Book V, Chapter I, 2

A herdsman has abundant leisure; a farmer, when farming is still rudimentary, has some; an artisan or manufacturer has none at all. The first can spend a great deal of time on military exercises without loss, the second can spend some, but the last cannot spend a single hour on them without loss, and concern for his own interest naturally leads him to neglect them entirely. Improvements in agriculture brought about by the progress of the arts and manufactures likewise leave the farmer as little leisure as the artisan. Military exercises are neglected in the country no less than in the town, and the population at large becomes wholly unfit for war. Meanwhile, the wealth that always follows improvements in agriculture and manufactures—and is, in fact, simply their accumulated produce—invites invasion by all their neighbors. An industrious nation, and therefore a wealthy one, is more likely to be attacked than any other; unless the state makes some new provision for public defense, the people's natural habits leave them utterly unable to defend themselves.

In these circumstances, the state seems to have only two ways of making adequate provision for public defense.

First, through very strict regulation and against the whole tendency of the people's interests, abilities, and inclinations, it may require military exercise and oblige either all citizens of military age, or a certain number of them, to combine some degree of soldiering with whatever other trade or profession they pursue.

Or, second, by supporting and employing a certain number of citizens in constant military training, it may make soldiering a particular profession, separate and distinct from every other.

If the state adopts the first expedient, its military force is called a militia; if it adopts the second, it is called a standing army. Military exercises are the sole or principal occupation of soldiers in a standing army, and the maintenance or pay the state gives them is their principal and ordinary means of subsistence. For militia soldiers, military exercises are only an occasional occupation, and their principal and ordinary means of subsistence comes from other work. In a militia, the laborer, artisan, or merchant predominates over the soldier; in a standing army, the soldier predominates over every other character. Here seems to lie the essential distinction between these two kinds of military force.

Militias have taken several forms. In some countries, citizens chosen to defend the state appear to have been trained but not, so to speak, organized into regiments: they were not divided into separate bodies of troops, each exercising under its own permanent officers. In the ancient Greek and Roman republics, citizens while at home appear to have practiced their exercises separately or with companions of their own choosing; they were attached to a particular body of troops only when actually called into the field. In other countries militias were both trained and organized into regiments. In England, Switzerland, and, I believe, every other modern European country where such an imperfect military force has been established, each militiaman belongs even in peacetime to a particular unit, which exercises under its own permanent officers.

Before firearms were invented, the superior army was the one whose individual soldiers were most skillful and dexterous with their weapons. Physical strength and agility were of the highest importance and usually settled battles. Such skill and dexterity could be acquired, as in fencing today, only by training individually, not in large groups, at a particular school with a particular instructor or among one's own companions and equals. Since the invention of firearms, physical strength and agility, and even exceptional skill with weapons, though far from irrelevant, matter less. The weapon does not make a clumsy man the equal of a skilled one, but it brings them closer than ever before. The skill needed to use it, it is believed, can be acquired well enough through training in large groups.

Regularity, order, and prompt obedience to commands matter more in deciding modern battles than the soldiers' dexterity with their weapons. Yet the noise of firearms, the smoke, and the unseen death to which everyone feels exposed at every moment once within cannon range—often long before the battle can properly be said to have begun—must make any substantial degree of regularity, order, and prompt obedience very hard to maintain, even at the beginning of a modern battle. In an ancient battle there was no noise except human voices, no smoke, no invisible cause of wounds or death. Until a deadly weapon actually approached him, each man could see clearly that none was near. In these circumstances, among troops who had some confidence in their own skill with weapons, maintaining a measure of regularity and order must have been much easier, not just at the outset of an ancient battle but throughout its course until one army was clearly defeated. Yet the habits of regularity, order, and prompt obedience to commands can be acquired only by troops trained in large bodies.

A militia, however, no matter how it is disciplined or trained, must always be much inferior to a well-disciplined and well-trained standing army.

Soldiers who train only once a week or once a month can never be as proficient with their weapons as those who train every day or every other day. Though this may matter less now than it did in ancient times, the acknowledged superiority of Prussian troops, attributed largely to their superior proficiency in drill, should convince us that it matters a great deal even today.

Soldiers required to obey an officer only once a week or once a month, and free at every other time to conduct their affairs as they please without being accountable to him, can never feel the same awe in his presence or the same readiness to obey as soldiers whose entire lives and conduct he directs daily, and who even rise and go to bed—or at least retire to their quarters—at his command. In discipline, or the habit of ready obedience, a militia must always fall even further short of a standing army than it sometimes does in manual drill or the handling of weapons. Yet in modern war the habit of ready and instant obedience matters far more than considerable superiority in handling weapons.

