Book 6

Chapter 1

1 During the same winter the Athenians again wished to sail against Sicily, with a force greater than the one under Laches and Eurymedon, and conquer it if they could. Most of them knew nothing of the island’s size or the number of its inhabitants, both Greeks and barbarians, or that they were taking on a war scarcely less formidable than their war against the Peloponnesians.

2 For a merchant ship, the voyage around Sicily takes not much less than eight days; yet, large as it is, a stretch of sea measuring some twenty stades keeps it from being part of the mainland.

Chapter 2

1 Its settlement in ancient times followed this course, and these were all the peoples it contained. The earliest inhabitants of a part of the country are said to have been the Cyclopes and Laestrygonians. I cannot say what people they belonged to, where they came from, or where they went. Let what the poets have said, and whatever anyone may think about them, suffice.

2 After them, the Sicani appear to have been the first settlers—though they themselves claim to have come earlier still, since they are indigenous. The truth, as inquiry establishes it, is that they were Iberians, driven by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. From them the island, previously called Trinacria, then took the name Sicania. They still inhabit the western parts of Sicily today.

3 When Ilium was captured, some of the Trojans escaped the Achaeans and reached Sicily in ships. Settling beside the Sicani, they were collectively called Elymi; their cities were Eryx and Egesta. Some Phocians also joined their settlement: on their voyage from Troy at that time, a storm had carried them first to Libya and then from there to Sicily.

4 The Sicels crossed into Sicily from Italy, where they had been living, as fugitives from the Opicans. According to the likely and accepted account, they crossed on rafts, watching for a wind down the strait; though they may perhaps have sailed over in some other way. There are still Sicels in Italy today, and the country took its name, Italy, from a king of the Sicels called Italus.

5 They came to Sicily as a great host, defeated the Sicani in battle, and drove them back toward its southern and western regions. They caused the island to be called Sicily instead of Sicania, and occupied and settled the best of the land after their crossing, nearly three hundred years before the Greeks came to Sicily. They still hold the central and northern parts of the island today.

6 The Phoenicians too had settlements all around Sicily, occupying headlands on the sea and the little islands offshore for trade with the Sicels. But when the Greeks began coming overseas in large numbers, they abandoned most of these places and concentrated their settlements at Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymi. They relied on their alliance with the Elymi and on the fact that from there the voyage between Sicily and Carthage is shortest. Such, then, were the barbarian peoples that settled Sicily, and such the manner of their settlement.

Chapter 3

1 The first Greeks to settle were Chalcidians from Euboea, who sailed over with Thucles as their founder and established Naxos. They set up the altar of Apollo Archegetes which now stands outside the city; sacred envoys setting sail from Sicily first sacrifice upon it.

2 In the following year Archias, one of the Heraclids, came from Corinth and founded Syracuse. He first drove the Sicels out of the island on which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water. Later the outer city too was enclosed within the walls and grew populous.

3 In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from Naxos, expelled the Sicels by force, and founded Leontini, and after it Catana. The Catanaeans themselves appointed Euarchus as their founder.

Chapter 4

1 About the same time Lamis also arrived in Sicily, leading a colony from Megara. He founded a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas; later he moved from there to Leontini, where his people briefly shared citizenship with the Chalcidians, before being expelled by them. He then founded Thapsus, where he himself died. The others left Thapsus and, with Hyblon, a Sicel king, giving them the land and guiding them there, founded the settlement whose people were called the Hyblaean Megarians.

2 After living there for two hundred and forty-five years, they were driven from their city and territory by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse. Before their expulsion, a hundred years after their own settlement, they had founded Selinus, sending out Pamillus, who came from Megara, their mother city, and helped establish the colony.

3 Gela was founded jointly by Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who brought settlers there in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The city took its name from the river Gelas, but the site on which the city now stands, the first part to be fortified, is called Lindii. Dorian institutions were established for them.

4 About a hundred and eight years after their own settlement, the Geloans founded Acragas. They named the city after the river Acragas, appointed Aristonous and Pystilus as its founders, and gave it the institutions of Gela.

5 Zancle was originally founded by pirates who came from Cumae, a Chalcidian city in Opicia. Later a large body of settlers came from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea and shared in the division of the land. Its founders were Perieres and Crataemenes, the one from Cumae, the other from Chalcis. Its original name was Zancle, given it by the Sicels because the site is shaped like a sickle—the Sicels call a sickle a zanclon. Later the inhabitants were expelled by Samians and other Ionians who, fleeing the Medes, had come to Sicily.

6 Not long afterward Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, expelled the Samians, settled the city himself with a mixed population, and renamed it Messene after his own ancestral homeland.

Chapter 5

1 Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon. Most of those who joined the colony were Chalcidians, but some exiles from Syracuse, called the Myletidae, who had been defeated in civil strife, settled with them. Their speech became a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric, but Chalcidian institutions prevailed.

2 Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans: Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenae nearly twenty years after Acrae.

3 Camarina too was first founded by the Syracusans, about a hundred and thirty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse. Its founders were Dascon and Menecolus. When the Camarinaeans revolted, the Syracusans drove them out in war. Later Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, received the territory of Camarina as ransom for Syracusan prisoners of war, and himself became its founder, resettling the city. It was again depopulated by Gelon, and was settled for the third time by the Geloans.

Chapter 6

1 So many peoples, Greek and barbarian, inhabited Sicily; and this was the island against which the Athenians were eager to campaign. Their truest motive was the desire to rule it all, though they also wished, under a fair pretext, to assist their own kinsmen and the allies who had since joined them.

2 Above all, they were stirred to action by envoys from Egesta who were present and appealed to them with particular urgency. Egesta bordered on Selinus, and the two had gone to war over certain marriage disputes and contested land. The Selinuntians had brought in the Syracusans as allies and were pressing them hard in the war both on land and at sea. The Egestaeans therefore reminded the Athenians of the alliance with the Leontines made in the time of Laches and the earlier war, and begged them to send ships to their aid. Among their many arguments, the chief was this: if the Syracusans went unpunished for driving out the Leontines, and destroyed the remaining allies of Athens until they themselves held the entire power of Sicily, there was a danger that one day they would bring a great force to aid the Peloponnesians—as Dorians helping their Dorian kin, and as colonists helping those who had sent them out—and join in overthrowing Athenian power as well. It was prudent, they said, to resist the Syracusans with the allies who still remained, especially since they themselves would provide ample money for the war.

3 The Athenians heard these arguments repeatedly in their assemblies, both from the Egestaeans and from those who spoke in their support. They voted first to send envoys to Egesta to examine whether the money really existed in the public treasury and the temples, as was claimed, and at the same time to learn how matters stood in the war against Selinus.

Chapter 7

1 The Athenian envoys were accordingly sent to Sicily. During the same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, marched into Argive territory. They ravaged a small part of the land and carried away some grain, bringing teams of animals to transport it. They settled the Argive exiles in Orneae and left a few men from the rest of their army with them; then, after concluding a truce for a specified period, under which the Orneatae and Argives were not to harm one another’s territory, they withdrew their army home.

2 Not long afterward the Athenians arrived with thirty ships and six hundred hoplites. The Argives marched out in full force with them and besieged the people in Orneae for a day. But at night, when the army had encamped some distance away, those inside Orneae escaped. The next day, when the Argives discovered this, they razed Orneae and withdrew; later the Athenians too sailed home.

3 The Athenians also transported cavalry by sea to Methone, on the border of Macedonia—both their own cavalry and the Macedonian exiles living among them—and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas.

4 The Lacedaemonians sent to the Chalcidians in Thrace, who were observing ten-day truces with the Athenians, and urged them to join Perdiccas in the war; but they refused. The winter ended, and the sixteenth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Chapter 8

1 At the start of the next campaigning season, with the coming of spring, the Athenian envoys returned from Sicily, accompanied by the Egestaeans, who brought sixty talents of uncoined silver as a month’s pay for the sixty ships they intended to ask Athens to send.

2 The Athenians held an assembly and heard from the Egestaeans and their own envoys much that was alluring but untrue, including the claim that great sums of money lay ready in the temples and the public treasury. They voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, with Alcibiades son of Clinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes as generals with full powers. They were to help the Egestaeans against Selinus, to assist in resettling the Leontines if the war afforded them an opportunity, and to conduct the other affairs of Sicily as they judged best for Athens.

3 On the fifth day after this, another assembly was held to consider how the ships could be made ready most quickly, and to vote the generals anything further they might need for the voyage.

4 Nicias had been chosen to command against his will. He thought the city’s decision mistaken: on a slight but plausible pretext it was reaching for all Sicily, an immense undertaking. He came forward, wishing to turn the Athenians from their purpose, and advised them as follows.

Chapter 9

1 “This assembly was called to discuss our preparations and how we are to sail to Sicily. Yet I think we must still examine the question itself—whether it is better to send the ships at all—and not, after so little deliberation on matters so great, be persuaded by men of another race to take up a war that does not concern us.

2 “Such an enterprise brings me honor, and I have less fear for my own life than others—though I consider a man no less a good citizen for taking some thought for his life and property: such a man, for his own sake, will be especially eager for the city to prosper too. Nevertheless, I have never in the past spoken against my judgment for the sake of greater honor, nor shall I now; I shall say what I judge best.

3 “With your temperament, my words would carry little weight if I urged you to preserve what you possess and not risk what is already yours for things unseen and still to come. But I shall show you that your haste is ill-timed, and that what you have set your hearts on will not be easy to hold.

Chapter 10

1 “For I maintain that you are leaving many enemies behind you here, and wish to sail there and bring still others upon yourselves.

2 “You perhaps imagine that the treaty you have made has some security. So long as you remain quiet, it will be a treaty in name—such is the arrangement men both here and among our opponents have contrived. But if we suffer a reverse anywhere with a substantial force, our enemies will be quick to attack us. In the first place, misfortunes forced them to make the agreement from a position more humiliating than ours; and then, even within the agreement itself, there are many points in dispute between us.

3 “There are some who have not yet accepted even this settlement, and they are not the weakest. Some are openly at war with us; others, only because the Lacedaemonians still remain quiet, are themselves held back by ten-day truces.

4 “If they should find our strength divided—as we are now hastening to divide it—they might very readily join the Siceliots in attacking us; in the past they would have prized an alliance with them above many other things.

5 “We must therefore give these matters some thought, and not choose to run risks while the city hangs in uncertainty, or reach for another empire before we have secured the one we hold. The Chalcidians in Thrace, after so many years of revolt, are still unsubdued, and some of our other subjects on the mainland offer only doubtful obedience. Yet we rush to the aid of the Egestaeans, on the grounds that they are our allies and are being wronged, while still delaying to defend ourselves against those whose long-standing revolt wrongs us here.

Chapter 11

1 “And yet, if we subdued these people, we could hold them; whereas even if we defeated the others, their distance and their numbers would make them hard to rule. It is folly to attack a people whom victory will not enable us to hold, while failure will leave us worse off than before we undertook the venture.

2 “As for the Siceliots, it seems to me that, in their present circumstances, they would become still less dangerous to us if the Syracusans ruled them—the very prospect with which the Egestaeans most seek to frighten us.

3 “As things stand, their separate cities might perhaps come to gratify the Lacedaemonians; but in that other situation, one empire would hardly march against another. For just as they might join the Peloponnesians in taking our empire away, so they might expect their own to be overthrown by those same people in the same fashion.

4 “The Greeks there would hold us in the greatest awe if we did not come at all; next best would be to display our strength and leave after a short time. We all know that what is farthest away, and has least put its reputation to the test, is most admired. But if we suffered any reverse, they would quickly despise us and join our enemies here in attacking us.

5 “That is precisely your present attitude, Athenians, toward the Lacedaemonians and their allies. Because, contrary to your expectations and your original fears, you have gained the upper hand over them, you now despise them and reach out for Sicily as well.

6 “But we must not let our enemies’ misfortunes elate us: confidence should come only when we have thwarted their designs. Nor should we imagine that the Lacedaemonians, stung by their disgrace, are thinking of anything but how, even now, they may, if they can, bring us down and redeem their own dishonor. The more so because they prize their reputation for valor above all else and have cultivated it longest.

7 “If we are prudent, then, our struggle is not over the Egestaeans in Sicily, a barbarian people, but over how to keep a vigilant guard against a city whose oligarchy plots against us.

Chapter 12

1 “We must also remember that we have only lately gained a little respite from a great plague and from war, enough to recover somewhat in wealth and manpower. It is right to expend these resources here on ourselves, not on these exiles who beg for aid. For them it pays to lie persuasively, risking their neighbor’s lives while contributing nothing but words: if they succeed, they can repay us with inadequate gratitude; if they fail, they can drag their friends into ruin with them.

2 “And if someone, delighted to have been chosen to command, urges you to sail with an eye only to his own interest—especially one still too young for command, who wants admiration for his horse breeding and, because of his extravagance, some profit from his office—do not enable him to glorify himself at the city’s peril. Recognize that such men harm the public interest and squander their private fortunes, and that this undertaking is great, not one for a young man to plan and hastily execute.

Chapter 13

1 “I am alarmed to see men of this kind sitting here now at that same man’s summons, and I call in turn upon the older men. If one of them sits beside you, do not be ashamed to vote against war for fear of seeming a coward; nor fall, as they may, into a perverse passion for distant things. Understand that desire brings the fewest successes, foresight the most. Cast your votes against the expedition for your country’s sake, since she is hazarding the greatest danger she has ever faced. Vote to let the Siceliots retain their own possessions and settle their affairs among themselves, keeping the present boundaries between them and us—boundaries that give no cause for complaint: the Ionian Gulf for one sailing along the coast, and the Sicilian Sea for one crossing open water.

2 “Tell the Egestaeans separately that, since they began their war with Selinus without the Athenians, they should also end it on their own. And in future let us not make allies as we have been accustomed to do—people whom we must defend when they fare badly, but from whom we shall obtain no assistance when we ourselves need it.

Chapter 14

1 “And you, presiding officer, if you believe it your duty to care for the city and wish to prove a good citizen, put this to the vote and bring the question before the Athenians again. If you fear to reopen the vote, reflect that with so many witnesses you would incur no charge of breaking the laws, but would become the physician of a city that has made a bad decision. Good government means this: to benefit one’s country as much as possible, or at least to do it no deliberate harm.”

Chapter 15

1 Such was Nicias’ speech. Most of the Athenians who came forward urged that the expedition should go ahead and the resolution stand, though some spoke against it.

2 Alcibiades son of Clinias was the most ardent advocate of the expedition. He wished to oppose Nicias, with whom he differed on other matters of policy as well, and who had spoken of him disparagingly; above all, he longed to command, hoping that through him Sicily and Carthage would be conquered, and that his success would at the same time advance his private wealth and reputation.

3 For although he enjoyed high standing among the citizens, his passions outran his existing fortune, both in his horse breeding and in his other expenditure. This, indeed, contributed greatly to the later downfall of the Athenian city.

4 The people took fright at the scale of the lawlessness in his personal way of life and at the ambition he displayed in every particular undertaking. They became his enemies, believing that he aspired to tyranny; and although his public conduct of the war was excellent, each man’s private resentment of his habits led them to entrust affairs to others, and before long they brought the city to disaster.

5 At this time, however, he came forward and advised the Athenians as follows.

Chapter 16

1 “Athenians, I have a better claim than others to command—I must begin here, since Nicias has attacked me—and I believe myself worthy of it as well. For the things that make me notorious bring glory to my ancestors and myself, and benefit to my country too.

2 “The splendor of my presence at Olympia made the Greeks judge our city greater even than its actual strength, whereas before they had expected it to be exhausted by the war. For I entered seven chariots, more than any private citizen had ever entered before, and won first, second, and fourth places; in everything else too I made provision worthy of my victory. Such things bring honor by convention, but from the deed itself people also infer power.

3 “Again, whatever distinction I gain in the city through financing choruses or any other means naturally arouses envy among my fellow citizens; but to foreigners this too appears as strength. It is no useless folly when a man, at his own expense, benefits not himself alone but his city as well.

4 “Nor is it unjust that a man proud of himself should refuse to stand on an equal footing with others, since a man in adversity has no one to share his misfortune equally. Just as we receive no greeting when we are unfortunate, so a man must in fairness endure the contempt of the prosperous—or else give equal treatment before demanding it in return.

5 “I know that men of this kind, and all who have stood out in some form of splendor, are troublesome in their own lifetime, above all to their equals, but also to others with whom they associate. Yet they leave behind them a legacy that makes some later men claim kinship with them even where none exists; and their own country boasts of them, not as strangers or men who went astray, but as her own sons who achieved great things.

6 “These are the things I aspire to, and for which I am denounced in private life. But examine whether I manage public affairs worse than anyone else. I brought together the strongest powers in the Peloponnese, without great risk or expense to you, and forced the Lacedaemonians to stake everything upon a single day’s battle at Mantinea. Though they won that battle, even now they have not recovered a settled confidence.

Chapter 17

1 “It was my youth and supposedly monstrous folly that achieved this, confronting the power of the Peloponnesians with fitting arguments and winning assent by the trust my ardor inspired. Do not be afraid of it now either: while I am still in my prime, with this spirit, and Nicias is thought fortunate, make full use of what each of us can offer.

2 “Do not reverse your decision to sail to Sicily on the grounds that you will be facing a great power. The cities are populous, but their crowds are mixed, and they readily change their citizen bodies and admit newcomers.

3 “For this reason no one equips himself with arms, or makes the usual improvements to his land, as he would for a homeland of his own. Instead, each man prepares to get what he thinks he can from the common stock, either by persuasive speech or by civil strife, and to settle in another land if he fails.

4 “Such a crowd is unlikely either to hear counsel with a single mind or to act in concert. Rather, each group would quickly come over to us if it heard something to its liking, especially if they are torn by civil strife, as we are told.

5 “Nor have they as many hoplites as they boast. The other Greeks too proved less numerous than each people’s own reckoning claimed: Hellas had grossly miscalculated its numbers, and in this war barely mustered an adequate force of hoplites.

6 “Such, from what I hear, is the situation there, and it will prove easier still—for we shall have many barbarians who, out of hatred for the Syracusans, will join us in attacking them. Nor will affairs here stand in our way, if you decide wisely.

7 “Our fathers acquired the empire with these very men as enemies, the same men we are now told we shall be leaving behind if we sail, and with the Mede as their enemy besides. Their strength lay in nothing but their superiority at sea.

8 “Never yet have the Peloponnesians had less hope of defeating us than now. Even if they are at full strength, they can invade our land whether we sail or not; but they could do us no harm at sea, for we still have a fleet left that is a match for theirs.

Chapter 18

1 “What reasonable plea, then, could we offer either for shrinking from the undertaking ourselves or for refusing our allies there the help they ask? We are bound to defend them, especially since we have sworn to do so, and must not object that they, in turn, give us no help. We did not take them into alliance to bring their help here, but so that, by harassing our enemies there, they might prevent them from coming here against us.

2 “This is how we acquired our empire, and how all others who have held empire acquired theirs: by readily coming to the aid of those, barbarian or Greek, who called upon them. If everyone remained inactive or quibbled over which peoples deserved assistance, we should add little to our empire and put what we already hold in greater danger. For it is not enough to repel a stronger power when it attacks; one must forestall its attack as well.

3 “We cannot measure out exactly how far we wish to rule. Having reached our present position, we must plot against some and keep our hold on others, since we risk being ruled ourselves if we do not rule others. Nor can you judge the attractions of a quiet life by the same standard as other peoples, unless you also mean to adopt their ways.

4 “Let us therefore reckon that an expedition there will rather strengthen our position here, and make the voyage. We shall humble the Peloponnesians' pride if we show ourselves willing to disregard our present respite and sail even to Sicily. At the same time, with the resources there added to ours, we shall probably rule all Greece, or at least cripple the Syracusans, to our own advantage and our allies'.

5 “Our ships will give us the security either to remain, if matters prosper, or to leave: for we shall command the sea even against all the Siceliots together.

6 “Do not let the inactivity Nicias advocates, or his attempt to divide the young from the old, turn you aside. In the accustomed harmony by which our fathers, young and old deliberating together, raised our affairs to their present height, strive now, in the same way, to advance the city. Remember that youth and age can accomplish nothing without each other, but that lesser ability, middling ability, and the most exact intelligence, blended together, have their greatest strength. A city that remains inactive will wear itself away from within, like anything else, and its knowledge of every art will grow old; through continual struggle it will gain experience and become accustomed to defending itself in deed rather than in word.

7 “In short, my judgment is that nothing could ruin an active city more quickly than a change to inactivity, and that people live most securely when their political conduct departs least from their established customs and laws, even if these are inferior.”

Chapter 19

1 Such were Alcibiades' words. The Athenians, after hearing him and the Egestaeans and the exiles from Leontini, who came forward to plead with them, invoke their oaths, and beg for help, were far more eager than before to undertake the expedition.

2 Nicias saw that he could no longer turn them aside by repeating his arguments, but thought that the scale of the preparations might change their minds if he demanded a large force. He came forward again and spoke as follows.

Chapter 20

1 “Since I see, Athenians, that you are wholly bent on this expedition, may it turn out as we wish. For the present, however, I shall tell you what I think.

2 “From what I learn by report, we are about to attack great cities, neither subject to one another nor in need of the sort of change by which someone might gladly pass from forcible enslavement to an easier condition. They are unlikely to exchange freedom for our rule; and their Greek cities are numerous for a single island.

3 “Besides Naxos and Catana, which I hope will join us because of their kinship with the Leontines, there are seven others, all equipped in almost every respect on a scale comparable to our own power—not least Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our voyage.

4 “They have many hoplites, archers, and javelin throwers, many triremes, and a population to man them. They have money in private hands; the Selinuntians also have funds in their temples, while the Syracusans receive contributions from certain barbarian peoples. Above all, they surpass us in possessing many horses and in living on grain grown at home, not imported.

Chapter 21

1 “Against such a power we need more than a fleet with a paltry army: a large infantry force must sail with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our design and not be kept off the land by their numerous cavalry. This is especially true if fear unites the cities and we find no friends other than the Egestaeans to supply cavalry with which to meet theirs

2 “—for it would be shameful to be driven away or to send back later for reinforcements because our original decision was ill considered. We must set out from here with adequate equipment, recognizing that we are to sail far from our own country. This will not be like your campaigns here, when you went as allies against one of our subjects and could readily obtain whatever else you needed from friendly territory. We shall cut ourselves off in a land entirely foreign, from which not even a messenger could easily reach us in the four winter months.

Chapter 22

1 “We must therefore, in my judgment, take many hoplites, both our own and our allies'—from our subject allies, and from the Peloponnese if we can persuade or hire any there. We need many archers and slingers to hold out against their cavalry, and an overwhelming superiority in ships, so that we can import supplies more easily. We must also bring grain from home in merchant ships, both wheat and roasted barley, and paid breadmakers conscripted by quota from the mills, so that, if weather prevents our sailing anywhere, the army will have provisions: so large an army cannot be accommodated by every city. We must prepare everything else as fully as possible and not put ourselves in others' hands; above all, we must take as much money as possible from home. As for the funds of the Egestaeans, said to be waiting there, assume that they are waiting chiefly in words.

Chapter 23

1 “For if we sail from here equipped not merely to match them—except, of course, in their fighting arm, the hoplites—but to surpass them in every other respect, only then shall we just be able to overcome the enemy and preserve our own forces.

2 “We must consider ourselves settlers going to found a city among foreign and hostile peoples: men who must master the country on the very day they land, or know that, if they fail, everything around them will be hostile.

3 “That is what I fear. I know that much will depend on sound judgment on our part, and still more on good fortune—a hard demand to make, being human. I therefore wish to sail entrusting myself as little as possible to fortune, but secured, so far as reasonable expectation allows, by our preparations.

4 “I consider this the surest course for the city as a whole, and the means of safety for us who are to serve. If anyone thinks otherwise, I surrender the command to him.”

Chapter 24

1 Nicias spoke at such length in the belief that he would either deter the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking or, if compelled to go on the expedition, sail with the greatest possible security.

2 But the burden of preparation did not extinguish their desire for the voyage; they were far more eager than before, and his speech had the opposite effect to the one he intended. They thought his advice sound, and believed that the expedition would now be thoroughly secure.

3 A passion to sail fell upon them all alike. The older men believed that they would either conquer the land they sailed against or that so great a force could come to no harm; those in the prime of life longed to see and explore a distant country and were confident of returning safely. The mass of the people and the soldiers expected to earn money for the present and to acquire an empire that would furnish an enduring source of paid service.

4 So overwhelming was the majority's desire that anyone who disapproved remained silent, fearing that a vote against the expedition would make him seem disloyal to the city.

Chapter 25

1 At last one of the Athenians came forward and called on Nicias to stop making excuses and delaying, and to declare now, before them all, what force he required the Athenians to vote him.

2 Reluctantly, Nicias replied that he would prefer to deliberate at leisure with his fellow commanders. So far as he could judge already, however, they must sail with no fewer than a hundred triremes. As many as they thought necessary would be Athenian troop transports, and further ships must be summoned from the allies. There must be at least five thousand hoplites in all, Athenians and allies, and more if they could obtain them. They would equip and take the rest of the force in proportion: archers from home and from Crete, slingers, and whatever else seemed appropriate.

Chapter 26

1 On hearing this, the Athenians immediately voted the generals full authority over the size of the army and every aspect of the voyage, to act as they thought best [for the Athenians].

2 After this the preparations began. They sent to the allies and drew up muster rolls at home. The city had only just recovered from the plague and the unremitting war: a large new generation had reached military age, and money had accumulated during the truce, so that everything was more readily procured. Thus they were occupied with their preparations.

Chapter 27

1 Meanwhile, in a single night, most of the stone Herms in the city of Athens had their faces hacked away. These are square pillars in the local style, standing in great numbers both at private doorways and in sanctuaries.

2 No one knew the perpetrators. The city offered large public rewards for information about them, and also decreed that anyone who knew of any other act of impiety—citizen, foreigner, or slave—might report it without fear.

3 They took the affair very seriously. It seemed an omen for the expedition, and at the same time the work of a conspiracy aiming at revolution and the overthrow of the democracy.

Chapter 28

1 Reports were accordingly made by certain resident aliens and attendants, though not about the Herms. They concerned earlier mutilations of other statues by young men in drunken play, and celebrations of the Mysteries in private houses as an act of outrage. Alcibiades was among those they accused.

