Chapter 17

SECTION 61These, then, are the limits that I believe should be observed: when the characters of friends are morally sound, there should be between them, without any exception, a complete community of interests, purposes, and desires. Even if by some chance it should happen that we must assist desires of our friends that are not altogether just, in cases where their life or reputation is at stake, we may have to depart from the straight path, provided that utter disgrace does not follow; for there is a certain point up to which friendship may be granted indulgence. Yet reputation must not be neglected, nor should we regard the goodwill of our fellow citizens as an insignificant weapon in the conduct of affairs. To gather it by flattery and servile assent is shameful; but virtue, which is followed by affection, must by no means be rejected.

SECTION 62But—for I often return to Scipio, whose entire conversation was about friendship—he used to complain that men were more careful in every other matter: each could say how many goats and sheep he owned, but could not say how many friends he had. They exercised care in acquiring the former, yet were negligent in choosing friends, and possessed no marks or signs, as it were, by which to judge who was fit for friendship. We must therefore choose men who are firm, steady, and constant, a kind of which there is a great scarcity. Yet it is certainly difficult to judge a man without testing him, and the test must be made within friendship itself. Thus friendship outruns judgment and takes away the opportunity for testing.

SECTION 63It is therefore the part of a prudent man to check the rush of goodwill, as he would check a runner’s course, so that we may enter upon friendship only after putting our friends’ characters to the test in some degree, just as we use horses only after testing them. Some men are often revealed in a small matter of money, showing how unstable they are; while others, whom a small sum could not move, are exposed when a great sum is involved. But even if some are found who consider it sordid to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find men who do not place honors, magistracies, military commands, civil authority, and power above friendship—men who, when these things are offered on one side and the claims of friendship on the other, will not greatly prefer the former? For human nature is too weak to despise power; and even if men attain it by disregarding friendship, they suppose that their conduct will be obscured because friendship cannot have been disregarded without some weighty cause.

SECTION 64Thus true friendships are especially difficult to find among those engaged in the pursuit of public office and affairs of state. For where will you find the man who prefers his friend’s advancement to his own? And, to pass over this point, how burdensome and how difficult most men find it to share in another’s misfortunes! It is not easy to find one who will descend into them. Although Ennius rightly says, “A sure friend is discerned in an unsure hour,” still these two circumstances convict most men of fickleness and weakness: either they scorn their friends in prosperity or desert them in adversity. The man, therefore, who in both conditions has shown himself serious, constant, and steadfast in friendship must be judged to belong to a supremely rare and almost divine class of men.

SECTION 61I therefore believe that the proper limits are these: when friends have morally sound characters, there should be between them, without any exception, complete sharing of all matters, plans, and desires. Even if it should happen by some misfortune that we must support wishes of our friends that are not entirely just, in cases where their life or reputation is at stake, we may deviate from the straight path, provided that utter disgrace does not follow; for there is a limit to the pardon that can be granted for friendship’s sake. Reputation, however, must not be neglected, nor should we suppose that the goodwill of our fellow citizens is an insignificant weapon in conducting public affairs. To obtain that goodwill by flattery and servile agreement is shameful; but virtue, which is followed by affection, must by no means be rejected.

SECTION 62But—since I often return to Scipio, whose whole conversation was about friendship—he used to complain that people were more careful in every other matter. Each person could say how many goats and sheep he owned, but could not say how many friends he had. They took care in acquiring the former, but were negligent in choosing friends and had, as it were, no particular signs and marks by which they might judge those who were fit for friendship. We must therefore choose people who are firm, steady, and constant, but there is a great shortage of that kind. And it is certainly difficult to judge a person without putting him to the test, yet the testing must take place within the friendship itself. Thus friendship outruns judgment and takes away the opportunity for testing.

SECTION 63A prudent person, therefore, should restrain the impulse of affection just as he would restrain a runner’s pace, so that we may enter into friendship only after our friends’ characters have been tested to some degree, just as we use horses only after they have been tried. Some people are often revealed by a small sum of money to be utterly unreliable; others, whom a small sum could not influence, are exposed when a large sum is involved. But even if some people are found who consider it sordid to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find those who do not place honors, public offices, military commands, positions of power, and wealth ahead of friendship, so that, when these things are offered on one side and the claims of friendship on the other, they do not much prefer the former? For human nature is too weak to despise power; and even if people attain it by neglecting friendship, they think that neglect will be obscured because friendship could not have been neglected without some weighty reason.

SECTION 64And so true friendships are hardest to find among those who are engaged in the pursuit of office and in public life. For where can you find a man who puts his friend’s advancement ahead of his own? And, to leave that aside, how burdensome and difficult most people find it to share in another’s misfortunes, which few can readily be found willing to enter. Although Ennius rightly says, “A sure friend is discerned in unsure circumstances,” these two situations expose most people as fickle and weak: they either despise their friends in prosperity or desert them in adversity. Therefore, anyone who in both situations has shown himself serious, constant, and steadfast in friendship must be regarded as belonging to an exceedingly rare, almost divine class of human beings.