Book V, Chapter I, 1

OF THE REVENUE OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH

OF THE EXPENSES OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH

PART I. Of the Expense of Defense.

The sovereign's first duty, protecting society against violence and invasion by other independent societies, can be fulfilled only through military force. But the expense of preparing that force in peacetime and deploying it in war differs greatly with the state of society and its stage of development.

Among hunting peoples, society's earliest and least developed state, as among the native tribes of North America, every man is a warrior as well as a hunter. When he goes to war, whether to defend his society or to avenge injuries done to it by others, he sustains himself by his own labor, just as he does at home. His society—for in this condition there is, properly speaking, neither sovereign nor commonwealth—incurs no expense either to prepare him for battle or to sustain him in it.

Among pastoral peoples, a more advanced state of society, as among the Tartars and Arabs, every man is likewise a warrior. Such peoples generally have no fixed homes, but live in tents or covered wagons that can readily be moved from place to place. The entire tribe or nation changes its location with the seasons and as other circumstances require. Once its herds and flocks have consumed the forage in one area, it moves to another and then a third. In the dry season it descends to the riverbanks; in the wet season it withdraws to higher ground. When such a people goes to war, the warriors will not entrust their herds and flocks to the frail defense of their old men, women, and children; nor can those left behind survive without defense or sustenance. Besides, the whole nation is accustomed to wandering even in peace and can readily take the field in war. Whether it marches as an army or moves as a company of herdsmen, its way of life is much the same, though its purpose is very different. They therefore all go to war together, and each does what he can. Even Tartar women have frequently been known to fight. Victory brings everything belonging to the hostile tribe as its reward; defeat costs them everything: not merely their herds and flocks, but their women and children become the conqueror's spoils. Even most who survive the battle must submit to him in order to survive at once. The others are usually scattered and dispersed across the desert.

The ordinary life and exercise of a Tartar or Arab prepares him well enough for war. Running, wrestling, fighting with cudgels, throwing the javelin, drawing the bow, and the like are ordinary pastimes of those who live outdoors, and each resembles warfare. When a Tartar or Arab actually goes to war, he lives from his own herds and flocks, which he takes with him as in peacetime. His chief or sovereign—for all these peoples have chiefs or sovereigns—incurs no expense in preparing him for battle; once there, the prospect of plunder is the only pay he expects or needs.

An army of hunters can seldom number more than two or three hundred men. The uncertain sustenance afforded by the chase can rarely keep a larger number together for any length of time. An army of herdsmen, by contrast, can sometimes reach two or three hundred thousand. Provided nothing checks their advance, and they can move from one district whose forage they have consumed to another whose forage remains untouched, there seems scarcely any limit to the numbers who can march together. A hunting people can never pose a serious threat to the civilized nations nearby; a pastoral people can. Nothing can be less imposing than an Indian war in North America; nothing more terrible than the Tartar invasions so often seen in Asia. Thucydides' judgment that Europe and Asia together could not withstand the united Scythians has been confirmed by the experience of every age. The inhabitants of the vast but defenseless plains of Scythia or Tartary have often been united under the chief of a conquering horde or clan, and the ruin and devastation of Asia have always marked their union. The inhabitants of Arabia's inhospitable deserts, the other great pastoral nation, have been united only once, under Mahomet and his immediate successors. Their union, brought about more by religious enthusiasm than by conquest, was marked in the same way. If America's hunting peoples ever become herdsmen, their proximity will be far more dangerous to the European colonies than it is now.

At a still more advanced stage of society, among farming peoples with little foreign commerce and no manufactures beyond the coarse household goods nearly every family makes for itself, each man likewise either is a warrior or can readily become one. Those who live by agriculture generally spend their days outdoors, exposed to all the hardships of the seasons. The hardiness of their everyday lives prepares them for the rigors of war, some of which closely resemble their necessary work. Ditching prepares a man to dig trenches and fortify a camp as well as to enclose a field. Such farmers' ordinary pastimes are the same as those of herdsmen, and likewise resemble warfare. But farmers have less leisure than herdsmen and practice these pastimes less often. They are soldiers, but less practiced soldiers. Even so, it seldom costs the sovereign or commonwealth anything to prepare them for battle.