2 His bitterest opponents seized on these reports. He stood in the way of their securing the leadership of the people, and they believed that, if they drove him out, they would stand first. They magnified the affair and cried out that the profanation of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms were aimed at overthrowing the democracy, and that none of it had been done without his involvement. As evidence they cited the undemocratic lawlessness of his conduct in other matters.

Chapter 29

1 For the moment he defended himself against the accusations and offered to stand trial before sailing, to establish whether he had committed any of these acts, since the preparations were by now complete. If he had done any of them, he would pay the penalty; if acquitted, he would take up his command.

2 He solemnly protested that they must not receive slanders against him in his absence: if he was guilty, they should put him to death now. It was wiser, he said, not to send him out in command of so great an army under such an accusation before they had reached a verdict.

3 His enemies, however, feared that, if he stood trial at once, he would have the army's goodwill and that the people would relent, favoring him because it was through him that the Argives and some of the Mantineans were joining the expedition. They therefore opposed a trial and pressed for haste, putting forward other speakers to argue that he should sail now rather than hold up the departure, and stand trial on his return, on appointed days. Their intention was to have him recalled to face trial under a weightier burden of slander, which they could more easily build up in his absence. It was decided that Alcibiades should sail.

Chapter 30

1 After this, when summer was already at its height, the expedition sailed for Sicily. Most of the allies, together with the grain-carrying merchant ships, the smaller vessels, and all the other accompanying equipment, had previously been ordered to assemble at Corcyra, so that the whole force could cross the Ionian Sea from there to Cape Iapygia. The Athenians themselves, and any allies who were present, went down to Piraeus at dawn on the appointed day and began manning the ships for departure.

2 With them went down virtually the entire remaining population of the city, citizens and foreigners alike. The local people were each seeing off their own—friends, relatives, or sons—and went in hope mingled with lamentation: hope for what they might acquire, grief at the thought that they might never see their loved ones again, as they reflected on the long voyage for which they were sending them away from home.

Chapter 31

1 Now, at the moment of parting, when they were about to leave one another amid such dangers, the terrors of the enterprise came home to them more forcibly than when they had voted to sail. Yet the sight of the strength before them, the multitude of everything they saw, restored their confidence. The foreigners and the rest of the crowd had come to watch an undertaking at once mighty and scarcely credible. For no Greek force ever sent to sea by a single city had yet equaled this expedition in cost and splendor.

2 In numbers of ships and hoplites, however, the expedition to Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same force sent to Potidaea under Hagnon, were no smaller. Four thousand Athenian hoplites, three hundred cavalry, and a hundred triremes had sailed on that occasion, with fifty ships from Lesbos and Chios and many more allies.

3 But those had set out on a short voyage with modest equipment; this expedition was fitted out for a long absence, to serve wherever needed both by sea and on land. Immense sums and effort had been spent on the fleet by the trierarchs and the city alike. The treasury paid each sailor a drachma a day and provided the hulls—sixty fast ships and forty hoplite transports—with the finest specialist crews for them. The trierarchs supplemented the public pay of the upper-tier rowers and the specialist seamen, and lavished money on emblems and fittings; each strained to the utmost to make his own ship stand out in beauty and speed. The infantry, too, had been chosen from carefully drawn muster rolls, and the men vied keenly with one another in their arms and personal equipment.

4 The result was both a contest among themselves, each in the service assigned to him, and, to the other Greeks, the appearance of a display of power and resources rather than preparations for an attack on an enemy.

5 Had anyone reckoned the city's public expenditure and the private spending of those on the expedition—the sums the city had already paid out and those it sent with the generals, what each man had spent on his own equipment or each trierarch on his ship, and what they would still spend—then added the money that everyone would naturally have provided for a long campaign apart from his public pay, and whatever each soldier or merchant carried for trade, the total taken out of the city would have amounted to many talents.

6 The expedition became renowned no less for its astonishing boldness and the splendor of its appearance than for the overwhelming force brought against its intended enemies. It was also the largest expedition yet to cross the sea far from home, and the one launched with the greatest hopes for the future in proportion to what was already possessed.

Chapter 32

1 When the ships were manned and everything they were to take had been stowed aboard, a trumpet signaled silence. The customary prayers before departure were offered not ship by ship, but by the whole force together, at a herald's bidding. Wine had been mixed in bowls throughout the fleet, and the soldiers aboard and their commanders poured libations from gold and silver cups.

2 The crowd on shore joined in their prayers, both the citizens and any others present who wished them well. After singing the paean and completing the libations, they put to sea. At first they sailed out in single file, then raced as far as Aegina. They hastened toward Corcyra, where the rest of the allied force was also assembling.

3 Reports of the approaching fleet reached Syracuse from many quarters, but for a long time none were believed. Indeed, when an assembly was held, speeches of the following tenor were made by various men, some believing the reports of the Athenian expedition, others arguing the contrary. Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward, convinced that he had reliable knowledge of the matter, and addressed them with this advice.

Chapter 33

1 “Like some others, I may seem to you to be saying incredible things about the truth of this coming attack. I know that those who state or report what seems unbelievable not only fail to persuade but are thought fools. Yet I shall not be frightened into silence while the city is in danger, convinced as I am that I speak with surer knowledge than others.

2 “For the Athenians, much as you marvel at it, have set out against you with a great force by sea and land. Their pretext is the alliance with the Egestaeans and the restoration of the Leontines, but their real motive is desire for Sicily, and above all for our city: they think that, if they take it, they will easily possess the rest.

3 “Expect them, then, to arrive soon, and consider how best to resist them with the resources you have. Do not let contempt leave you defenseless when they come, or disbelief make you neglect the whole matter.

4 “But even if a man believes the reports, he must not be dismayed by their daring and their power. They will not be able to inflict more harm on us than they suffer themselves. Nor is their coming with a great fleet without advantage: it puts us in a much better position with the other Siceliots, who will be frightened and more willing to become our allies. And if we either destroy them or drive them away without achieving their aims—for I certainly do not fear that they will gain what they expect—it will be a most glorious achievement for us, and one that I, at least, do not regard as beyond hope.

5 “Few great expeditions, whether Greek or barbarian, have sailed far from home and succeeded. The invaders do not outnumber the inhabitants and their neighbors, for fear unites them all; and if they founder in a foreign land through lack of supplies, they leave the glory to those they attacked, even when most of their reverses are of their own making.

6 “These very Athenians grew great in just this way: the Mede suffered many unexpected reverses, but they gained the credit because his attack was directed against Athens. We too may hope for such an outcome.

Chapter 34

1 “Let us therefore take heart and make our preparations here. Let us send to the Sicels to strengthen the allegiance of some and try to gain the friendship and alliance of others; let us also send envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the danger is common to all, and to Italy, so that its people may either ally themselves with us or refuse to receive the Athenians.

2 “I think it would also be well to send to Carthage. An Athenian attack on their city is not beyond their expectations: they live in constant fear of it. Perhaps, then, if they think that abandoning us would bring danger upon themselves as well, they might be willing to defend us, whether secretly or openly, or at least in one way or another. If willing, they are better able to do so than any other power today, for they possess the greatest stores of gold and silver, which amply supply war and everything else.

3 “Let us send to Lacedaemon and Corinth as well, asking them to bring help here quickly and to renew the war there.

4 “But the course I consider most timely is the one you, accustomed to a quiet life, would be slowest to accept; nevertheless, I shall state it. If all of us Siceliots were willing—or, failing that, as many as possible together with ourselves—to launch our entire available fleet with two months' provisions, and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and Cape Iapygia, we should show them that before they could fight for Sicily they must fight to cross the Ionian Sea. This would dismay them most and bring home to them that we are defenders operating from friendly territory, for Tarentum receives us, while they must cross a wide sea with their whole force. The length of the voyage would make it difficult for them to keep formation, and their force, coming up slowly and in small detachments, would be easy for us to attack.

5 “If, on the other hand, they lightened their ships and attacked with their fast vessels in a more concentrated force, then, if they had used their oars, we could fall on them exhausted; or, if we thought it best not to, we could withdraw to Tarentum. They, having crossed with scanty supplies in expectation of a sea battle, would find themselves in difficulties along a deserted coast. If they stayed, they would be blockaded; if they tried to sail on along the coast, they would leave the rest of their equipment behind, and uncertainty about whether the cities would receive them would dishearten them.

6 “I therefore believe that, confronted with this prospect, they would never even leave Corcyra. Either, while they deliberated and sent scouts to discover our numbers and position, the advancing season would drive them into winter, or, dismayed by the unexpected, they would abandon the voyage. All the more so since, as I hear, their most experienced general leads them unwillingly and would gladly seize a pretext if any formidable move were seen on our part.

7 “Reports of us would, I am sure, exaggerate our strength. Men's judgments take their shape from what they hear; and they are more afraid of those who strike first, or at least make clear to their attackers beforehand that they will resist, believing the danger to be as great for themselves as for their opponents.

8 “That is what the Athenians would feel now. They advance against us expecting no resistance, and with reason they have formed a low opinion of us, since we did not join the Lacedaemonians in wearing them down. But if they saw us display a daring contrary to their expectations, the surprise would dismay them more than our actual strength.

9 “Be persuaded, then, above all to dare this course; failing that, make the other preparations for war as quickly as possible. Let every man understand that contempt for an invader must show itself in resolute action, and that the most useful course is to recognize, here and now, that preparations inspired by fear are the safest, and act as men in danger. These men are coming against us: I know well that they are already at sea and will be here at any moment.”

Chapter 35

1 So much Hermocrates said. The Syracusan people were fiercely divided among themselves. Some maintained that the Athenians would never come and that what he said was untrue; others asked what, even if they came, they could do to them without suffering still greater harm in return. Others again, utterly contemptuous, turned the affair into a jest. Few believed Hermocrates and feared what lay ahead.

2 Athenagoras then came forward. He was a leader of the people and at that time the man most persuasive with the multitude, and he spoke as follows.

Chapter 36

1 “Anyone who does not wish the Athenians to be so ill-advised as to come here and fall into our hands is either a coward or no friend to the city. As for those who bring such reports and fill you with alarm, I am not astonished at their audacity, but at their stupidity, if they think they are not transparent.

2 “For men who have private reasons for fear wish to throw the city into panic, so that the general terror may cast a shadow over their own. That is the purpose of these reports now: they have not arisen by chance, but have been concocted by the very men who are always stirring up these troubles.

3 “If you are wise, you will reckon what is likely not by examining what these men report, but by considering what capable men of wide experience—as I judge the Athenians to be—would do.

4 “They are hardly likely to leave the Peloponnesians behind, with the war there not yet securely settled, and willingly embark on another war no less formidable. Indeed, I think they are content that we, with so many cities and such great ones, are not coming against them.

Chapter 37

1 “But if they should come, as the reports say, I consider Sicily better able than the Peloponnese to carry a war through, since in every respect it is better equipped. Our city alone, I believe, is far stronger than the army now said to be advancing, even if twice that number should come. For I know that no horses will accompany them, nor will they obtain any here except a few from the Egestaeans; nor, coming by sea, will they bring hoplites equal in number to ours—it is a great undertaking to make so long a voyage here even with the ships themselves lightly laden. And all the other equipment needed for an attack on a city of this size is no small matter to procure.

2 “So great do I judge the disparity to be that, even if they brought another city as large as Syracuse and established it on our borders to wage war from there, I think they would scarcely escape utter destruction. Much less will they do so with all Sicily hostile—for it will unite against them—with their army lodged in a camp improvised on landing, in makeshift tents and with only the bare necessities, and unable to venture far because of our cavalry. In short, I do not think they could even gain control of the countryside: so much stronger do I consider our preparations.

Chapter 38

1 “But the Athenians understand these things, as I have explained them, and I am certain that they are safeguarding their own interests. It is men here who invent stories of things that neither exist nor could come to pass.

2 “I have known them, not for the first time now but always, to want to terrify the mass of you with such stories, or with still more vicious ones, or by deeds, and so to rule the city themselves. And I do fear that, after many attempts, they may one day succeed. We, meanwhile, are poor at guarding ourselves before the blow falls, and at pursuing them when we detect them.

3 “That is why our city seldom enjoys peace, but takes upon itself many bouts of civil strife and contests no more often against its enemies than against itself, and at times tyrannies and unjust rule by powerful factions.

4 “If you will follow me, I shall try never to let any of this happen in our time. I shall persuade you, the majority, and punish those who contrive such schemes—not only when caught in the act, for they are hard to catch, but also for what they intend yet cannot accomplish. For we must defend ourselves in advance against an enemy's intentions as well as his deeds, if failure to take precautions means being the first to suffer. As for the few, I shall refute them on some points, keep watch over them on others, and on others instruct them: by these means, I think, I can best turn them away from wrongdoing.

5 “And indeed, a question I have often considered: what is it you want, young men? To hold office already? But that is not lawful; and the law was enacted because you lack the capacity, rather than to dishonor you if you possess it. Or is it that you refuse equality under the law with the many? Yet how is it just that men of the same standing should not be entitled to the same rights?

Chapter 39

1 “Someone will say that democracy is neither intelligent nor equitable, and that those who possess wealth are also best qualified to provide the best government. I say, first, that ‘the people’ is the name of the whole, but ‘oligarchy’ of a part; next, that the rich are the best guardians of money, the intelligent the best counselors, and the many, after hearing the arguments, the best judges. All these, both as separate groups and together as a whole, have their equal share in a democracy.

2 “An oligarchy gives the many a share in the dangers, but of the benefits it not only takes more than its share: it appropriates and keeps them all. That is what the powerful and the young among you are eager for, though it cannot be maintained in a great city. But even now, most senseless of men, if you do not understand that you are striving for evil, you are the most ignorant Greeks I know; or, if you understand and dare it, the most unjust.

Chapter 40

1 “Learn, then, or change your minds, and enlarge the common good of the city for all, recognizing that in this way the able among you may have an equal and even greater share [than the mass of the city's people], whereas if you pursue other aims you risk being deprived of everything. And have done with reports of this kind: you face men who see through them and will not submit.

2 “For this city, even if the Athenians are coming, will repel them in a manner worthy of itself, and we have generals who will attend to these matters. If none of the reports is true, as I believe, the city will not be terrified by your tidings into choosing you as rulers and laying a self-chosen slavery upon itself. It will examine matters for itself, judging your words to have the force of deeds; it will not be stripped of its existing freedom merely by listening, but will seek to preserve it by vigilance in action and by refusing to yield.”

Chapter 41

1 Such was the speech of Athenagoras. One of the generals rose, allowed no one else to come forward, and himself addressed the present situation as follows.

2 “It is not prudent either to make accusations against one another or for those who hear them to accept them. We should look instead to the reports that reach us, and consider how each of us individually and the city as a whole may prepare well to repel the invaders.

3 “And if there should prove to be no need, there is no harm in the city's being furnished with cavalry and arms

4 “and all the other things that give war its splendor—we shall undertake their supervision and inspection—or in sending missions to the cities to gather intelligence and for any other purpose that seems expedient. Some of this we have already attended to, and whatever we learn we shall bring before you.” When the general had said this, the Syracusans dispersed from the meeting.

Chapter 42

1 The Athenians themselves and all their allies were by now at Corcyra. The generals first reviewed the force and arranged it in the order in which it was to anchor and encamp. They divided it into three parts and assigned one by lot to each general, so that, instead of sailing all together, they would not lack water, anchorages, and provisions at their stopping places; and so that, organized in divisions under a general, they would be better ordered in other respects and easier to command.

2 They then sent three ships ahead to Italy and Sicily, to discover which cities would receive them. These were instructed to return and meet them, so that they could approach with this knowledge.

Chapter 43

1 After this the Athenians put out from Corcyra and crossed toward Sicily with the following force: a hundred and thirty-four triremes in all, and two Rhodian fifty-oared ships. Of these, a hundred were Attic—sixty fast ships and the rest troop transports—and the remainder of the fleet came from Chios and the other allies. The hoplites numbered five thousand one hundred altogether: of these, fifteen hundred Athenians were drawn from the muster roll, and seven hundred were thetes serving as marines aboard the ships; the others who joined the expedition were allies, some from the subject states, and five hundred from Argos and two hundred and fifty Mantineans and mercenaries. There were four hundred and eighty archers in all, eighty of them Cretans; seven hundred Rhodian slingers; a hundred and twenty lightly armed Megarian exiles; and a single horse transport carrying thirty cavalrymen.

Chapter 44

1 Such was the first force that sailed across for the war. To carry its supplies there were thirty grain-carrying merchant ships, which also carried bakers, stonemasons, carpenters, and all the tools needed for fortification, and a hundred boats compelled to sail with the merchant ships. Many other boats and merchant ships also followed the army voluntarily for trade. All these now crossed the Ionian Gulf together from Corcyra.

2 The whole expedition made landfall at the Iapygian promontory, at Tarentum, or wherever each contingent could, and proceeded along the Italian coast. The cities would not admit them to a market or within their walls, though they allowed them water and anchorage; Tarentum and Locri would not allow even these. Thus they reached Rhegium, at the extremity of Italy.

3 There they now gathered, and, since they were not admitted within the city, established a camp outside it in the sanctuary of Artemis, where a market was also provided for them; they hauled up their ships and rested. They approached the Rhegians, urging them, as Chalcidians, to help the Leontinians, who were Chalcidians too. But the Rhegians said they would take neither side, and would do whatever the other Greeks of Italy should agree upon.

4 The Athenians considered how best to approach affairs in Sicily. At the same time they awaited the return from Egesta of the ships sent ahead, wishing to learn whether the money was there as the envoys had claimed at Athens.

Chapter 45

1 Meanwhile, the Syracusans were receiving clear reports from many quarters, and from their scouts, that the ships were at Rhegium. They no longer disbelieved, but devoted themselves wholeheartedly to preparations against this threat. They sent guards to some of the Sicels and envoys to others, brought garrisons into the outlying forts in their territory, and examined the state of affairs in the city, reviewing arms and horses to see whether all was complete. In everything else they put themselves on a footing for a war close at hand, indeed almost upon them.

Chapter 46

1 The three ships sent ahead to Egesta reached the Athenians at Rhegium and reported that the rest of the promised money did not exist: only thirty talents could be found.

2 The generals were immediately disheartened. This was their first reverse, along with the refusal of the Rhegians to join the expedition: these were the first people they had tried to persuade, and those most likely to agree, since they were kin to the Leontinians and had always been friendly to Athens. Nicias had expected the news from the Egestaeans, but for the other two it was more of a surprise.

3 The Egestaeans had devised the following trick when the first Athenian envoys came to inspect their wealth. They took them into the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Eryx and displayed the offerings—bowls, wine jugs, incense burners, and a considerable array of other furnishings. These were silver, and made a far greater show than their relatively small monetary value warranted. They also entertained the ships' crews in private houses, collecting the gold and silver drinking cups of Egesta itself and borrowing others from the neighboring cities, Phoenician as well as Greek; each host brought these to the feasts as though they were his own.

4 Since almost everyone was using the same objects and a profusion of them appeared everywhere, the Athenians from the triremes were greatly impressed, and on reaching Athens they spread the report that they had seen great wealth.

5 These men, who had themselves been deceived and had then persuaded the others, were now bitterly blamed by the soldiers when word spread that the money did not exist at Egesta. The generals deliberated on the situation before them.

Chapter 47

1 Nicias proposed sailing against Selinus with the whole army, the chief purpose for which they had been sent. If the Egestaeans provided money for the entire force, they should take counsel accordingly; if not, they should require them to provide subsistence for the sixty ships they had requested, remain there, and reconcile the Selinuntians with them either by force or by agreement. They should then sail past the other cities, display the power of Athens and demonstrate its zeal for friends and allies, and sail home—unless some sudden opportunity enabled them, within a short time, to help the Leontinians or win over another city—rather than endanger their own city by consuming its resources.

Chapter 48

1 Alcibiades said they ought not to have sailed out with so great a force only to depart in disgrace without achieving anything. They should send heralds to all the other cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and try to detach some of the Sicels from the Syracusans and make friends of others, so as to obtain grain and troops. First they should persuade the Messenians: their position lay directly on the passage to Sicily and at its point of approach, and would offer the army an excellent harbor and base of operations. After winning over the cities and knowing whom they would have as partners in war, they should then attack Syracuse and Selinus, unless the Selinuntians came to terms with the Egestaeans and the Syracusans allowed the Leontinians to be restored to their homes.

Chapter 49

1 Lamachus said they ought to sail straight against Syracuse and fight at the city as soon as possible, while its people were still unprepared and at the height of their alarm.

2 Every army, he argued, is most terrifying at first; but if it delays before coming into sight, men's spirits revive and they regard even its appearance with greater contempt. If they fell upon the Syracusans suddenly, while they were still awaiting them in dread, they would have the best chance of victory and would terrify them in every way: by their appearance—for now they would seem most numerous—by the expectation of what they would suffer, and above all by the immediate peril of battle.

3 Many would probably be caught outside in the fields because they did not believe the Athenians would come. And while they were bringing their property into the city, the army would not lack resources, if it established itself in force close to the city.

4 The other Sicilian Greeks would then be more likely to refuse alliance with the Syracusans and come over to Athens, rather than delay, watching to see which side would prevail. For a naval base to which they could withdraw and from which they could launch their attacks, he said they should use Megara, which was deserted and only a short voyage or march from Syracuse.

Chapter 50

1 Though Lamachus spoke in this way, he too finally supported Alcibiades' proposal. After this Alcibiades crossed in his own ship to Messene and discussed an alliance with its people. He failed to persuade them: they replied that they would not admit the Athenians into the city, but would provide a market outside. He therefore sailed back to Rhegium.

2 The generals immediately manned sixty ships drawn from the whole fleet, took provisions, and sailed along the coast to Naxos, leaving the rest of the army at Rhegium with one of their number.

3 The Naxians admitted them into the city, and they sailed on to Catana. But the Catanaeans would not receive them, for there were men there who favored the Syracusans.

4 They proceeded to the river Terias, where they spent the night, and on the following day sailed against Syracuse, with the main body of their ships in single file. They sent ten ships ahead to sail into the Great Harbor and discover whether any fleet had been launched, and to approach and proclaim from aboard ship that the Athenians had come to restore the Leontinians to their own country in accordance with their alliance and kinship. Any Leontinians in Syracuse should therefore leave without fear and come to the Athenians, their friends and benefactors.

5 When they had made the proclamation and reconnoitered the city, the harbors, and the surrounding country from which they would have to conduct the war, they sailed back to Catana.

Chapter 51

1 An assembly was held, and the Catanaeans, though refusing to admit the army, invited the generals to enter and say whatever they wished. While Alcibiades was speaking and the people in the city had their attention fixed on the assembly, the soldiers unnoticed broke through a small gateway that had been poorly walled up, entered the city, and began buying in the market.

2 The Catanaeans who favored the Syracusans—a small number—were at once terrified when they saw the army inside, and slipped away. The rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians and told them to bring the remainder of their army from Rhegium.

3 After this the Athenians crossed to Rhegium, set out again with their entire army for Catana, and on arrival began establishing their camp.

Chapter 52

1 Reports reached them from Camarina that its people would come over if they came, and they also heard that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. With their whole force, therefore, they sailed first toward Syracuse. Finding no fleet being manned, they sailed on to Camarina, anchored off the beach, and sent a herald. The Camarinaeans refused to receive them, saying that their sworn agreement was to admit the Athenians when they came in a single ship, unless they themselves summoned more.

2 Having achieved nothing, they sailed away. They landed at a point in Syracusan territory and plundered it; but the Syracusan cavalry came to its defense and killed some of the scattered light troops. The Athenians then returned to Catana.

Chapter 53

1 There they found that the ship Salaminia had arrived from Athens to summon Alcibiades home to answer the charges brought against him by the city, and also to fetch certain other soldiers accused along with him of profaning the Mysteries, some of them also in connection with the Herms.

2 For after the army sailed, the Athenians pursued their investigation of the offenses involving the Mysteries and the Herms no less vigorously. Without scrutinizing the informers, but receiving every report with suspicion, they trusted worthless men and arrested and imprisoned citizens of the highest character. They thought it better to probe the affair and discover the truth than to let even a man reputed honest, once accused, escape unexamined because the informer was a scoundrel.

3 The people knew by hearsay that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had grown harsh toward its end, and moreover that it had been overthrown not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians. They were therefore always afraid and received everything with suspicion.

Chapter 54

1 The daring enterprise of Aristogiton and Harmodius arose from an incident of love. I shall relate it at greater length and show that neither others nor the Athenians themselves give any accurate account of their own tyrants or of what happened.

2 When Pisistratus died in old age while still tyrant, it was not Hipparchus, as most people suppose, but Hippias, the eldest, who succeeded to power. Harmodius was then conspicuous for the beauty of his youth, and Aristogiton, a citizen of middling station, was his lover.

3 Hipparchus, the son of Pisistratus, made advances to Harmodius and was rejected; Harmodius told Aristogiton. Deeply wounded in his love, and afraid that Hipparchus might use his power to take Harmodius by force, Aristogiton immediately began plotting to overthrow the tyranny, so far as his existing position allowed.

4 Meanwhile Hipparchus made another attempt and was no more successful in persuading Harmodius. He had no wish to use violence, but prepared to humiliate him in some concealed way, so that this would not appear to be the reason.

5 For in his rule generally he was not oppressive to the multitude, but conducted it without giving offense. Indeed, these tyrants cultivated virtue and intelligence to an exceptional degree, and, exacting from the Athenians only a twentieth of their produce, they adorned their city handsomely, carried on their wars, and offered sacrifices in the sanctuaries.

6 In other respects the city itself continued to observe its previously established laws, except that the tyrants always took care to have one of their own family in office. Among others of the family who held the annual office at Athens was Pisistratus, son of Hippias the tyrant and named after his grandfather. During his term he dedicated the altar of the Twelve Gods in the marketplace and that of Apollo in the precinct of Pythian Apollo.

7 Later, the Athenian people added to the length of the altar in the marketplace and obliterated its inscription. But the inscription in the precinct of Pythian Apollo is still visible even now, in faint letters, and reads as follows: / In memory of his term of office, Pisistratus, Hippias' son, / set this up within the precinct of Pythian Apollo.

