Chapter 18
Original Latin
41 Chrysippus autem cum et necessitatem inprobaret et nihil vellet sine praepositis causis evenire, causarum genera distinguit, ut et necessitatem effugiat et retineat fatum. Causarum enim, inquit, aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae. Quam ob rem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri causis antecedentibus, non hoc intellegi volumus: causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adiuvantibus [antecedentibus] et proximis. Itaque illi rationi, quam paulo ante conclusi, sic occurrit: si omnia fato fiant, sequi illud quidem, ut omnia causis fiant antepositis, verum non principalibus causis et perfectis, sed adiuvantibus et proximis. Quae si ipsae non sunt in nostra potestate, non sequitur, ut ne adpetitus quidem sit in nostra potestate. At hoc sequeretur, si omnia perfectis et principalibus causis fieri diceremus, ut, cum eae causae non essent in nostra potestate, ne ille quidem esset in nostra potestate.
42 Quam ob rem, qui ita fatum introducunt, ut necessitatem adiungant, in eos valebit illa conclusio; qui autem causas antecedentis non dicent perfectas neque principalis, in eos nihil valebit. Quod enim dicantur adsensiones fieri causis antepositis, id quale sit, facile a se explicari putat. Nam quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tamen, cum id visum proximam causam habeat, non principalem, hanc habet rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam dudum diximus, non ut illa quidem fieri possit nulla vi extrinsecus excitata (necesse est enim adsensionem viso commoveri), sed revertitur ad cylindrum et ad turbinem suum, quae moveri incipere nisi pulsa non possunt. Id autem cum accidit, suapte natura, quod superest, et cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem putat.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the surviving Latin in separate source-only tasks. Sections 1–48 and five fragments/testimonia follow Müller’s 1915 edition; lost passages remain marked. Perseus source and these derived editions CC BY-SA 4.0.
41 Chrysippus, however, rejecting necessity yet unwilling that anything should occur without prior causes, distinguishes kinds of causes so as both to escape necessity and to retain fate. “Of causes,” he says, “some are complete and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. Hence, when we say that everything happens by fate through antecedent causes, we do not mean through complete and principal causes, but through auxiliary [antecedent] and proximate causes.” Thus he meets the argument I concluded a little earlier as follows: if everything happens by fate, it does indeed follow that everything happens through prior causes, but not through principal and complete causes; rather, through auxiliary and proximate causes. If these causes themselves are not in our power, it does not follow that impulse is not in our power either. That would follow if we said that everything happens through complete and principal causes: since those causes were not in our power, impulse too would not be in our power.
42 That argument will therefore hold against those who introduce fate in such a way as to attach necessity to it; but it will have no force against those who will not call antecedent causes complete or principal. Chrysippus thinks he can readily explain what is meant by saying that acts of assent occur through prior causes. Although assent cannot occur unless stirred by an impression, nevertheless, since that impression serves as a proximate, not a principal, cause, assent, as Chrysippus maintains, has the character we described a little earlier. Not that it can occur without some force being aroused from outside—for assent must be stirred by an impression—but he returns to his cylinder and spinning top, which cannot begin to move unless struck. Once that happens, however, he holds that for the rest the cylinder rolls and the top spins by their own nature.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted direct-Latin Plain English translation. Initial drafts used separate Latin-only tasks; later source-based editorial revisions were made by a reviewer with prior editorial access to Musean, not from its English wording. Includes all 48 sections and five fragments/testimonia, with lost passages marked. Perseus source and these derived editions CC BY-SA 4.0.
41 Chrysippus rejects necessity but wants nothing to happen without prior causes. So he distinguishes kinds of causes, hoping both to escape necessity and to keep fate. “Some causes,” he says, “are complete and primary; others are contributing and immediate. So when we say that everything happens by fate through preceding causes, we do not mean complete and primary causes. We mean contributing [preceding] and immediate causes.” This is how he answers the argument I set out a little earlier. If everything happens by fate, it does follow that everything happens through prior causes. But these are not primary and complete causes. They are contributing and immediate ones. Even if these causes themselves are not under our control, it does not follow that impulse is not under our control either. That would follow if we said everything happened through complete and primary causes. Then, because those causes were not under our control, impulse would not be under our control either.
42 So the earlier argument will work against people who introduce fate in a way that also brings in necessity. But it will have no force against people who say that preceding causes are not complete or primary. Chrysippus thinks he can easily explain what it means to say that assent happens through prior causes. Assent cannot happen unless an impression stirs it. Still, because it has that impression as its immediate cause, not its primary cause, it fits the account we gave earlier, as Chrysippus intends. Not that assent can happen without some outside force setting it in motion: an impression must stir assent. But he goes back to his cylinder and his spinning top. These cannot start moving unless they are pushed. Once that happens, however, he thinks the cylinder keeps rolling and the top keeps spinning because of their own nature.
About this section
Chapter 18 is part of On Fate by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 18 of 25 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the Roman tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.