Marcus Tullius Cicero · Complete work
Chapter 6
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SECTION 20quanta autem vis amicitiae sit ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est et adducta in angustum, ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur.est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio, qua quidem haud scio an excepta sapientia nil quicquam melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum. divitias alii praeponunt, bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates. beluarum hoc quidem extremum, illa autem superiora caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis nostris quam in fortunae temeritate. qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, praeclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest.
SECTION 21iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae nostrae sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur, virosque bonos eos qui habentur numeremus—Paulos Catones Gallos Scipiones Philos—his communis vita contenta est; eos autem omittamus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur.
SECTION 22talis igitur inter viros amicitia tantas opportunitates habet, quantas vix queo dicere. principio qui potest esse vita vitalis, ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescit? quid dulcius quam habere quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum? qui esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes qui illis aeque ac tu ipse gauderet? Adversas vero ferre difficile esset sine eo, qui illas gravius etiam quam tu ferret. denique ceterae res, quae expetuntur, opportunae sunt singulae rebus fere singulis—divitiae, ut utare; opes, ut colare; honores, ut laudere; voluptates, ut gaudeas; valetudo, ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis; amicitia res plurimas continet: quoquo te verteris praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempestiva, numquam molesta est. itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, pluribus locis utimur quam amicitia. neque ego nunc de volgari aut de mediocri, quae tamen ipsa et delectat et prodest, sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum, qui pauci nominantur, fuit. nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia, et adversas, partiens communicansque, leviores.
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections for fidelity, philosophical precision, rhetorical clarity, structure, and cadence.
SECTION 20How great the power of friendship is may best be understood from this: out of the boundless fellowship of the human race, which nature herself has brought into being, the relationship has been so contracted and narrowed that every bond of affection is joined either between two persons or among only a few.Friendship is nothing other than complete harmony in all things, divine and human, joined with goodwill and affection; and with the possible exception of wisdom, I hardly know whether anything better than friendship has been given to man by the immortal gods. Some prefer riches, others good health, others power, others public honors, and many even pleasures. This last is the aim of beasts; the former are fleeting and uncertain, resting not so much on our own judgment as on the caprice of fortune. Those, however, who place the highest good in virtue are indeed right to do so; but it is this very virtue that both engenders and sustains friendship, nor can friendship exist in any way without virtue.
SECTION 21Now let us interpret virtue according to the practice of our own lives and the usage of our own speech, and not measure it, as certain learned men do, by grandiloquent definitions. Let us count as good men those who are commonly so regarded—the Pauli, the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios, the Phili. Ordinary life is content with such men; let us leave aside those who are nowhere to be found at all.
SECTION 22Friendship between men of this kind, then, contains advantages so great that I can scarcely express them. To begin with, how can life be “a life worth living,” as Ennius says, if it does not find repose in the mutual goodwill of a friend? What is sweeter than having someone with whom you dare to speak of everything as freely as with yourself? What great enjoyment would there be in prosperity if you had no one to rejoice in it as much as you yourself? And adversity would be difficult to bear without someone who bore it even more heavily than you. Finally, all the other things that people seek are each useful for almost one purpose alone: riches, that you may use them; influence, that you may be courted; public honors, that you may be praised; pleasures, that you may rejoice; health, that you may be free from pain and perform the functions of the body. Friendship embraces the greatest number of purposes. Wherever you turn, it is at hand; it is excluded from no place; it is never untimely, never burdensome. Thus, as the saying goes, we do not use water or fire on more occasions than we use friendship. And I am not now speaking of the ordinary or commonplace kind of friendship, which nevertheless gives both pleasure and benefit, but of friendship true and perfect, such as belonged to those few whose friendships are renowned. For friendship makes prosperity more splendid and adversity lighter by sharing and dividing it.
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections.
SECTION 20The great power of friendship can be understood most clearly from this fact: out of the boundless fellowship of the human race, which nature herself has created, the matter has been so contracted and narrowed that every bond of affection is joined between two people or among only a few.
Friendship is nothing other than complete agreement, accompanied by goodwill and affection, on all things divine and human; and with the possible exception of wisdom, I hardly know whether anything better than friendship has been given to humanity by the immortal gods. Some people prefer riches, others good health, others power, others public office, and many even prefer pleasures. This last belongs to beasts, while the things mentioned before it are fleeting and uncertain, dependent not so much on our own judgment as on the caprice of fortune. Those who place the highest good in virtue are certainly right to do so, but this very virtue both creates and preserves friendship, and without virtue friendship cannot possibly exist.
SECTION 21Let us interpret virtue according to the ordinary practice of our lives and our everyday way of speaking, and not measure it, as certain learned men do, by grandiose language. Let us count as good men those who are commonly regarded as such—the Pauli, Catos, Galli, Scipios, and Phili. Ordinary life is content with them; let us leave aside those perfect men who are found nowhere at all.
SECTION 22Friendship between men of this kind, then, offers advantages so great that I can scarcely describe them. To begin with, how can a life be truly alive, as Ennius says, if it does not find rest in the mutual goodwill of a friend? What is sweeter than having someone with whom you dare to speak about everything as freely as you speak with yourself? What great enjoyment would there be in prosperity if you had no one who rejoiced in it as much as you yourself? And adversity would be hard to bear without someone who took it even more heavily than you did. In short, the other things people seek are each useful for generally only one particular purpose: riches, so that you may use them; influence, so that you may be courted; public offices, so that you may be praised; pleasures, so that you may enjoy yourself; health, so that you may be free from pain and perform the functions of the body. Friendship embraces a great many purposes. Wherever you turn, it is at hand. It is excluded from no place; it is never untimely and never troublesome. And so, as the saying goes, we do not use water or fire on more occasions than we use friendship. I am not now speaking of ordinary or moderate friendship, though even that brings pleasure and benefit, but of true and perfect friendship, such as belonged to those few whose friendships are famous. Friendship makes prosperity more splendid, and by sharing and dividing adversity, makes it lighter.