Chapter 55

1 That Hippias, as the eldest, held the rule, I assert from knowledge gained through more exact accounts than others have heard; but this fact alone would also enable anyone to judge. Of the legitimate brothers, he alone is known to have had children, as both the altar and the pillar set up on the Athenian acropolis to record the crimes of the tyrants show. On that pillar no child of Thessalus or Hipparchus is inscribed, but five of Hippias, born to him by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias son of Hyperochides. For it was natural that the eldest should marry first.

2 On the same pillar he is also named first after his father, again naturally enough, since he was the eldest after him and had held the tyranny.

3 Nor do I think Hippias could ever have secured the tyranny so easily at that moment if Hipparchus had died as ruler and he himself had taken office that same day. Rather, the fear he had long inspired in the citizens and the firm loyalty of his mercenaries gave him an overwhelming margin of security in retaining power. He was not at a loss, as a younger brother would have been who had not previously been in constant contact with the government.

4 But Hipparchus, through the misfortune of his death, became famous and so acquired, for later generations, the reputation of having been the tyrant as well.

Chapter 56

1 Hipparchus, then, carried out his intention of insulting Harmodius after his rejection of the advances. They invited his unmarried sister to come and carry a basket in a procession, then drove her away, declaring that they had never invited her in the first place, since she was unworthy.

2 Harmodius took this bitterly, and Aristogiton, for his sake, was roused to far greater anger still. Their other arrangements with those who were to join in the attack had been made; they were waiting for the Great Panathenaea, the only day when the citizens who were to accompany the procession could assemble in arms without arousing suspicion. They themselves were to begin the attack, and the others were immediately to help them against the bodyguards.

3 For safety's sake, few had been admitted to the conspiracy. They hoped that if even a handful dared to act, those who knew nothing beforehand, having their weapons ready, would be willing on the instant to join in winning their own freedom.

Chapter 57

1 When the festival came, Hippias was outside the city in the place called the Ceramicus, with his bodyguards, arranging how each part of the procession was to move forward. Harmodius and Aristogiton, already carrying their daggers, were advancing to the deed.

2 But when they saw one of their fellow conspirators talking familiarly with Hippias—for Hippias was readily approachable by everyone—they grew afraid, believing that they had been betrayed and were on the point of arrest.

3 Before that happened, they wished, if they could, to take revenge upon the man who had hurt them and for whose sake they were risking everything. Just as they were, they rushed inside the gates and came upon Hipparchus near the place called the Leocorium. At once they fell upon him without a thought, in the fiercest anger, one driven by love, the other by the insult he had suffered; they struck and killed him.

4 As the crowd came running together, Aristogiton escaped the bodyguards for the moment, but was later captured and put to a cruel death. Harmodius was killed there on the spot.

Chapter 58

1 When the news reached Hippias in the Ceramicus, he went immediately, not to the scene of the deed, but to the hoplites in the procession, before they could learn of it at that distance. Composing his face so that it betrayed nothing of the disaster, he pointed out a place and ordered them to go there without their weapons.

2 They withdrew, thinking he wished to address them. He then told the mercenaries to take possession of the weapons and immediately picked out those he accused, together with anyone found carrying a dagger; for it was customary to take part in the processions with shield and spear.

Chapter 59

1 Thus a wound dealt to love gave rise to the plot of Harmodius and Aristogiton, and sudden terror brought them to their reckless act of daring.

2 After this the tyranny became harsher for the Athenians. Hippias, now living in greater fear, killed many citizens and at the same time looked abroad, seeking some refuge that might be open to him if his fortunes changed.

3 It was after this, at any rate, that, Athenian though he was, he gave his daughter Archedice to a Lampsacene, Aeantides son of Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampsacus, knowing that their family had great influence with King Darius. Her tomb at Lampsacus bears this inscription: / “Her father was foremost in Hellas among men of his day: / Hippias, whose daughter Archedice this dust conceals. / Her father, husband, and brothers were tyrants, / And her sons, yet her mind never rose into reckless pride.”

4 Hippias continued as tyrant of Athens for three years. In the fourth he was overthrown by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmaeonids, and departed under a truce, first to Sigeum and to Aeantides at Lampsacus, then from there to King Darius. From there, too, in the twentieth year afterward, when he was already an old man, he set out with the Medes on the expedition to Marathon.

Chapter 60

1 With these events in mind, and recalling all they knew of them by hearsay, the Athenian people were at that time harsh and suspicious toward those accused in the affair of the mysteries. Everything, they thought, had been done as part of an oligarchic and tyrannical conspiracy.

2 Their anger over this had already filled the prison with many men of standing, and there was no sign of a pause: each day they grew fiercer and arrested still more. At this point one of the prisoners, the very man who seemed most deeply implicated, was persuaded by a fellow prisoner to make a disclosure—whether true or not. Both views are conjectured; no one, either then or afterward, has been able to say with certainty who committed the deed.

3 His fellow prisoner persuaded him by saying that, even if he had not done it, he ought to secure immunity and save himself, while releasing the city from its present suspicion. A confession under immunity offered him a surer prospect of safety than a denial followed by trial.

4 He therefore gave information against himself and others in the affair of the Herms. The Athenian people welcomed what they believed to be the truth, having previously thought it intolerable not to know who was plotting against their democracy. They immediately released the informer and all his fellow prisoners whom he had not accused. Those accused were brought to trial: all who had been arrested were put to death, while those who had escaped were condemned to death and a reward was proclaimed for anyone who killed them.

5 It remained uncertain whether those who suffered in this affair had been unjustly punished; the rest of the city, however, had plainly benefited for the time being.

Chapter 61

1 As for Alcibiades, his enemies—the same men who had attacked him before he sailed—pressed their charges, and the Athenians took them bitterly. Now that they thought the affair of the Herms had been cleared up, they were all the more convinced that the affair of the mysteries, in which he was implicated, had been his doing also, with the same purpose and as part of the conspiracy against the people.

2 Indeed, at the very time when they were in this turmoil, a small Lacedaemonian army happened to have advanced as far as the Isthmus on some business with the Boeotians. The Athenians therefore believed it had come at an agreed signal, through his contrivance, and not on account of the Boeotians; and that, had they not forestalled it by arresting the men on the informer's evidence, the city would have been betrayed. For one night they even slept under arms in the sanctuary of Theseus in the city.

3 At the same time Alcibiades' guest-friends in Argos were suspected of plotting an attack on the people. For this reason the Athenians then handed over the Argive hostages held in the islands to the Argive people to be put to death.

4 Suspicion thus closed around Alcibiades from every side. Wishing to bring him to trial and put him to death, they accordingly sent the ship Salaminia to Sicily to fetch him and the others against whom information had been laid.

5 The instructions were to summon him to follow and make his defense, but not to arrest him. They were taking care not to cause a disturbance among either their own soldiers in Sicily or the enemy, and were particularly anxious that the Mantineans and Argives should remain, believing that it was through him that these had been persuaded to join their expedition.

6 Alcibiades, taking his own ship, and those accused along with him sailed from Sicily with the Salaminia, as though bound for Athens. But when they reached Thurii, they followed no farther: they left their ship and disappeared, afraid to sail home for trial under such accusations.

7 The men from the Salaminia searched for Alcibiades and his companions for a time, but when they were nowhere to be found, sailed away. Not long afterward Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed in a vessel from the territory of Thurii to the Peloponnese. The Athenians condemned him and his companions to death in their absence.

Chapter 62

1 After this, the remaining Athenian generals in Sicily divided the army into two parts and each took one by lot; then, with the whole force, they sailed toward Selinus and Egesta. They wished to learn whether the Egestaeans would furnish the money, to examine the situation at Selinus, and to understand its dispute with Egesta.

2 Sailing with Sicily on their left, along the coast facing the Tyrrhenian Gulf, they put in at Himera, the only Greek city in that part of Sicily. When its people refused to receive them, they continued along the coast.

3 On the voyage they captured Hyccara, a small Sicanian town on the coast, hostile to the Egestaeans. They enslaved its inhabitants and handed the town over to the Egestaeans, some of whose cavalry had joined them. Their infantry then marched back through the country of the Sicels until they reached Catana, while the ships sailed around with the captives.

4 Nicias sailed directly from Hyccara to Egesta, transacted the other business, and received thirty talents before rejoining the army. They sold the captives and realized a hundred and twenty talents from them.

5 They also sailed around to their Sicel allies, ordering them to send troops; and with half their own army they advanced against the hostile town of Hybla Geleatis, but failed to take it. And the summer ended.

Chapter 63

1 At the very beginning of the following winter, the Athenians began preparing their advance against Syracuse; the Syracusans, for their part, were preparing to march against the Athenians.

2 For when the Athenians did not immediately attack, as their first fears had led them to expect, their confidence revived with each passing day. And when the Athenians were seen sailing along the distant parts of Sicily, far from them, and had gone against Hybla and failed to take it by assault, their contempt grew greater still. They demanded that their generals lead them against Catana, as a crowd emboldened by confidence is apt to do, since the Athenians would not come against them.

3 Syracusan cavalry scouts were constantly riding up to the Athenian army and taunting them, asking, among other insults, whether they had come to settle themselves alongside the Syracusans in a foreign country rather than to restore the Leontines to their own.

Chapter 64

1 Aware of this, the Athenian generals wished to draw the Syracusans out of the city in full force and as far away as possible, while they themselves sailed along the coast by night and quietly occupied a suitable campsite. They knew they could not do this so easily if they landed from their ships against a prepared enemy, or were seen approaching by land: the numerous Syracusan cavalry would inflict great damage on their light troops and camp followers, since they themselves had no cavalry. By this means, however, they would secure a position where the cavalry could do them no serious harm. Syracusan exiles accompanying them had told them about the place near the Olympieum which they did in fact occupy. To achieve their purpose, then, the generals devised the following scheme.

2 They sent a man whom they trusted, and whom the Syracusan generals believed to be no less friendly to themselves. He was a Catanaean, and said he had come from men in Catana whose names the generals knew, and whom they knew to be among their well-wishers still remaining in the city.

3 He said that the Athenians spent the night inside the city, away from their arms. If the Syracusans would come in full force against the camp at dawn on an appointed day, the men in Catana would shut in the Athenians who were with them and burn the ships, while the Syracusans would easily capture the army by attacking the palisade. Many Catanaeans, he said, were ready to join in the deed and had already made their preparations; it was from these men that he had come.

Chapter 65

1 The Syracusan generals, confident in other respects and already intending, even without this message, to prepare a march against Catana, believed the man with all the less reflection. They immediately agreed on the day when they would arrive and sent him away. Since some of their allies, men from Selinus and elsewhere, had already joined them, they issued orders for the entire Syracusan levy to march out. When their preparations were complete and the agreed time for their arrival was near, they set out toward Catana and camped by the river Symaethus in the territory of Leontini.

2 As soon as the Athenians learned of their approach, they took their entire army, together with all the Sicels and others who had joined them, embarked them in the warships and transports, and sailed for Syracuse by night.

3 At dawn the Athenians were landing near the Olympieum to occupy their campsite, while the Syracusan cavalry, riding ahead into Catana, discovered that the whole army had put to sea. They turned back and reported to the infantry; the entire force now turned around and hurried to the city's defense.

Chapter 66

1 Meanwhile, since the Syracusans had a long way to travel, the Athenians settled their army at leisure in a favorable position, where they could begin battle whenever they wished, and where the Syracusan cavalry could least trouble them, either during the action or before it. On one side low walls, houses, trees, and a marsh barred access; along the other were cliffs.

2 They cut down nearby trees, carried them to the sea, and planted a palisade beside the ships. At Dascon, where the enemy could most easily approach, they hastily raised a defense of stones picked up on the spot and timber; they also broke down the bridge over the Anapus.

3 While they were making these preparations, no one came out from the city to hinder them. The Syracusan cavalry were the first to arrive in support, and afterward the whole infantry force assembled. At first they came close to the Athenian army, but when the Athenians did not advance to meet them, they withdrew, crossed the Helorine road, and encamped.

Chapter 67

1 The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle and drew up as follows. The Argives and Mantineans held the right wing, the Athenians the center, and the other allies the rest. Half the army was stationed in front, eight deep; the other half formed a square by the camp, also eight deep, with orders to watch and go to the aid of whichever part of the army was hardest pressed. The baggage carriers were placed within this reserve formation.

2 The Syracusans drew up all their hoplites sixteen deep, comprising the full Syracusan levy and the allies who were present. The largest contingent supporting them came from Selinus; there were also cavalry from Gela, about two hundred in all, and about twenty cavalry and fifty archers from Camarina. Their cavalry, no fewer than twelve hundred, they stationed beside the right wing, with the javelin throwers alongside them.

3 As the Athenians were about to open the attack, Nicias went along the ranks of each national contingent and addressed this exhortation to them all.

Chapter 68

1 “Men who have come here for the same struggle, what need have we of a long exhortation? The force we have assembled, I think, can inspire confidence more effectively than fine words spoken to a feeble army.

2 “For here we stand, Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the best of the islanders. With allies so numerous and of such quality, how should any man fail to have high hopes of victory? Especially against men defending themselves with their whole levy, not a picked force like ours, and Siceliots at that—men who despise us but will not stand against us, since their skill falls short of their daring.

3 “Let each man also keep this in mind: we are far from our own land, with no friendly ground at hand except what you win for yourselves in battle. And I remind you of the opposite of what I know the enemy are urging upon themselves. They tell one another that the struggle will be for their native land; I tell you that we are not in our native land, but on ground where we must conquer or find retreat difficult, for their numerous cavalry will press us hard.

4 “Remember your own worth, then, and advance against the enemy with spirit, judging our present necessity and helplessness more terrible than our opponents.”

Chapter 69

1 With this exhortation Nicias led the army forward at once. The Syracusans had not expected to fight at that moment, and some of them, with the city so near, had even gone away. These came running back in haste to help, but were late; each took his place wherever he happened to join the main body. For neither in this battle nor in the others did they lack spirit or daring. In courage they were no worse, so far as their skill could sustain them; but where that failed, they unwillingly forfeited the strength of their resolve as well. Still, though they had not expected the Athenians to attack first and were compelled to defend themselves in haste, they took up their weapons and immediately advanced to meet them.

2 First the stone throwers, slingers, and archers on either side fought ahead of the main bodies, routing one another in the usual fashion of light troops. Then the seers brought forward the customary sacrificial victims, and the trumpeters sounded the charge for the hoplites.

3 They advanced: the Syracusans fighting for their native land and, each for himself, for immediate survival and future freedom; on the other side, the Athenians to make another's land their own and not to damage their own through defeat; the Argives and the independent allies to share with the Athenians in winning what they had come for, and to see their own native land again as victors. The subject allies were chiefly spurred by the need for immediate survival, of which there was no hope unless they won; only as a secondary concern did they hope that helping to subdue further lands might ease their own subjection.

Chapter 70

1 Once the battle came to close quarters, they held out against one another for a long time. Thunder, lightning, and heavy rain happened to break upon them together, adding to the fear of those fighting for the first time and least familiar with war. The more experienced thought the storm no more than the season might bring; far more alarming to them was the enemy's resistance, so long as it remained unbroken.

2 The Argives first drove back the Syracusan left wing, and after them the Athenians drove back the troops opposite themselves. The rest of the Syracusan army now began to break apart as well and took to flight.

3 The Athenians did not pursue far, for the Syracusan cavalry, numerous and still undefeated, held them back, charging among their hoplites and checking any they saw pressing ahead in pursuit. Following in a compact body as far as was safe, the Athenians then withdrew and set up a trophy.

4 The Syracusans rallied on the Helorine road and re-formed as best they could in the circumstances. Even so, they sent a detachment of their own men to guard the Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might lay hands on the treasure kept there; the rest withdrew into the city.

Chapter 71

1 The Athenians did not approach the sanctuary. They gathered their own dead, laid them on a pyre, and camped where they were. The next day they gave back the Syracusans' dead under a truce—about two hundred and sixty of the Syracusans and their allies had fallen—and collected the bones of their own dead, about fifty of themselves and their allies. Taking the spoils of the enemy, they sailed back to Catana.

2 For it was winter, and they did not yet think it possible to wage the war from that position until they had sent for cavalry from Athens and gathered more from their allies on the spot, so as not to be wholly at the mercy of the enemy's horsemen. They also needed to collect money locally and receive funds from Athens, to win over some of the cities—which they hoped would be more ready to submit after the battle—and to lay in the other preparations, grain and everything required, with a view to attacking Syracuse in the spring.

Chapter 72

1 With this intention they sailed away to Naxos and Catana to spend the winter. The Syracusans buried their own dead and held an assembly.

2 Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward to speak. A man second to none in general intelligence, he had also proved himself well versed in war and conspicuous for courage. He encouraged them and would not let them give way under what had happened.

3 Their spirit, he said, had not been defeated; disorder had done the damage. Nor had they fallen as far short as might have been expected, especially since they had faced the foremost Greeks in experience, amateurs, so to speak, competing against craftsmen.

4 The multitude of generals and the division of authority had also done great harm—they had fifteen generals—as had the undisciplined lack of control among the mass of the troops. If they appointed a few experienced generals and during this winter prepared their hoplite force, providing arms for those who lacked them so as to make their numbers as large as possible, and compelling them to undertake the rest of their training, he said they would in all likelihood overcome the enemy. They already possessed courage; discipline would be added when they came to act. Both qualities would improve: discipline through practice amid danger, and courage itself would grow bolder with the confidence that comes from skill.

5 They ought to choose few generals, with full powers, and swear an oath to let them command as their judgment dictated. In this way matters requiring secrecy would be better concealed, and the other preparations would be made in good order and without room for excuses.

Chapter 73

1 After hearing him, the Syracusans voted for all his proposals and elected three generals: Hermocrates himself, Heraclides son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus son of Execestus.

2 They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon to obtain allied support and persuade the Lacedaemonians to wage war against Athens more resolutely and openly on their behalf, so that the Athenians would either withdraw from Sicily or send fewer reinforcements to their army there.

Chapter 74

1 The Athenian army at Catana sailed at once against Messene, expecting the city to be betrayed to them. But the scheme came to nothing. When Alcibiades left his command, having already been recalled and knowing that he would go into exile, he disclosed the impending plot, of which he had knowledge, to the friends of Syracuse in Messene. They had first put the conspirators to death; and now, amid civil strife and under arms, those who favored this policy prevailed in keeping the Athenians out.

2 The Athenians remained for about thirteen days, but, battered by storms, short of supplies, and making no progress, they withdrew to Naxos. There they marked out their camp, enclosed it with a palisade, and passed the winter. They also sent a trireme to Athens for money and cavalry, to arrive at the beginning of spring.

Chapter 75

1 During the winter the Syracusans also built a wall extending their city to include the Temenites, along the whole side facing Epipolae, so that, if they suffered a reverse, they could not easily be enclosed by a shorter line of siegeworks. They built a fort at Megara and another at the Olympieum, and drove stakes into the sea along every stretch where a landing was possible.

2 Knowing that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched with their whole force against Catana, ravaged part of its territory, burned the Athenian tents and camp, and returned home.

3 When they learned that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina, invoking the alliance made in the time of Laches in the hope of winning them over, they too sent envoys to counter it. They suspected that the Camarinaeans had been reluctant to send even the aid they had supplied for the first battle; and, seeing the Athenians' success in that battle, they might refuse further assistance and be persuaded by their old friendship to join the Athenians instead.

4 So Hermocrates and others arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus with others from the Athenians. When the Camarinaeans assembled, Hermocrates, wishing to prejudice them against the Athenians before they spoke, addressed them as follows.

Chapter 76

1 “Camarinaeans, we have not sent this embassy chiefly from fear that the Athenian force now here will overawe you, but rather that the arguments they are about to offer will persuade you before you have heard anything from us.

2 “They have come to Sicily with the pretext you have heard, but with the intention we all suspect. In my judgment, they wish not so much to restore the Leontines to their homes as to drive us from ours. It hardly makes sense for them to uproot cities there and restore cities here, or to cherish the Leontines as kinsmen because they are Chalcidians, while keeping the Chalcidians of Euboea, from whom these settlers came, in slavery.

3 “The method by which they gained their possessions there is the same they are now attempting here. They became leaders of the willing Ionians and of the allies descended from themselves, ostensibly to take vengeance on the Mede; then, charging some with desertion, others with making war on one another, and bringing against each whatever plausible accusation they could find, they subdued them.

4 “So neither did the Athenians resist the Mede for the freedom of the Greeks, nor the Greeks for their own: the Athenians fought to enslave them to themselves rather than to him, and the Greeks to exchange their master for one no less shrewd, but shrewder in wrongdoing.

Chapter 77

1 “But we have not come now to expose the Athenians, whose city is easy enough to accuse, before men who know its wrongs. Far more do we come to reproach ourselves. We have the example of the Greeks there, enslaved because they failed to defend themselves; and now the same contrivances are being brought against us—the restoration of their Leontine kinsmen, assistance to their Egestaean allies. Yet we will not unite and show them with greater spirit that these are not Ionians, Hellespontines, or islanders, who continually change their master, whether the Mede or someone else, and remain slaves, but free Dorians, settled in Sicily from the self-governing Peloponnese.

2 “Or shall we wait until we are taken city by city, knowing that this alone makes us vulnerable, and seeing them pursue just this design—to divide some of us by argument, set others at war with one another by the promise of alliance, and injure each as they can by offering something welcome to his ear? When a fellow inhabitant of Sicily, far away, is destroyed first, do we imagine that the danger will not reach us too, and that the sufferer before us is unfortunate only on his own account?

Chapter 78

1 “If anyone supposes that the Syracusan, but not he himself, is the Athenian's enemy, and thinks it a hardship to risk himself for my country, let him reflect that in fighting on my soil he is fighting no more for mine than, equally, for his own; and with greater safety, since I shall not already have been destroyed, but he will have me for an ally and will not struggle alone. The Athenian wishes not merely to punish the Syracusan's hostility, but, on the pretext of attacking me, to make this man's friendship no less secure.

2 “If anyone envies us, or even fears us—for greatness provokes both feelings—and therefore wishes Syracuse to suffer enough to teach us moderation, yet to survive for his own security, he hopes for something beyond human power. No man can be master alike of his desires and of fortune.

3 “And if his judgment fails, perhaps, lamenting his own misfortunes, he may one day wish that he could envy my prosperity again. But that will be impossible if he abandons us and refuses to share dangers which are the same in substance, whatever the difference in name: in word he would be preserving our power, but in deed his own survival.

4 “You above all, Camarinaeans, as our neighbors and the next to face the danger, should have foreseen this. Instead of giving us the halfhearted support you now give, you should be coming to us of your own accord, visibly urging us to yield nothing—just as you would appeal to us in your need if the Athenians had invaded Camarina first. But neither you nor the others have yet shown this spirit.

Chapter 79

1 “Perhaps, out of cowardice, you will observe justice toward both us and the invaders, saying that you have an alliance with the Athenians. Yet you made it not against your friends, but against any enemy who might attack you; and you undertook to help the Athenians when others wronged them, not when they themselves wronged their neighbors, as they do now.

2 “Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians themselves, refuse to help restore the Chalcidian Leontines. It would be monstrous if they, suspecting the deed behind the fine plea of justice, act wisely without a plausible excuse, while you, with a plausible pretext, choose to help your natural enemies and join your bitterest foes in destroying those who are still more naturally your kinsmen.

3 “That is not just. You must resist, and not fear their armament. It is not formidable if we all stand together, but only if, as they are striving to ensure, we stand apart. Even when they came against us alone and won a battle, they did not achieve their purpose, but quickly withdrew.

Chapter 80

1 “United, then, we have no reason to lose heart; rather, we should enter the alliance with greater zeal, especially since help will come from the Peloponnesians, who are altogether superior to these men in warfare. And let no one think that the cautious policy of helping neither side, on the ground that you are allied to both, is fair to us and safe for you.

2 “In deed it is not as fair as its claim sounds. If your refusal to join us brings defeat to the victim and victory to the aggressor, what have you done by the same abstention but withhold the help that would have saved the one, and fail to prevent the other's wrongdoing? Yet it would be nobler to take the side of those who are both wronged and your kinsmen, preserve the common good of Sicily, and prevent the Athenians, your friends as you say, from committing an injustice.

3 “To sum up, we Syracusans say that there is no need to instruct either you or the others at length in matters you understand no less clearly yourselves. We appeal to you, and at the same time, if we fail to persuade you, call you to witness: we Dorians are being attacked by Ionians, our perpetual enemies, and betrayed by you, our fellow Dorians.

4 “If the Athenians subdue us, they will win through your decisions, but the honor will bear their own name; and the prize they take for their victory will be none other than the men who gave it to them. If, on the other hand, we prevail, you who brought these dangers upon us will bear the punishment.

5 “Consider, then, and choose now: immediate slavery without risk, or the chance, by prevailing at our side, both to avoid the disgrace of taking these men as masters and to escape a quarrel with us that would be anything but brief.”

Chapter 81

1 Such was the speech of Hermocrates. After him Euphemus, the Athenian envoy, spoke as follows.

Chapter 82

1 “We came to renew our former alliance; but since the Syracusan has attacked us, we must also explain why we are justified in holding our empire.

2 “He himself has supplied the strongest evidence: the Ionians have always been enemies of the Dorians. The facts bear him out. We, being Ionians, considered how best to avoid subjection to the Peloponnesian Dorians, who outnumber us and live close by.

3 “After the Persian Wars we acquired a fleet and freed ourselves from Lacedaemonian rule and leadership. They had no more right to command us than we them, except insofar as they were stronger at the time. We in turn became leaders of those formerly subject to the King, and have maintained our position, believing that, with the power to defend ourselves, we should be least likely to fall under Peloponnesian rule. And, to speak precisely, there was no injustice in our subjugation of the Ionians and islanders whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved despite their kinship with us.

4 “For they came with the Mede against us, their mother city, and did not dare revolt and sacrifice their possessions, as we did when we abandoned our city. They chose slavery for themselves and sought to impose the same upon us.

Chapter 83

1 “For these reasons we hold our empire both as our due—because we furnished the Greeks with the largest fleet and an unstinting zeal, and because those men, showing the same readiness in the Mede's service, did us harm—and in pursuit of the strength we need against the Peloponnesians.

2 “We do not embellish our case with claims that we rightly rule because we alone overthrew the barbarian, or because we faced danger for these men's freedom rather than for that of all the Greeks and ourselves. No one can be blamed for securing his own proper safety. And now, here too, we have come for our own security, and see that your interests coincide with ours.

