Book V, Chapter I, 3

Many different causes helped weaken the discipline of the Roman armies. Its extreme severity was perhaps one of them. In the days of their greatness, when no enemy seemed capable of opposing them, they put aside their heavy armor as an unnecessary burden and neglected their arduous exercises as unnecessary toil. Under the Roman emperors, moreover, Rome's standing armies, particularly those guarding the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to their rulers, against whom they frequently raised their own generals. To make them less formidable, according to some authors Dioclesian, according to others Constantine, first withdrew them from the frontier, where they had previously always camped in large bodies, generally of two or three legions each, and scattered them in small detachments among the provincial towns. From these towns they were hardly ever moved except when an invasion had to be repelled. Small detachments of soldiers, quartered in trading and manufacturing towns and seldom moved from their quarters, themselves became tradesmen, artisans, and manufacturers. The civilian character came to predominate over the military one; and Rome's standing armies gradually degenerated into a corrupt, neglected, undisciplined militia, incapable of resisting the German and Scythian militias that soon afterwards invaded the western empire. Only by hiring the militia of some of these nations to oppose those of others could the emperors defend themselves for a time. The fall of the western empire is the third great revolution in human affairs of which ancient history has preserved any distinct and detailed account. It was brought about by the irresistible superiority that the militia of a barbarous nation has over that of a civilized nation; that the militia of a nation of shepherds has over that of a nation of farmers, artisans, and manufacturers. The victories won by militias have generally been won not over standing armies but over other militias inferior to them in training and discipline. Such were the victories of the Greek militia over that of the Persian empire, and such, in later times, were the victories of the Swiss militia over those of the Austrians and Burgundians.

The military force of the German and Scythian nations that established themselves upon the ruins of the western empire remained for some time much the same in their new settlements as it had been in their original countries. It was a militia of shepherds and farmers who, in war, took the field under the same chieftains they were accustomed to obey in peace. It was therefore reasonably well trained and disciplined. As arts and industry advanced, however, the chieftains' authority gradually declined, and the great body of the people had less time to spare for military exercises. The discipline and training of the feudal militia therefore gradually fell into ruin, and standing armies were gradually introduced to take its place. Once one civilized nation had adopted the expedient of a standing army, moreover, all its neighbors had to follow its example. They soon found that their safety depended on doing so and that their own militia was wholly incapable of resisting such an army.

The soldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen an enemy, have often shown all the courage of veteran troops and been fit to face the hardiest and most experienced veterans the moment they took the field. In 1756, when the Russian army marched into Poland, the courage of Russian soldiers seemed no less than that of the Prussians, then thought the hardiest and most experienced veterans in Europe. Yet the Russian empire had enjoyed deep peace for nearly twenty years before that, and could then have had very few soldiers who had ever seen an enemy. When the Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had enjoyed deep peace for about twenty-eight years. Yet far from having been corrupted by that long peace, the courage of her soldiers was never more conspicuous than in the attack on Carthagena, the first unfortunate exploit of that unfortunate war. During a long peace, generals may perhaps sometimes forget their skill; but where a well-regulated standing army is maintained, its soldiers seem never to forget their courage.

When a civilized nation relies on a militia for its defense, it is always exposed to conquest by any barbarous nation in its neighborhood. The frequent conquests of all the civilized countries of Asia by the Tartars amply demonstrate the natural superiority of a barbarous nation's militia over a civilized nation's. A well-regulated standing army is superior to every militia. Since such an army can best be maintained by an affluent and civilized nation, it alone can defend that nation against invasion by a poor and barbarous neighbor. Only by means of a standing army, therefore, can a country's civilization be perpetuated, or even preserved for any considerable time.

Just as a civilized country can be defended only by a well-regulated standing army, so a barbarous country can be civilized fairly rapidly only by such an army. A standing army establishes the sovereign's law with irresistible force throughout the remotest provinces of the empire, and maintains some degree of orderly government in countries that could not otherwise sustain any. Anyone who carefully examines the improvements Peter the Great introduced into the Russian empire will find that nearly all of them amount to the establishment of a well-regulated standing army. That army is the instrument that carries out and maintains all his other regulations. The degree of order and internal peace that the empire has enjoyed ever since is due entirely to its influence.

