Marcus Tullius Cicero · Complete work
Chapter 21
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SECTION 76atque in omni re considerandum est et quid postules ab amico et quid patiare a te impetrari.est etiam quaedam calamitas in amicitiis dimittendis non numquam necessaria—iam enim a sapientium familiaritatibus ad volgaris amicitias oratio nostra delabitur. erumpunt saepe vitia amicorum tum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos, quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. tales igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usus eluendae et, ut Catonem dicere audivi, dissuendae magis quam discindendae, nisi quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque facienda sit.
SECTION 77sin autem aut morum aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, facta erit, aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit (loquor enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium, sed de communibus amicitiis) cavendum erit ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur. nihil enim est turpius quam cum eo bellum gerere, quocum familiariter vixeris. ab amicitia Q. Pompei meo nomine se removerat, ut scitis, Scipio; propter dissensionem autem, quae erat in re publica, alienatus est a collega nostro Metello; utrumque egit graviter ac moderate et offensione animi non acerba.
SECTION 78quam ob rem primum danda opera est ne qua amicorum discidia fiant, sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut exstinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae esse videantur. cavendum vero ne etiam in gravis inimicitias convertant se amicitiae ex quibus iurgia maledicta contumeliae gignuntur. quae tamen si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt et hic honos veteri amicitiae tribuendus, ut is in culpa sit qui faciat, non is qui patiatur, iniuriam.omnino omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodorum una cautio est atque una provisio, ut ne nimis cito diligere incipiant neve non dignos.
SECTION 79digni autem sunt amicitia, quibus in ipsis inest causa cur diligantur. rarum genus! et quidem omnia praeclara, rara, nec quicquam difficilius quam reperire quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum. sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quicquam bonum norunt nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam pecudes eos potissimum diligunt, ex quibus sperant se maximum fructum esse capturos.
SECTION 80ita pulcherrima illa et maxime naturali carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita,nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, haec vis amicitiae et qualis et quanta sit. ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suae, sed quod per se quisque sibi carus est; quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur, verus amicus numquam reperietur: est enim is qui est tamquam alter idem.
SECTION 81quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucribus nantibus agrestibus, cicuribus feris, primum ut se ipsae diligant—id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur —deinde, ut requirant atque appetant ad quas se applicent eiusdem generis animantis—idque faciant cum desiderio et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani—quanto id magis in homine fit natura, qui et se ipse diligit et alterum anquirit, cuius animum ita cum suo misceat, ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus!
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections for fidelity, philosophical precision, rhetorical clarity, structure, and cadence.
SECTION 76In every matter, therefore, one must consider both what one asks of a friend and what one allows a friend to obtain from oneself.
There is also a certain misfortune sometimes unavoidable in dissolving friendships—for now our discourse is descending from the intimate relations of the wise to ordinary friendships. The faults of friends often burst forth, sometimes against their friends themselves, sometimes against strangers, though the resulting disgrace spills over upon their friends. Friendships of this kind should therefore be effaced by gradually relaxing the intimacy and, as I heard Cato say, should be unstitched rather than torn apart—unless some utterly intolerable wrong has blazed forth, making it neither right nor honorable, nor indeed possible, to avoid an immediate estrangement and separation.
SECTION 77But if, as commonly happens, some change has taken place either in character or in pursuits, or if disagreement has arisen over political allegiance—I am speaking now, as I said a little earlier, not of friendships among the wise but of ordinary friendships—care must be taken that it not appear that friendship has merely been laid aside and hostility taken up in its place. For nothing is more shameful than to wage war against a man with whom one has lived on intimate terms. Scipio, as you know, had withdrawn from friendship with Quintus Pompeius on my account; and because of the political disagreement between them, he became estranged from our colleague Metellus. In both cases he acted with dignity and restraint, and without bitter resentment.
SECTION 78For this reason, our first care must be to prevent any breach between friends; but if such a thing does occur, we should make it seem that the friendship has died out rather than been violently destroyed. We must also take care that friendships do not turn into bitter enmities, from which quarrels, abuse, and insults arise. Yet if these are bearable, they must be endured, and this honor must be paid to the old friendship: the blame for the wrong should rest upon the man who commits it, not upon the man who suffers it.