3 “We shall demonstrate this from the very grounds of their slanders and your most fearful suspicions. We know that men whose suspicions are sharpened by fear may delight for the moment in a pleasing speech, but later, when action comes, do what serves their interests.

4 “For, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire there; and the same motive has brought us here to establish security with our friends, not to enslave them, but rather to prevent our own enslavement.

Chapter 84

1 “Let no one suppose that we concern ourselves with you when you are no concern of ours. He should recognize that, if you survive and are strong enough to hold the Syracusans in check, we shall suffer less harm from any force they send to the Peloponnesians.

2 “In this respect you are already of the greatest concern to us. That is also why it makes sense to restore the Leontines, not as subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but as strong as possible, so that, as neighbors of Syracuse, they may trouble these men from their own territory on our behalf.

3 “At home we are ourselves strong enough to face our enemies; and the Chalcidians—whom he says we have inconsistently enslaved while freeing their kinsmen here—serve our interests by remaining unarmed and paying money alone. Here, however, both the Leontines and our other friends serve us best by enjoying the fullest possible independence.

Chapter 85

1 “For a tyrant or an imperial city, no advantage is unreasonable and no kinship counts without trust. In each case one must become an enemy or a friend as circumstances require. Here our advantage lies not in harming our friends, but in making our enemies powerless through our friends' strength.

2 “You need not distrust this. Even at home we order our relations with our allies according to the usefulness of each: the Chians and Methymnaeans retain their independence in return for furnishing ships; most others are more strictly bound to pay tribute; others again are allies on entirely free terms, although they are islanders and easy to subdue, because they occupy strategic positions around the Peloponnese.

3 “Here too, then, we may reasonably be expected to arrange matters to our advantage and, as we say, out of fear of the Syracusans. They aspire to rule you, and wish to unite you through suspicion of us, then themselves become masters of Sicily, either by force or, once we have departed unsuccessful, with the field left clear. This must happen if you join them: so great a power, once united, will no longer be easy for us to handle, and without us here these men will not be weak in their dealings with you.

Chapter 86

1 “If anyone doubts this, the facts themselves refute him. When you first called us in, the only fear you held before us was that, if we stood by while you fell under Syracusan rule, we too would be in danger.

2 “It is not just to distrust now the very argument with which you then claimed to persuade us, or to suspect us because we have come with greater forces to confront their strength. Far more should you distrust these men.

3 “We cannot even remain here without your support; and even if we proved wicked and conquered you, we could not hold you, given the length of the voyage and our lack of means to garrison great cities equipped as mainland powers. These men, however, live beside you not in a camp, but in a city stronger than our force here. They plot against you continually, and whenever they gain an opening against any one of you,

4 “they do not let it go—as they have already shown in other cases, and in their treatment of the Leontines. Yet now they dare to summon you, as though you had no sense, against those who prevent such things and have so far kept Sicily from falling under their rule.

5 “We appeal in return to a far truer security. We ask you not to betray the protection that each of us affords the other. Remember that their numbers always leave them a ready path against you, even without allies, whereas you will not often have the chance to defend yourselves with so great a force at your side. If suspicion makes you allow it to depart unsuccessful, or even defeated, you will one day long to see even a tiny fraction of it, when its arrival can no longer accomplish anything for you.

Chapter 87

1 “Do not, then, Camarinaeans, let their slanders persuade either you or the others. We have told you the whole truth about the things that arouse suspicion against us; and we shall recall the main points once more and ask you to be persuaded.

2 “We say that we rule those at home so as not to obey another, and free those here so as not to be harmed by them; that we are compelled to act on many fronts because we have many dangers to guard against; and that, now as before, we have come as allies to those of you here who suffer wrong, not uninvited, but at your call.

3 “Do not set yourselves up as judges or reformers of our conduct and try to turn us aside: that would now be difficult. Instead, take and use whatever share of our restless intervention and our character serves your own interests. Recognize that these qualities do not harm everyone alike, but benefit far more of the Greeks.

4 “For every man everywhere, even where we have no ties, whether he expects to suffer wrong or plots to inflict it, faces a standing prospect: the one of receiving aid from us, the other, if we come, of entering a struggle not free from fear. Both are thus constrained, the one to show restraint against his will, the other to remain safe without exertion.

5 “Do not reject this security, common to all who need it and now present for you. Rather, put yourselves on an equal footing with the others and join us, so that, instead of forever guarding against the Syracusans, you too may sometimes have your share in taking the offensive against them on equal terms.”

Chapter 88

1 Such was the speech of Euphemus. The Camarinaeans were in this position. They were well disposed toward the Athenians, except insofar as they believed that the Athenians would enslave Sicily; with the Syracusans, as their neighbors, they were perpetually at odds. Yet they feared no less that the Syracusans, being close at hand, might prevail even without them. This was why they had sent them the small force of cavalry at the outset, and they now resolved that their practical assistance in future would favor the Syracusans, though they would give it as sparingly as possible. For the present, however, so as not to appear to give the Athenians less consideration, especially after their victory in battle, they would give both sides an equal answer in words.

2 Having decided on this course, they replied that, since both sides were their allies and were at war with one another, they thought it consistent with their oaths to assist neither for the present. The envoys of both parties departed.

3 The Syracusans continued their own preparations for the war, while the Athenians, encamped at Naxos, negotiated with the Sicels to win over as many as possible.

4 Most of the Sicels nearer the plains, who were subjects of Syracuse, had held aloof. Among those occupying the interior, whose settlements had always been independent, all but a few had at once sided with the Athenians, bringing grain down to the army, and some of them money as well.

5 The Athenians marched against those who would not join them and compelled some to do so; in other cases they were prevented by the Syracusans, who sent garrisons and relief forces. During the winter the Athenians shifted their anchorage from Naxos to Catana, rebuilt the camp the Syracusans had burned, and wintered there.

6 They sent a trireme to Carthage to seek friendship, in the hope of obtaining some assistance, and sent a mission to Tyrrhenia as well, where certain cities had themselves offered to join them in the war. They also sent messages to the Sicels and to Egesta, ordering them to send as many horses as possible. Meanwhile they prepared bricks, iron, and everything else needed for the siege wall, intending to take up the war as soon as spring began.

7 The Syracusan envoys sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon, as they sailed along the coast, also tried to persuade the Greeks of Italy not to stand by and watch what the Athenians were doing, since these designs threatened them equally. On reaching Corinth, they appealed for help on the grounds of kinship.

8 The Corinthians were the first to vote at once to help with all their zeal. They also sent envoys with them to Lacedaemon, to join in persuading the Lacedaemonians both to wage war more openly against the Athenians at home and to send some assistance to Sicily.

9 The envoys from Corinth arrived at Lacedaemon, as did Alcibiades. Immediately after his escape he and his fellow exiles had crossed on a merchant vessel from Thurian territory to Cyllene in Elis; later he came to Lacedaemon under safe conduct, at the invitation of the Lacedaemonians themselves. He had feared them because of his part in the affair of Mantinea.

10 In the Lacedaemonian assembly, the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and Alcibiades all pressed the same requests upon the Lacedaemonians. The ephors and the other authorities were considering sending envoys to Syracuse to prevent an agreement with Athens, but were reluctant to send help. Alcibiades then came forward and roused the Lacedaemonians to action with the following speech.

Chapter 89

1 “I must first speak about the charges that have discredited me in your eyes, so that suspicion of me may not make you listen less favorably to what concerns us all.

2 “My ancestors had renounced their role as your city's hosts over some grievance; I myself renewed it and cultivated your friendship, on other occasions and especially during the disaster at Pylos. Yet, although my goodwill never faltered, when you made peace with Athens you conducted the negotiations through my enemies, investing them with power and me with dishonor.

3 “You were therefore justly harmed when I turned to the Mantineans and Argives and opposed you in other ways. If anyone then, in his suffering, was unreasonably angry with me, let him consider the truth and change his mind. Or if anyone thought less of me because I inclined more toward the people, let him not imagine that this gives him just grounds for resentment either.

4 “My family has always opposed tyrants—and everything opposed to the ruling power has been called ‘the people’—so the leadership of the multitude has remained with us from that time. Besides, as the city was governed democratically, we were obliged in most matters to conform to the established order.

5 “Yet amid the prevailing license we tried to show greater moderation in public affairs. There were others, in earlier days as now, who led the crowd into worse courses; these were the very men who drove me out.

6 “We stood at the head of the whole community, believing it right to help preserve the form of government under which the city had been greatest and freest, the constitution each of us had inherited. As for democracy, those of us with any sense knew what it was, and I no less than anyone, since I would have more cause than anyone to revile it. But nothing new could be said about an acknowledged folly; and we did not think it safe to change it while you, our enemies, were stationed at our doors.

Chapter 90

1 “Such, then, were the circumstances surrounding the charges against me. Now hear about the matters on which you must deliberate, and on which I must offer advice if my knowledge goes further than yours.

2 “We sailed to Sicily intending first, if we could, to subdue the Sicilian Greeks, then the Greeks of Italy, and after that to make an attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage itself.

3 “If these plans succeeded, either wholly or for the most part, we then intended to attack the Peloponnese. We would bring over the entire Greek force acquired there, hire large numbers of barbarians—Iberians and others from those parts, acknowledged to be the most warlike barbarians of our day—and build many triremes in addition to our own, since Italy has timber in abundance. With these we would blockade the Peloponnese all around, while our infantry simultaneously attacked the cities by land, taking some by force and enclosing others with siege walls. We hoped thus to bring the war to an easy conclusion and afterward to rule the whole Greek world.

4 “As for money and grain, to provide us with ampler supplies of both, the territories acquired there would themselves furnish enough, without the revenue from here.

Chapter 91

1 “You have now heard our intentions for the expedition that has sailed, from the man who knows them most exactly; and the generals who remain will carry them out in the same way if they can. Now learn that, unless you send help, the forces there will not hold out.

2 “The Sicilian Greeks are less experienced, but even now, if they united in a single body, they might prevail. The Syracusans alone, however, already defeated in battle with their whole levy and at the same time hemmed in by ships, will be unable to withstand the force the Athenians now have there.

3 “If this city is taken, all Sicily is taken with it, and Italy at once as well; and the danger from that quarter of which I have just warned you would descend upon you before long.

4 “So let no one suppose that your deliberations concern Sicily alone: they concern the Peloponnese too, unless you promptly take these measures. Send troops there aboard ships, men who will row themselves across and serve as hoplites immediately on arrival; and send what I consider still more useful than the troops—a Spartan commander, to organize the men already there and compel the unwilling to serve. In this way your existing friends will gain confidence, and those who hesitate will join you with less fear.

5 “At the same time you must wage war more openly here, so that the Syracusans, knowing that you are taking thought for them, may resist more firmly, and the Athenians may be less able to send further reinforcements to their own men.

6 “You must also fortify Decelea in Attica: this is what the Athenians have always feared most, and they consider it the one ordeal of the war they have not yet experienced. The surest way to harm an enemy is to discover what he most fears and, once you have established it clearly, bring that upon him. For each man, knowing his own dangers most precisely, is naturally afraid of them.

7 “I will pass over many of the advantages you will gain and the losses you will inflict on your opponents by this fortification, and set out only the chief points. Most of the resources with which the country is furnished will come into your hands, some by capture, others of their own accord. They will at once be deprived of the revenue from the silver mines at Laurium and of all the income they now derive from the land and the law courts; above all, the revenue from their allies will come in less fully, since the allies, seeing that you are now waging war with all your strength, will grow careless about paying.

Chapter 92

1 “Whether any of this is done, Lacedaemonians, and done promptly and energetically, rests with you. That it is practicable I am entirely confident, and I do not think my judgment will prove mistaken.

2 “And I claim that none of you should think the worse of me if, though once accounted a patriot, I now assail my own city resolutely in company with its bitterest enemies; nor should you suspect my argument as the product of an exile's zeal.

3 “For I am an exile from the wickedness of those who drove me out, not from the chance to serve your interests, if you listen to me. The greater enemies are not you, who have sometimes harmed your enemies, but those who have forced their friends to become enemies.

4 “My love of my city belongs not to the time when I am wronged, but to the time when I lived there securely as a citizen. Nor do I regard myself as now attacking a country that is still mine, but rather as recovering one that is mine no longer. The true patriot is not the man who, unjustly deprived of his country, refrains from attacking it, but the man who longs for it so deeply that he tries by every means to regain it.

5 “On these grounds I ask you, Lacedaemonians, to employ me without misgiving in every danger and hardship, recognizing the truth of that argument on everyone's lips: if as an enemy I harmed you greatly, as a friend I could also serve you well—all the more because I know the affairs of Athens, whereas yours I could only conjecture. Recognize, too, that the issues now before you are of the greatest consequence, and do not shrink from expeditions to Sicily and Attica. By joining in the struggle there with a small part of your forces, you may save great interests, overthrow the Athenians' present and future power, and afterward live in security yourselves and lead all Hellas, willing and unforced, through its goodwill toward you.”

Chapter 93

1 Such was the speech of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians had already been considering an expedition against Athens, but were still delaying and watching events. Now, as he explained each of these points, they were greatly strengthened in their resolve, believing that they had heard from the man who knew most clearly.

2 They therefore turned their attention to fortifying Decelea and to sending some immediate assistance to the forces in Sicily. They appointed Gylippus son of Cleandridas commander for the Syracusans, and instructed him to consult with them and the Corinthians and arrange for the greatest and speediest assistance possible in the circumstances to reach the men there.

3 He at once instructed the Corinthians to send him two ships to Asine, and to prepare the rest of the ships they intended to send, so that they would be ready to sail when the time came. Having reached this agreement, they departed from Lacedaemon.

4 The Athenian trireme which the generals had sent from Sicily for money and cavalry also arrived. After hearing its report, the Athenians voted to send the army funds for its maintenance and the cavalry. The winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Chapter 94

1 With the first coming of spring in the following summer, the Athenians in Sicily sailed from Catana along the coast toward Megara in Sicily. The Syracusans had expelled its inhabitants in the time of the tyrant Gelon, as I have mentioned before, and themselves hold its territory.

2 They landed and ravaged the fields, then advanced against a Syracusan fort, but failed to take it. Moving on again by land and sea to the river Terias, they went inland, ravaged the plain, and burned the grain. They encountered a small party of Syracusans, killed some of them, set up a trophy, and withdrew to their ships.

3 They sailed back to Catana, took on provisions there, and marched with their whole army against Centoripa, a Sicel town. After bringing it over by agreement, they departed, burning the grain of the Inessaeans and Hyblaeans as they went.

4 On reaching Catana, they found that the cavalry from Athens had arrived: two hundred and fifty men with their equipment but without horses, which were to be obtained locally, together with thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents of silver.

Chapter 95

1 In the same spring the Lacedaemonians also marched against Argos and got as far as Cleonae, but an earthquake occurred and they withdrew. After this the Argives invaded the neighboring territory of Thyrea and seized a large quantity of Lacedaemonian booty, which was sold for no less than twenty-five talents.

2 Not long afterward, in the same summer, the people of Thespiae attacked those who held office, but failed to gain control. The Thebans came to the rulers' aid; some of the insurgents were arrested, and others fled to Athens.

Chapter 96

1 In the same summer, when the Syracusans learned that cavalry had reached the Athenians and that they were now about to advance against them, they reasoned that unless the Athenians gained possession of Epipolae—a steep height immediately above the city—they could not easily be walled in, even if defeated in battle. They therefore intended to guard its approaches, to prevent the enemy from ascending by these routes unobserved; for they could not come up anywhere else.

2 The rest of the ground rises sheer; the whole area within slopes down toward the city and is visible from it. The Syracusans call it Epipolae because it lies above the surrounding country.

3 At daybreak the Syracusans came out in full force into the meadow beside the river Anapus. Hermocrates and his fellow generals had just taken up their command. They held a review of the troops and first selected six hundred picked hoplites, under Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae and, should they be needed elsewhere, to assemble quickly and come to the spot.

Chapter 97

1 During the night before the day on which the Syracusans held their review, the Athenians had already sailed from Catana with their entire force and, unobserved by them, put in at the place called Leon, six or seven stades from Epipolae. They disembarked their infantry and brought their ships to anchor at Thapsus. This is a peninsula projecting into the open sea from a narrow isthmus, not far from the city of Syracuse either by sea or by land.

2 The Athenian naval force palisaded the isthmus at Thapsus and remained there, while the infantry at once advanced at a run toward Epipolae and succeeded in ascending by Euryelus before the Syracusans, alerted to their presence, could arrive from the meadow and the review.

3 The rest of the Syracusans hurried to the rescue, each as fast as he could, as did the six hundred under Diomilus; but from the meadow they had no less than twenty-five stades to cover before reaching the enemy.

4 Coming against them in this disorderly fashion, the Syracusans were defeated in battle on Epipolae and withdrew into the city. Diomilus was killed, and about three hundred of the others.

5 After this the Athenians set up a trophy and returned the Syracusan dead under a truce. On the following day they descended against the city itself; when the Syracusans did not come out to meet them, they retired and built a fort at Labdalum, on the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae facing Megara. It was to serve as a store for their equipment and money whenever they advanced to fight or to build walls.

Chapter 98

1 Not long afterward three hundred cavalry arrived for them from Egesta, and about a hundred from the Sicels, the Naxians, and certain others. The two hundred and fifty Athenians were already there; for these they obtained some horses from the Egestaeans and Catanaeans and purchased the rest. Altogether six hundred and fifty cavalry were assembled.

2 After posting a garrison at Labdalum, the Athenians advanced to Syce, where they established themselves and rapidly built the circular fort. The speed of the construction alarmed the Syracusans, who came out intending to fight rather than look on without intervening.

3 The two armies were already drawing up against each other when the Syracusan generals, seeing that their force was scattered and could not easily form ranks, led it back into the city, except for a portion of the cavalry. These stayed behind and prevented the Athenians from carrying stones or straying too far afield.

4 One tribal contingent of Athenian hoplites, together with all their cavalry, attacked and routed the Syracusan cavalry, killed some of them, and set up a trophy for the cavalry battle.

Chapter 99

1 On the following day some of the Athenians worked on the wall north of the circular fort, while others brought stones and timber and laid them down continuously toward the place called Trogilus, along the shortest line for their siege wall from the Great Harbor to the sea on the other side.

2 The Syracusans, chiefly on the advice of Hermocrates, one of their generals, no longer wished to risk battles against the Athenians with their whole force. They thought it better to build a counterwall across the intended line of the Athenian wall: if they finished first, it would bar the way. If the Athenians intervened while they were at work, they would send part of their army against them, while they themselves hastened to occupy the approaches with stakes. The Athenians would then have to abandon their work and turn their entire force against them.

3 They therefore came out and began building from their own city, carrying a crosswall below the Athenian circular fort, cutting down the olive trees in the sacred precinct and erecting wooden towers.

4 The Athenian ships had not yet sailed around from Thapsus into the Great Harbor. The Syracusans still controlled the coastal districts, and the Athenians brought their supplies overland from Thapsus.

Chapter 100

1 When the Syracusans thought that enough of their counterwall had been palisaded and built, they withdrew into the city, leaving one tribal contingent to guard the structure. The Athenians had not come to prevent the work, fearing that if they divided their forces they would be easier to fight, and also pressing on with their own encircling wall. They now destroyed the Syracusans' underground conduits carrying drinking water into the city. Watching for a time at midday when the other Syracusans were in their tents, some had even gone back to the city, and the guards at the palisade were keeping careless watch, they detailed three hundred picked men of their own and some selected light troops, equipped for the attack, to make a sudden rush against the counterwall. The rest of the army advanced in two divisions: one, with one of the generals, toward the city, to meet any relieving force, and the other, with the other general, toward the palisade beside the postern gate.

2 The three hundred attacked and took the palisade. Its guards abandoned it and fled to the outer wall around the Temenites precinct. Their pursuers burst in with them, but once inside were driven out again by force by the Syracusans. Some Argives and a few Athenians were killed there.

3 The entire army then withdrew, demolished the counterwall, pulled up the palisade, carried the stakes back to their own lines, and set up a trophy.

Chapter 101

1 On the next day the Athenians continued their wall from the circular fort along the cliff above the marsh, which faces from Epipolae toward the Great Harbor at this point. Here the line of their encircling wall would be shortest as it descended across the level ground and the marsh to the harbor.

2 Meanwhile the Syracusans themselves came out and again began from the city to build a barrier of stakes through the middle of the marsh, digging a ditch alongside it, to prevent the Athenians from walling them off all the way to the sea.

3 Once their work along the cliff was finished, the Athenians again attacked the Syracusans' palisade and ditch. They ordered their ships to sail around from Thapsus into the Great Harbor of Syracuse, while they themselves descended from Epipolae to the level ground before dawn. Across the marsh, where the muddy ground was firmest, they laid doors and broad planks and walked over them. At dawn they took all but a small part of the palisade and the ditch, and later captured what remained.

4 A battle followed, in which the Athenians were victorious. The Syracusan right wing fled toward the city, and their left along the river. Wishing to cut the latter off from the crossing, the three hundred picked Athenians hurried at a run toward the bridge.

5 Alarmed at this, the Syracusans—who also had most of their cavalry there—advanced to meet these three hundred, routed them, and burst into the Athenian right wing. As they struck it, panic spread to the tribal contingent at the end of the wing as well.

6 Seeing this, Lamachus came to their aid from the Athenian left with a few archers, taking the Argives with him. He crossed a ditch and was cut off with a few of those who had crossed alongside him; he himself was killed, together with five or six of his men. The Syracusans at once rushed to seize their bodies and carried them across the river to safety before they could be recovered. They themselves withdrew as the rest of the Athenian army now advanced.

Chapter 102

1 Meanwhile those Syracusans who had originally fled toward the city, seeing what was happening, regained confidence and came out from the city to face the Athenians opposite them. They also sent a detachment against the circular fort on Epipolae, thinking they would find it deserted and capture it.

2 They took and sacked the outer fortification, ten plethra in length, but Nicias prevented them from taking the circular fort itself. He happened to have been left there because of illness. Realizing that, for lack of men, they could not prevail in any other way, he ordered the attendants to set fire to the siege engines and all the timber lying in front of the wall.

3 The result was as he intended: the fire prevented the Syracusans from advancing any farther, and they withdrew again. Help was already coming back up to the circular fort from the Athenians below, who had driven off the enemy there; at the same time their ships, as ordered, were sailing in from Thapsus to the Great Harbor.

4 Seeing this, the Syracusans on the heights withdrew in haste, and their whole army retired into the city. They judged that their present strength would no longer suffice to prevent the wall from reaching the sea.

Chapter 103

1 After this the Athenians set up a trophy, returned the Syracusan dead under a truce, and recovered Lamachus and those who had fallen with him. With their entire force now present, both fleet and infantry, they began from Epipolae and the cliffs and proceeded to shut the Syracusans in with a double wall extending to the sea.

2 Supplies for the army were brought in from every part of Italy. Many Sicels who had previously held back now joined the Athenians as allies, and three fifty-oared ships came from Tyrrhenia. Everything else, too, was advancing as they hoped.

3 For the Syracusans no longer thought they could prevail in war, since no assistance had reached them even from the Peloponnese. They discussed terms of settlement both among themselves and with Nicias, who now held sole command after the death of Lamachus.

4 Nothing was ratified; but, as was natural with men at a loss and more closely besieged than before, much was said to Nicias, and still more within the city. Their present misfortunes had also aroused some suspicion of one another. They removed the generals under whose command these events had occurred, attributing their losses either to their ill fortune or to their treachery, and elected Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias in their place.

Chapter 104

1 Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth had already reached the neighborhood of Leucas, eager to bring speedy assistance to Sicily. Alarming reports kept coming to them, all falsely agreeing that Syracuse was already completely walled in. Gylippus therefore abandoned all hope for Sicily, but wished to preserve Italy. He and Pythen the Corinthian crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum as fast as possible, with two Laconian and two Corinthian ships. The Corinthians intended to sail later, after manning two Leucadian ships and three Ambraciot ships in addition to their own ten.

2 From Tarentum Gylippus first sent an embassy to the territory of Thurii and renewed the citizenship his father had held there, but could not win them over. He then put to sea and sailed along the coast of Italy. Off the Terinaean Gulf he was caught by a wind which blows violently there when it has settled in the north, and was swept out to sea. After being severely battered by the storm, he made Tarentum again, where he hauled ashore and repaired the ships that had suffered most.

3 When Nicias heard that he was approaching, he thought little of his small fleet, making the same mistake as the Thurians. He thought they seemed equipped rather for piracy, and took no precautions as yet.

Chapter 105

1 At about the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Argive territory and ravaged most of the land. The Athenians came to the Argives' aid with thirty ships, and these ships constituted their most unmistakable breach of the treaty with the Lacedaemonians.

2 Previously they had fought alongside the Argives and Mantineans by raids from Pylos and by landings around the rest of the Peloponnese rather than in Laconia. Though the Argives had often urged them merely to put in on the Laconian coast under arms, ravage even the smallest stretch of land with them, and depart, they had refused. Now, however, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera and Prasiae and ravaged these and other parts of the country, giving the Lacedaemonians a more readily defensible charge against the Athenians as grounds for retaliation.

3 When the Athenians had sailed away from Argos and the Lacedaemonians had also withdrawn, the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius, ravaged part of its land, killed some of the inhabitants, and returned home.

Chapter 1

1 That same winter the Athenians wanted to sail to Sicily again. This time they planned a larger force than the one sent with Laches and Eurymedon, hoping to conquer the island if they could. Most of them did not know how big it was or how many people, both Greeks and non-Greeks, lived there. They also did not realize that they were taking on a war not much smaller than their war against the Peloponnesians.

2 Sailing around Sicily in a merchant ship takes not much less than eight days. Yet, large as it is, only about twenty stades of sea separate it from the mainland.

Chapter 2

1 This is how the island was settled in early times, and these were all the peoples who lived there. The Cyclopes and Laestrygonians are said to have been the earliest inhabitants of one part of the country. I cannot say what people they belonged to, where they came from, or where they went. We must leave them as the poets have described them and as each person understands them.

2 The Sicani appear to have been the first people to settle there after them. They themselves say they came even earlier, because they were native to the island. But investigation shows that they were Iberians, driven by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. The island, previously called Trinacria, was then named Sicania after them. They still live in the western parts of Sicily today.