Militias that go to war under the same chiefs whom they habitually obey in peace, like the Tartar or Arab militia, are far the best. In respect for their officers and readiness to obey, they come nearest to standing armies. The Highland militia, when it served under its own chiefs, enjoyed something of the same advantage. But the Highlanders were settled rather than wandering herdsmen: they had fixed homes and were not accustomed in peacetime to follow a chief from place to place. In war they were consequently less willing to follow him any great distance or to remain in the field for long. Having acquired booty, they were eager to go home, and his authority was rarely sufficient to keep them. In obedience they were always far inferior to the Tartars and Arabs as these are described. Moreover, their settled way of life meant the Highlanders spent less time outdoors and were always less accustomed to military exercise and less proficient with their weapons than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be.

It must be observed, however, that a militia of any kind which serves several successive campaigns in the field becomes, in every respect, a standing army. Its soldiers practice with their weapons every day and, remaining constantly under the command of their officers, develop the same prompt obedience found in standing armies. What they were before they went into the field matters little. After a few campaigns there, they necessarily become a standing army in every respect. Should the war in America continue through another campaign, the American militia may become a match in every respect for that standing army whose courage, at least in the last war, appeared no less than that of the hardiest veterans of France and Spain.

Once this distinction is understood, the history of every age, it will be found, bears witness to the irresistible superiority of a well-regulated standing army over a militia.

One of the first standing armies clearly recorded in well-attested history is that of Philip of Macedon. His frequent wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and certain Greek cities near Macedon gradually brought his troops, probably a militia at first, under the exact discipline of a standing army. In the rare and brief intervals of peace, he took care not to disband it. After a long and fierce struggle it vanquished and subdued the brave and well-trained militias of the leading republics of ancient Greece; then, with little struggle, the weakened and poorly trained militia of the great Persian empire. The fall of the Greek republics and of the Persian empire resulted from the irresistible superiority of a standing army over any militia. This is the first great revolution in human affairs of which history has preserved a clear and detailed account.

The fall of Carthage and consequent rise of Rome is the second. All the turns of fortune of those two famous republics may be explained by the same cause.

From the end of the first Carthaginian war to the beginning of the second, Carthage's armies were continually in the field, serving under three great generals in succession: Amilcar, his son-in-law Asdrubal, and his son Annibal. They first suppressed their own rebellious slaves, then subdued the rebellious peoples of Africa, and finally conquered the great kingdom of Spain. Through these successive wars, the army Annibal led from Spain into Italy must gradually have acquired the exact discipline of a standing army. The Romans, meanwhile, though not entirely at peace, had fought no war of great importance during this period, and their military discipline is generally said to have slackened considerably. The Roman armies Annibal met at Trebi, Thrasymenus, and Cannae were militias facing a standing army. This probably did more than anything else to determine the outcome of those battles.

The standing army Annibal left behind in Spain held the same advantage over the militia the Romans sent against it; in a few years, under his brother, the younger Asdrubal, it drove them almost entirely from that country.

Annibal received inadequate supplies from home. Through constant service in the field, the Roman militia became, as the war went on, a well-disciplined and well-trained standing army; Annibal's advantage diminished every day. Asdrubal judged it necessary to lead all, or nearly all, the standing army under his command in Spain to help his brother in Italy. During that march, his guides are said to have misled him; in unfamiliar country he was surprised and attacked by another standing army, in every respect equal or superior to his own, and was completely defeated.

After Asdrubal left Spain, the great Scipio found only a militia inferior to his own facing him. He conquered and subdued it, and in the course of the war his own militia necessarily became a well-disciplined and well-trained standing army. That standing army was later taken to Africa, where again only a militia opposed it. To defend Carthage, the standing army under Annibal had to be recalled. The disheartened African militia, repeatedly defeated, joined it and made up the greater part of Annibal's troops at the battle of Zama. That day's outcome determined the fate of the two rival republics.

From the end of the second Carthaginian war to the fall of the Roman republic, Rome's armies were standing armies in every respect. Macedon's standing army offered some resistance. Even at the height of Rome's power, subduing that small kingdom took two great wars and three great battles, and would probably have proved still harder but for the cowardice of its last king. The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient world—Greece, Syria, and Egypt—offered only feeble resistance to Rome's standing armies. Some less civilized nations' militias defended themselves much better. The Scythian or Tartar militia that Mithridates drew from the countries north of the Euxine and Caspian seas were the most formidable enemies the Romans faced after the second Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German militias, too, were always formidable and on several occasions gained considerable advantages over Roman armies. Generally, however, when the Roman armies were well commanded, they appear to have been far superior; if Rome never completed the conquest of Parthia or Germany, it was probably because the Romans thought those two less civilized countries were not worth adding to an empire already too large. The ancient Parthians appear to have descended from Scythians or Tartars and to have retained much of their ancestors' customs. The ancient Germans, like the Scythians or Tartars, were wandering herdsmen who went to war under the same chiefs they followed in peace. “Their militia was of exactly the same kind as that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom they too were probably descended.”

