Chapter 19

43 “Just as the man who pushed the cylinder,” he says, “gave it the beginning of its motion, but did not give it its capacity to roll, so an impression presented to the mind will indeed impress and, as it were, stamp its own image upon it, but our assent will be in our power. And that assent, as we said of the cylinder, once set in motion from outside, will move for the rest by its own force and nature. If anything were brought about without an antecedent cause, it would be false that everything happens by fate. But if it is likely that a cause precedes everything that happens, what reason can be offered for not admitting that everything happens by fate? Only let the distinction and difference between causes be understood.”

44 Now that Chrysippus has explained matters in this way, if those who deny that acts of assent occur by fate †nevertheless admit that they do not occur without a preceding impression, that is a different account. But if they grant that impressions precede, yet hold that acts of assent do not occur by fate because that proximate and immediate cause does not set assent in motion, consider whether they are not saying the same thing. Nor will Chrysippus, in granting that the proximate and immediate cause of assent lies in the impression, [nor will he] grant that this is a cause which necessitates assent, so that, if everything happens by fate, everything happens through antecedent and necessitating causes. Likewise, those who disagree with him, while acknowledging that acts of assent do not occur without impressions coming first, will say that if everything happened by a fate of such a kind that nothing happened without a cause going before it, one would have to acknowledge that everything happens by fate. From this it is easy to understand that, since both parties, once they have disclosed and explained their meaning, reach the same conclusion, they disagree in words, not in substance.

45 In general, the distinction is this: in some cases it can truly be said that, once these causes have gone before, it is not in our power to prevent the events of which they were the causes from occurring; in other cases, even when causes have gone before, it is still in our power for the outcome to be otherwise. Both parties approve this distinction. But one party holds that those events which, once their causes have gone before, it is not in our power to make turn out otherwise occur by fate, whereas events that are in our power are exempt from fate […]

43 He says: “Pushing a cylinder gives it the start of its motion, not its capacity for rolling. An impression presented to the mind does something similar. It leaves its own likeness stamped there, rather like a seal. But giving assent remains our decision. Assent, like the cylinder in our example, receives a push from outside. After that, its own power and nature carry on the movement. A single event without a prior cause would disprove the claim that fate governs everything. But a prior cause seems likely for every event that takes place. What could justify refusing to acknowledge fate as the explanation of all events? Only be sure you understand how the kinds of causes differ and how they must be distinguished.”

44 That is Chrysippus' explanation. Now take the people who deny that fate governs assent. If they †still acknowledge that an impression has to precede assent, the argument is different. But suppose they allow that impressions come first while still rejecting fated assent, because that immediate and closely connected cause does not set assent in motion. Look at whether their point is actually the same as his. Chrysippus allows the impression to be assent's immediate and closely connected cause. He does not [nor] allow it to be a cause that forces assent, making all events both caused in advance and compelled if they are all fated. His opponents likewise accept that impressions must arrive before assent. They will say this: “If saying that all events are fated means that each event requires a cause to come before it, we must acknowledge that all events are fated.” It is therefore easy to understand their disagreement. When each party opens up and explains its position, both arrive at one result. Their words differ; their actual views do not.

45 In general, the distinction runs as follows. For some events, after certain causes have come first, we can truly say we have no power to stop the resulting events from occurring. For others, the causes may already have come first, yet we retain the power to change the result. Both parties accept that division. One party, however, calls an event fated when its preceding causes leave us unable to change its outcome. Things we can control, they say, have no fate attached to them […]