Marcus Tullius Cicero · Complete work
Chapter 23
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SECTION 86quo etiam magis vituperanda est rei maxime necessariae tanta incuria. una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis, de cuius utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt; quamquam a multis virtus ipsa contemnitur et venditatio quaedam atque ostentatio esse dicitur; multi divitias despiciunt, quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat; honores vero, quorum cupiditate quidam inflammantur, quam multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius, nihil esse levius existiment! itemque cetera, quae quibusdam admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt qui pro nihilo putent. De amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt; et ei qui ad rem publicam se contulerunt, et ei qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur, et ei qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi; postremo ei qui se totos tradiderunt voluptatibus, sine amicitia vitam esse nullam, si modo velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter vivere.
SECTION 87serpit enim nescio quo modo per omnium vitas amicitia nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui.quin etiam si quis asperitate ea est et immanitate naturae, congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus, tamen is pati non possit, ut non anquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat virus acerbitatis suae. atque hoc maxime iudicaretur, si quid tale possit contingere, ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam collocaret atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum quas natura desiderat, abundantiam et copiam, hominis omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet—quis tam esset ferreus qui eam vitam ferre posset cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo?
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections for fidelity, philosophical precision, rhetorical clarity, structure, and cadence.
SECTION 86All the more blameworthy, therefore, is such great carelessness in a matter of the greatest necessity. For friendship is the one thing in human affairs whose usefulness everyone affirms with one voice. Virtue itself, indeed, is despised by many, who call it a kind of advertising and display. Many men scorn riches and, content with little, take pleasure in modest food and a simple manner of life. As for public honors, which set some men ablaze with desire, how many despise them so utterly that they regard nothing as emptier or more frivolous! Likewise, many men count as worthless the other things that seem marvelous to some. But about friendship everyone, without exception, thinks alike: those who have devoted themselves to public affairs, those who delight in the knowledge and study of the world, those who attend to their own business in a life of leisure, and, finally, those who have surrendered themselves wholly to pleasure—all agree that without friendship life is no life at all, provided they wish to live in some measure as free and cultivated men.
SECTION 87For friendship somehow winds its way through every human life and permits no manner of passing one’s days to remain wholly without it.
Indeed, even if a man were so harsh and savage by nature that he shunned and hated all contact with mankind—such a man as we are told that a certain Timon was at Athens—even he could not endure without seeking someone into whose presence he might spew the venom of his bitterness. This truth would be most clearly tested if something of the following sort could happen: suppose some god were to remove us from this crowded world of men and set us somewhere in complete solitude, supplying us there with abundance and plenty of everything nature desires, yet depriving us utterly of the power to see another human being. Who would be so hard as to endure such a life? From whom would solitude not rob every pleasure of its fruit?
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections.
SECTION 86All the more blameworthy, therefore, is such great carelessness in a matter of the greatest necessity. Friendship is the one thing in human affairs whose usefulness everyone unanimously acknowledges. Virtue itself, to be sure, is despised by many and is said to be a kind of self-promotion and display. Many people scorn riches and, content with little, take pleasure in modest food and a simple way of life. As for public honors, the desire for which inflames some people, how many despise them so completely that they consider nothing emptier or more trivial! Likewise, there are very many who regard as worthless the other things that seem wonderful to some. But on friendship everyone, without exception, holds the same opinion: those who have devoted themselves to public life; those who delight in knowledge and learning; those who attend to their private affairs while remaining out of public life; and, finally, those who have surrendered themselves entirely to pleasure. They all believe that life is no life without friendship, provided that they wish to live with some degree of dignity.
SECTION 87For friendship somehow winds its way through everyone’s life and permits no way of spending our years to be entirely without it.
Indeed, even if someone were so harsh and savage by nature that he avoided and hated all contact with other people—the sort of person we are told some Timon was at Athens—even he could not endure without seeking someone in whose presence he could spew out the venom of his bitterness. This would be judged most clearly if something like the following could happen: suppose some god removed us from this crowded human world and placed us somewhere in solitude, supplying us there with an abundance and plenty of everything nature desires, but taking away every possibility of ever seeing another human being. Who would be so hardhearted that he could endure such a life, and from whom would solitude not take away the enjoyment of every pleasure?