A shepherd has plenty of free time. A farmer practicing agriculture in its early form has some. A craftsperson or manufacturer has none at all. The shepherd can spend a lot of time on military exercises without losing anything; the farmer can spend some time on them. But the craftsperson cannot spend even an hour on them without a loss, and concern for personal interests naturally leads that person to neglect them entirely. As crafts and manufacturing develop, they also lead to improvements in farming that leave farmers as little free time as craftspeople. People in the country then neglect military exercises as much as people in towns do, and most of the population becomes entirely unprepared for war. At the same time, improvements in agriculture and manufacturing bring wealth, which is really just the accumulated produce of those improvements. That wealth invites invasion by all the nation's neighbors. A hardworking nation, and therefore a wealthy one, is more likely to be attacked than any other. Unless the state takes some new step to defend the public, people's normal habits make them completely unable to defend themselves.

Under these conditions, there seem to be only two ways the state can provide anything like adequate public defense.

First, it can enforce military exercises through very strict policing, against the interests, abilities, and wishes of the population. It can require either all citizens of military age, or a certain number of them, to take up soldiering alongside whatever other work or profession they practice.

Second, it can support and employ a certain number of citizens who constantly practice military exercises. In this way it can make soldiering a separate trade, distinct from every other trade.

If the state chooses the first method, its military force is called a militia. If it chooses the second, the force is called a standing army. Practicing military exercises is the only or main job of soldiers in a standing army. The support or pay the state gives them is their main, regular means of living. Militia soldiers practice military exercises only occasionally and get most of their regular livelihood from some other job. In a militia, a person is mainly a laborer, craftsperson, or tradesperson, rather than a soldier. In a standing army, being a soldier takes priority over every other role. This seems to be the essential difference between the two kinds of force.

Militias have taken several forms. In some countries, citizens chosen to defend the state seem to have drilled but were not, so to speak, organized into regiments. They were not divided into separate units of troops that each drilled under their own permanent officers. In the ancient republics of Greece and Rome, each citizen seems to have practiced exercises at home on his own or with whatever other citizens he preferred. He was assigned to a particular unit only when actually called out to war. In other countries, militias have both drilled and been organized into regiments. In England, Switzerland, and, I believe, every other modern European country that has set up an imperfect force of this kind, each member of the militia belongs to a particular unit even in peacetime. That unit drills under its own permanent officers.

Before firearms were invented, the better army was the one whose individual soldiers had the most skill with their weapons. Physical strength and agility were crucial and usually decided battles. But soldiers could develop their weapon skills only as people now learn fencing: practicing individually at a particular school under a particular teacher, or with their own peers and companions, not drilling in large groups. Since the invention of firearms, strength, agility, and even exceptional skill with weapons are still important, but less so. A firearm does not make a clumsy person as capable as a skilled one, but it brings them closer than before. People are thought to be able to learn all the skill they need to use it by drilling in large groups.

In modern armies, keeping ranks in order and promptly obeying commands matter more to the outcome of a battle than soldiers' skill with their weapons. Yet firearms make a great deal of noise and smoke. From the moment a soldier comes within cannon range, often long before a battle is fully under way, that soldier feels constantly exposed to death from an unseen source. These conditions must make it very hard to preserve much order or quick obedience, even at the start of a modern battle. In ancient battles, only human voices made noise. There was no smoke and no invisible cause of wounds or death. Until a deadly weapon actually came toward a man, he could clearly see that none was near him. Under those conditions, troops who had some confidence in their own skill with weapons would find it much easier to keep some order. They could do so not just at the start of a battle but throughout it, until one of the armies was clearly defeated. But troops can acquire the habit of keeping order and promptly following commands only by drilling in large groups.

Still, no matter how a militia is trained or drilled, it will always be much weaker than a well-trained, well-drilled standing army.

Soldiers who drill only once a week or once a month can never become as skilled with their weapons as those who drill every day or every other day. This difference may matter less now than it did in ancient times. But the recognized superiority of Prussian troops is said to be largely due to their greater skill in drills. That should show us the difference still matters a great deal today.

Soldiers who must obey an officer only once a week or once a month, and who manage their own affairs the rest of the time without answering to that officer at all, cannot regard him with the same sense of authority or obey as readily as soldiers whose whole lives are directed by him every day. Those soldiers even get up and go to bed, or at least return to their quarters, on his orders. A militia must therefore fall even further behind a standing army in discipline—the habit of quick obedience—than it sometimes falls behind in weapons drill and handling. In modern war, quick and immediate obedience matters much more than a considerable advantage in handling weapons.