Men of republican principles have viewed a standing army with suspicion as a danger to liberty. It certainly is one wherever the interests of the general and the chief officers are not necessarily bound to the preservation of the constitution of the state. Caesar's standing army destroyed the Roman republic. Cromwell's standing army drove the long parliament out of office. But where the sovereign is himself the general, and the country's leading nobility and gentry are the army's chief officers; where military force is commanded by those who have the greatest interest in preserving civil authority because they themselves have the greatest share of it, a standing army can never endanger liberty. On the contrary, it may in some cases favor liberty. The security it gives the sovereign makes unnecessary the oppressive vigilance that in some modern republics seems to watch the smallest actions and stands always ready to disturb every citizen's peace. Where the magistrate's security, though backed by the country's leading people, is imperiled by every outbreak of popular discontent; where a small tumult can bring about a great revolution in a few hours, the whole authority of government must be used to suppress and punish every murmur and complaint against it. By contrast, the rudest, most groundless, most unrestrained protests can cause little disturbance to a sovereign who feels supported not only by the country's natural aristocracy but also by a well-regulated standing army. He can safely pardon or disregard them, and awareness of his own superiority naturally inclines him to do so. A degree of liberty approaching license can be tolerated only in countries where the sovereign is protected by a well-regulated standing army. Only in such countries does public safety not require that the sovereign be entrusted with discretionary power to suppress even the impertinent excesses of that unrestrained liberty.

The sovereign's first duty, then, that of defending society against the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows steadily more expensive as society advances in civilization. Society's military force, which originally cost the sovereign nothing in either peace or war, must, as improvement progresses, first be maintained by him in wartime and then even in peacetime.

The great change in the art of war brought about by the invention of firearms has increased still further both the peacetime expense of training and disciplining any given number of soldiers and the wartime expense of employing them. Their weapons and ammunition have both become more costly. A musket costs more than a javelin or a bow and arrows; a cannon or mortar more than a ballista or catapult. Powder spent in a modern military review is irrecoverably lost and entails a very considerable expense. The javelins and arrows thrown or shot in an ancient review could readily be gathered up again and were, besides, of very little value. Cannon and mortars are not only much more expensive but much heavier than ballistas or catapults, requiring greater expense both to prepare for the field and to carry there. The superiority of modern artillery over ancient artillery is also so great that fortifying a town to withstand even a few weeks of its attack has become far more difficult, and consequently far more expensive. In modern times, many different causes make the defense of society more costly. The unavoidable effects of the natural progress of improvement have in this respect been greatly intensified by a revolution in the art of war apparently occasioned by a mere accident: the invention of gunpowder.

In modern war, the great expense of firearms gives an evident advantage to the nation best able to afford them and, consequently, to an affluent and civilized nation over a poor and barbarous one. In ancient times affluent, civilized nations found it difficult to defend themselves against poor, barbarous nations. In modern times poor, barbarous nations find it difficult to defend themselves against affluent, civilized ones. The invention of firearms, which at first sight seems so destructive, certainly favors both the permanence and the spread of civilization.

PART II. On the Expense of Justice

The sovereign's second duty, that of protecting, so far as possible, every member of society from injustice or oppression by every other member, or of establishing an exact administration of justice, requires very different degrees of expense at different stages of society.

