Chapter 15
Original Latin
33 Quid enim spectans deus ipse diceret Marcellum eum, qui ter consul fuit, in mari esse periturum? Erat hoc quidem verum ex aeternitate, sed causas id efficientis non habebat. Ita ne praeterita quidem ea, quorum nulla signa tamquam vestigia extarent, Apollini nota esse censebat; quo minus futura! causis enim efficientibus quamque rem cognitis posse denique sciri, quid futurum esset. Ergo nec de Oedipode potuisse Apollinem praedicere nullis in rerum natura causis praepositis, cur ab eo patrem interfici necesse esset, nec quicquam eius modi. Quocirca, si Stoicis, qui omnia fato fieri dicunt, consentaneum est huius modi oracla ceteraque, quae a divinatione ducuntur, conprobare, iis autem, qui, quae futura sunt, ea vera esse ex aeternitate dicunt, non idem dicendum est, vide, ne non eadem sit illorum causa et Stoicorum; hi enim urguentur angustius, illorum ratio soluta ac libera est.
34 Quodsi concedatur nihil posse evenire nisi causa antecedente, quid proficiatur, si ea causa non ex aeternis causis apta dicatur? Causa autem ea est, quae id efficit, cuius est causa, ut vulnus mortis, cruditas morbi, ignis ardoris. Itaque non sic causa intellegi debet, ut, quod cuique antecedat, id ei causa sit, sed quod cuique efficienter antecedat, nec, quod in campum descenderim, id fuisse causae, cur pila luderem, nec Hecubam causam interitus fuisse Troianis, quod Alexandrum genuerit, nec Tyndareum Agamemnoni, quod Clytaemnestram. Hoc enim modo viator quoque bene vestitus causa grassatori fuisse dicetur, cur ab eo spoliaretur.
35 Ex hoc genere illud est Ennii:Utinám ne in nemore Pélio secúribusCaesae áccidissent ábiegnae ad terrám trabes!Licuit vel altius: “Utinam ne in Pelio nata ulla umquam esset arbor!” etiam supra: “Utinam ne esset mons ullus Pelius!” similiterque superiora repetentem regredi infinite licet.Neve índe navis ínchoandi exórdiumCoepísset.Quorsum haec praeterita? Quia sequitur illud:Nam númquam era errans méa domo ecferrét pedem,Medéa, animo aegra, amóre saevo saúcia,†non ut eae res causam adferrent amoris.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the surviving Latin in separate source-only tasks. Sections 1–48 and five fragments/testimonia follow Müller’s 1915 edition; lost passages remain marked. Perseus source and these derived editions CC BY-SA 4.0.
33 For what could the god himself consult to foretell that Marcellus, who was consul three times, would perish at sea? This had indeed been true from all eternity, but it had no causes to bring it about. Carneades thus believed that not even past events were known to Apollo if no signs of them survived as traces—much less future events! Only when the causes producing each event were known could one know what would happen. Thus Apollo could not have made a prediction about Oedipus, or anything of that kind, unless causes had already been laid down in the nature of things that made it necessary for him to kill his father. Accordingly, if the Stoics, who say that everything happens by fate, are consistent in accepting such oracles and the other evidence drawn from divination, while the same need not be said of those who say that future events have been true from all eternity, consider whether their position is really the same as the Stoics’. The Stoics are more tightly hemmed in; the others’ reasoning is unfettered and free.
34 But if we grant that nothing can occur without an antecedent cause, what is gained by saying that this cause is not linked to eternal causes? A cause is that which brings about the thing of which it is the cause: a wound causes death, indigestion illness, fire heat. Thus we must not understand a cause to mean whatever precedes a thing, but whatever precedes it in such a way as to produce it. My going down to the Campus was not the cause of my playing ball; nor was Hecuba the cause of the Trojans’ destruction because she gave birth to Alexander; nor Tyndareus the cause of Agamemnon’s destruction because he fathered Clytemnestra. For by this reasoning a well-dressed traveler, too, will be called the cause of a highwayman’s robbing him.
35 Of this kind are those lines of Ennius:“If only in Pelion’s grove no axesHad felled the firwood timbers to the earth!”He might have gone back still further: “If only no tree had ever grown on Pelion!” Further still: “If only there had never been a Mount Pelion!” In the same way, retracing earlier events, one may go back without end.“And from that place no start on building a shipHad ever been made.”Why recall these past events? Because this follows:“For then my deluded mistress would never have set foot outside her home,Medea, sick at heart, wounded by savage love,”†not that those things brought about her love.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted direct-Latin Plain English translation. Initial drafts used separate Latin-only tasks; later source-based editorial revisions were made by a reviewer with prior editorial access to Musean, not from its English wording. Includes all 48 sections and five fragments/testimonia, with lost passages marked. Perseus source and these derived editions CC BY-SA 4.0.
33 What could the god himself consult to announce that Marcellus—the three-time consul—would lose his life at sea? That had indeed been true for all eternity. But there were no causes producing that result. Carneades therefore believed Apollo could not even know about past events if they left no marks, no footprints, so to speak. Still less could he know what lay ahead! To know the future, you first have to know the causes that produce each event. On that basis, Apollo could not have made a prediction about Oedipus unless nature already contained causes making his killing his father inevitable. The same applies to any similar prediction. The Stoics say fate accounts for all events. Accepting oracles of this sort, and the other evidence taken from divination, fits their position. But people who say the future has been true for all eternity are not committed to the same claim. Ask yourself, then, whether their case is really identical to the Stoics' case. The Stoics are much more restricted. The others' reasoning has room to move freely.
34 Now grant that an event cannot occur without a cause coming before it. What is gained by denying that this cause is tied to an eternal series of causes? To be a cause, something must produce the result attributed to it. Think of a deadly wound, indigestion that causes sickness, or fire that causes heat. Something's merely coming first does not make it a cause. It has to come first in a way that actually brings about the result. Going down to the field did not cause me to play ball. Giving birth to Alexander did not make Hecuba the cause of the Trojans' ruin. Nor did fathering Clytemnestra make Tyndareus the cause of Agamemnon's ruin. On that basis, when a bandit robs a smartly dressed traveler, the traveler himself would count as the cause.
35 This passage from Ennius is a case in point:“If only the axes in Pelion's woodshad never chopped the fir trunks down to the earth!”He could have started even earlier: “If only Pelion had never grown a single tree!” Or earlier still: “If only there had never been any mountain called Pelion!” Keep tracing earlier events like that, and you can go backward without end.“And if only the work of starting that shiphad never begun with that timber.”Why run through these earlier events? Because of what comes next:“For my deluded mistress would never have put a foot outside her home,Medea, her mind sick, hurt by violent love,”†not that these things brought about her love.
About this section
Chapter 15 is part of On Fate by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 15 of 25 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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