Chapter 16

SECTION 56We must now determine what the bounds of friendship are, and what may be called the limits of affection. On this subject I see three opinions advanced, none of which I approve: first, that we should feel toward a friend exactly as we feel toward ourselves; second, that our goodwill toward our friends should correspond precisely and equally to their goodwill toward us; and third, that a man should be valued by his friends at exactly the value he sets upon himself.

SECTION 57I assent to none of these three opinions at all. For the first is not true—that a man should feel toward his friend just as he feels toward himself. How many things we do for our friends that we would never do for our own sake! We make requests of an unworthy man, we resort to entreaty, we assail someone more bitterly and pursue him more vehemently—acts that would be hardly honorable in our own affairs, but become entirely honorable when done for our friends. And there are many circumstances in which good men surrender, and allow to be taken from them, much of their own advantage, so that their friends rather than they themselves may enjoy it.

SECTION 58The second opinion defines friendship as an equal exchange of services and goodwill. But this is to reduce friendship to far too narrow and meager an accounting, insisting that the balance of receipts and payments must be even. True friendship seems to me richer and more abundant, and it does not keep a strict watch lest it give back more than it has received. For there is no reason to fear that something will spill over, or run to waste upon the ground, or that more than is fair will be heaped into friendship.

SECTION 59The third limit, however, is the worst of all: that a man should be valued by his friends exactly as highly as he values himself. For often in some men the spirit is too downcast, or their hope of improving their fortunes too broken. It is therefore not the part of a friend to feel toward such a man as he feels toward himself, but rather to strive to raise his friend’s prostrate spirit and lead him to better hopes and thoughts. Some other limit must therefore be established for true friendship, after I have first related what saying Scipio was accustomed above all to condemn. He maintained that no utterance more hostile to friendship could possibly have been devised than that of the man who said that one ought to love as if one were someday going to hate. Nor could he be persuaded to believe, as was commonly supposed, that Bias had said this—Bias, who was counted one of the Seven Sages. It was the maxim, he thought, of some impure or ambitious man, or of one who made everything serve his own power. For how can anyone be a friend to a man whom he believes he may someday be able to hate? Indeed, he will necessarily wish and hope that his friend may do wrong as often as possible, so as to give him, as it were, more handles for reproach; and conversely, he will necessarily be distressed, grieved, and envious at his friends’ right actions and successes.

SECTION 60Therefore this precept, whoever its author may be, serves only to destroy friendship. The rule that ought rather to have been given is that we should exercise such care in forming friendships that we never begin to love a man whom we might someday come to hate. Indeed, even if we had been less fortunate in our choice, Scipio thought that this should be endured rather than that we should look ahead to a time of enmity.

SECTION 56We must now determine what the boundaries of friendship are, and, so to speak, the limits of affection. I see three opinions offered about them, none of which I approve: first, that we should feel toward a friend exactly as we feel toward ourselves; second, that our goodwill toward our friends should correspond precisely and equally to their goodwill toward us; and third, that a person should be valued by his friends as highly as he values himself.

SECTION 57I agree completely with none of these three opinions. The first is not true—that a person should feel toward a friend just as he feels toward himself. How many things we do for our friends that we would never do for ourselves! We make requests of an unworthy person, resort to entreaties, attack someone more bitterly and pursue him more vehemently. Actions that would not be entirely honorable in our own affairs become thoroughly honorable when done for our friends. And there are many situations in which good men sacrifice much of their own advantage, and allow it to be sacrificed, so that their friends rather than they themselves may enjoy it.

SECTION 58The second opinion defines friendship in terms of equal services and equal goodwill. But this is to reduce friendship to an excessively narrow and meager accounting, so that the balance of what is received and what is given must be equal. True friendship seems to me richer and more abundant than that, and it does not keep a strict watch to avoid giving back more than it has received. There is no need to fear that something will spill out, or run onto the ground, or that more than the proper amount will be poured into friendship.

SECTION 59The third limit is the worst of all: that a person should be valued by his friends as highly as he values himself. For some people often have too low an opinion of themselves, or too little hope of improving their fortunes. A friend, therefore, should not treat such a person as that person treats himself, but should instead strive to raise his friend’s dejected spirit and lead him to greater hope and better thoughts. We must therefore establish another limit for true friendship, after I first tell you what saying Scipio used to condemn above all. He maintained that no statement more hostile to friendship could ever have been devised than the saying that one should love as if one might someday come to hate. He could not bring himself to believe that Bias, as was commonly thought, had said this, since Bias was regarded as one of the Seven Sages. It was, he said, the opinion of some corrupt or ambitious man, or of someone who made everything serve his own power. For how can anyone be a friend to a person whom he thinks he may become an enemy? Indeed, he will inevitably wish and hope that his friend makes mistakes as often as possible, so as to provide him with more handles, as it were, for criticism; and, conversely, he will inevitably be distressed, grieved, and envious at his friends’ right actions and successes.

SECTION 60Therefore this maxim, whoever its author may be, is effective only in destroying friendship. What should have been advised instead was that we use such care in forming friendships that we never begin to love someone whom we might someday be able to hate. Indeed, even if we had been less fortunate in our choice, Scipio thought we should endure it rather than contemplate a time of hostility.