3 When Troy fell, some Trojans escaped the Achaeans and reached Sicily by ship. They settled next to the Sicani, and the combined population was called the Elymians. Their cities were Eryx and Egesta. Some Phocians also settled with them. These had been blown off course on their way from Troy, first to Libya and then from there to Sicily.

4 The Sicels crossed to Sicily from Italy, where they had been living, to escape the Opicans. The likely account, which is also the one people give, is that they crossed on rafts, waiting until the wind blew down the strait. But they may have sailed across in some other way. There are still Sicels in Italy today. The country got its name, Italy, from a Sicel king named Italus.

5 They arrived in Sicily as a large army, defeated the Sicani in battle, and pushed them into the southern and western parts of the island. They changed its name from Sicania to Sicily. After their crossing they settled in and held the best land, nearly three hundred years before the Greeks came to Sicily. They still occupy the central and northern parts of the island today.

6 Phoenicians also lived all around Sicily. They occupied coastal headlands and the small offshore islands so they could trade with the Sicels. But when Greeks began arriving by sea in large numbers, the Phoenicians left most of these places. They concentrated their settlements at Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymians. They relied on their alliance with the Elymians, and this part of Sicily also offered the shortest crossing to Carthage. These, then, were the non-Greek peoples who settled Sicily, and this was how they did so.

Chapter 3

1 The first Greeks were Chalcidians who sailed from Euboea with Thucles as their founder and established Naxos. They built the altar of Apollo the Founder that now stands outside the city. Sacred delegations sailing from Sicily first offer sacrifices at this altar.

2 The following year Archias, a descendant of Heracles from Corinth, founded Syracuse. He first drove the Sicels out of the island where the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water. Later the outer city was also enclosed by a wall and became heavily populated.

3 In the fifth year after Syracuse was founded, Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from Naxos. They drove out the Sicels by force and founded Leontini, and afterward Catana. The Catanaeans themselves chose Euarchus as their founder.

Chapter 4

1 About the same time, Lamis arrived in Sicily leading a colony from Megara. He founded a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas. Later he left there and joined the Chalcidians as a fellow citizen at Leontini for a short time. They expelled him, and he founded Thapsus, where he died. The others left Thapsus and founded the city called Hyblaean Megara. Hyblon, a Sicel king, had given them the land and guided them there.

2 After living there for two hundred and forty-five years, they were driven out of their city and territory by Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse. Before their expulsion, a hundred years after their own settlement, they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus. Pamillus came from Megara, their mother city, and helped establish the colony.

3 Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete brought settlers and jointly founded Gela in the forty-fifth year after Syracuse was settled. The city was named after the river Gelas. The site where the city now stands, which was the first part to be walled, is called Lindii. They adopted Dorian institutions.

4 About a hundred and eight years after their own settlement, the people of Gela founded Acragas. They named the city after the river Acragas and appointed Aristonous and Pystilus as its founders. They gave it the institutions of Gela.

5 Zancle was first settled by pirates from Cumae, a Chalcidian city in Opicia. Later a large number of people came from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea and shared out the land with them. Its founders were Perieres from Cumae and Crataemenes from Chalcis. Its original name was Zancle, a name given by the Sicels because the site is shaped like a sickle: the Sicels call a sickle a ‘zanclon.’ Later the inhabitants were driven out by Samians and other Ionians who reached Sicily while escaping from the Persians.

6 Not long afterward Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium, drove out the Samians. He settled a mixed population in the city himself and renamed it Messene after his own original homeland.

Chapter 5

1 Himera was settled from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon. Most of the colonists were Chalcidians, but some exiles from Syracuse, called the Myletidae, joined them after being defeated in civil strife. Their language became a mixture of Chalcidian and Dorian, but Chalcidian institutions prevailed.

2 Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans: Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenae nearly twenty years after Acrae.

3 Camarina too was first founded by the Syracusans, about a hundred and thirty-five years after Syracuse was established. Its founders were Dascon and Menecolus. The Syracusans later drove out the people of Camarina in a war following their revolt. Some time afterward Hippocrates, the tyrant of Gela, received the territory of Camarina as ransom for Syracusan prisoners. He settled Camarina again, acting as its founder himself. Gelon emptied it once more, and the people of Gela settled it for the third time.

Chapter 6

1 These were the Greek and non-Greek peoples living in Sicily. It was against an island of this size and population that the Athenians were eager to campaign. Their real aim was to rule the whole island, though they also wanted the respectable excuse of helping their relatives and the allies they had gained there.

2 The strongest encouragement came from the Egestaean ambassadors who were in Athens urgently asking for help. The Egestaeans had gone to war with their neighbors at Selinus over some marriage disputes and a piece of disputed land. The Selinuntians brought in the Syracusans as allies and were pressing them hard in the war, on both land and sea. The Egestaeans therefore reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches and the earlier Leontine war. They asked the Athenians to send ships to defend them. Among their many arguments, their main point was this: if the Syracusans went unpunished after expelling the people of Leontini, and went on to destroy Athens' remaining allies and take control of all Sicily's power, there would be a danger later. The Syracusans might send a large force to help the Peloponnesians, as fellow Dorians and as colonists helping the people who had sent them out, and join in destroying Athenian power. It would be sensible, they said, to resist the Syracusans together with the allies who still remained, especially since the Egestaeans would provide enough money for the war.

3 The Athenians heard these arguments repeated at the assemblies by the Egestaeans and their supporters. They voted to send ambassadors to Egesta first. These would investigate whether the money really was available in the public treasury and the temples, as the Egestaeans claimed. They would also find out how the war against the Selinuntians stood.

Chapter 7

1 The Athenian ambassadors were sent to Sicily. That same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, invaded Argive territory. They devastated a small part of the land and took away some grain, using teams of animals they had brought along. They settled the Argive exiles at Orneae and left a few men from the rest of the army with them. They also arranged a truce for a set period, under which the people of Orneae and the Argives would not damage one another's territory. Then they withdrew their army and went home.

2 Not long afterward the Athenians arrived with thirty ships and six hundred hoplites. The Argives marched out with their entire army alongside the Athenians and besieged the people in Orneae for one day. At night, when the army camped some distance away, the people in Orneae escaped. The next day, when the Argives found out, they demolished Orneae and withdrew. The Athenians later sailed home too.

3 The Athenians also took cavalry by sea to Methone, on the border of Macedonia. These were their own cavalry and the Macedonian exiles living among them. They ravaged Perdiccas' territory.

4 The Lacedaemonians sent a message to the Chalcidians in Thrace, who had a truce with Athens renewable on ten days' notice. They told them to join Perdiccas in the war, but the Chalcidians refused. The winter ended, and with it the sixteenth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote about.

Chapter 8

1 At the start of the next summer, in early spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily. Egestaeans came with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver as a month's pay for the sixty ships they intended to request.

2 The Athenians held an assembly and heard the Egestaeans and their own ambassadors. Along with other attractive but untrue statements, they reported that plenty of money was ready in the temples and the public treasury. The Athenians voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, with Alcibiades son of Clinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes as generals with full authority. They were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntians and, if the war went well for them, help restore the people of Leontini to their city. They were also to handle other matters in Sicily as they thought best for Athens.

3 On the fifth day after this, another assembly was held. It was to decide how to prepare the ships as quickly as possible and vote the generals anything else they needed for the voyage.

4 Nicias had been elected to the command against his wishes. He thought the city had made a bad decision: on a slight but respectable excuse, it was aiming to take all Sicily, an enormous undertaking. He came forward to try to stop it and gave the Athenians the following advice.

Chapter 9

1 “This assembly was called to discuss our preparations and how we should sail to Sicily. But I think we should still consider the basic question: is it better to send the ships at all? We should not make such a major decision after so little thought, or let foreigners persuade us to take on a war that is none of our business.

2 “I do gain honor from a command like this, and I am less afraid for my own life than others are. That said, I think a man who takes some care of his own life and property is just as good a citizen. For his own sake, he would be particularly eager for his city's affairs to go well. Still, I have never spoken against my judgment to gain honors, and I will not do so now. I will say what I think is best.

3 “Given your character, I would achieve little by advising you to preserve what you have and not risk your present possessions for uncertain gains in the future. But I will show you that you are rushing ahead at the wrong time, and that what you are setting out to conquer will not be easy to hold.

Chapter 10

1 “My point is that you are leaving many enemies behind you here, yet want to sail over there and bring still more enemies back upon yourselves.

2 “You may think the treaty you have made offers some security. As long as you stay quiet it will remain a treaty in name: that was how men on both sides arranged it. But if you suffer a setback with a substantial force, our enemies will quickly attack us. First, their troubles forced them into the agreement on terms more humiliating for them than for us. Second, we have many disputes over the treaty itself.

3 “Some states have not even accepted this agreement yet, and they are not the weakest. Some are openly at war with us. Others are restrained only by truces renewable on ten days' notice, and only because the Lacedaemonians are still keeping quiet.

4 “If they find our forces divided, as we are now hurrying to divide them, they may very well join the Sicilian Greeks in attacking us. They would have valued an alliance with them above many other things in the past.

5 “So we must consider these matters. We should not choose to put our city at risk while its position is uncertain, or reach for another empire before we secure the one we have. The Chalcidians in Thrace have been in revolt against us for years and are still not subdued. Some others on the mainland give us only doubtful obedience. Yet we hurry to help the Egestaeans on the grounds that they are our allies and are being wronged. Meanwhile we still put off defending ourselves against the people whose long-standing revolt wrongs us directly.

Chapter 11

1 “If we defeated these people, we could keep them under control. But even if we beat the Sicilians, they are so far away and so numerous that we could hardly rule them. It is foolish to attack people when victory will not let you hold them, and failure will leave you worse off than before you began.

2 “As things stand, I think the Sicilian Greeks would be even less dangerous to us if the Syracusans came to rule them. Yet this is the very thing the Egestaeans use most to frighten us.

3 “At present, individual states might perhaps come here to please the Lacedaemonians. But under those conditions, one empire would be unlikely to attack another. If they helped the Peloponnesians destroy our empire, their own would probably be destroyed by the same people in the same way.

4 “The Greeks over there would fear us most if we never went, or next best, if we displayed our power and soon left. We all know that people admire what is most distant and what has least exposed its reputation to a test. But if we met with any setback, they would quickly lose their respect for us and join our enemies here in attacking us.

5 “This is just what has now happened to you, Athenians, in your attitude toward the Lacedaemonians and their allies. You were afraid of them at first. But because you did better against them than you expected, you now look down on them and are reaching for Sicily as well.

6 “We should not let our enemies' misfortunes make us overconfident. We should feel confident only when we have defeated their plans. We should also assume that the Lacedaemonians, humiliated as they are, are thinking of nothing else but how, even now, they can trip us up if possible and repair their disgrace. They care more than anyone about a reputation for courage and have worked at it longer than anyone.

7 “So if we are sensible, our struggle is not about the Egestaeans, non-Greeks in Sicily. It is about taking prompt precautions against a city whose oligarchy is plotting against us.

Chapter 12

1 “We must also remember that only recently have we had a short respite from a great epidemic and from war, allowing us to recover money and manpower. We should spend these resources here on ourselves, not on these exiles who are asking for help. They benefit from telling convincing lies. They put others at risk while contributing nothing but words themselves. If they succeed, they need not show gratitude in proportion to what we have done; if they fail somewhere, they can destroy their friends along with themselves.

2 “And if someone who is delighted to have been elected to command urges you to sail, think about his motives. He may be looking only to his own interests, especially if he is still too young for command. He wants admiration for his racehorses and, because of his expensive habits, some profit from his command. Do not give him the chance to make himself famous at the city's risk. Consider that such men harm public interests while wasting their own resources. This is a major undertaking, not something for a younger man to plan and carry out in a hurry.

Chapter 13

1 “I am alarmed to see these young men sitting here at that same man's call to support him. In response, I appeal to the older men. If one of them is sitting beside you, do not be embarrassed or fear being thought a coward if you do not vote for war. Do not share their unhealthy longing for things far away. Remember that desire brings very few successes, while foresight brings most. Vote against them for the sake of your country, which is taking the greatest risk it has ever faced. Vote to let the Sicilian Greeks keep the boundaries that now separate them from us—boundaries that give us no cause for complaint: the Ionian Gulf for those sailing along the coast, and the Sicilian Sea for those crossing open water. Let them enjoy their own possessions and settle their affairs among themselves.

2 “Tell the Egestaeans separately that, since they began their war against the Selinuntians without the Athenians, they must also end it on their own. In future, let us stop making allies as we usually do: people whom we will defend when things go badly for them, but from whom we will get no help when we need it ourselves.

Chapter 14

1 “And you, presiding officer, put this to a vote and open the question to the Athenians again, if you think it your duty to care for the city and want to be a good citizen. If you are afraid of holding another vote, consider this: with so many witnesses, you cannot be charged with breaking the law. Instead, you can cure the city's bad decision. Good leadership means benefiting your country as much as possible, or at least doing it no deliberate harm.”

Chapter 15

1 That was what Nicias said. Most of the Athenians who came forward urged them to carry out the expedition and not overturn the vote. Some, however, spoke against it.

2 The most eager supporter of the expedition was Alcibiades son of Clinias. He wanted to oppose Nicias, both because they disagreed on politics in general and because Nicias had spoken insultingly about him. Above all, he wanted the command. He hoped to capture both Sicily and Carthage through his leadership, and at the same time to use his success to gain wealth and fame for himself.

3 He enjoyed high standing among the citizens, but his spending on racehorses and other things went beyond what his existing wealth could support. This contributed more than almost anything else to the later downfall of Athens.

4 Most people were frightened by how far he disregarded the law in his personal way of life, and by the ambition he showed in everything he undertook. They became his enemies because they thought he wanted to become a tyrant. Although his public management of the war was excellent, individuals were offended by his private behavior and put affairs in other hands. Before long they brought the city to disaster.

5 At this time, then, he came forward and gave the Athenians the following advice.

Chapter 16

1 “Athenians, I am more entitled than others to command, and I believe I deserve it. I have to begin here, since Nicias has attacked me. The things that make people talk about me bring fame to my ancestors and myself, and also benefit our country.

2 “The Greeks had expected our city to be worn out by the war. But the splendid display I made at Olympia led them to think it even more powerful than it really is. I entered seven chariots, more than any private individual had ever entered before. I won first, second, and fourth place, and arranged everything else on a scale worthy of my victory. Custom treats such things as an honor, but people also infer power from what they see done.

3 “Again, when I make a show in our city by sponsoring choruses or in some other way, my fellow citizens naturally envy it. But foreigners see this too as a sign of strength. This supposed foolishness is not useless when a man spends his own money to benefit not just himself but his city as well.

4 “Nor is it unfair for someone who takes pride in himself to refuse to be on an equal footing with others. After all, no one takes an equal share of the misfortunes of someone who is doing badly. Just as people do not greet us when we are unfortunate, they should put up with being looked down on by the successful. Or let them give equal treatment before demanding it in return.

5 “I know that men like this, and everyone who stands out for some distinction, are resented during their own lives. Their equals resent them most, but so do the other people they deal with. Yet they leave later generations claiming kinship with them, sometimes even when none exists. Their country boasts about them, not as outsiders or failures, but as its own people who achieved great things.

6 “That is what I aim for, and why people make a fuss about my private life. But look at my public work: do I handle it worse than anyone else? I brought together the strongest powers in the Peloponnese, without great risk or expense to you, and forced the Lacedaemonians to stake everything on a single day's fighting at Mantinea. Even though they won that battle, they have still not fully regained their confidence.

Chapter 17

1 “This was what my youth and my supposedly outrageous foolishness achieved. I dealt with the Peloponnesian powers using arguments suited to them, and my enthusiasm inspired trust and won them over. Do not be afraid of that quality now. While I am still in my prime and have it, and while Nicias has his reputation for good luck, make full use of what each of us can offer.

2 “Do not change your decision to sail to Sicily on the grounds that we would be facing a great power. The cities have large populations, but these are mixed crowds. Their citizenship changes easily, and newcomers are easily admitted.

3 “As a result, no one equips himself with weapons or furnishes the countryside with permanent buildings as he would if it were his own homeland. Instead, each man prepares to get whatever he can from the community, either by persuasive speeches or through civil strife, and to settle in another country if he fails.

4 “A crowd like that is unlikely either to agree when listening to a speech or to work together in action. Each group would quickly come over to us if it heard something it liked, especially if they are in civil strife, as we are told they are.

5 “Nor do they have as many hoplites as they boast. The other Greeks have not turned out to have the numbers each claimed for themselves either. Hellas greatly deceived itself on this point and has barely managed to equip enough men in this war.

6 “From what I hear, then, that is the situation over there, and it will be still more favorable. We will have many non-Greeks who will join our attack on the Syracusans out of hatred for them. And the situation here will not stand in our way if you make the right decisions.

7 “Our fathers won their empire with these very same enemies—the ones we are now told we would leave behind if we sailed—and with Persia as an enemy too. Their strength lay in nothing other than the superiority of their navy.

8 “And the Peloponnesians have never had less hope of success against us than they do now. Even if they are full of confidence, they can invade our land whether we sail or not. But they could not harm us at sea, since we will still have a navy left here that is a match for theirs.

Chapter 18

1 “So what reasonable excuse could we give for holding back ourselves, or for refusing to help our allies there? We have sworn an alliance with them, so we must defend them. We should not object that they do not help us in return. We did not take them as allies so that they would come here to help us. We wanted them to keep our enemies there busy and prevent them from coming to attack us here.

2 “We acquired our empire in this way, as everyone else who has ruled others has done: by readily helping whoever called on us, whether Greeks or non-Greeks. If everyone stayed quiet or carefully sorted out which people deserved help, we would add little to our empire and put what we already have at greater risk. When someone is stronger, you do not just defend yourself when he attacks. You take steps beforehand to stop him from attacking.

3 “We cannot decide for ourselves how far we want our rule to extend. Now that we are in this position, we must plan to attack some people and keep our hold on others. Otherwise, if we do not rule others, we risk being ruled ourselves. You cannot judge the advantages of staying quiet on the same basis as other people unless you also intend to adopt their way of life.

4 “So let us consider that going there will strengthen our position here, and make the voyage. We will discourage the Peloponnesians if they see that we have not been content with the present peace and have even sailed to Sicily. At the same time, if we gain control of the people there, we will probably rule all of Hellas. Or we will at least damage Syracuse, benefiting both ourselves and our allies.

5 “Our ships will make it safe for us either to stay, if things go well, or to leave. Even against all the Sicilians together, we will control the sea.

6 “Do not let Nicias turn you aside with his arguments for doing nothing or his attempt to divide the young from the old. Keep our usual good order. Our fathers brought our power to its present level by having young and old make decisions together. Try to advance the city in the same way now. Remember that neither youth nor old age can achieve anything without the other. Their less developed, average, and highly accurate judgments will be strongest when combined. If the city does nothing, it will wear itself out from within, like anything else, and its knowledge in every field will grow outdated. By constantly taking on challenges, it will gain more experience and become used to defending itself in practice rather than just in words.

7 “In short, I believe that nothing would destroy a city used to activity faster than a change to inactivity. The people who live most securely are those who make the fewest departures from their existing customs and laws, even if those customs and laws are not particularly good.”

Chapter 19

1 That was what Alcibiades said. The Athenians heard him, and also the Egestaeans and the exiles from Leontini. These came forward to appeal for help, reminding the Athenians of their sworn promises and begging them to honor them. The Athenians were now much more eager to launch the expedition than before.

2 Nicias realized that repeating his arguments would no longer turn them against it. But he thought he might change their minds by demanding preparations on a very large scale. He came forward again and spoke as follows.

Chapter 20

1 “Athenians, I see that you are completely determined to go on this expedition. I hope it turns out as we wish. For now, I will tell you what I think.

2 “From what I hear, the cities we are about to attack are large. They are not subject to one another. They have no need for a change of government, such as people would welcome if it took them from forced slavery to an easier condition. They are unlikely to exchange their freedom for our rule. And there are many Greek cities for a single island.

3 “Besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect to join us because of their kinship with Leontini, there are seven others. They are equipped in much the same way as our own forces in every respect. This is especially true of Selinus and Syracuse, the main targets of our voyage.

4 “They have many hoplites, archers, and javelin throwers, as well as many triremes and enough men to crew them. They have money in private hands, and the people of Selinus also have money in their temples. Syracuse also receives offerings of first produce from some non-Greek peoples. Their greatest advantages over us are their large numbers of horses and their use of homegrown grain rather than imports.

Chapter 21

1 “Against forces like these, we need more than a fleet and a small army. A large infantry force must sail with us if we intend to achieve anything worthy of our plans and avoid being kept off the land by their numerous cavalry. This is especially important if fear unites the cities and no allies besides the Egestaeans supply us with cavalry to oppose theirs.

2 “It would be disgraceful to be forced to withdraw, or to send for reinforcements later because we had not thought things through at the start. We must leave here with adequate forces. Remember that we are going to sail a long way from home. This will not be like an expedition here, when you went as allies to attack someone among your subjects and could easily get any extra supplies from friendly territory. We will be cut off in a completely foreign country. During the four winter months, even a messenger cannot easily get here from there.

Chapter 22

1 “So I think we must take many hoplites, both our own and our allies': those of our subject allies and any men from the Peloponnese we can persuade to come or hire for pay. We also need many archers and slingers to resist their cavalry. Our fleet must be much larger than theirs, so that we can bring in supplies more easily. We must also take grain from here in cargo ships—wheat and roasted barley—and paid grain processors, conscripted in due proportion from the mills. Then, if bad sailing conditions hold us up somewhere, the army will have provisions. Not every city will be able to accommodate such a large force. We must prepare everything else as fully as possible and not depend on others. Above all, we must take as much money from here as we can. As for the funds that the Egestaeans say are ready over there, assume that they are mainly ready in words.

Chapter 23

1 “If we set out from here with equipment not just equal to theirs but greater in every respect, apart from their fighting infantry, the hoplites, only then will we just be able to defeat them and keep our own forces safe.

2 “You must think of yourselves as going to establish a city among foreign and hostile peoples. Such settlers must take control of the land immediately, on the very day they arrive. Otherwise, they must understand that if they fail, everything around them will be hostile.

3 “That is what I fear. I know that we must make many sound decisions, and that we will need good luck in even more things. That is difficult for human beings. So I want to sail with as little as possible left to chance, and with preparations that make us as secure as we can reasonably expect.

4 “I believe this is the surest course for the city as a whole and the way to keep those of us on the expedition alive. If anyone disagrees, I hand over the command to him.”

Chapter 24

1 Nicias said this thinking that the scale of the undertaking would either discourage the Athenians or, if he was forced to go, allow him to sail as safely as possible.

2 But the burden of the preparations did not take away their desire to sail. Instead, they became much more eager. The result was the opposite of what he intended. They thought his advice was good and that the expedition would now be very safe indeed.

3 Everyone alike was seized with a desire to sail. The older men thought that they would either conquer the places they were sailing against or that, at least, so large a force could not come to harm. Those of military age wanted to see and explore distant places, and they were confident that they would come back alive. The mass of ordinary people and the soldiers expected to earn money immediately and to acquire power that would provide them with paid service forever.

4 The majority's enthusiasm was so great that anyone who disapproved kept quiet. He feared that voting against the expedition would make him seem disloyal to the city.

Chapter 25

1 Finally, an Athenian came forward and called on Nicias to stop making excuses or delaying. He should tell everyone there, right away, what preparations he wanted the Athenians to vote for.

2 Reluctantly, Nicias said that he would rather discuss the matter quietly with his fellow commanders. But his present view was that they must sail with at least a hundred triremes. The Athenians themselves should provide as many troop transports as seemed necessary, and further ships should be called in from the allies. There should be at least five thousand hoplites in all, Athenians and allies together, and more if possible. They would prepare and take other forces in proportion: archers from Athens and Crete, slingers, and anything else they thought suitable.

Chapter 26

1 On hearing this, the Athenians immediately voted to give the generals full authority over the size of the army and the expedition as a whole. They could act as they thought best [for the Athenians].

2 Preparations then began. They sent messages to the allies and drew up enlistment lists at home. The city had only recently recovered from the plague and the continuous fighting. During the truce, a large new generation had reached military age and money had accumulated. This made it easier to supply everything. So the Athenians continued their preparations.

Chapter 27

1 Meanwhile, in a single night, most of the stone figures of Hermes in Athens had their faces hacked away. These are made in the local style, with a square pillar, and stand in large numbers both at the entrances to private houses and in sacred places.

2 No one knew who had done it. The state offered large rewards for information leading to the culprits. The Athenians also voted that anyone who knew of any other offense against religion could report it without fear of punishment, whether a citizen, a foreigner, or a slave.

3 They took the affair very seriously. They saw it as an omen for the expedition and also believed it was part of a conspiracy to bring about revolution and overthrow the democracy.

Chapter 28

1 Some resident foreigners and servants then gave information, though not about the figures of Hermes. They reported that young men had previously damaged other statues as a drunken joke, and that the mystery rites were being performed in private houses as an insult to religion. Alcibiades was among those they accused.

2 The men who most resented Alcibiades seized on these reports. He prevented them from securing the leadership of the people for themselves, and they thought that if they drove him out, they would take first place. They exaggerated the affair and loudly claimed that the mockery of the mysteries and the mutilation of the figures of Hermes had been intended to overthrow the democracy. They said that nothing in either affair had been done without him. As evidence, they cited the other lawless features of his way of life, which were at odds with democracy.

Chapter 29

1 Alcibiades immediately defended himself against the accusations. The preparations for departure were already complete, and he was ready to stand trial before sailing to determine whether he had done any of these things. If guilty of any of them, he would accept punishment. If acquitted, he would take up his command.

2 He appealed to them not to accept slanders against him in his absence. If he was guilty, they should put him to death now. It would be wiser, he said, not to send him out in command of so large a force with an accusation like this unresolved.

3 But his enemies feared that if he stood trial immediately, the army would support him. They also feared that the people would be lenient and favor him because he had persuaded the Argives and some of the Mantineans to join the expedition. They worked to prevent the trial and hurry him away. They put forward other speakers who said he should sail now, without delaying the departure, and stand trial on a specified date after his return. Their aim was to have him recalled to face trial after stirring up more hostility against him, which they could do more easily while he was away. It was decided that Alcibiades should sail.