Even in its earliest and simplest form, agriculture presupposes a settlement, some fixed dwelling that cannot be abandoned without great loss. When a nation composed solely of farmers goes to war, therefore, the whole population cannot take the field together. At least the old men, women, and children must remain at home to care for their dwellings. All the men of military age, however, can go, and in small nations of this kind they often have. Men of military age are supposed to make up about a fourth or a fifth of the whole population in every nation. Moreover, if a campaign begins after seedtime and ends before harvest, both a farmer and his principal laborers can leave the farm without great loss. He trusts that the work needed in the meantime can be done adequately by the old men, women, and children. He is therefore willing to serve without pay during a short campaign; and it often costs the sovereign or commonwealth as little to sustain him in battle as to prepare him for it. The citizens of the various states of ancient Greece seem to have served in this way until after the second Persian war, and the people of Peloponnesus until after the Peloponnesian war. Thucydides observes that the Peloponnesians generally left the field in summer and went home to reap the harvest. The Romans served likewise under their kings and in the early republic. Not until the siege of Veii did those who stayed at home begin contributing to the support of those who went to war. In the European monarchies founded on the ruins of the Roman empire, both before and for a time after the establishment of what is properly called feudal law, the great lords and all their immediate dependents served the crown at their own expense. They supported themselves in the field, just as at home, from their own revenue, not from any stipend or pay granted by the king for the occasion.

In a more advanced society, two causes make it altogether impossible for those who take the field to support themselves at their own expense: the progress of manufactures and the development of the art of war.

If a farmer joins an expedition that begins after seedtime and ends before harvest, interrupting his business will not always appreciably reduce his revenue. Without his labor, Nature herself does most of the work that remains. But the moment an artisan—a smith, carpenter, or weaver, for example—leaves his workshop, his only source of revenue dries up completely. Nature does nothing for him; he does everything for himself. When he goes to war to defend the public, therefore, he has no revenue with which to sustain himself and must be supported by the public. In a country where many inhabitants are artisans and manufacturers, many of those who go to war must come from those classes and so must be supported by the public throughout their service.

When the art of war has gradually become an intricate and complex science, and the outcome of a war is no longer settled, as it was in society's earliest ages, by a single irregular skirmish or battle, but the struggle generally extends over several campaigns, each lasting most of the year, it becomes necessary everywhere for the public to support those who serve it in war, at least while they are in service. Whatever their ordinary occupations in peace, a service so long and costly would otherwise place far too heavy a burden on them. Accordingly, after the second Persian war, the armies of Athens seem generally to have consisted of paid troops, partly citizens and partly foreigners, all alike hired and paid at state expense. From the siege of Veii onward, Roman armies received pay for the time they spent in the field. Under feudal governments, after a certain period, the military service of both great lords and their immediate dependents was everywhere replaced by a payment in money used to maintain those who served in their place.

The share of the population able to go to war is necessarily much smaller in a civilized society than in a less developed one. In civilized society soldiers live entirely on the labor of nonsoldiers; their number can never exceed what those others can support after providing, in a manner befitting their respective stations, for themselves and for the other officers of government and law whom they must also support. In the small farming states of ancient Greece, a fourth or a fifth of the whole population considered themselves soldiers and, it is said, would sometimes take the field. In the civilized nations of modern Europe, the usual estimate is that no more than one hundredth of a country's inhabitants can be employed as soldiers without ruining the country that pays for their service.

The expense of preparing an army for battle appears to have become considerable only long after the sovereign or commonwealth had assumed the entire expense of maintaining it in the field. In every ancient Greek republic, learning military exercises was a necessary part of the education the state required of every free citizen. Each city seems to have had a public field where young people learned their different exercises from different instructors under the protection of the public magistrate. This simple institution seems to have been the entire expense any Greek state incurred to prepare its citizens for war. In ancient Rome the exercises of the Campus Martius served the same purpose as those of the Gymnasium in ancient Greece. Under feudal governments, numerous public ordinances requiring the inhabitants of each district to practice archery and other military exercises were meant to serve the same end, but do not seem to have done so as well. Whether the officials charged with enforcing these ordinances lacked an interest in doing so, or for some other reason, the ordinances appear to have been universally neglected. As those governments developed, military exercises seem gradually to have fallen out of use among the population at large.

Throughout their existence, in the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, and for a considerable time after the establishment of feudal governments, soldiering was not a distinct profession, the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens. Every subject of the state, whatever his ordinary livelihood, considered himself fit to serve as a soldier on ordinary occasions and bound to do so on many extraordinary ones.

The art of war, though certainly the noblest of all arts, necessarily becomes one of the most complex as civilization advances. Its attainable perfection at any given time depends on the condition of mechanical and certain other arts to which it is necessarily connected. But to attain that perfection, it must become the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens; the division of labor is as necessary to improve this art as any other. In other arts, the division of labor arises naturally from the prudence of individuals, who find it more to their private advantage to confine themselves to a single trade than to practice many. Only the wisdom of the state, however, can make soldiering a profession separate from all others. A private citizen who spent most of his time practicing military exercises during profound peace, without any particular public encouragement, might undoubtedly improve greatly at them and enjoy himself too; but he would certainly not advance his own interest. Only the wisdom of the state can make it advantageous for him to devote most of his time to this peculiar occupation; and states have not always shown that wisdom, even when circumstances made it necessary for their very survival.