Among nations of hunters, since there is hardly any property, or at least none worth more than two or three days' labor, there is seldom an established magistrate or a regular administration of justice. People without property can injure one another only in person or reputation. But when one person kills, wounds, beats, or defames another, the victim suffers while the offender gains nothing. Injuries to property are different. The offender's gain is often equal to the victim's loss. Envy, malice, or resentment are the only passions that prompt one person to injure another's person or reputation. Most people, however, are not often under their influence, and even the worst are so only occasionally. And since indulging these passions, however agreeable it may be to certain characters, brings no real or lasting advantage, prudence commonly restrains them in most people. People may live together in society with a tolerable degree of security even without a civil magistrate to protect them from injustices arising from these passions. But greed and ambition among the rich, and among the poor an aversion to labor and a love of immediate ease and enjoyment, are the passions that prompt attacks on property—passions far steadier in their operation and far more universal in their influence. Wherever property is extensive, inequality is great. For every very rich man there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few presupposes the poverty of the many. The rich man's affluence arouses the indignation of the poor, who are often driven by want and prompted by envy to invade his possessions. Only under the protection of the civil magistrate can the owner of valuable property acquired by the labor of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations, sleep securely for a single night. He is always surrounded by unknown enemies whom he has never provoked yet can never appease; only the powerful arm of the civil magistrate, continually raised to punish their injustice, can protect him. The acquisition of valuable and extensive property therefore necessarily calls for the establishment of civil government. Where there is no property, or at least none worth more than two or three days' labor, civil government is less necessary.

Civil government presupposes a certain subordination. But just as the need for civil government gradually grows with the acquisition of valuable property, so the chief causes that naturally introduce subordination gradually grow with that property.

The causes or circumstances that naturally introduce subordination, giving some people superiority over most of their fellows naturally and before any civil institution exists, seem to be four.

The first is superiority in personal qualities: bodily strength, beauty, and agility; wisdom and virtue; prudence, justice, courage, and moderation of mind. Bodily qualities, unless supported by mental ones, confer little authority at any stage of society. A man must be very strong to force two weaker men to obey him through bodily strength alone. Only qualities of mind can confer very great authority. They are, however, invisible qualities, always open to dispute and generally disputed. No society, barbarous or civilized, has ever found it convenient to settle precedence of rank and subordination according to such invisible qualities rather than something more obvious and tangible.

The second cause is superiority of age. An old man, provided he is not so old as to raise suspicions of senility, is everywhere more respected than a young man of equal rank, fortune, and abilities. Among nations of hunters, such as the native tribes of North America, age is the sole basis of rank and precedence. Among them, father is the name for a superior, brother for an equal, and son for an inferior. In the most affluent and civilized nations, age determines rank among those equal in every other respect, who therefore have no other means of determining it. Among brothers and among sisters, the eldest always takes precedence; and in succession to a father's estate, anything that cannot be divided but must pass whole to one person, such as a title of honor, is usually given to the eldest. Age is an obvious and tangible quality that admits of no dispute.

Many different causes weakened the discipline of the Roman armies. Their discipline was extremely strict, and that may have been one cause. At the height of their power, when no enemy seemed able to resist them, soldiers stopped wearing their heavy armor because it seemed like an unnecessary burden. They stopped their demanding exercises because those seemed like unnecessary work. Under the Roman emperors, the standing armies also became a danger to the emperors. The armies guarding the German and Pannonian frontiers were especially dangerous. They often backed their own generals against their rulers. Some writers say Dioclesian, and others say Constantine, was the first to move these troops away from the frontier to make them less threatening. Before then they had always camped there in large groups, usually two or three legions each. He scattered them in small groups among the provincial towns, and they were hardly ever moved except to turn back an invasion. Soldiers stationed in small groups in trading and manufacturing towns, and rarely moved, became traders, craftspeople, and manufacturers themselves. Civilian life came to matter more to them than military life. Rome’s standing armies gradually turned into a corrupt, neglected, undisciplined militia. It could not withstand the German and Scythian militias that soon invaded the western empire. For a time, the emperors could defend themselves only by hiring the militia of some of these peoples to fight the others. The fall of the western empire is the third great change in human affairs for which ancient history has preserved a clear and detailed account. It resulted from the overwhelming advantage that a militia from a people called barbarous had over one from a civilized people. In particular, a militia of shepherds had that advantage over a militia of farmers, craftspeople, and manufacturers. Militias have generally won their victories over other militias that were less well trained and disciplined, not over standing armies. This was true of the Greek militia’s victories over the militia of the Persian empire. It was also true, in later times, of the Swiss militia’s victories over those of the Austrians and Burgundians.