The best militias by far are those, like the Tartar or Arab militia, that go to war under the same chiefs they usually obey in peacetime. Their respect for officers and habit of quick obedience make them more like standing armies. When the Highland militia served under its own chiefs, it shared some of this advantage. But the Highlanders were shepherds who lived in one place, not wanderers. They had permanent homes and did not normally follow their chief from place to place in peacetime. So in war they were less willing to follow him a long distance or remain in the field a long time. As soon as they got any spoils, they wanted to go home, and their chief's authority was seldom strong enough to keep them there. They were always much less obedient than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be. Because the Highlanders stayed in one place, they also spent less time outdoors. They were less used to military exercises and less skilled with their weapons than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be.

But a militia of any kind becomes, in every respect, a standing army after serving in the field through several successive campaigns. Its soldiers drill with their weapons every day. Constantly under their officers' command, they develop the same habit of quick obedience as standing-army soldiers. What they were before going to war matters little. After a few campaigns, they necessarily become a standing army in every respect. If the war in America lasts through another campaign, the American militia may become equal in every respect to the standing army whose courage, at least in the last war, appeared no less than that of the toughest veterans of France and Spain.

Once we understand this distinction, we find that history in every age supports the overwhelming superiority of a well-organized standing army over a militia.

One of the first standing armies clearly described in reliable history belonged to Philip of Macedon. His frequent wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and some Greek cities near Macedon gradually gave his troops the strict discipline of a standing army. They probably started out as militia. During the rare times he was at peace, which never lasted long, he took care not to disband the army. After a long and hard struggle, it defeated and subdued the brave, well-drilled militias of the main republics of ancient Greece. It then defeated the soft, poorly drilled militia of the great Persian empire with very little struggle. The Greek republics and the Persian empire fell because a standing army was overwhelmingly stronger than any kind of militia. This is the first great change in human affairs that history records clearly and in detail.

The fall of Carthage and the resulting rise of Rome is the second. The same cause can explain all the changes in the fortunes of these two famous republics.

Between the end of the first Carthaginian war and the beginning of the second, Carthage's armies stayed in the field under three leading generals in succession: Amilcar, his son-in-law Asdrubal, and his son Annibal. First they punished their own rebellious slaves, then subdued the peoples of Africa who had revolted, and finally conquered the great kingdom of Spain. These different wars must gradually have turned the army Annibal led from Spain into Italy into a strictly disciplined standing army. Meanwhile, the Romans were not entirely at peace, but they had fought no particularly important war during this period. Their military discipline is generally said to have weakened considerably. At Trebi, Thrasymenus, and Cannae, Annibal's standing army faced Roman militias. This probably did more than anything else to decide those battles.

The standing army Annibal left in Spain likewise had the advantage over the Roman militia sent against it. Within a few years, under the command of his brother, the younger Asdrubal, it drove the Romans almost entirely out of Spain.

Annibal received too few supplies from home. Meanwhile, the Roman militia stayed in the field and, as the war went on, became a well-trained, well-drilled standing army. Annibal's advantage decreased every day. Asdrubal decided he needed to bring all, or almost all, of the standing army he commanded in Spain to help his brother in Italy. His guides are said to have led him astray on this march. In unfamiliar country, he was surprised and attacked by another standing army at least equal to his own in every respect, and his army was completely defeated.

After Asdrubal left Spain, the great Scipio faced only a militia weaker than his own. He conquered and subdued it. As the war continued, his own militia necessarily became a well-trained, well-drilled standing army. That army later went to Africa, where it again faced only a militia. Carthage then had to call back Annibal's standing army to defend the city. The discouraged African militia, defeated many times before, joined it and made up most of Annibal's troops at the battle of Zama. The outcome of that day decided the fate of the two rival republics.

From the end of the second Carthaginian war until the fall of the Roman republic, Rome's armies were standing armies in every respect. Macedon's standing army put up some resistance. Even at the height of Roman power, conquering that little kingdom took two great wars and three great battles. It would probably have been still harder if its last king had not been a coward. The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient world—Greece, Syria, and Egypt—offered little resistance to Rome's standing armies. Some peoples considered less civilized defended themselves much better. The Scythian or Tartar militia that Mithridates recruited from lands north of the Euxine and Caspian seas were the most formidable enemies Rome faced after the second Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German militias were also capable forces and won major victories against Roman armies on several occasions. In general, however, well-led Roman armies seem to have been much stronger. If the Romans did not finish conquering Parthia or Germany, it was probably because they thought those two countries were not worth adding to an empire already too large. The ancient Parthians seem to have descended from the Scythians or Tartars and to have kept many of their ancestors' customs. The ancient Germans, like the Scythians or Tartars, were wandering shepherds. They went to war under the same chiefs they followed in peacetime. “Their militia was exactly the same kind as the Scythian or Tartar militia, and they probably descended from those peoples too.”