OF THE REVENUE OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH

OF THE EXPENSES OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH.

PART I. Of the Expense of Defense.

The sovereign's first duty is to protect society from violence and invasion by other independent societies. This requires a military force. But the cost of preparing that force in peacetime and using it in wartime varies greatly with the state of society and its stage of development.

Among nations of hunters, society is at its earliest and least developed stage, as it is among the native tribes of North America. Every man is both a hunter and a warrior. When he goes to war to defend his society or avenge injuries another society has done to it, he supports himself by his own labor, just as he does at home. His society—at this stage, there is really no sovereign or commonwealth—pays nothing either to prepare him for war or to support him during it.

Among nations of shepherds, society is more developed, as it is among the Tartars and Arabs. Here too, every man is a warrior. Such peoples generally have no permanent homes. They live in tents or in covered wagons that can easily be moved from place to place. The whole tribe or nation moves with the seasons and in response to other events. When its herds and flocks have eaten the fodder in one area, it moves to another, then to a third. In the dry season it moves down to the riverbanks; in the wet season it retreats to higher ground. When such a nation goes to war, the warriors will not leave their herds and flocks to the weak protection of old men, women, and children. Nor can those people be left behind without protection or a means of living. Besides, the whole nation is used to moving around even in peacetime, so it can readily take the field in wartime. Whether it travels as an army or as a group of herders, its way of life is almost the same, though its purpose is very different. So everyone goes to war together and does what they can. Even Tartar women have often been known to fight. If the nation wins, the property of the enemy tribe is its reward. If it loses, it loses everything. Its herds and flocks, as well as its women and children, become the conqueror's spoils. Most of the survivors of the battle must submit to him simply to get food right away. The others usually scatter across the desert.

The daily life and exercise of a Tartar or Arab prepare him well enough for war. Running, wrestling, fighting with sticks, throwing the javelin, and drawing the bow, etc., are ordinary pastimes for people who live outdoors. All resemble activities in war. When a Tartar or Arab goes to war, he brings his own herds and flocks to support himself, just as he does in peacetime. His chief or sovereign—all these nations have chiefs or sovereigns—pays nothing to prepare him for battle. Once there, the chance to take spoils is the only pay he expects or wants.

An army of hunters can rarely have more than two or three hundred men. Hunting provides such an uncertain food supply that a larger group could seldom stay together for long. An army of shepherds, by contrast, can sometimes number two or three hundred thousand. If nothing stops them from moving from one district where they have used up the fodder to another where it remains untouched, there seems to be almost no limit to the number who can travel together. A nation of hunters can never seriously threaten its civilized neighbors; a nation of shepherds can. Nothing is less impressive than an Indian war in North America. By contrast, Tartar invasions of Asia have often been terrifying. Thucydides judged that Europe and Asia together could not resist the Scythians if they united, and the experience of every age has confirmed his judgment. The people of the vast but undefended plains of Scythia or Tartary have often united under the leader of a conquering horde or clan. Such unions have always brought devastation and destruction to Asia. The people of Arabia's harsh deserts, the other great nation of shepherds, united only once, under Mahomet and his immediate successors. Religion, rather than conquest, was the main cause of their union, and it brought similar results. If America's hunting nations ever became shepherds, they would pose a far greater danger to the European colonies than they do now.

At a still more developed stage, nations of farmers have little foreign commerce and no manufacturing beyond the rough household goods that almost every family makes for itself. Here, too, every man is a warrior or can easily become one. Farmers usually spend the whole day outdoors in every kind of weather. Their hard daily lives prepare them for the hardships of war, and some of their work closely resembles military tasks. Digging ditches prepares a man to dig trenches and fortify a camp as well as to enclose a field. Farmers' usual pastimes are the same as shepherds' and likewise resemble war. But farmers have less spare time than shepherds and play these games less often. They are soldiers, but they are not quite as skilled in military exercises. Even so, preparing them for war rarely costs the sovereign or commonwealth anything.

