Chapter 20

SECTION 71Therefore, just as those who hold the higher place in the bonds of friendship and close association ought to put themselves on an equal footing with those below them, so the latter ought not to resent being surpassed by their friends in intellect, fortune, or rank. Yet most of them are forever complaining about something, or even making reproaches, especially if they think they can claim to have performed some act dutifully, affectionately, and with effort on their part. A truly odious breed of men are those who reproach others with their services—services which the recipient ought to remember, but which the giver ought not to mention.

SECTION 72Therefore, just as those who are superior ought to lower themselves in friendship, so they ought in a certain sense to raise up those who are inferior. For some men make friendships burdensome because they imagine that they are being despised—something that generally happens only to those who think themselves deserving of contempt. Such men must be relieved of this belief not only by words, but also by deeds.

SECTION 73Moreover, each person should be granted only so much as, first, you yourself are able to accomplish, and, second, the person whom you love and assist is able to bear. For however eminent you may be, you cannot advance all your friends to the highest offices. Scipio, for example, was able to make Publius Rupilius consul, but he could not do the same for Rupilius’s brother Lucius. Even if you could bestow anything whatever upon another, you must still consider what he is capable of bearing.

SECTION 74As a general rule, friendships should be judged only after both character and age have grown settled and mature. If some men in early youth shared a passion for hunting or ball-playing, they need not therefore regard as intimate friends all those whom they loved at the time because they shared the same enthusiasm. On that principle, nurses and tutors would, by right of long acquaintance, claim the greatest share of our affection. They should not, indeed, be neglected, but they must be valued in a different way; otherwise stable friendships cannot endure. For unlike characters lead to unlike pursuits, and this dissimilarity severs friendships. Nor is there any other reason why good men cannot be friends with the wicked, or the wicked with the good, except that the distance between their characters and pursuits is as great as it can possibly be.

SECTION 75It may also rightly be laid down as a rule in friendship that an unrestrained affection must not, as very often happens, obstruct a friend’s great opportunities. To return to the legends, Neoptolemus could not have captured Troy if he had chosen to heed Lycomedes, at whose court he had been reared, when with many tears the king tried to prevent his departure. And important occasions often arise when one must part from friends. Whoever seeks to prevent this because he cannot easily endure the longing is weak and soft by nature, and for that very reason is less than just in friendship.

SECTION 71Just as those who are superior in a close bond of friendship and association ought to make themselves equal to their inferiors, so the inferiors ought not to resent being surpassed by their friends in ability, fortune, or rank. Most of them are always complaining about something or even making reproaches, especially if they think they can say that they have done something dutifully and affectionately, with some effort of their own. People who reproach others for their services are certainly an offensive class of human beings: the person on whom a service has been bestowed ought to remember it, but the person who bestowed it ought not to mention it.

SECTION 72Therefore, just as those who are superior ought to lower themselves in friendship, so those who are inferior ought in a certain sense to raise themselves up. For some people make friendships burdensome by imagining that they are being looked down on—something that generally happens only to those who also think themselves worthy of contempt. They must be relieved of this belief not only by words but also by actions.

SECTION 73Each person should be given, first, as much as you yourself are able to accomplish, and then as much as the person you love and assist is able to bear. For no matter how distinguished you may be, you cannot bring all your friends to the highest public offices. Scipio, for example, was able to make Publius Rupilius consul, but he could not do the same for Rupilius’s brother Lucius. And even if you could confer any honor at all upon another person, you would still have to consider what he was capable of bearing.

SECTION 74In general, friendships should be judged only after both character and age have matured and become settled. If some men in their youth were devoted to hunting or ball games, they should not therefore regard as intimate friends those whom they loved at that time because they shared the same enthusiasm. On that principle, nurses and tutors would have the strongest claim upon our affection by right of long acquaintance. They certainly should not be neglected, but they must be valued in a different way; otherwise, stable friendships cannot endure. For unlike characters are accompanied by unlike interests, and the difference between them breaks friendships apart. Nor is there any other reason why good people cannot be friends with the wicked, or the wicked with the good, except that the distance between them in character and interests is as great as it can possibly be.

SECTION 75It can also rightly be laid down as a rule in friendship that an excessive affection, as very often happens, must not obstruct a friend’s great advantages. To return to the stories, Neoptolemus could not have captured Troy if he had chosen to listen to Lycomedes, in whose household he had been raised, when Lycomedes tried with many tears to prevent his departure. And important circumstances often arise that require us to leave our friends. Anyone who tries to prevent this because he cannot easily bear the separation is weak and soft by nature and, for that very reason, not sufficiently fair in friendship.