Chapter 13

29 For this is how they put the question: “If it is your fate to recover from this illness, you will recover whether you call in a doctor or not. Likewise, if it is your fate not to recover from this illness, you will not recover whether you call in a doctor or not. And one or the other is your fate. There is therefore no point in calling in a doctor.” This kind of questioning has rightly been called idle and inert, since the same reasoning will remove all action from life. You may even alter it so as not to introduce the word ‘fate,’ and still retain the same meaning, as follows: “If the statement ‘You will recover from this illness’ has been true from all eternity, you will recover whether you call in a doctor or not. Likewise, if the statement ‘You will recover from this illness’ has been false from all eternity, you will not recover whether you call in a doctor or not”—and then the rest. Chrysippus criticizes this argument.

30 “Some things,” he says, “are simple, others conjoined. ‘Socrates will die on that day’ is simple. Whether he does anything or not, his day of death has been fixed. But if the fated statement is ‘Oedipus will be born to Laius,’ one cannot say ‘whether Laius has intercourse with a woman or not.’ The matter is conjoined and co-fated.” That is the term he uses, because it is fated both that Laius will sleep with his wife and that he will father Oedipus by her. Thus, if it had been said, “Milo will wrestle at the Olympic Games,” and someone replied, “Then he will wrestle whether he has an opponent or not,” he would be mistaken. For “he will wrestle” is conjoined with something else, since there is no wrestling without an opponent. All sophisms of this kind are therefore refuted in the same way. “You will recover whether you call in a doctor or not” is a sophism, since calling in a doctor is as much fated as recovering. These, as I said, he calls co-fated events.

29 They put their challenge this way: “Suppose fate has decreed your recovery from this illness. You will get well, doctor or no doctor. Now suppose fate has decreed that you will not recover from this illness. You will not get well, doctor or no doctor. Fate has decreed one of these two outcomes. So why bother getting a doctor?” “Lazy” and “idle” are apt names for this kind of challenge. Apply its reasoning generally, and you remove all activity from life. You can also change the wording to omit fate entirely and still make the same point. Here is how: “Suppose ‘You will get over this illness’ has been true for all eternity. You will get well, doctor or no doctor. Now suppose ‘You will get over this illness’ has been false for all eternity. You will not get well, doctor or no doctor.” The rest of the argument stays the same. Chrysippus objects to this reasoning.

30 He says: “Events can be single or linked together. Take ‘Socrates is going to die on that date.’ That is single. His date of death is fixed regardless of anything he does or leaves undone. But take this decree of fate: ‘Laius is going to father Oedipus.’ You cannot add, ‘Whether Laius sleeps with a woman or not.’ Here the events are linked and jointly fated.” He uses that expression because fate decrees both Laius' sleeping with his wife and his having Oedipus by her. Compare “Milo is going to compete in wrestling at the Olympics.” Someone would be wrong to answer, “Then he will wrestle, opponent or no opponent.” Wrestling is a linked event: it cannot take place without an opponent. This same reply disposes of all such trick arguments. It is a trick to say, “You will get well, doctor or no doctor.” Getting a doctor is no less decreed by fate than getting well. “Jointly fated,” as I said, is his name for these events.