Chapter 17
Original Latin
39 Ac mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum philosophorum, una eorum, qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri, ut id fatum vim necessitatis adferret, in qua sententia Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aristoteles fuit, altera eorum, quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, Chrysippus tamquam arbiter honorarius medium ferire voluisse, sed adplicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus animorum liberatos volunt; dum autem verbis utitur suis, delabitur in eas difficultates, ut necessitatem fati confirmet invitus.
40 Atque hoc, si placet, quale sit videamus in adsensionibus, quas prima oratione tractavi. Eas enim veteres illi, quibus omnia fato fieri videbantur, vi effici et necessitate dicebant. Qui autem ab iis dissentiebant, fato adsensiones liberabant negabantque fato adsensionibus adhibito necessitatem ab his posse removeri, iique ita disserebant: Si omnia fato fiunt, omnia fiunt causa antecedente, et, si adpetitus, illa etiam, quae adpetitum sequuntur, ergo etiam adsensiones; at, si causa adpetitus non est sita in nobis, ne ipse quidem adpetitus est in nostra potestate; quod si ita est, ne illa quidem, quae adpetitu efficiuntur, sunt sita in nobis; non sunt igitur neque adsensiones neque actiones in nostra potestate. Ex quo efficitur, ut nec laudationes iustae sint nec vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia. Quod cum vitiosum sit, probabiliter concludi putant non omnia fato fieri, quaecumque fiant.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the surviving Latin in separate source-only tasks. Sections 1–48 and five fragments/testimonia follow Müller’s 1915 edition; lost passages remain marked. Perseus source and these derived editions CC BY-SA 4.0.
39 There were two views among the ancient philosophers. One was held by those who thought everything happened by fate in such a way that fate brought with it the force of necessity; Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle held this view. The other was held by those who thought that the mind’s voluntary movements were free of fate altogether. It seems to me that Chrysippus, like an arbitrator chosen by the parties, wished to strike a middle course; yet he inclines rather toward those who wish the mind’s movements to be freed from necessity. But in using his own terminology he slips into such difficulties that, against his will, he establishes the necessity of fate.
40 If you please, let us examine how this works in the case of acts of assent, which I discussed at the beginning of my discourse. Those ancient thinkers who held that everything happens by fate said that acts of assent were produced by force and necessity. Those who disagreed with them freed assent from fate, and denied that necessity could be removed from acts of assent if fate were applied to them. They argued as follows: if everything happens by fate, everything happens through an antecedent cause; and if impulse does, so too do the things that follow impulse, and therefore acts of assent as well. But if the cause of impulse does not lie in us, neither is impulse itself in our power. If that is so, neither do the things brought about by impulse lie in us. Neither acts of assent nor actions, then, are in our power. It follows that neither praise nor blame, neither honors nor punishments, are just. Since this is wrong, they think they have plausibly established that not everything that happens happens by fate.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted direct-Latin Plain English translation. Initial drafts used separate Latin-only tasks; later source-based editorial revisions were made by a reviewer with prior editorial access to Musean, not from its English wording. Includes all 48 sections and five fragments/testimonia, with lost passages marked. Perseus source and these derived editions CC BY-SA 4.0.
39 I see it this way. Among the earlier philosophers there were two positions. For one group, fate determined everything, and that fate brought unavoidable compulsion with it. This was the position of Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle. For the other group, movements of our minds that we freely choose had nothing to do with fate. Chrysippus seems to have wanted a compromise, as though serving as an arbitrator by agreement. In practice he sides more with those who want mental movements freed from necessity. But his own terminology gets him into trouble. Without meaning to, he ends up upholding the very necessity of fate.
40 We can look, if you wish, at assent to see what this amounts to. I dealt with assent at the opening of my discussion. Those earlier philosophers who attributed all events to fate also attributed assent to force and necessity. Their opponents exempted assent from fate. You could not, they said, subject assent to fate while keeping it free of necessity. Their reasoning went like this. Assume fate governs everything. Each event must then have a prior cause. If this holds for impulses, it holds for what follows from impulses, including assent. But if the cause of an impulse is not located in us, the impulse itself is beyond our control. What the impulse produces must then be beyond our control as well. That leaves us without control of either our assent or our actions. Consequently there would be no justice in praise or blame, in honors or punishments. They regard that as an unacceptable result. So, they think, it is reasonable to conclude that not all events are fated.
About this section
Chapter 17 is part of On Fate by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 17 of 25 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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