Chapter 30

1 After this, when summer was already halfway through, the expedition set sail for Sicily. Most of the allies, the grain-carrying cargo ships, the other vessels, and all the other supporting equipment had already been told to assemble at Corcyra. From there they would cross the Ionian Sea together to the Iapygian promontory. The Athenians themselves, with any allies who were present, went down to the Piraeus at dawn on the appointed day and manned the ships for departure.

2 Almost everyone else in the city, citizens and foreigners alike, went down with them. The local people each saw off their own friends, relatives, or sons. They went with both hope and tears: hope for what they would gain, and tears at the thought that they might never see their loved ones again. They thought about how far from home they were sending them.

Chapter 31

1 Now, when they were about to part and face danger, the terrors of the expedition struck them more strongly than when they had voted to sail. Still, the sight of the force before them restored their confidence, because of the huge quantities of everything they saw. The foreigners and the rest of the crowd had come to watch what seemed an important and almost unbelievable undertaking. No Greek force sent out by a single city up to that time had been so expensive or so impressive to look at.

2 In numbers of ships and hoplites, the expedition to Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same force that went to Potidaea under Hagnon, had been no smaller. Four thousand Athenian hoplites, three hundred cavalry, and a hundred triremes had sailed on it, along with fifty ships from Lesbos and Chios and many more allies.

3 But those forces had set out on a short voyage with modest equipment. This fleet, by contrast, was fitted out for a long campaign and for action, wherever needed, both at sea and on land. The city and the trireme commanders had spent large sums and taken great trouble over the fleet. The state paid each sailor a drachma a day and provided the ship hulls: sixty fast ships and forty troop transports, with the best crews for them. The trireme commanders added extra pay to the state wages for the upper-tier rowers and the ships' specialist crews. They also provided expensive figureheads and other fittings. Each commander made every possible effort to make his ship stand out for its appearance and speed. The infantry had been picked from carefully selected enlistment lists, and the men competed keenly with one another over their weapons and personal equipment.

4 As a result, there was competition among the men in every assigned duty. To the other Greeks, the whole undertaking looked more like a display of power and wealth than preparations for a campaign against an enemy.

5 Suppose someone had added up the city's public spending and the private spending of the men on the expedition. On the city's side, there was all it had already spent in advance and the money it sent out with the generals. On the private side, there was what each man had spent on his own equipment, what each trireme commander had spent on his ship, and what they would still have to spend. In addition, everyone would naturally have provided money for a long campaign beyond the pay from the state, and soldiers and traders were taking goods to sell. The total being carried out of the city would have amounted to many talents.

6 The expedition became famous as much for its astonishing boldness and magnificent appearance as for the army's overwhelming size compared with those it was attacking. It was also the largest expedition yet to cross the sea far from home, and none had placed such great hopes in future gains compared with what it already possessed.

Chapter 32

1 When the ships were manned and everything they needed for departure was aboard, a trumpet signaled for silence. They said the customary prayers before sailing, not ship by ship but all together, led by a herald. Wine was mixed in bowls throughout the force, and the fighting men aboard and their officers poured offerings from gold and silver cups.

2 The crowd on shore joined in the prayers, both citizens and anyone else present who wished them well. After singing the hymn and completing the drink offerings, they put to sea. At first they sailed out in single file; then they raced as far as Aegina. They hurried on toward Corcyra, where the rest of the allied force was assembling.

3 Reports of the coming attack reached Syracuse from many sources, but for a long time none of them was believed. An assembly was held, and speakers gave arguments of the following kind. Some believed the reports about the Athenian expedition; others argued against them. Hermocrates son of Hermon also came forward. Believing that he had reliable information about the Athenians, he spoke and gave the following advice.

Chapter 33

1 “Like some other speakers, I may seem to you to be saying things you cannot believe when I tell you the truth about the coming attack. I know that people who state or report things that seem unbelievable not only fail to persuade their audience but also look foolish. Even so, I will not let fear silence me when the city is in danger. I am convinced that I speak with more definite knowledge than anyone else.

2 “The Athenians have set out against you with a large force of ships and infantry, however surprising you find that. Their stated reasons are their alliance with Egesta and the restoration of the people of Leontini to their home. Their real aim is to take Sicily, especially our city. They think that if they capture it, they will easily control the rest.

3 “So expect them to arrive soon. Consider how to use what you have to defend yourselves as effectively as possible. Do not despise them and let yourselves be caught without defenses. And do not disbelieve the reports and neglect the whole matter.

4 “But anyone who does believe the reports should not be overwhelmed by their boldness or strength. They will not be able to do us more harm than they suffer themselves. And the fact that they are attacking with a large fleet is not entirely to our disadvantage. It will greatly improve our position with the other Sicilians, who will be frightened and more willing to become our allies. If we defeat the Athenians, or drive them away without achieving their aims—I certainly do not fear that they will achieve what they expect—we will have accomplished something outstanding. I, for one, do not think this is beyond our hopes.

5 “Very few large expeditions, whether Greek or non-Greek, have succeeded after sailing far from home. They do not arrive in greater numbers than the inhabitants and their neighbors, since fear unites everyone. And if lack of supplies brings them to disaster in a foreign land, they still leave a great reputation to the people they attacked, even if their own mistakes caused most of their trouble.

6 “That is how these very Athenians grew powerful. The Persians suffered many unexpected reverses, but the Athenians gained the reputation because the attack had been directed against Athens. We too can reasonably hope for something like that.

Chapter 34

1 “So let us prepare our defenses here with confidence. We should send to the Sicels, strengthening our ties with some and trying to establish friendship and an alliance with others. We should also send ambassadors to the rest of Sicily to make clear that the danger threatens everyone, and to Italy, to win allies or at least persuade the people there not to receive the Athenians.

2 “I also think it would be best to send to Carthage. The Carthaginians do not regard an Athenian attack on their city as impossible. In fact, they constantly fear it. They may think that if they abandon us, they too will be in trouble, and so be willing to help us secretly, openly, or in some other way. If they choose to act, they are better able to help than any other power today. They possess enormous amounts of gold and silver, which provide the means for war and everything else.

3 “We should also send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, asking them to send help here quickly and to get the war going again over there.

4 “Now I will tell you what I think is the most useful step, though your habit of staying quiet makes it the proposal you are least likely to accept quickly. If all of us Sicilians were willing—or, failing that, as many as possible joined us—we could launch every ship we have, take two months' provisions, and go to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory. We would make it clear that before they could fight for Sicily, they would have to fight to cross the Ionian Sea. This would alarm them most and make them think. They would see that we were defending ourselves from a base in friendly territory, since Tarentum receives us, while they had to cross a wide stretch of sea with all their equipment. The length of the voyage would make it hard for them to keep formation. Their force would be easy for us to attack as it came up slowly in small groups.

5 “If instead they lightened their loads and attacked with a more concentrated force of fast ships, we could attack them when they were tired, if they had used their oars. If we decided not to attack, we could retreat to Tarentum. They would have crossed with few supplies, expecting a sea battle, and would be short of provisions along a deserted coast. If they stayed, they could be blockaded. If they tried to sail along the coast, they would leave the rest of their equipment behind. And uncertainty about whether the cities would receive them would discourage them.

6 “So I think this reasoning would make them feel blocked, and they would not even set out from Corcyra. They would either keep debating and sending scouts to find out how many we were and where we were stationed, until the season slipped away into winter, or they would be so alarmed by this unexpected development that they would call off the voyage. This is especially likely because, as I hear, the most experienced of their generals is leading them unwillingly. He would gladly seize on any excuse if he saw us making a serious show of strength.

7 “I am certain that reports would exaggerate our numbers. People base their decisions on what they hear. They are more afraid of those who attack first, or at least make it clear to their attackers in advance that they will defend themselves. They think that such opponents face them on equal terms of danger.

8 “That is how the Athenians would react now. They are coming against us expecting no resistance. They have good reason to think poorly of us, since we did not help the Lacedaemonians to crush them. But if they saw us showing courage beyond their expectations, the surprise would frighten them more than our actual strength.

9 “So take my advice. Above all, be bold enough to carry out this plan. If not, get everything else ready for war as quickly as possible. Everyone must understand that contempt for an attacker should be shown by courage in action. For now, the most useful course is to regard preparations made out of fear as the safest and act as though danger is at hand. The enemy is coming. I know for certain that they are already at sea and will be here at any moment.”

Chapter 35

1 That was what Hermocrates said. The people of Syracuse argued fiercely among themselves. Some said the Athenians would never come and that his report was untrue. Others asked what harm the Athenians could do them, even if they came, without suffering still greater harm in return. Others were completely dismissive and made a joke of the whole thing. Only a few believed Hermocrates and feared what was coming.

2 Then Athenagoras came forward to speak. He was a leader of the people and, at that time, the speaker the majority found most convincing. He said this:

Chapter 36

1 “Anyone who does not want the Athenians to make such a foolish mistake and come here to fall into our hands is either a coward or no friend of this city. As for those who report these things and frighten you, I am not surprised at their nerve. But I am surprised at their stupidity, if they think their motives are not obvious.

2 “People who have something to fear for themselves want to panic the city. They hope to hide their own fear behind everyone's fear. That is what these reports amount to now. They have not come about by chance. They are put together by the very men who are always stirring up trouble here.

3 “If you want to make a sound decision, do not judge what is likely by looking at their reports. Instead, consider what clever, experienced men would do. That is how I rate the Athenians.

4 “They are hardly likely to leave the Peloponnesians behind, with the war there still not securely settled, and willingly start another war just as big. In fact, I think they are glad that we are not attacking them, with so many cities, and such large ones.

Chapter 37

1 “But suppose they do come, as the reports say. I think Sicily is better able than the Peloponnese to fight the war through, because it is better equipped in every way. Our city alone, I think, is far stronger than the force said to be coming against us, even if twice that number comes. I know they will bring no horses with them. They will not get any here either, except perhaps a few from the Egestaeans. Nor can they bring as many hoplites as we have, when they have to come by sea. Even getting the ships themselves here over such a distance, without extra loads, is a major task. Then there are all the other supplies that must be provided for an attack on a city like ours. Those are no small matter.

2 “That is how great I think the difference is. Even if they brought another city as large as Syracuse, settled it beside us, and fought from there, I think they would barely escape complete destruction. Still less could they escape in Sicily with the whole island against them—for it will unite. They would have a camp set up after leaving their ships, with little tents and only essential equipment. Our cavalry would stop them from going far outside it. In short, I do not think they could even control the countryside. That is how much stronger I consider our resources.

Chapter 38

1 “But the Athenians understand this, just as I have explained it, and I am sure they are looking after their own interests. Men here are making up stories about things that are not happening and never could happen.

2 “I have known these men, not just now but all along, to want to frighten the mass of you into letting them rule the city. They use speeches like these, or even more harmful ones, or actual deeds. And I really do fear that, with so many attempts, they may succeed someday. We are poor at taking precautions before we suffer, and at taking action against them once we recognize the danger.

3 “That is why our city is rarely at peace. It goes through repeated civil strife and fights as many battles against itself as against its enemies. Sometimes it also suffers tyrannies and the unjust rule of small groups.

4 “If you are willing to follow me, I will try never to let any of this happen in our time. I will persuade the majority of you and punish those who plot such things. I will not punish them only when they are caught in the act—that is hard to do—but also for what they intend, even if they cannot carry it out. We must defend ourselves against an enemy's intentions, not just his actions. Otherwise, unless we take precautions, we will suffer first. As for the few, I will expose them in some cases, watch them in others, and in others teach them better. I think that is the best way to turn them away from wrongdoing.

5 “And now, young men, what is it you actually want? I have often wondered. Do you want to hold office already? The law does not allow it. That law was made because you lack the ability, rather than to deny you office when you have it. Or is it that you do not want to have equal rights with everyone else? How can it be right for people who are equals not to receive equal treatment?

Chapter 39

1 “Someone will say that democracy is neither sensible nor fair, and that those with money are also best suited to govern. My answer is, first, that ‘the people’ means the whole community, while ‘oligarchy’ means only a part. Second, the rich are best at looking after money, the intelligent at giving advice, and the majority at judging once they have heard the arguments. In a democracy all these groups have equal shares, both separately and together.

2 “An oligarchy gives the majority a share of the dangers. But when it comes to the benefits, it does not just take more than its share. It takes everything and keeps it. This is what the powerful men and the young men among you are eager for. In a large city it is impossible to maintain. Even now, you utterly foolish men, if you do not understand that you are rushing toward disaster, you are the most ignorant Greeks I know. Or, if you do understand and still dare to do it, you are the most unjust.

Chapter 40

1 “So either learn better or change your minds, and build up the city's common good for everyone. Recognize that the better men among you can have an equal share in it, or even a larger one [than the mass of the city's people]. But if you want something else, you risk losing everything. And stop bringing us reports like these. We see through you and will not let you have your way.

2 “If the Athenians really are coming, this city will defend itself in a way worthy of it. We have generals to look into these things. And if none of this is true, as I believe, the city will not let your reports frighten it into choosing you as rulers and imposing slavery on itself. It will think for itself and judge your words by the effects they can have. It will not lose its existing freedom simply by listening to you. Instead, it will try to keep that freedom by taking practical precautions and refusing to give in.”

Chapter 41

1 That was what Athenagoras said. One of the generals stood up and let no one else come forward. He spoke about the present situation himself, as follows:

2 “It is not sensible for speakers to make accusations against each other, or for listeners to accept them. We should pay more attention to the reports we are receiving. We must see how each of us, and the city as a whole, can be properly prepared to defend ourselves against the attackers.

3 “Even if none of this turns out to be needed, there is no harm in equipping the community with horses and weapons

4 “and all the other things that make a military force impressive. We will take responsibility for arranging and inspecting these. Nor is there any harm in sending people to the cities, both to gather information and for any other useful purpose that appears. We have already taken care of some things, and we will report to you whatever we learn.” After the general had said this, the Syracusans left the meeting.

Chapter 42

1 By now the Athenians and all their allies were at Corcyra. First the generals reviewed the force and organized it in the order they intended to use when anchoring and camping. They divided it into three parts and assigned one to each general by lot. This was to prevent the whole fleet from sailing together and running short of water, harbors, and supplies wherever they put in. It would also keep the force better organized in other respects and easier to command, with each division assigned to a general.

2 They then sent three ships ahead to Italy and Sicily to find out which cities would receive them. These ships were told to come back and meet them, so that they would know the situation before sailing in.

Chapter 43

1 After this the Athenians left Corcyra and crossed toward Sicily with the following force. There were 134 triremes in all, and two Rhodian ships with fifty oars each. Of the triremes, 100 were Athenian: sixty were fast ships, and the rest troop transports. The remaining ships belonged to Chios and the other allies. There were 5,100 hoplites in all. Among these, the Athenians themselves provided 1,500 from the citizen muster roll and 700 from the poorest citizen class serving as marines aboard the ships. The rest of the army consisted of allies, some from the subject cities, together with 500 Argives and 250 Mantineans and mercenaries. There were 480 archers in all, including eighty Cretans, as well as 700 Rhodian slingers and 120 lightly armed Megarian exiles. There was also one horse transport carrying thirty cavalrymen.

Chapter 44

1 That was the size of the first force to sail across for the war. Thirty grain-carrying cargo ships brought its supplies. They also carried bakers, stonemasons, carpenters, and all the tools needed for building fortifications. A hundred smaller vessels had been required to sail with these cargo ships. Many other boats and cargo ships followed the army voluntarily for trade. All of them crossed the Ionian Gulf together from Corcyra at this time.

2 The whole force made land at the Iapygian promontory, at Tarentum, or wherever each group could manage. They then sailed along the coast of Italy. The cities would not let them into their markets or towns, but allowed them water and anchorage. Tarentum and Locri refused even these. Eventually they reached Rhegium, at the tip of Italy.

3 There they gathered together. Since they were not allowed inside the city, they set up camp outside it in the sanctuary of Artemis, where the Rhegians also provided them with a market. They pulled their ships ashore and rested. They opened talks with the Rhegians and asked them, as people of Chalcidian descent, to help the people of Leontini, who were also Chalcidian. The Rhegians said they would not join either side. They would do whatever the other Greeks in Italy jointly decided.

4 The Athenians considered how best to deal with the situation in Sicily. At the same time they waited for the ships sent ahead to return from Egesta. They wanted to know whether the money was there, as the envoys had claimed at Athens.

Chapter 45

1 Meanwhile the Syracusans were receiving clear reports from many sources, including their scouts, that the ships were at Rhegium. With this confirmed, they threw themselves into preparations and no longer doubted the news. They sent guards to some of the Sicels and envoys to others. They put garrisons into the outlying forts in their territory. In the city they inspected weapons and horses to see whether everything was in order. They made their other arrangements for a war that would come quickly and was almost upon them.

Chapter 46

1 The three ships sent ahead to Egesta reached the Athenians at Rhegium. They reported that the rest of the promised money did not exist. Only thirty talents could be found.

2 The generals were immediately discouraged. This was the first setback, along with the Rhegians' refusal to join the expedition. The Rhegians had been the first people they tried to persuade and seemed the most likely to agree. They were related to the people of Leontini and had always been friendly to the Athenians. Nicias had expected the news from Egesta, but the other two generals found it more surprising.

3 The Egestaeans had used the following trick when the first Athenian envoys came to inspect their funds. They took them to the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the offerings: bowls, wine jugs, incense burners, and a considerable amount of other equipment. These silver objects gave an impression of wealth far greater than their relatively small value. They also entertained the ships' crews in private homes. They collected the gold and silver drinking cups from Egesta itself and borrowed others from nearby cities, both Phoenician and Greek. Each host brought these out at dinner as though they were his own.

4 Most of the hosts were using the same objects. But because so many appeared everywhere, the Athenians from the triremes were deeply impressed. When they got back to Athens, they spread the word that they had seen great wealth.

5 These men had been fooled themselves and had then persuaded the others. When the news spread that the money did not exist at Egesta, the soldiers blamed them heavily. The generals discussed what to do in the circumstances.

Chapter 47

1 Nicias proposed sailing against Selinus with the whole army. That was the main purpose for which they had been sent. If the Egestaeans provided money for the whole force, they could plan accordingly. If not, they should demand supplies for the sixty ships the Egestaeans had actually requested. They should stay until they had reconciled the Selinuntians with the Egestaeans, either by force or by agreement. Then they should sail past the other cities, displaying the power of Athens and showing its readiness to help its friends and allies, and sail home. The only exception would be if some quick, unexpected opportunity let them help the people of Leontini or win over another city. They should not put Athens at risk by using up its own resources.

Chapter 48

1 Alcibiades said they should not sail away in disgrace without achieving anything, after coming out with so large a force. Instead, they should send heralds to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse. They should also try to get some of the Sicels to break away from Syracuse and make friends with the others, so that they would have grain and troops. First they should persuade the people of Messene. That city was right on the strait, at the point of entry into Sicily, and would provide an excellent harbor and base for the army. Once they had won the cities over and knew who would fight on their side, they should attack Syracuse and Selinus, unless Selinus reached an agreement with Egesta and Syracuse allowed the people of Leontini to be resettled.

Chapter 49

1 Lamachus said they should sail straight to Syracuse and fight beside the city as quickly as possible, while the Syracusans were still unprepared and most frightened.

2 Every army was most frightening at first, he said. If it delayed before appearing, people regained confidence and were more inclined to look down on it when they saw it. But if they struck suddenly, while the Syracusans were still waiting in fear, they would have the best chance of winning and would frighten them in every way. The sight of the army would be frightening, since it would now appear at its greatest strength. So would the thought of what they might suffer, and, most of all, the immediate danger of battle.

3 Many people were also likely to be caught outside in the fields because they did not believe the Athenians would come. While these people were bringing their possessions into the city, the army would have no shortage of resources, if it took up a position outside the city and controlled the area.

4 This would also make the other Sicilian Greeks more likely to refuse an alliance with Syracuse and join the Athenians instead. They would not keep delaying while they watched to see which side would win. He said they should withdraw to Megara and make it their naval base for further attacks. It was deserted and not far from Syracuse by either sea or land.

Chapter 50

1 Although Lamachus argued this way, he too supported Alcibiades' proposal in the end. After this Alcibiades sailed to Messene in his own ship and discussed an alliance with its people. He did not persuade them. They answered that they would not admit the Athenians into the city but would provide a market outside. He then sailed back to Rhegium.

2 The generals immediately manned sixty ships drawn from the whole fleet, loaded supplies, and sailed along the coast to Naxos. They left the rest of the army at Rhegium with one of the generals.

3 The Naxians admitted them into their city, and they sailed on to Catana. The people of Catana would not admit them, because there were men there who supported Syracuse.

4 So they went to the river Terias and camped for the night. The next day they sailed toward Syracuse with the main body of their ships in single file. They sent ten ships ahead to sail into the Great Harbor and see whether any warships had been launched. These ships were also to sail close in and announce that the Athenians had come to resettle the people of Leontini in their own land, because of their alliance and shared ancestry. Any people from Leontini who were in Syracuse should therefore come out without fear to the Athenians, their friends and helpers.

5 When they had made the announcement and examined the city, the harbors, and the surrounding countryside from which they would have to conduct the war, they sailed back to Catana.

Chapter 51

1 An assembly was held. The people of Catana would not admit the army, but invited the generals to come in and say whatever they wished. While Alcibiades was speaking and the people in the city were focused on the assembly, the soldiers broke through a small gateway that had been poorly walled up, without being noticed. They entered the city and began buying things in the market.

2 When the supporters of Syracuse in Catana saw the army inside, they immediately became frightened and slipped away. There were not many of them. The others voted for an alliance with Athens and told the Athenians to bring the rest of their army from Rhegium.

3 After this the Athenians sailed across to Rhegium, then left for Catana with the whole army. When they arrived, they set up their camp.

Chapter 52

1 They received a report from Camarina that its people would join them if they came. They also heard that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. So they first sailed along the coast to Syracuse with their whole force. Finding no fleet being manned, they sailed on to Camarina. They put in at the beach and sent a herald. But the Camarinaeans would not admit them. They said their sworn agreement was to receive the Athenians when they arrived in a single ship, unless they themselves sent for more.

2 Having achieved nothing, they sailed away. They landed in a part of Syracusan territory and plundered it. The Syracusan cavalry came to its defense and killed some of the light troops who had scattered. The Athenians then returned to Catana.

Chapter 53

1 They found that the ship Salaminia had arrived from Athens. It had come to order Alcibiades to sail home and defend himself against the city's charges. It had also come for some of the soldiers with him who had been accused of offenses against religion involving the Mysteries, some of them also in connection with the statues of Hermes.

2 After the army sailed, the Athenians had continued just as vigorously to investigate what had been done concerning the Mysteries and the statues of Hermes. They did not check the informers' credibility. Instead, they accepted every report as grounds for suspicion, arrested thoroughly respectable citizens on the word of dishonest men, and put them in prison. They thought it better to investigate the affair fully and discover the truth than to let any accused man escape investigation, even one considered respectable, just because the informer was dishonest.

3 The people knew from accounts handed down to them that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had become harsh toward the end. They also knew that it had been overthrown not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians. So they were always afraid and treated everything with suspicion.

Chapter 54

1 The daring attack by Aristogiton and Harmodius began with an incident involving a love affair. I will describe it in more detail and show that neither other people nor the Athenians themselves give an accurate account of their own tyrants or of what happened.

2 When Pisistratus died in old age while still tyrant, it was not Hipparchus who took power, as most people think, but Hippias, who was the oldest son. Harmodius was a young man of striking beauty. Aristogiton, an Athenian citizen of middle rank, was his lover and had a relationship with him.

3 Hipparchus, the son of Pisistratus, made advances to Harmodius, who rejected him and told Aristogiton. Aristogiton was deeply hurt as a lover and feared that Hipparchus would use his power to take Harmodius by force. He immediately began planning, as far as his position allowed, to overthrow the tyranny.

4 Meanwhile Hipparchus made another attempt and had no more success in persuading Harmodius. He did not want to use force. Instead, he planned to humiliate him in some indirect way, so that this would not appear to be the reason.

5 In his exercise of power more generally, too, he did not oppress the majority, but ruled without provoking resentment. These tyrants made a very great effort to act honorably and intelligently. They took only a twentieth of the Athenians' produce as tax. They made their city beautiful, fought their wars, and offered sacrifices at the sanctuaries.

6 Otherwise the city itself continued to use its existing laws. The only exception was that the tyrants always made sure one of their own people was in office. Several of them held the yearly office of archon at Athens, including Pisistratus, the son of the tyrant Hippias, who had his grandfather's name. While archon, he dedicated the altar of the Twelve Gods in the marketplace and the altar of Apollo in the Pythian sanctuary.

7 Later the Athenian people extended the altar in the marketplace, making it longer and covering up the inscription. But the inscription on the altar in the Pythian sanctuary can still be seen even now, in faint letters. It says: / Pisistratus, son of Hippias, set this up to commemorate his term in office / in the sacred precinct of Pythian Apollo.

Chapter 55

1 I am confident that Hippias ruled as the oldest brother. What I have learned by word of mouth is more accurate than most people's information. But anyone can also recognize this from the following fact. Of the legitimate brothers, he alone is known to have had children. This is shown both by the altar and by the stone recording the tyrants' wrongdoing that was set up on the Athenian Acropolis. It lists no child of Thessalus or Hipparchus, but five of Hippias, born to him by Myrrhine, the daughter of Callias son of Hyperochides. It was natural for the oldest brother to marry first.

2 On that same stone he is listed first after his father. This too makes sense, since he was his father's oldest son and ruled as tyrant.

3 Nor do I think Hippias could ever have kept control of the tyranny so easily at that critical moment if Hipparchus had died while in power and Hippias himself had taken over that very day. Instead, his established position had already made him feared by the citizens and given him a firm hold over the mercenaries. This gave him a large margin of safety as he kept control. He did not find himself helpless, as a younger brother would have been who had not previously been regularly involved in governing.

4 Hipparchus, however, became well known because of his unfortunate death. As a result, later generations also came to think that he had been the tyrant.

Chapter 56

1 After Harmodius rejected his approach, Hipparchus went ahead with the insult he had planned. They invited Harmodius' unmarried sister to come and carry a basket in a procession. Then they turned her away, saying that they had never invited her in the first place because she was not worthy of it.