The German and Scythian peoples who settled on the ruins of the western empire kept much the same kind of military force for a time in their new homes as they had had in their old ones. It was a militia of shepherds and farmers. In war they followed the same chiefs they obeyed in peace. They were therefore reasonably well trained and disciplined. But as crafts and industry developed, the chiefs gradually lost authority, and most people had less time for military training. The feudal militia’s training and discipline gradually fell apart, and standing armies gradually replaced it. Once one civilized nation adopted a standing army, its neighbors had to do the same. They soon learned that their safety depended on it: their own militia could not stand up to such an army.

Soldiers in a standing army can have all the courage of veterans even if they have never faced an enemy. The moment they go to war, they can be ready to face the toughest and most experienced veterans. In 1756, when the Russian army marched into Poland, its soldiers seemed no less brave than the Prussians, then thought to be Europe’s toughest and most experienced veterans. Yet the Russian empire had been at peace for nearly twenty years, so few of its soldiers could have faced an enemy. When the Spanish war began in 1739, England had been at peace for about eight-and-twenty years. Even so, that long peace had not weakened its soldiers’ courage. It was never more evident than in the attempt on Carthagena, the first disastrous operation of that disastrous war. In a long peace, generals may sometimes lose their skill. But if a well-regulated standing army remains in place, its soldiers do not seem to lose their courage.

When a civilized nation relies on a militia for defense, it can always be conquered by a neighboring people called barbarous. The Tartars’ repeated conquests of all the civilized countries of Asia clearly show the natural advantage a militia from a barbarous people has over that of a civilized one. A well-regulated standing army is stronger than any militia. A prosperous, civilized nation is best able to maintain such an army, and only such an army can defend it from invasion by a poor, barbarous neighbor. So only a standing army can allow a country’s civilization to continue, or even survive, for any substantial length of time.

A well-regulated standing army is the only way to defend a civilized country. It is also the only way to make a barbarous country reasonably civilized in a short time. Its overwhelming force establishes the ruler’s laws even in the most distant provinces and maintains some regular government in places where this would otherwise be impossible. Anyone who closely examines the improvements Peter the Great made in the Russian empire will find that almost all of them come down to the establishment of a well-regulated standing army. That army puts all his other rules into effect and keeps them in place. The order and internal peace the empire has enjoyed ever since are entirely due to its influence.

People who believe in republican government have been wary of standing armies as a threat to liberty. An army certainly is a threat if the interests of its general and leading officers are not firmly tied to supporting the state’s constitution. Caesar’s standing army destroyed the Roman republic. Cromwell’s standing army expelled the long parliament. But a standing army can never threaten liberty when the ruler is its general and the country’s leading nobility and gentry are its principal officers. Then the armed forces are commanded by those with the strongest interest in supporting civilian government, since they themselves hold the greatest share of its authority. Such an army may even favor liberty in some cases. It makes the ruler feel secure, so he does not need the intrusive vigilance found in some modern republics. That vigilance seems to monitor the smallest actions and is always ready to disturb every citizen’s peace. Suppose the safety of a magistrate is threatened by every sign of popular discontent, even though the country’s leading people support him. Suppose a small disturbance can bring about a major revolution within hours. In that case, the government must use all its authority to suppress and punish every complaint or murmur against it. By contrast, a ruler supported both by the country’s natural aristocracy and by a well-regulated standing army is hardly troubled by even the rudest, least justified, and most unrestrained protests. He can safely pardon or ignore them, and his awareness of his own superior power naturally inclines him to do so. Freedom that comes close to being unrestrained can be tolerated only where a well-regulated standing army keeps the ruler secure. Only there does public safety not require giving the ruler discretionary power to suppress even the thoughtless excesses of that freedom.

The ruler’s first duty is to defend society against violence and injustice from other independent societies. This duty becomes more and more expensive as society becomes more civilized. At first, the society’s military forces cost the ruler nothing in either peace or war. As society develops, he must first pay to maintain them during war and eventually also during peace.

