Marcus Tullius Cicero · Complete work
Chapter 24
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SECTION 88verum ergo illud est, quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi ab aliis senibus auditum: si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore, quae iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem cui narraret habuisset. Sic natura solitarium nihil amat semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum adnititur, quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.sed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret quid velit anquirat desideret, tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo modo nec ea, quae ab ea monemur, audimus. est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur, quas tum evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est. una illa subeunda est offensio ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur; nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt.
SECTION 89sed nescio quo modo verum est, quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit: obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit. molesta veritas, siquidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiae, sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit; maxima autem culpa in eo, qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio impellitur.omni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, primum ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat. in obsequio autem, quoniam Terentiano verbo lubenter utimur, comitas adsit, assentatio vitiorum adiutrix procul amoveatur, quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est; aliter enim cur tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur.
SECTION 90Cuius autem aures clausae veritati sunt, uta ab amico verum audire nequeat, huius salus desperanda est. scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa: melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri, quam eos amicos, qui dulces videantur; illos verum saepe dicere, hos numquam. atque illud absurdum, quod ei, qui monentur, eam molestiam quam debent capere non capiunt, ear capiunt qua debent vacare. peccasse enim se non anguntur, obiurgari moleste ferunt; quod contra oportebat delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.
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SECTION 88True, then, is that saying which, as I recall, our elders used to attribute to Archytas of Tarentum, having heard it from elders of their own: if a man ascended into heaven and beheld the structure of the universe and the beauty of the stars, his wonder would give him no delight, though it would have been supremely delightful if he had had someone to whom he could tell of it. Thus nature loves nothing solitary and always leans upon something as though upon a supporting prop; and the sweetest support is found in one’s closest friend.
Yet although nature makes clear by so many signs what she wills, seeks, and desires, somehow we grow deaf and do not hear her warnings. For the practice of friendship is varied and complex, and many occasions for suspicion and offense arise; it is the part of a wise man sometimes to avoid them, sometimes to lessen them, and sometimes to endure them. One kind of offense alone must be risked if usefulness and loyalty are to be preserved in friendship: friends must often be admonished and rebuked, and such admonitions, when kindly meant, must be received in a friendly spirit.
SECTION 89But somehow it is true, as my friend says in The Woman of Andros:
“Complaisance wins friends; truth breeds hatred.”
Truth is troublesome if hatred, the poison of friendship, springs from it; but complaisance is much more troublesome, since by indulging his faults it allows a friend to rush headlong to ruin. The greatest blame, however, belongs to the man who both rejects the truth and is driven into deception by complaisance.
In this whole matter, therefore, judgment and care must be exercised: first, admonition must be free of bitterness; second, rebuke must be free of insult. In complaisance—since we are glad to use Terence’s word—let courtesy be present, but let flattery, the accomplice of vice, be banished far away; for flattery is unworthy not merely of a friend but even of a free man. One lives with a tyrant in one manner, with a friend in another.
SECTION 90But if a man’s ears are closed to the truth so that he cannot bear to hear it from a friend, his salvation must be despaired of. For that saying of Cato’s, like many of his sayings, is shrewd: bitter enemies serve some men better than friends who seem agreeable; the former often speak the truth, the latter never. And it is absurd that those who are admonished do not feel the distress they ought to feel, but do feel the distress from which they ought to be free. They are not anguished because they have done wrong; they resent being rebuked. Yet the reverse would be proper: they should grieve at the offense and rejoice at the correction.
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections.
SECTION 88What Archytas of Tarentum used to say, then, is true, as I believe. I heard our elders repeat it after hearing it from other elders: “If someone had ascended into the sky and beheld the structure of the universe and the beauty of the stars, his wonder at them would give him no pleasure, though it would have been most delightful if he had had someone to whom he could describe it.” Thus nature loves nothing solitary and always leans upon something as a kind of support, and that support is sweetest in one’s closest friend.
But although nature makes clear by so many signs what she wants, seeks, and desires, somehow we grow deaf and do not hear her warnings. The practice of friendship is varied and complex, and many causes of suspicion and offense arise. It is the part of a wise person sometimes to avoid them, sometimes to lessen them, and sometimes to endure them. One kind of offense must be faced if both usefulness and good faith are to be preserved in friendship: friends must often be advised and reproved, and these things must be received in a friendly spirit when they are done out of goodwill.
SECTION 89But somehow what my friend says in The Woman of Andros is true:
“Compliance makes friends; truth breeds hatred.”
Truth is troublesome if hatred, the poison of friendship, springs from it; but compliance is far more troublesome, because by indulging a friend’s faults it allows him to be carried headlong toward ruin. The greatest blame, however, lies with the person who both scorns the truth and is driven into deception by compliance.
In this whole matter, therefore, care and diligence must be used: first, so that advice is free from harshness, and then so that reproof is free from insult. In compliance, since I gladly use Terence’s word, let there be courtesy, but let flattery, the assistant of faults, be kept far away. Flattery is unworthy not only of a friend but even of a free person; for one lives in one way with a tyrant and in another with a friend.
SECTION 90But if a person’s ears are closed to the truth so that he cannot bear to hear the truth from a friend, there is no hope for his well-being. That saying of Cato’s, like many of his sayings, is perceptive: “Bitter enemies render some people better service than friends who seem pleasant; the former often tell the truth, the latter never do.” And it is absurd that those who are being advised do not feel the distress they ought to feel, but do feel the distress from which they ought to be free. They are not troubled that they have done wrong, but they resent being reproved, whereas they ought, on the contrary, to grieve over their offense and rejoice at their correction.