2 Harmodius took this badly, and Aristogiton was even more angry on his account. They had already made the other arrangements with those who would join their attack. They were waiting for the Great Panathenaea. This was the only day when the citizens taking part in the procession could assemble with weapons without raising suspicion. Harmodius and Aristogiton were to begin the attack, and the others were immediately to help them fight the bodyguards.

3 For safety, they had allowed only a few people into the plot. They hoped that, if even a few men took action, people who knew nothing of the plan would also want to help win their own freedom on the spot, since they would have their weapons with them.

Chapter 57

1 When the festival came, Hippias was outside the city in the place called the Ceramicus. With his bodyguards, he was arranging the order in which each part of the procession should move forward. Meanwhile, Harmodius and Aristogiton were already carrying their daggers and going to make the attack.

2 Then they saw one of their fellow conspirators talking on friendly terms with Hippias. Hippias was easy for anyone to approach. They became frightened and thought that the plot had been reported and that they were about to be arrested.

3 So, if they could, they wanted to get their revenge first on the man who had hurt them and was the reason they were risking everything. They rushed inside the gates just as they were and came across Hipparchus beside the place called the Leocorium. They immediately attacked him without thinking. Both were as angry as they could be, one because of his love, the other because he had been insulted. They struck Hipparchus and killed him.

4 As the crowd rushed together, Aristogiton escaped the bodyguards for the moment. He was caught later and treated harshly. Harmodius was killed there on the spot.

Chapter 58

1 When the news reached Hippias in the Ceramicus, he immediately went, not to the scene of the killing, but to the hoplites taking part in the procession. They were some distance away and had not yet heard what had happened. He kept his face from showing any response to the disaster. Pointing out a place, he ordered them to go there without their weapons.

2 They went off, thinking he wanted to speak to them. He told the mercenaries to take charge of the weapons and immediately picked out the men he suspected, along with anyone found carrying a dagger. The usual weapons for the processions were a shield and a spear.

Chapter 59

1 That is how a painful affair of love led Harmodius and Aristogiton to begin their plot, and how their sudden fear led them to act so recklessly.

2 After this, the tyranny became harsher for the Athenians. Hippias was now more afraid. He killed many citizens and at the same time looked abroad for some place where he could find safety if his situation changed.

3 Afterward, for example, although he was an Athenian, he gave his daughter Archedice in marriage to a man from Lampsacus, Aeantides, the son of Hippoclus, its tyrant. He knew that they had great influence with King Darius. Her tomb is in Lampsacus and has this inscription: / Hippias stood above the men of his time in Hellas; / this earth covers his daughter Archedice. / Her father, husband, and brothers were tyrants, / and her sons too, but she did not let pride lead her mind into wrongdoing.

4 Hippias ruled the Athenians as tyrant for three more years. In the fourth he was removed by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmaeonids. He left under an agreement guaranteeing his safety and went to Sigeum and to Aeantides at Lampsacus. From there he went to King Darius. Setting out from there, he later joined the Medes in their campaign against Marathon in the twentieth year after his departure, when he was already an old man.

Chapter 60

1 The Athenian people had these events in mind and remembered all they had heard about them. So at this time they were harsh and suspicious toward those accused over the mysteries. They thought that everything had been done as part of a conspiracy to establish an oligarchy or a tyranny.

2 Their anger over this had already put many prominent men in prison. There seemed to be no end in sight. Each day they grew more violent and arrested still more people. At that point, one of the prisoners persuaded another, the man thought most guilty, to give information. Whether his account was true or not is uncertain. People have suggested both possibilities, but neither then nor later has anyone been able to say for certain who committed the act.

3 His fellow prisoner persuaded him by saying that, even if he had not done it, he should obtain immunity and save himself, and end the city's current suspicions. He would be more certain of surviving if he confessed with a guarantee of immunity than if he denied the charge and went through a trial.

4 So he gave information about the damage to the herms, accusing both himself and others. The Athenian people were delighted to have what they thought was the truth. Previously they had been deeply alarmed at the thought that they might not discover who was plotting against their democracy. They immediately released the informer and the other prisoners he had not accused. They tried those he had accused and executed those who were in custody. They sentenced those who had escaped to death and announced a cash reward for anyone who killed them.

5 In this affair it remained uncertain whether the people who suffered had been punished unjustly. But the rest of the city clearly benefited for the time being.

Chapter 61

1 Meanwhile, the enemies of Alcibiades kept stirring up accusations against him. These were the same men who had attacked him before he sailed. The Athenians took the matter very seriously. Now that they thought they knew the truth about the herms, they were all the more convinced that the affair of the mysteries, in which he was implicated, had also been arranged by him for the same purpose, as part of the conspiracy against the people.

2 Also, during this period of alarm, a small Lacedaemonian army happened to have advanced as far as the Isthmus on some business with the Boeotians. People believed that it had come by prior agreement at Alcibiades' arrangement, not because of the Boeotians. They thought the city would have been betrayed if they had not acted first and arrested the men named in the information. For one night they even slept under arms in the sanctuary of Theseus in the city.

3 At the same time, Alcibiades' personal friends in Argos were suspected of plotting an attack on the people there. For this reason, the Athenians then handed over the Argive hostages they were holding on the islands to the Argive people to be killed.

4 Suspicion surrounded Alcibiades on every side. Wanting to put him on trial and execute him, they therefore sent the ship Salaminia to Sicily to fetch him and the others who had been accused.

5 The crew had orders to tell him to come with them to defend himself, but not to arrest him. The Athenians wanted to avoid causing alarm among either their own troops in Sicily or the enemy. Above all, they wanted the Mantineans and Argives to stay. They believed that these men had been persuaded by Alcibiades to join their expedition.

6 Alcibiades, with his own ship, and those accused along with him sailed from Sicily with the Salaminia, supposedly bound for Athens. When they reached Thurii, however, they stopped following it. They left the ship and disappeared, afraid to sail back and face trial on malicious accusations.

7 The men from the Salaminia searched for Alcibiades and his companions for a while. When they could find them nowhere, they sailed away. Not long afterward, Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed by boat from the territory of Thurii to the Peloponnese. The Athenians tried him and his companions in their absence and sentenced them to death.

Chapter 62

1 After this, the remaining Athenian generals in Sicily divided the army into two parts. Each took command of one by lot, and they sailed with the whole force toward Selinus and Egesta. They wanted to find out whether the Egestaeans would provide the money. They also wanted to investigate the situation at Selinus and learn about its dispute with Egesta.

2 They sailed along the side of Sicily facing the Tyrrhenian Gulf, keeping the island on their left, and put in at Himera. It is the only Greek city in that part of Sicily. When its people refused to admit them, they continued along the coast.

3 On their way along the coast, they captured Hyccara, a small Sicanian town that was hostile to the Egestaeans. It stood beside the sea. They enslaved its people and handed the town over to the Egestaeans, some of whose cavalry had joined them. Their own infantry then returned through Sicel territory until they reached Catana. The ships sailed around the coast carrying the captives.

4 Nicias sailed straight from Hyccara along the coast toward Egesta. He dealt with the other business there, received thirty talents, and returned to the army. They sold the captives and received 120 talents for them.

5 They also sailed around to their Sicel allies and told them to send troops. With half their own army they marched against the hostile town of Hybla Geleatis, but failed to capture it. And the summer ended.

Chapter 63

1 At the very beginning of the following winter, the Athenians began preparing their advance on Syracuse. The Syracusans were also preparing to march against them.

2 The Athenians had not attacked immediately, as the Syracusans had first feared and expected. Each day that passed made them more confident. When they saw the Athenians sailing along the far side of Sicily, a long way from them, and heard that they had attacked Hybla but failed to take it by force, they became still more dismissive. As a crowd tends to do when it feels confident, they demanded that their generals lead them against Catana, since the Athenians were not coming against them.

3 Syracusan cavalry scouts also kept riding up to the Athenian army and insulting them. Among other things, they asked whether the Athenians had come to settle themselves in someone else's country rather than to resettle the Leontinians in their own.

Chapter 64

1 The Athenian generals knew about this. They wanted to draw the entire Syracusan force as far from the city as possible. Meanwhile, they would sail along the coast at night and occupy a suitable campsite without interference. They knew they could not do this so easily if they landed from their ships against an enemy who was ready, or if they marched by land and were spotted. The Syracusans' large cavalry force would badly damage their light troops and camp followers, since the Athenians had no cavalry with them. By using this plan, they could instead take up a position where the cavalry could do them little serious harm. Syracusan exiles accompanying them had told them about the place beside the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus, which they did in fact occupy. To achieve their purpose, the generals devised the following trick.

2 They sent a man they trusted, who also seemed no less friendly to the Syracusan generals. He was from Catana. He said he had been sent by men in Catana whose names the generals recognized and whom they knew to be among their supporters still left in the city.

3 He said that the Athenians spent the night in the city away from their weapons. If the Syracusans were willing to bring their whole force against the camp at dawn on a specified day, the men in Catana would shut in the Athenians staying with them and burn their ships. The Syracusans could easily capture the camp by attacking the stockade. Many people in Catana would join in this action, he said, and the men who had sent him were already prepared.

Chapter 65

1 The Syracusan generals were already confident about the situation in general. Even without this proposal, they intended to prepare an advance against Catana. So they trusted the man with far too little thought. They immediately agreed on a day when they would arrive and sent him away. Then, since the Selinuntians and some of their other allies had already arrived, they ordered all the Syracusans to march out in full force. Once their preparations were complete and the agreed date for their arrival was near, they set off toward Catana. They camped beside the river Symaethus in Leontinian territory.

2 When the Athenians learned that they were approaching, they took their entire army, together with all the Sicels and anyone else who had joined them, and put them aboard the warships and transports. They sailed toward Syracuse during the night.

3 At dawn the Athenians landed near the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus to occupy their campsite. At the same time, the Syracusan cavalry reached Catana ahead of the infantry and found that the whole army had sailed away. They turned back and told the infantry. The entire force then turned around and hurried to defend the city.

Chapter 66

1 The Syracusans had a long way to go. Meanwhile, the Athenians settled their army without interference in a suitable position. It would let them begin battle whenever they wanted, and gave the Syracusan cavalry the least chance to trouble them either during the fighting or beforehand. On one side small walls, houses, trees, and a marsh blocked access; on the other there were steep drops.

2 They cut down the nearby trees, carried them down to the sea, and built a stockade beside their ships. At Dascon, where the enemy could most easily approach, they quickly put up a defensive barrier of stones gathered as they came to hand and timber. They also broke up the bridge over the Anapus.

3 While they were making these preparations, no one came out of the city to interfere. The Syracusan cavalry arrived first to help defend it, and later the whole infantry force assembled as well. At first they approached close to the Athenian army. But when the Athenians did not come out to meet them, they withdrew, crossed the road to Helorus, and camped.

Chapter 67

1 The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle and arranged their forces as follows. The Argives and Mantineans held the right wing, the Athenians the center, and the other allies the rest of the line. Half the army was posted in front, eight men deep. The other half was formed into a square near the sleeping quarters, also eight deep. These men had orders to watch and go to help whichever part of the army was under the greatest pressure. The baggage carriers were placed inside this reserve formation.

2 The Syracusans arranged all their hoplites sixteen men deep. These included the full Syracusan levy and all the allies present. The Selinuntians provided the most help. There were also cavalry from Gela, about two hundred in all, and about twenty cavalry and fifty archers from Camarina. The Syracusans posted their cavalry on the right, no fewer than 1,200 men, with the javelin throwers beside them.

3 As the Athenians were about to attack first, Nicias went along the ranks, addressing each national contingent and the whole force with encouragement like this.

Chapter 68

1 “Men, why should we need a long speech of encouragement when we have come here for the same fight? I think the force we have assembled can give us more confidence than a fine speech delivered to a weak army.

2 “We have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the best of the islanders among us. With allies of such quality and in such numbers, how can any of us fail to have high hopes of victory? This is especially true against men who are defending themselves with a general levy, not a selected force like ours. Besides, they are Sicilians. They look down on us, but they will not stand up to us, because their skill falls short of their daring.

3 “Each of you should also remember this. We are a long way from our own country, and we are not near any friendly land except what you yourselves win by fighting. My reminder to you is the opposite of what I know the enemy are saying to encourage themselves. They say that they will be fighting for their homeland. I say that we are not in our homeland. Here we must win, or we will find it hard to get away, because their many cavalry will be on our heels.

4 “So remember your own quality and attack the enemy eagerly. Consider the desperate difficulty of our present situation more frightening than the enemy themselves.”

Chapter 69

1 After giving this encouragement, Nicias immediately led the army forward. The Syracusans had not expected to fight just then. Some had even gone off to the city, since it was nearby. They hurried back at a run to help, but arrived late and took their places wherever each man happened to reach the main body. They were certainly not short of enthusiasm or daring, either in this battle or in the others. They matched their opponents in courage as far as their skill could support it. But where their skill fell short, they could not carry out their intentions, however much they wanted to. Still, although they had not thought the Athenians would attack first and were forced to defend themselves in a hurry, they took up their weapons and immediately advanced to meet them.

2 First the stone throwers, slingers, and archers on both sides fought in front of the main armies. They drove one another back in the usual way of light troops. Then the diviners brought forward the customary animals for sacrifice, and the trumpeters gave the hoplites the signal to engage.

3 The armies advanced. The Syracusans were fighting for their homeland, and each man for his own immediate survival and future freedom. On the other side, the Athenians were fighting to make someone else's country their own, and to avoid damaging their own country through defeat. The Argives and the independent allies wanted to help the Athenians win what they had come for, and to win the battle so they could see their own homeland again. The subject allies were eager to fight mainly because of their immediate survival: without victory, they had no hope of it. As a secondary motive, they also hoped that helping conquer other peoples might make their own obedience less burdensome.

Chapter 70

1 Once the battle became hand-to-hand, the two sides held out against each other for a long time. Thunder, lightning, and heavy rain also broke out. For those fighting for the first time, with very little experience of war, this added to their fear. The more experienced men thought the weather was simply normal for the time of year. The enemy facing them, still undefeated, gave them much more reason for alarm.

2 First the Argives drove back the Syracusan left wing. Then the Athenians drove back the troops facing them. The rest of the Syracusan army now began to break apart as well and took to flight.

3 The Athenians did not pursue far. The Syracusan cavalry were numerous and still undefeated, and held them back. Whenever they saw any Athenian hoplites pursuing ahead of the others, they charged them and drove them back. The Athenians followed in a close body as far as it was safe, then returned and set up a victory monument.

4 The Syracusans gathered at the road to Helorus and formed up as well as circumstances allowed. Even in this situation, they sent a detachment of their own men to guard the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus. They were afraid the Athenians might take some of the treasures kept there. The rest withdrew into the city.

Chapter 71

1 The Athenians did not approach the sanctuary. They gathered their own dead, laid them on a funeral pyre, and camped there for the night. The next day they returned the Syracusan dead under a truce. About 260 Syracusans and allies had been killed. They collected the bones of their own dead, about fifty Athenians and allies, and sailed away to Catana with the equipment stripped from the enemy.

2 It was winter, and they did not yet think they could conduct the war from that position. First they would have to send to Athens for cavalry and gather more from their local allies, so that they would not be completely outmatched in cavalry. They also needed to collect money locally and receive funds from Athens. They wanted to win over some of the cities, which they hoped would be more ready to submit to them after the battle. They also needed to prepare grain and all their other requirements, ready to attack Syracuse in the spring.

Chapter 72

1 With this plan, they sailed away to Naxos and Catana to spend the winter. The Syracusans buried their own dead and held an assembly.

2 Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward to speak to them. He was as intelligent as anyone in other matters, and in war he had gained considerable experience and was known for his courage. He encouraged them and urged them not to give way because of what had happened.

3 Their resolve had not been defeated, he said. Their lack of order had hurt them. Even so, they had not fallen as far short as might have been expected, especially since they had faced the most experienced of the Greeks. It had been, so to speak, a contest between amateurs and skilled workers.

4 Another great disadvantage had been the number of generals and the divided command: they had fifteen generals. The troops' disorderly lack of discipline had also done great harm. But they would probably defeat the enemy, he said, if they appointed a few experienced generals and used this winter to prepare their hoplites. They should obtain armor and weapons for those who had none, to bring their numbers as high as possible, and also make them practice the other military skills. They already had courage; good order in action would now be added to it. Both would improve. Discipline would be practiced in dangerous situations, and their courage itself would become more confident with the assurance that comes from skill.

5 They should elect only a few generals and give them full authority. They should swear an oath to let these men command according to their own judgment. That way, matters needing secrecy would be better protected, and all the other preparations would be made in an orderly way, without excuses.

Chapter 73

1 After hearing him, the Syracusans voted for all his proposals. They elected three generals: Hermocrates himself, Heraclides son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus son of Execestus.

2 They also sent ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedaemon. They wanted allied help to reach them, and they wanted to persuade the Lacedaemonians to wage war against Athens more firmly and openly on their behalf. This would either draw the Athenians away from Sicily or reduce the reinforcements they could send to their army there.

Chapter 74

1 The Athenian army at Catana immediately sailed to Messene, expecting the city to be handed over by people inside it. But the plan failed. When Alcibiades left his command after being recalled, he already knew he would go into exile. He knew about the plan and revealed it to the friends of Syracuse in Messene. They had already killed the men involved. Now they were engaged in civil strife and under arms, and those who wanted to keep the Athenians out had the upper hand.

2 The Athenians stayed about thirteen days. But they were suffering from winter weather, had no supplies, and were making no progress. They left for Naxos, marked out their camp, put a palisade around it, and spent the winter there. They sent a trireme to Athens to ask for money and cavalry, so that these could arrive at the start of spring.

Chapter 75

1 During the winter the Syracusans also added a wall to their city. It ran along the whole side facing Epipolae and brought the Temenites inside the defenses. This would prevent the enemy from easily cutting them off with a shorter wall if they suffered a defeat. They also built a fort at Megara and another in the Olympieum. Along the sea they set up stakes in front of every possible landing place.

2 Knowing that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched against Catana with their whole available force. They ravaged part of its territory, burned the Athenians' tents and camp, and went home.

3 They heard that the Athenians were sending ambassadors to Camarina, hoping to win it over through the alliance made in the time of Laches. So they too sent ambassadors to oppose them. They suspected that the Camarinaeans had been reluctant to send even the help they had sent for the first battle. They also feared that, after seeing the Athenians' success in the battle, the Camarinaeans would no longer be willing to support them. Instead, the Athenians might persuade them to change sides on the strength of their earlier friendship.

4 Hermocrates and others came to Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus came with others from the Athenians. The Camarinaeans held an assembly. Hermocrates wanted to turn them against the Athenians before the Athenians spoke, and said this:

Chapter 76

1 “Camarinaeans, we have not sent this embassy because we feared that the Athenian force now here would frighten and overwhelm you. We are more afraid that the speeches they are about to make will persuade you before you have heard anything from us.

2 “They have come to Sicily with the excuse you have heard, but with the intention we all suspect. I think they want not so much to resettle the Leontini as to drive us out of our homes. It makes no sense for them to destroy cities back there while resettling cities here. Nor does it make sense for them to care about the Leontini as their Chalcidian relatives while keeping the Chalcidians in Euboea enslaved. Those are the very people who founded Leontini.

3 “They are now trying to gain control here by the same method they used there. The Ionians and the allies descended from Athens willingly accepted them as leaders, supposedly to take revenge on the Persian. Then Athens conquered them. It charged some with failing to serve in the army, others with fighting one another, and each of the rest with whatever plausible accusation it could find.

4 “So neither did the Athenians resist the Persian for the freedom of the Greeks, nor did the Greeks resist him for their own freedom. The Athenians wanted to enslave them for themselves rather than for him. The Greeks were only exchanging their master for one who was no less clever, but cleverer at doing harm.

Chapter 77

1 “But we have not come here now to expose the Athenian state. It is easy enough to accuse it, and you know all its wrongdoing already. We have come much more to blame ourselves. We have the example of the Greeks over there, who were enslaved because they did not defend themselves. Now the same tricks are being used against us: resettling their relatives, the Leontini, and helping their allies, the Egestaeans. Yet we are unwilling to unite and show the Athenians more forcefully who lives here. We are not Ionians or people of the Hellespont and the islands. They keep changing masters, whether the Persian or someone else, and remain slaves. We are free Dorians who came from the independent Peloponnese to settle Sicily.

2 “Or are we waiting to be captured city by city? We know that this is the only way we can be conquered. We can see the Athenians following this method. They use speeches to divide some of us. They lead others into war against one another by offering the hope of an alliance. They tell each city something it likes to hear, and so manage to harm it. When a fellow Sicilian community some distance away is destroyed first, do we think the danger will not reach us too? Do we think that its suffering is merely its own separate misfortune, rather than something happening to it before it happens to us?

Chapter 78

1 “Perhaps someone thinks that Syracuse is Athens' enemy, but he is not, and feels it is wrong to take risks for my country. He should remember that, in fighting for my country, he will be fighting just as much for his own. He will also fight with greater safety, because I will not have been destroyed beforehand. He will have me as an ally, instead of facing the struggle alone. He should remember too that Athens does not simply want to punish Syracuse for its hostility. It is using us as an excuse to make his own friendship with Athens just as firmly binding.

2 “Perhaps someone envies us, or is even afraid of us. Greater powers provoke both feelings. Because of this, he wants Syracuse to suffer enough to teach us a lesson, but to survive for the sake of his own safety. He is hoping for something beyond human power. No one can control the outcome as fully as he controls his own wishes.

3 “If he miscalculates, he may soon be mourning his own troubles and wishing he could envy our good fortune once again. But that will be impossible if he abandons us and refuses to share the same dangers. These concern realities, not labels. In name, he would be preserving our power; in fact, he would be protecting his own safety.

4 “Camarinaeans, as our neighbors and the next people who will be in danger, you above all should have seen this coming. You should not be such halfhearted allies as you are now. Instead, you should come to us yourselves and urge us not to give in at all. You should make the same appeal to us now, on equal terms, that you would have begged us to accept if the Athenians had attacked Camarina first. But neither you nor the others have yet made any move to do this.

Chapter 79

1 “Perhaps fear will make you try to meet your obligations both to us and to the invaders. You will say that you have an alliance with the Athenians. But you did not make it for use against your friends. It was for defense if any enemy attacked you, and to help the Athenians when others wronged them, not when they themselves wronged their neighbors, as they are doing now.

2 “Even the people of Rhegium, who are Chalcidians, are unwilling to help resettle the Leontini, although they too are Chalcidians. They suspect what is really behind this fine claim, and act sensibly despite having no respectable excuse. It would be outrageous if you, with a respectable excuse, chose to help your natural enemies and joined your bitterest enemies in destroying people still more closely related to you by nature.

3 “That is not right. You must help us and not be afraid of their forces. Those forces are no threat if we all stand together. They are a threat if, on the contrary, we split apart, which is just what the Athenians are trying to achieve. Even when they attacked us alone and won a battle, they failed to get what they wanted and quickly withdrew.

Chapter 80

1 “So if we are united, there is no reason to lose heart. You should join the alliance more eagerly, especially since help will come from the Peloponnese, whose people are far superior to these men in warfare. No one should think that the following cautious course is fair to us and safe for you: to help neither side, on the grounds that you are allies of both.

2 “It is fair in its claim, but not in its effect. Suppose your refusal to join us means that the victims are defeated and the conquerors prevail. By the very same absence, have you not both failed to help one side survive and failed to stop the other from doing wrong? It would be better to side with people who are being wronged and are also your relatives. You would protect Sicily's common interest, and stop the Athenians, your supposed friends, from doing wrong.

3 “To sum up, we Syracusans say there is no need to explain clearly to you or to the others things you understand just as well yourselves. But we ask for help. And if we fail to persuade you, we put this on record: we Dorians are being attacked by Ionians, our constant enemies, and betrayed by you, who are Dorians yourselves.

4 “If the Athenians conquer us, your decisions will have won their victory, but they will take the credit themselves. Their prize for winning will be none other than the people who gave them the victory. If, on the other hand, we win, you yourselves will pay the penalty for having caused our danger.

5 “So consider this and make your choice now. You can accept slavery at once without taking a risk. Or you can have the chance of winning with us, avoiding the shame of taking these men as masters, and escaping an enmity with us that would not be short-lived.”

Chapter 81

1 That was what Hermocrates said. After him, Euphemus, the Athenian ambassador, spoke as follows:

Chapter 82

1 “We came to renew the alliance that existed before. But since the Syracusan has attacked us, we must also explain why we have good reason to hold our empire.

2 “He himself gave the strongest evidence: the Ionians have always been enemies of the Dorians. This is indeed the case. We are Ionians. The Peloponnesians are Dorians, are more numerous than we are, and live near us. We considered how best to avoid coming under their rule.

3 “After the Persian Wars, we acquired ships and freed ourselves from Lacedaemonian rule and leadership. They had no more right to give orders to us than we had to give orders to them, except that they were stronger at the time. We ourselves became leaders of those who had formerly been under the King, and we still hold that position. We thought that having the power to defend ourselves was the best way to avoid falling under the Peloponnesians. And to be precise, we were not unjust in conquering the Ionians and islanders whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved despite their kinship with us.

4 “They came with the Persian to attack us, their mother city. They did not dare to rebel and sacrifice their property, as we did when we abandoned our city. Instead, they accepted slavery for themselves and wanted to impose the same on us.

Chapter 83

1 “For these reasons we rule them, and deserve to. We supplied the Greeks with the largest navy and gave our wholehearted support without making excuses. These people, by willingly doing the same for the Persian, harmed us. At the same time, we seek the strength to stand up to the Peloponnesians.

2 “We do not dress this up by claiming that we rightly rule because we alone defeated the non-Greeks. Nor do we claim that we took risks for these people's freedom rather than for everyone's, including our own. No one can be blamed for securing their own safety. We are here now for our own security, and we see that the same course serves your interests too.

3 “We will show this from the very things they accuse us of, which make you most fearful and suspicious. We know that people whose fears make them suspicious may enjoy a pleasant speech for the moment. But when it comes to action later, they do what serves their interests.

4 “As we have said, fear makes us hold our empire at home. The same reason has brought us here to put affairs on a secure footing with our friends. We have come not to enslave people, but rather to prevent our own enslavement.

