Chapter XVIII

The Only Cases in Which Intolerance Is Warranted by Human Law.

For a government to have no right to punish people's errors, those errors must not be crimes. They are crimes only when they disturb society; they disturb society as soon as they inspire fanaticism. People must therefore begin by ceasing to be fanatics before they deserve toleration.

If some young Jesuits, knowing that the Church abhors the reprobate, that the Jansenists are condemned by a papal bull, and that the Jansenists are therefore reprobate, go off to burn down a house of the Fathers of the Oratory because Quesnel, an Oratorian, was a Jansenist, it is clear that we shall be obliged to punish those Jesuits.

Likewise, if they have proclaimed criminal maxims, if their order's constitution is contrary to the laws of the kingdom, we cannot avoid dissolving their Society and abolishing the Jesuits to make citizens of them. At bottom this is an imaginary evil and a real benefit to them: for what harm is there in wearing a short coat instead of a cassock, and in being free instead of enslaved? Whole regiments are disbanded at the peace and do not complain: why do the Jesuits cry out so loudly when they are disbanded so that we may have peace?

If the Franciscans, carried away by holy zeal for the Virgin Mary, go to demolish the church of the Dominicans, who think that Mary was born in original sin, we shall then be obliged to treat the Franciscans much as we treat the Jesuits.

The same must be said of the Lutherans and Calvinists. It will be useless for them to say, “We follow the promptings of our conscience; it is better to obey God than men; we are the true flock; we must exterminate the wolves.” It is evident that they themselves are then wolves.

One of the most astonishing examples of fanaticism was a small sect in Denmark whose principle was the best in the world. These people wished to procure eternal salvation for their brothers; but the consequences they drew from this principle were singular. They knew that all little children who die without baptism are damned, and that those fortunate enough to die immediately after baptism enjoy eternal glory. They went about cutting the throats of whatever newly baptized boys and girls they could find. This was doubtless doing them the greatest good one could procure for them: they were preserved at once from sin, the miseries of this life, and Hell; they were sent infallibly to Heaven. But these charitable people did not consider that we are not permitted to do a small evil for a great good; that they had no right over these little children's lives; that most fathers and mothers are carnal enough to prefer having their sons and daughters beside them to seeing their throats cut so that they may go to Paradise; and, in a word, that the magistrate must punish homicide even when it is committed with good intentions.

The Jews would seem to have more right than anyone to rob and kill us. For although the Old Testament contains a hundred examples of toleration, it also contains some examples and some laws of severity. God sometimes ordered them to kill idolaters and spare only girls of marriageable age. They regard us as idolaters; and although we tolerate them today, if they were masters they might well leave none of us in the world but our daughters.

Above all, they would be under an indispensable obligation to murder all the Turks; that follows without difficulty. For the Turks possess the country of the Hittites, Jebusites, Amorites, Jerseneans, Hivites, Araceans, Cineans, Hamathites, and Samareans. All these peoples were devoted to destruction; their country, which was more than twenty-five leagues long, was given to the Jews by several successive covenants. They must recover their property: the Muslims have usurped it for more than a thousand years.

If the Jews reasoned in this way today, it is clear that there would be no other answer to give them than to impale them.

These are almost the only cases in which intolerance seems reasonable.

The Only Cases in Which Human Law Allows Intolerance.

For a government to have no right to punish people's errors, those errors must not be crimes. They are crimes only when they disturb society. They disturb society as soon as they inspire fanaticism. People must therefore stop being fanatics before they can deserve toleration.

Suppose some young Jesuits know that the Church abhors the damned, that a papal bull condemns the Jansenists, and that the Jansenists are therefore damned. If they then go and burn down a house of the Oratorian Fathers because Quesnel the Oratorian was a Jansenist, clearly we will have to punish these Jesuits.

Likewise, if they have spread criminal principles, if the rules of their order go against the kingdom's laws, we cannot avoid dissolving their Society and abolishing the Jesuits to make citizens of them. For them this is really an imaginary evil and a genuine good. What harm is there in wearing a short coat instead of a cassock and being free instead of enslaved? In peacetime, whole regiments are disbanded without complaint. Why do the Jesuits cry out so loudly when they are disbanded to bring about peace?

Suppose the Franciscans, carried away by holy zeal for the Virgin Mary, go and demolish the church of the Dominicans, who think that Mary was born in original sin. Then we will have to treat the Franciscans much as we treat the Jesuits.

The same applies to Lutherans and Calvinists. It will do them no good to say, "We follow the promptings of our conscience. It is better to obey God than men. We are the true flock; we must exterminate the wolves." Clearly, in that case, they are wolves themselves.

One of the most astonishing examples of fanaticism was a small sect in Denmark whose basic principle was the best in the world. These people wanted to secure eternal salvation for their brothers and sisters. But the consequences of that principle were strange. They knew that all little children who die without baptism are damned, and that those fortunate enough to die immediately after baptism enjoy eternal glory. They went around cutting the throats of any newly baptized boys and girls they could find. This was surely doing them the greatest possible good: it protected them at once from sin, the miseries of this life, and hell. It sent them to heaven without fail. But these charitable people did not consider that we are not allowed to do a small evil for a great good; that they had no right over these little children's lives; that most fathers and mothers are worldly enough to prefer having their sons and daughters with them to seeing their throats cut so they can go to paradise; and, in short, that the magistrate must punish murder even when it is committed with good intentions.

The Jews would seem to have more right than anyone to rob and kill us. Although the Old Testament has a hundred examples of toleration, it also has some examples of severity and some harsh laws. God sometimes ordered them to kill idolaters and spare only girls of marriageable age. They regard us as idolaters. Although we tolerate them today, if they were in charge they might well leave only our daughters alive in the world.

Above all, they would be absolutely obliged to murder all the Turks. There is no difficulty about that, since the Turks hold the country of the Hittites, Jebusites, Amorites, Jerseneans, Hivites, Araceans, Cineans, Hamathites, and Samareans. All these peoples were condemned to destruction. Their country, which was more than twenty-five leagues long, was given to the Jews in several successive covenants. They must recover their property. The Muslims have been usurping it for more than a thousand years.

If the Jews reasoned this way today, clearly the only answer we could give them would be to impale them.

These are more or less the only cases in which intolerance seems reasonable.