Chapter 14
Original Latin
31 Carneades genus hoc totum non probabat et nimis inconsiderate concludi hanc rationem putabat. Itaque premebat alio modo nec ullam adhibebat calumniam; cuius erat haec conclusio: Si omnia antecedentibus causis fiunt, omnia naturali conligatione conserte contexteque fiunt; quod si ita est, omnia necessitas efficit; id si verum est, nihil est in nostra potestate; est autem aliquid in nostra potestate; at, si omnia fato fiunt, omnia causis antecedentibus fiunt; non igitur fato fiunt, quaecumque fiunt.
32 Hoc artius adstringi ratio non potest. Nam si quis velit idem referre atque ita dicere: “Si omne futurum ex aeternitate verum est, ut ita certe eveniat, quem ad modum sit futurum, omnia necesse est conligatione naturali conserte contexteque fieri”, nihil dicat. Multum enim differt, utrum causa naturalis ex aeternitate futura vera efficiat, an etiam sine aeternitate naturali, futura quae sint, ea vera esse possint intellegi. Itaque dicebat Carneades ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the surviving Latin in separate source-only tasks. Sections 1–48 and five fragments/testimonia follow Müller’s 1915 edition; lost passages remain marked. Perseus source and these derived editions CC BY-SA 4.0.
31 Carneades did not approve of this entire kind of reasoning, and thought that the argument had been brought to its conclusion far too heedlessly. He therefore pressed the case in another way, without any quibbling. His argument was this: if everything happens through antecedent causes, everything happens in an interwoven, interlocking natural chain. If that is so, necessity brings everything about. If that is true, nothing is in our power. But something is in our power. Yet if everything happens by fate, everything happens through antecedent causes. Therefore, not everything that happens happens by fate.
32 This reasoning cannot be drawn any tighter. For if someone wished to turn the same argument back and say, “If every future event has been true from all eternity, so that it will assuredly occur just as it is going to occur, everything must happen in an interwoven, interlocking natural chain,” he would be saying nothing. There is a great difference between a natural cause making future events true from all eternity, and our being able to understand that future events may be true even without an eternal natural cause. Carneades therefore used to say that not even Apollo could foretell future events, except those whose causes were so contained in nature that they must occur.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted direct-Latin Plain English translation. Initial drafts used separate Latin-only tasks; later source-based editorial revisions were made by a reviewer with prior editorial access to Musean, not from its English wording. Includes all 48 sections and five fragments/testimonia, with lost passages marked. Perseus source and these derived editions CC BY-SA 4.0.
31 Carneades would have none of this approach. In his view, people arrived at the conclusion of this argument much too hastily. He therefore pressed his attack on another front, without any dishonest quibbling. Here was his reasoning. Let preceding causes account for every event. That would put every event in an interconnected, interwoven chain of nature. In that case, necessity produces every event. If that is right, we have control over nothing. Yet we do have control over something. Now, to say fate accounts for every event is to give every event preceding causes. Therefore fate cannot account for every event that occurs.
32 There is no way to make this reasoning tighter. But suppose someone tried to turn the same reasoning around: “Suppose it has been true for all eternity that every future event will take place. Its outcome is therefore certain to be exactly as it is going to be. So every event must belong to an interconnected, interwoven chain of nature.” That would be an empty argument. The two questions are very different. Is a natural cause making the future true for all eternity? Or can we understand that something is truly going to happen without there being an eternal natural chain? Carneades accordingly said that even Apollo could tell the future only in cases where nature held causes that made the outcome unavoidable.
About this section
Chapter 14 is part of On Fate by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 14 of 25 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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