Marcus Tullius Cicero · Complete work
Chapter 22
Chapter 22 of 27. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
Open the complete readerOriginal Latin
SECTION 82sed plerique perverse, ne dicam impudenter, habere talem amicum volunt, quales ipsi esse non possunt, quaeque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab eis desiderant. par est autem primum ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem sui quaerere. in talibus ea, quam iam dudum tractamus, stabilitas amicitiae confirmari potest, cum homines benevolentia coniuncti primum cupiditatibus eis quibus ceteri serviunt imperabunt; deinde aequitate iustitiaque gaudebunt omniaque alter pro altero suscipiet; neque quicquam umquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit, neque solum colent inter se ac diligent, sed etiam verebuntur. nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit, qui ex ea tollit verecundiam.
SECTION 83itaque in eis perniciosus est error, qui existimant libidinum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam. virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea quae summa sunt pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret. quae si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura est, eorum est habendus ad summum naturae bonum optimus beatissimusque comitatus.
SECTION 84haec est, inquam, societas, in qua omnia insunt, quae putant homines expetenda—honestas gloria tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas; ut et, cum haec adsint, beata vita sit, et sine his esse non possitquod cum optimum maximumque sit, si id volumus adipisci, virtuti opera danda est, sine qua nec amicitiam neque ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus; ea vero neglecta qui se amicos habere arbitrantur, tum se denique errasse sentiunt, cum eos gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit.
SECTION 85quocirca, dicendum est enim saepius, cum iudicaris, diligere oportet; non, cum dilexeris, iudicare. sed cum multis in rebus neglegentia plectimur, tum maxime in amicis et diligendis et colendis; praeposteris enim utimur consiliis et acta agimus, quod vetamur vetere proverbio. nam, implicati ultro et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam officiis, repente in medio cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione disrumpimus.
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections for fidelity, philosophical precision, rhetorical clarity, structure, and cadence.
SECTION 82Yet most men perversely—not to say shamelessly—wish to have the sort of friend they themselves are incapable of being, and they demand from their friends what they do not give to them. It is only fair that a man should first be good himself and then seek another like himself. Among such men the stability in friendship that we have long been discussing can be made secure: united by mutual affection, they will first master the desires to which other men are enslaved; then they will delight in fairness and justice, each will undertake everything for the other, and neither will ever ask of the other anything that is not honorable and right. Nor will they merely respect and love each other; they will also stand in awe of one another. For whoever removes a sense of shame from friendship strips it of its greatest adornment.
SECTION 83Therefore, those who believe that friendship gives free license to every passion and every sin are dangerously mistaken. Friendship was given us by nature as the helper of virtue, not as the companion of vice, so that virtue, since it could not reach the highest goals in isolation, might reach them when joined and allied with another. If such a partnership exists between any men, or has existed, or ever will exist, theirs must be considered the best and happiest companionship on the journey toward nature’s highest good.
SECTION 84This, I say, is the partnership that contains everything men deem desirable—honor, glory, tranquility of mind, and delight—so that when these are present life is happy, and without them it cannot be happy.
Since this is the best and greatest end, if we wish to attain it we must devote ourselves to virtue, without which we can obtain neither friendship nor anything else worth desiring. Those who neglect virtue yet imagine that they have friends discover at last that they were mistaken when some grave misfortune compels them to put those friends to the test.
SECTION 85For this reason—for it must be said again and again—you ought to love after you have judged, not judge after you have loved. But though we are punished for carelessness in many matters, we are punished most of all for carelessness in choosing and cherishing our friends. For we reverse the proper order of deliberation and try to undo what is already done, though an ancient proverb forbids it. After we have become entangled with one another through long association or even through mutual services, we suddenly break off our friendships in midcourse when some offense arises.
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections.
SECTION 82But most people perversely, not to say shamelessly, want to have a friend of a kind that they themselves are incapable of being, and they demand from their friends the very things that they do not give them. It is fair, however, first to be a good person oneself, and then to seek another person like oneself. Among such people, that stability of friendship which we have now been discussing for so long can be secured. When people are joined by mutual affection, they will first rule the desires that enslave everyone else; then they will delight in fairness and justice and will undertake everything for one another. Neither will ever ask anything of the other unless it is honorable and right, and they will not only respect and love each other, but also feel reverence for each other. For anyone who removes reverence from friendship removes its greatest adornment.
SECTION 83Therefore, those who think that friendship gives free license to every lust and wrongdoing are making a ruinous error. Friendship was given by nature as an assistant to virtues, not as a companion to faults, so that, since virtue could not reach the highest goals in isolation, it might reach them when joined and allied with another. If such a partnership exists, has existed, or will exist between any people, their companionship must be regarded as the best and happiest possible journey toward nature’s highest good.
SECTION 84This, I say, is the partnership that contains everything people think desirable—honor, glory, peace of mind, and pleasure—so that when these things are present, life is happy, and without them it cannot be happy.
Since this is the best and greatest thing, if we wish to attain it, we must devote ourselves to virtue, without which we can obtain neither friendship nor anything else worth desiring. But those who neglect virtue and still think they have friends finally realize their mistake when some serious misfortune forces them to put those friends to the test.
SECTION 85For this reason—for it must be said repeatedly—you should love someone after you have judged him, not judge him after you have loved him. But although we are punished for carelessness in many matters, we are most careless of all in choosing and cherishing our friends. We form our plans backward and try to undo what has already been done, although an old proverb forbids this. For after we have become mutually entangled, either through long association or even through obligations, we suddenly break off our friendships in midcourse when some offense arises.