Even at its earliest stage, agriculture requires settlement and some kind of permanent home, which cannot be abandoned without great loss. So when a nation made up entirely of farmers goes to war, not everyone can go along. At least the old men, women, and children must stay home to care for their homes. All men of military age can still go, and in small nations of this kind they often have. In any nation, men of military age are thought to make up about a fourth or a fifth of the population. If a campaign begins after seedtime and ends before harvest, the farmer and his main laborers can leave the farm without much loss. He expects the old men, women, and children to manage the work that has to be done while he is gone. He is therefore willing to serve without pay on a short campaign. Supporting him in the field often costs the sovereign or commonwealth as little as preparing him for it. Citizens of all the different states of ancient Greece seem to have served this way until after the second Persian war. The people of Peloponnesus did so until after the Peloponnesian war. Thucydides notes that the Peloponnesians generally left the field in summer and went home to reap the harvest. The Romans served in the same way under their kings and in the early republic. Only at the siege of Veii did those who stayed home begin to contribute anything toward supporting those who went to war. In the European monarchies founded on the ruins of the Roman empire, great lords and all their immediate dependents served the crown at their own expense. They did so both before and for some time after the establishment of what is properly called feudal law. They lived on their own revenue in the field, just as they did at home, rather than on any special pay from the king.

At a more developed stage of society, two changes make it completely impossible for people who go to war to support themselves. They are the growth of manufacturing and advances in the art of war.

A farmer may go on an expedition after seedtime and return before harvest without losing much revenue. Nature does most of the remaining work without his labor. But when a craftsperson—a smith, carpenter, or weaver, for example—leaves the workshop, that person's only source of revenue stops completely. Nature does none of that work; the craftsperson must do it all. So when a craftsperson goes to war to defend the public, the public must provide support, since the craftsperson has no revenue to live on. In a country where many people are craftspeople or manufacturers, many of those who go to war must come from these groups. The public must support them throughout their service.

War also gradually becomes a complex and difficult science. At first, its outcome could be settled by a single disorderly fight or battle. Later, wars usually stretch over several campaigns, each lasting most of the year. Then the public must support its soldiers, at least while they are serving. Whatever work they normally do in peacetime, a service so long and costly would otherwise be too heavy a burden. After the second Persian war, the armies of Athens seem generally to have consisted of paid troops. Some were citizens and some were foreigners, but the state hired and paid them all. From the siege of Veii onward, Rome's armies received pay while they were in the field. Under feudal governments, after a certain time, the military service owed by great lords and their immediate dependents was everywhere replaced by a payment of money. This money supported people who served in their place.

In a civilized society, a much smaller share of the population can go to war than in a society at an earlier stage. In a civilized society, the work of nonsoldiers supports all the soldiers. There can therefore be no more soldiers than the nonsoldiers can support while also supporting themselves, in a way suited to their respective positions, and the officers of government and law whom they must support. In the small farming states of ancient Greece, a fourth or a fifth of the people considered themselves soldiers and, it is said, sometimes went to war. In modern Europe's civilized nations, the usual estimate is that no country can employ more than one hundredth of its inhabitants as soldiers without ruining the country that pays for them.

The expense of training an army for war seems to have become substantial only long after the sovereign or commonwealth had taken on the entire cost of maintaining it in war. In all the republics of ancient Greece, the state required every free citizen to learn military exercises as part of his education. Each city seems to have had a public field where different instructors taught young people their exercises under a public magistrate's supervision. This simple arrangement seems to have been the full cost any Greek state paid to prepare its citizens for war. In ancient Rome, exercises on the Campus Martius served the same purpose as those in the Gymnasium in ancient Greece. Under feudal governments, many public orders required citizens of every district to practice archery and other military exercises. These orders had the same goal but seem to have worked less well. Whether the officers charged with enforcing them lacked interest or something else went wrong, the orders appear to have been widely neglected. As these governments developed, most people gradually stopped practicing military exercises.

Throughout the existence of the ancient Greek and Roman republics, and for a long time after feudal governments were established, soldiering was not a separate trade. It was not the only or main occupation of a special class of citizens. Every subject, whatever work provided a living, considered himself fit to serve as a soldier in ordinary circumstances and obliged to do so in many extraordinary ones.

Yet the art of war, certainly the noblest of arts, necessarily becomes one of the most complex as society develops. Its possible level of refinement at any given time depends on the state of the mechanical arts and of other arts linked to it. To reach that level, soldiering must become the only or main occupation of a particular group of citizens. The division of labor is needed to improve war just as it is needed to improve any other art. In other arts, individuals introduce this division on their own. They find it more profitable to concentrate on one trade than to practice many. Only the wisdom of the state can make soldiering a trade separate from all others. A private citizen in a time of deep peace, with no special public incentive, could spend most of his time on military exercises. He would certainly improve his skills and might enjoy himself. But he would not advance his own interests. Only the state can make spending most of his time on this special work serve his interests. States have not always been wise enough to do so, even when their survival required it.