The invention of firearms made a major change in warfare. It further raised both the peacetime cost of training and disciplining a given number of soldiers and the wartime cost of using them. Their weapons and ammunition became more expensive. A musket costs more than a javelin or a bow and arrows; a cannon or mortar costs more than a balista or catapulta. Powder fired in a modern military review is gone for good and costs a considerable amount. Javelins and arrows thrown or shot in an ancient review could easily be collected afterward, and they were worth very little anyway. Cannons and mortars are not only far more expensive than balistas or catapultas but also much heavier. They cost more to prepare for the field and to transport there. Modern artillery is also far more powerful than ancient artillery. It has therefore become much harder and more expensive to fortify a town so that it can hold out against a modern artillery attack even for a few weeks. Many different factors now make defending society more expensive. The natural costs of development have been greatly increased by a major change in warfare that seems to have begun with a chance invention: gunpowder.

In modern war, the high cost of firearms clearly favors the nation best able to pay for them. It favors a prosperous, civilized nation over a poor, barbarous one. In ancient times, prosperous, civilized nations found it hard to defend themselves against poor, barbarous nations. In modern times, poor, barbarous nations find it hard to defend themselves against prosperous, civilized ones. Firearms may seem harmful at first sight, but their invention certainly helps civilization survive and spread.

PART II. The Cost of Justice

The ruler’s second duty is to protect each member of society, as far as possible, against injustice or oppression by every other member. In other words, the ruler must set up a reliable system of justice. This duty calls for very different levels of spending at different stages of society.

Among peoples who live by hunting, there is almost no property, or at least none worth more than two or three days’ work. So there is rarely an established magistrate or a regular system of justice. People without property can injure one another only physically or by harming their reputations. A person who kills, wounds, beats, or defames someone else causes suffering but gets no benefit from it. An injury to property is different: the person who causes it often gains as much as the other person loses. Envy, spite, or resentment alone can lead someone to hurt another person physically or harm their reputation. Most people do not often feel these passions, and even the worst people feel them only sometimes. Satisfying them may please some people, but it brings no real or lasting advantage. Most people are therefore held back by concern for the consequences. People can live together with a reasonable degree of safety without a civil magistrate to protect them from wrongs driven by these passions. Property, however, is threatened by the rich person’s greed and ambition and by the poor person’s dislike of work and desire for immediate comfort and pleasure. These impulses are much more persistent and much more widespread. Where there is extensive property, there is great inequality. For every very rich person there must be at least five hundred poor people. The prosperity of the few depends on the poverty of the many. The wealth of the rich arouses the poor people’s anger, and need and envy often drive them to take a rich person’s possessions. Only under the protection of a civil magistrate can someone with valuable property, acquired through many years of work or perhaps several generations of it, sleep safely for a single night. That person is always surrounded by unknown enemies. Though he has never provoked them, he can never satisfy them. Only the powerful, ever-ready authority of a civil magistrate can protect him from their injustice and punish it. Acquiring valuable property on a large scale therefore makes civil government necessary. Where there is no property, or none worth more than two or three days’ work, civil government is less necessary.

Civil government assumes that some people have authority over others. As valuable property grows and makes civil government more necessary, the main causes that naturally give some people authority over others grow too.

There seem to be four causes or circumstances that naturally create this hierarchy. Even before civil institutions exist, these factors give some people an advantage over most others.

The first is a person’s own qualities: physical strength, beauty, and agility, as well as wisdom, virtue, good judgment, justice, courage, and self-control. Physical qualities carry little authority in any society without mental qualities to support them. A man would have to be very strong to make even two weaker men obey him by strength alone. Only qualities of the mind can give someone great authority. But these qualities cannot be seen and can always be questioned; people generally do question them. No society, whether called barbarous or civilized, has found it practical to base rules of rank and precedence on these invisible qualities. Instead, it bases them on something clearer and easier to observe.

The second is age. An old man, unless he is so old that people suspect his mind is failing, receives more respect everywhere than a younger man of the same rank, wealth, and ability. Among hunting peoples, such as the native tribes of North America, age is the only basis of rank and precedence. They call a superior father, an equal brother, and an inferior son. Even in the richest and most civilized nations, age determines rank among people equal in every other way, who have nothing else to set their order. Among brothers and among sisters, the eldest always comes first. In inheriting a father’s estate, something that cannot be divided and must go to one person, such as a title of honor, usually goes to the eldest. Age is clear and observable, and cannot be disputed.