In general, there is one safeguard and one precaution against all these faults and troubles: people must not begin to love too quickly, nor love those who are unworthy.
SECTION 79Those, however, are worthy of friendship who possess within themselves the reason why they should be loved. A rare breed! Yet all excellent things are rare, and nothing is more difficult than to find something wholly perfect of its kind in every respect. But most men recognize no good in human affairs except what is profitable, and they prize as friends, much as they do livestock, those from whom they hope to reap the greatest gain.
SECTION 80Thus they are deprived of that loveliest and most natural friendship, sought for its own sake and because of itself; nor do they take themselves as an example from which to learn the nature and magnitude of friendship’s power. For every man loves himself, not because he demands some payment from himself in return for his affection, but because each man is dear to himself for his own sake. Unless this same principle is carried over into friendship, a true friend will never be found; for a true friend is, as it were, a second self.
SECTION 81If this is evident among animals—birds, creatures of the water, beasts of the field, tame and wild—first, that they love themselves, for this instinct is born alike in every living creature; and then, that they seek and desire other animals of their own kind to which they may attach themselves, doing so with longing and with something resembling human love—how much more naturally does this happen in man, who both loves himself and seeks another whose soul he may so mingle with his own as to make almost one soul out of two!
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections.
SECTION 76In every situation, moreover, you must consider both what you ask of a friend and what you allow a friend to obtain from you.
There is also a certain misfortune, sometimes unavoidable, in bringing friendships to an end—for our discussion is now descending from the friendships of the wise to ordinary friendships. Friends’ faults often burst out, sometimes against their friends themselves and sometimes against strangers, though the resulting disgrace still reflects upon their friends. Such friendships, therefore, must be dissolved by a gradual relaxation of contact and, as I heard Cato say, should be unstitched rather than torn apart—unless some utterly intolerable wrong has flared up, making it neither right nor honorable, nor even possible, to avoid an immediate estrangement and separation.
SECTION 77But if, as often happens, some change has occurred either in character or in interests, or if a disagreement over political allegiance has intervened—I am speaking now, as I said a little earlier, not of the friendships of the wise but of ordinary friendships—we must take care that it does not appear that not only has the friendship been laid aside, but hostility has also been assumed. For nothing is more shameful than waging war against someone with whom you have lived on intimate terms. Scipio, as you know, withdrew from his friendship with Quintus Pompeius on my account; and because of the political disagreement between them, he became estranged from our colleague Metellus. In both cases he acted with dignity and moderation, and without bitter resentment.
SECTION 78For this reason, our first effort should be to prevent any breach between friends; but if something of that kind does occur, we should make it appear that the friendship died out rather than that it was violently crushed. We must certainly take care that friendships do not turn into bitter hostilities, which give rise to quarrels, abuse, and insults. Yet if these are tolerable, they must be endured, and this honor must be paid to the former friendship: the person who commits the wrong, not the person who suffers it, should be the one at fault.
In general, there is one safeguard and one precaution against all these faults and troubles: people should not begin to love too quickly, and they should not love those who are unworthy.
SECTION 79Those worthy of friendship are people who possess within themselves the reason why they should be loved. They are a rare class! Indeed, everything excellent is rare, and nothing is more difficult than finding something that is perfect in every respect within its kind. But most people recognize nothing good in human affairs unless it is profitable, and, like livestock, they particularly value those friends from whom they hope to obtain the greatest return.
SECTION 80Thus they are deprived of that most beautiful and most natural friendship, sought for its own sake and because of itself; nor do they themselves provide their own example of the nature and magnitude of friendship’s power. For every person loves himself, not in order to demand from himself some payment for his affection, but because each person is dear to himself in and of himself. Unless this same feeling is transferred to friendship, a true friend will never be found; for a true friend is, as it were, another self.
SECTION 81If this is apparent among animals—birds, fish, land animals, tame and wild—first, in their loving themselves, since that feeling is born equally in every living creature, and then in their seeking and pursuing other living creatures of their own kind to which they may attach themselves, doing so with longing and with something resembling human love, how much more does this occur by nature in a human being, who both loves himself and seeks another person whose mind he may so blend with his own as to make almost one person out of two!