_cicero_friendship_plain.txt"}],"retex_markdown_url":"https://mouseia.org/api/works/cicero-friendship/retex.md"}}