Chapter 84

1 “No one should think we have no reason to care about you. He should understand that if you survive and are strong enough to resist Syracuse, we will be less exposed to harm from any force it sends to help the Peloponnesians.

2 “In this respect, you are already of the greatest concern to us. That is also why it makes sense to resettle the Leontini, not as subjects like their relatives in Euboea, but as strong as possible. From their own territory on the Syracusan border, they can then cause Syracuse trouble on our behalf.

3 “At home, we can face our enemies by ourselves. The Chalcidians there are useful to us without armed forces, simply paying us money. He says it makes no sense for us to have enslaved them while freeing the Chalcidians here. But here the Leontini and our other friends are useful to us when they are as independent as possible.

Chapter 85

1 “For a tyrant or a city that rules others, nothing is unreasonable if it serves their interests, and no one counts as a relative if they cannot be trusted. In each case they must become an enemy or a friend as the situation requires. What helps us here is not to harm our friends, but to have friends strong enough to keep our enemies powerless.

2 “You should not distrust us. We also direct each of our allies at home according to how it can be useful. The Chians and Methymnaeans are independent and supply ships. We put stronger pressure on most of the others to make them pay money. Others are our allies on completely free terms, although they are islanders and easy to conquer, because they occupy important positions around the Peloponnese.

3 “So you should expect our policy here too to serve our interests and, as we say, to be shaped by fear of Syracuse. The Syracusans want to rule you. They want to unite you through suspicion of us and then rule Sicily themselves, either by force or by taking advantage of your isolation after we leave without achieving anything. This must happen if you join them. We will no longer find it easy to deal with such great strength united in one body. And once we are gone, they will not be weak when they confront you.

Chapter 86

1 “The facts themselves refute anyone who disagrees. When you first called us in, you held out only this threat: if we let you fall under Syracusan rule, we ourselves would be in danger too.

2 “It is not right for you now to distrust the very argument you thought should persuade us. Nor should you suspect us because we have come with a larger force to match their strength. You have much more reason to distrust them.

3 “We cannot even stay here without your support. Even if we acted wickedly and conquered you, we could not keep control. The voyage is long, and we would lack the means to garrison large cities equipped to fight on land. But these men live close to you, not in a camp, but in a city stronger than the force we have brought here. They are always plotting against you. Whenever they get an opportunity against one of you,

4 “they do not let it go. They have already shown this in other cases and in their treatment of the Leontini. Yet now they dare to call on you to attack the people who stop them and have so far kept Sicily from falling under their rule, as though you could not see what was happening.

5 “Our appeal, on the other hand, offers much more real safety. We ask you not to throw away the security that each side gains from the other. Remember that their numbers always leave them ready to march against you, even without allies. But you will not often have the chance to defend yourselves with so much help. If your suspicions make you let this force leave without achieving anything, or even after a defeat, you will later wish you could see even a tiny fraction of it. By then, its arrival will no longer do you any good.

Chapter 87

1 “Camarinaeans, do not let their accusations persuade either you or the others. We have told you the whole truth about the things that make you suspicious of us. We will briefly remind you of the main points, and ask you to accept them.

2 “We say that we rule the people at home so that we do not have to obey someone else. We free the people here so that they cannot harm us. We are forced to do many things because we must guard against many things. Both now and before, we have come as allies to those of you here who are being wronged, not uninvited, but because we were called in.

3 “Do not try to turn us from our course by making yourselves judges of what we do or by trying to discipline us. That would be difficult now anyway. Instead, take whatever part of our active policy and our way of doing things serves your own interests, and use it. Remember that these things do not harm everyone equally, and that they benefit far more of the Greeks than they harm.

4 “Everywhere, even in places where we are not present, both the person expecting to be wronged and the person planning harm have to reckon with us. The first can always hope to get help from us. The second knows that, if we come, he cannot take his risk without fear. So the would-be attacker has to restrain himself, however unwillingly, while his intended victim stays safe without having to do anything.

5 “Do not reject this protection, which is available to anyone who needs it and is now offered to you. Instead, put yourselves on the same footing as the others and join us. Take your turn in plotting against Syracuse on equal terms, rather than always having to guard against it.”

Chapter 88

1 That was what Euphemus said. The Camarinaeans' feelings were as follows. They were friendly toward the Athenians, except that they thought Athens would enslave Sicily. They were always at odds with Syracuse because they shared a border. But they were just as afraid that their Syracusan neighbors might win even without their help. That was why they had sent them the small cavalry force at first. For the future, they decided that their practical help would favor Syracuse, but they would give as little as they could. For the moment, however, they decided to give both sides the same answer. Since the Athenians had also won the battle, they did not want to seem to have treated them less favorably.

2 Having reached this decision, they answered that, since both their allies happened to be at war with each other, they thought keeping their oaths required them to help neither side for the present. The ambassadors of both sides left.

3 The Syracusans continued their own preparations for war. Meanwhile, the Athenians, encamped at Naxos, negotiated with the Sicels to get as many as possible to join them.

4 Most of the Sicels living nearer the plains had held back, since they were subjects of Syracuse. Among those in the interior, whose settlements had always been independent, all but a few immediately sided with the Athenians. They brought grain down to the army, and some brought money too.

5 The Athenians marched against those who would not join them and forced some to do so. In other cases, the Syracusans sent garrisons and help, and prevented them. During the winter the Athenians moved their ships from Naxos to Catana, rebuilt the camp the Syracusans had burned, and spent the winter there.

6 They sent a trireme to Carthage to discuss friendship and see whether they could get any help. They also sent to Tyrrhenia, where some cities had themselves offered to join the war. They sent instructions around to the Sicels and sent to Egesta too, telling them to provide as many horses as possible. They also prepared bricks, iron, and everything else needed for a wall around Syracuse. They intended to take up the war at the start of spring.

7 The Syracusan ambassadors sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon sailed along the coast of Italy. On the way, they tried to persuade the Greeks there not to stand by and watch what the Athenians were doing, since the same plans threatened them too. When they reached Corinth, they spoke there, asking for help on the grounds of kinship.

8 The Corinthians were the first to vote, immediately and on their own initiative, to give help with all their strength. They also sent ambassadors with the Syracusans to Lacedaemon. Together they were to persuade the Lacedaemonians both to wage war against Athens more openly in their own region and to send some help to Sicily.

9 The ambassadors from Corinth arrived at Lacedaemon, and Alcibiades was there too. At about this time he and his fellow exiles had first crossed on a merchant ship from the territory of Thurii to Cyllene in Elis. Later he came to Lacedaemon under a safe-conduct, at the invitation of the Lacedaemonians themselves. He was afraid of them because of his involvement in the affairs of Mantinea.

10 In the Lacedaemonian assembly, the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and Alcibiades all happened to urge the same course on the Lacedaemonians. The ephors and the other authorities intended to send ambassadors to Syracuse to stop it from reaching an agreement with Athens, but they were not eager to send help. Alcibiades came forward, stirred the Lacedaemonians up, and urged them into action with this speech:

Chapter 89

1 “I must first speak about the accusations against me, so that your suspicion of me does not make you less willing to listen to what I say about public affairs.

2 “My ancestors gave up their role as your city's official hosts and representatives because of a grievance. I myself took it up again and worked to serve you, both in other matters and during the disaster at Pylos. Although I remained eager to help, when you made peace with Athens you negotiated through my enemies. You gave them influence and brought dishonor on me.

3 “So you deserved the harm I did you when I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and through my other actions against you. Anyone who was unreasonably angry with me then, while suffering that harm, should now look at the truth and change his mind. Or if someone thought less of me because I was more closely aligned with the people, he should not think his resentment justified on that account either.

4 “My family has always opposed tyrants. Everything opposed to the ruling power has been called ‘the people.’ That is how leadership of the people came to us and stayed with us. Besides, since the city was a democracy, we generally had to go along with the established system.

5 “Still, we tried to be more moderate in our political conduct than the prevailing lack of restraint. Others, both in the past and now, led the crowd to worse behavior. They were the very people who drove me out.

6 “We led the whole community. We thought it right to help preserve the form of government under which the city had become greatest and freest, the same form each of us had inherited. Those of us with any sense understood democracy, and I understood it as well as anyone—all the more because I could say so much against it. But there is nothing new to be said about something everyone agrees is foolish. With you stationed nearby as enemies, we did not think it safe to change it.

Chapter 90

1 “Those are the facts about the accusations against me. Now listen to the matters you need to decide, and on which I need to advise you if I know anything more than you do.

2 “We sailed to Sicily intending first to conquer the Sicilian Greeks, if we could, and then the Greeks in Italy. After that we would attack the Carthaginian empire and Carthage itself.

3 “If all or most of this succeeded, we then intended to attack the Peloponnese. We would bring all the Greek forces we had gained there and hire large numbers of non-Greeks, including Iberians and others from that region who are now generally recognized as the best fighters among non-Greeks. We would also build many triremes to add to our own, since Italy has plentiful timber. With these ships we would blockade the Peloponnese all around its coast, while our infantry attacked by land. We would take some cities by force and build forts against others. We hoped to defeat the Peloponnese easily in this way and then rule the whole Greek world.

4 “The territories we gained there would provide enough money and grain to make both more plentiful for us, without any need for revenue from here.

Chapter 91

1 “So you have heard what we intended to do with the expedition that has now sailed, from the man who knows the facts most exactly. The generals who remain will carry out the same plans if they can. Now learn why things there will not survive unless you help.

2 “The Sicilian Greeks are less experienced, but even now they could still win if they joined together as a single force. But the Syracusans alone cannot resist the Athenian forces now there. Their entire army has already been defeated in battle, and they are also being blockaded by sea.

3 “If this city is taken, all Sicily is in Athenian hands, and Italy will immediately follow. The danger from that direction that I have just described would soon fall on you.

4 “So no one should think that you are deciding only about Sicily. You are also deciding about the Peloponnese, unless you act quickly as follows. Send troops there on ships, men who will row themselves across and immediately serve as hoplites. And send a Spartan commander, which I think is even more useful than the troops. He can organize the forces already there and force the unwilling to join them. This will give your existing friends more confidence, and those who are undecided will feel safer about joining you.

5 “At the same time you must wage war more openly here. This will make the Syracusans resist more firmly, because they see that you are taking an interest in them. It will also make the Athenians less able to send further reinforcements to their own troops.

6 “You must also fortify Decelea in Attica. This is what the Athenians have always feared most. They believe it is the only experience of this war they have not yet faced. The surest way to hurt your enemies is to find out exactly what they fear most and then bring it upon them. It is reasonable to suppose that each side knows its own dangers best and fears them accordingly.

7 “I will pass over many of the advantages you will gain, and the losses you will inflict on your opponents, by establishing this fort. I will sum up the most important. Most of the resources with which their countryside is stocked will come into your hands, some by capture and some of their own accord. They will immediately lose the revenue from the silver mines at Laurium, and everything they now earn from the land and the law courts. Above all, they will lose revenue from their allies, which will come in less regularly. The allies will become careless about paying when they think you are now waging war with all your strength.

Chapter 92

1 “Lacedaemonians, it is up to you to carry out any of this quickly and energetically. I am entirely confident that it can be done, and I do not think my judgment will prove wrong.

2 “I do not think any of you should consider me a worse man because I now attack my own city so forcefully alongside its bitterest enemies, although I once seemed devoted to it. Nor should you distrust what I say because of an exile's eagerness.

3 “I am in exile from the wickedness of those who drove me out, not from the chance to help you, if you listen to me. You, who have harmed your enemies, are not greater enemies than those who forced their friends to become enemies.

4 “My love for my city is not for a city where I am wronged, but for one where I lived securely as a citizen. I do not think I am now attacking a country that is still mine. Instead, I am trying to recover the country I no longer have. The true lover of his city is not the man who refuses to attack it after unjustly losing it. It is the man who wants it so much that he tries every possible way to recover it.

5 “So, Lacedaemonians, I ask you to use me without hesitation in any danger or hardship. Remember the argument everyone repeats: if I did you great harm as an enemy, I could also be very useful as a friend. Indeed, I know the Athenians' affairs, whereas I could only guess at yours. You should now recognize that the matters you are deciding are of the greatest importance. Do not hesitate to send expeditions to Sicily and Attica. By sending a small part of your forces to help there, you can save great interests and bring down both the present and the future power of Athens. After that you can live in safety yourselves and lead all Hellas with its willing support, through goodwill rather than force.”

Chapter 93

1 That was what Alcibiades said. The Lacedaemonians had already been thinking of marching against Athens themselves, but they were still delaying and watching events. His explanation of each of these points made them much more determined. They thought they had heard from the man who knew the facts most clearly.

2 They now turned their attention to fortifying Decelea and to sending immediate help to the people in Sicily. They appointed Gylippus son of Cleandridas commander for the Syracusans. They told him to consult with them and the Corinthians and arrange for the greatest and quickest possible help to reach the people there with the resources available.

3 He immediately told the Corinthians to send him two ships to Asine. They were to prepare the rest of the ships they intended to send and have them ready to sail when the time came. After making these arrangements, they left Lacedaemon.

4 The Athenian trireme that the generals had sent from Sicily to get money and cavalry also arrived. After hearing its report, the Athenians voted to send the army money for its upkeep and the cavalry. The winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war, whose history Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Chapter 94

1 At the very beginning of spring in the following summer, the Athenians in Sicily sailed from Catana along the coast toward Megara in Sicily. As I mentioned earlier, the Syracusans had expelled its inhabitants in the time of the tyrant Gelon and now held the land themselves.

2 The Athenians landed and destroyed the crops in the fields. They advanced against a Syracusan fort but failed to take it. Then they moved on by land and sea to the river Terias. They went inland onto the plain, destroyed the crops, and burned the grain. They met a small number of Syracusans and killed some of them. After setting up a victory monument, they returned to their ships.

3 They sailed back to Catana and collected provisions there. Then they marched with their whole army against Centoripa, a Sicel town. They brought it over to their side by agreement and left, burning the grain of the Inessaeans and Hyblaeans as they went.

4 When they reached Catana, they found that 250 cavalrymen had arrived from Athens with their equipment but without horses, since horses were to be obtained locally. Thirty mounted archers and 300 talents of silver had also arrived.

Chapter 95

1 That same spring the Lacedaemonians marched against Argos. They reached Cleonae, but an earthquake made them withdraw. After this the Argives invaded the neighboring district of Thyreatis and took a great deal of plunder belonging to the Lacedaemonians. It sold for at least twenty-five talents.

2 Not long afterward, in the same summer, the people of Thespiae attacked those holding office but failed to gain control. The Thebans came to help the authorities. Some of the attackers were captured, and others fled to Athens.

Chapter 96

1 That same summer the Syracusans learned that the cavalry had reached the Athenians and that they were now about to advance against them. They thought the Athenians could not easily surround them with a wall, even if they won a battle, unless they took control of Epipolae. This was a steep height directly above the city. They planned to guard its approaches so that the enemy could not climb up by these routes without being noticed. There was no other way for them to get up.

2 The rest of the ground stands high above its surroundings. It slopes down as far as the city, and its entire inner surface is visible. The Syracusans call it Epipolae because it lies above the rest of the area.

3 At daybreak the Syracusans went out with their whole army to the meadow beside the river Anapus. Hermocrates and his fellow generals had just taken office. They held a review of the troops and first picked out 600 selected hoplites under Diomilus, an exile from Andros. These men were to guard Epipolae and, if needed elsewhere, to assemble and arrive quickly.

Chapter 97

1 During the night before the day of this review, the Athenians had brought their whole army from Catana without the Syracusans noticing. They put in at the place called Leon, six or seven stades from Epipolae, and landed their infantry. They then anchored their ships at Thapsus. This is a peninsula extending into the open sea from a narrow isthmus, only a short journey from Syracuse by either sea or land.

2 The Athenian naval force built a palisade across the isthmus at Thapsus and stayed there. The infantry immediately ran toward Epipolae. They climbed up by Euryelus before the Syracusans, on learning what was happening, could arrive from the meadow where they were holding their review.

3 The other Syracusans hurried to help as fast as each could, together with Diomilus and his 600 men. From the meadow they had to cover at least twenty-five stades before they could meet the enemy.

4 As a result, the Syracusans attacked in considerable disorder. They were defeated in battle on Epipolae and withdrew into the city. Diomilus was killed, along with about 300 others.

5 After this the Athenians set up a victory monument and returned the Syracusan dead under a truce. The next day they went down toward the city itself. When the Syracusans did not come out against them, they withdrew and built a fort at Labdalum, on the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae facing Megara. It was to serve as a store for their equipment and money whenever they went forward to fight or build walls.

Chapter 98

1 Not long afterward, 300 cavalrymen from Egesta reached them, along with about 100 from the Sicels, Naxos, and some other places. There were already 250 Athenians there. They obtained horses for these men, some supplied by the Egestaeans and Catanaeans and others bought. Altogether they assembled 650 cavalrymen.

2 The Athenians left a garrison in Labdalum and advanced to Syce. They established themselves there and quickly built their circular fort. The speed of the building alarmed the Syracusans. They came out intending to fight rather than stand by and let it continue.

3 The two sides were already forming up against each other when the Syracusan generals saw that their army was scattered and difficult to get into formation. They led it back into the city, except for some of the cavalry. These stayed behind and prevented the Athenians from carrying stones or spreading out very far.

4 The hoplites of one Athenian tribe, together with all their cavalry, attacked and routed the Syracusan cavalry. They killed some of them and set up a victory monument for the cavalry battle.

Chapter 99

1 The next day some of the Athenians were building the wall north of the circular fort. Others collected stones and timber and kept laying them along the route toward the place called Trogilus. This was the shortest line for their blockade wall from the Great Harbor to the sea on the other side.

2 The Syracusans no longer wanted to risk their whole army in battles against the Athenians, particularly on the advice of their general Hermocrates. They thought it better to build a counterwall across the line where the Athenians intended to take their wall. If they finished first, it would block the Athenians' route. And if the Athenians came to stop the work, the Syracusans could send part of their army against them while getting ahead of them to secure the approaches with stakes. The Athenians would then have to stop work and turn their whole force against them.

3 So they came out and began building from their own city. They ran a wall across the Athenian line below the circular fort, cutting down the olive trees in the sacred precinct and putting up wooden towers.

4 The Athenian ships had not yet sailed around from Thapsus into the Great Harbor. The Syracusans still controlled the coastal area, and the Athenians brought their supplies overland from Thapsus.

Chapter 100

1 The Syracusans decided that they had built enough of their counterwall and its palisade. The Athenians had not come to stop them, since they feared that dividing their own forces would make them easier to fight, and they were also hurrying to complete their own blockade wall. The Syracusans left one tribe to guard the structure and withdrew into the city. The Athenians destroyed the underground channels that brought drinking water into the city. Then they watched for a time at midday when the other Syracusans were in their tents, some had even gone back into the city, and the men at the palisade were keeping a careless watch. They placed 300 selected men of their own and some picked light troops with their weapons in front, with orders to run suddenly at the counterwall. The rest of the army advanced in two divisions. One, under one of the generals, moved toward the city to meet any force coming to help. The other, under the other general, moved toward the palisade beside the small gate.

2 The 300 attacked and took the palisade. Its guards abandoned it and fled into the outer defensive wall around the Temenites. Their pursuers rushed in with them, but once inside they were forced out again by the Syracusans. Some Argives and a few Athenians were killed there.

3 The whole army withdrew, demolished the counterwall, pulled up the palisade, and carried the stakes back to their own lines. They also set up a victory monument.

Chapter 101

1 The next day the Athenians extended their wall from the circular fort along the cliff above the marsh. This is the side of Epipolae that faces the Great Harbor. From there, down across the level ground and the marsh to the harbor, lay the shortest route for their blockade wall.

2 Meanwhile the Syracusans also came out and built another line of stakes, starting from the city and running through the middle of the marsh. They dug a ditch alongside it to prevent the Athenians from completing their wall to the sea.

3 Once the Athenians had finished their work by the cliff, they attacked the Syracusan palisade and ditch again. They ordered their ships to sail around from Thapsus into the Great Harbor of Syracuse. They themselves went down from Epipolae onto the level ground before dawn. They laid doors and broad planks across the marsh where its muddy ground was firmest and walked over them. At daybreak they captured the ditch and all but a small section of the palisade. Later they took the remaining section too.

4 A battle followed, and the Athenians won. The Syracusan right wing fled toward the city, and the left wing along the river. The 300 selected Athenian troops hurried at a run toward the bridge, hoping to cut them off from the crossing.

5 The Syracusans were alarmed. Most of their cavalry were also there. They advanced to meet these 300 men, routed them, and charged into the Athenian right wing. Their attack also panicked the tribe at the front of the wing.

6 Lamachus saw this and came to help from the Athenian left wing, bringing a few archers and the Argives with him. He crossed a ditch and was cut off with a few men who had crossed with him. He was killed, along with five or six of his companions. The Syracusans immediately seized their bodies and hurried them to safety on the other side of the river before the Athenians could intervene. They themselves withdrew as the rest of the Athenian army was now coming up.

Chapter 102

1 Meanwhile, the Syracusans who had first fled toward the city saw what was happening. Encouraged, they came out from the city again and formed up against the Athenians facing them. They also sent some of their men against the circular fort on Epipolae, thinking they could capture it while it was deserted.

2 They captured and destroyed the Athenians' outer wall, ten plethra long. But Nicias prevented them from taking the circular fort itself. He happened to have been left there because he was ill. He realized that, with so few men, they could not hold out in any other way. So he ordered the attendants to set fire to the siege engines and all the timber lying in front of the wall.

3 This had the intended effect. The Syracusans could no longer approach because of the fire and withdrew again. Athenian reinforcements were already coming back up to the circular fort from below, after driving off the enemy there. At the same time their ships, following their orders, sailed from Thapsus into the Great Harbor.

4 When the Syracusans on the heights saw this, they withdrew quickly, and the entire Syracusan army returned to the city. They thought their present forces could no longer stop the wall from reaching the sea.

Chapter 103

1 After this the Athenians set up a victory monument, returned the Syracusan dead under a truce, and recovered Lamachus and the men killed with him. Their entire force, both fleet and infantry, was now there. Starting from Epipolae and the cliffs, they began to cut off the Syracusans with a double wall extending to the sea.

2 Supplies for the army came in from every part of Italy. Many Sicels who had previously stood back now came to join the Athenians as allies. Three ships with fifty oars each also arrived from Tyrrhenia. Everything else was going as they hoped.

3 The Syracusans no longer thought they could win the war, since no help had reached them even from the Peloponnese. They discussed a settlement both among themselves and with Nicias. He now held sole command, since Lamachus was dead.

4 Nothing was agreed. But, as was natural among people in difficulty and under a tighter siege than before, there was much discussion with Nicias and still more within the city. Their current troubles also made them somewhat suspicious of one another. They dismissed the generals under whom these events had happened, thinking they were suffering from either their bad luck or their treachery. They elected Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias in their place.

Chapter 104

1 Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth had reached the area of Leucas. They wanted to get to Sicily quickly to help. Alarming reports kept reaching them, all repeating the same false claim that Syracuse was already completely walled off. Gylippus gave up all hope for Sicily but wanted to save Italy. He and Pythen the Corinthian therefore crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum as quickly as possible with two Laconian and two Corinthian ships. The Corinthians were to sail later, after manning two Leucadian ships and three Ambraciot ships in addition to their own ten.

2 From Tarentum, Gylippus first sent an embassy to Thurii and renewed the citizenship his father had held there, but he could not win them over. He then set sail along the Italian coast. Off the Terinaean Gulf he was caught by a strong wind that blows steadily from the north there, and was driven out to sea. After being badly battered by the storm, he returned to Tarentum. He pulled ashore the ships that had suffered most in the storm and repaired them.

3 Nicias learned that Gylippus was sailing toward him, but dismissed the small number of ships, just as the people of Thurii had done. He thought they were equipped more for piracy and took no precautions yet.

Chapter 105

1 About the same time that summer, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded the territory of Argos and devastated most of the land. The Athenians sent thirty ships to help the Argives. These ships marked their clearest breach of the treaty with the Lacedaemonians.

2 Previously they had fought alongside the Argives and Mantineans by making raids from Pylos and landing elsewhere around the Peloponnese rather than in Laconia. The Argives had often urged them merely to make an armed landing in Laconia, destroy even the smallest amount of property with them, and then leave. But the Athenians had refused. Now, however, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places and devastated the land. This gave the Lacedaemonians a better justification for blaming the Athenians and taking action against them.

3 After the Athenians had sailed away from Argos and the Lacedaemonians had also withdrawn, the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius. They ravaged some of its land, killed some people, and returned home.

Chapter 1

1 The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with a greater armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if possible, to conquer the island; most of them being ignorant of its size and of the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and of the fact that they were undertaking a war not much inferior to that against the Peloponnesians.

2 For the voyage round Sicily in a merchantman is not far short of eight days; and yet, large as the island is, there are only two miles of sea to prevent its being mainland.

Chapter 2

1 It was settled originally as follows, and the peoples that occupied it are these. The earliest inhabitants spoken of in any part of the country are the Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I cannot tell of what race they were, or whence they came or whither they went, and must leave my readers to what the poets have said of them and to what may be generally known concerning them.

2 The Sicanians appear to have been the next settlers, although they pretend to have been the first of all and aborigines; but the facts show that they were Iberians, driven by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. It was from them that the island, before called Trinacaria, took its name of Sicania, and to the present day they inhabit the west of Sicily.

3 On the fall of Ilium, some of the Trojans escaped from the Achaeans, came in ships to Sicily, and settled next to the Sicanians under the general name of Elymi; their towns being called Eryx and Egesta. With them settled some of the Phocians carried on their way from Troy by a storm, first to Libya, and afterwards from thence to Sicily.

4 The Sicels crossed over to Sicily from their first home Italy, flying from the Opicans, as tradition says and as seems not unlikely, upon rafts, having watched till the wind set down the strait to effect the passage; although perhaps they may have sailed over in some other way. Even at the present day there are still Sicels in Italy; and the country got its name of Italy from Italus, a king of the Sicels, so called.

5 These went with a great host to Sicily, defeated the Sicanians in battle and forced them to remove to the south and west of the island, which thus came to be called Sicily instead of Sicania, and after they crossed over continued to enjoy the richest parts of the country for near three hundred years before any Hellenes came to Sicily; indeed they still hold the centre and north of the island.

6 There were also Phoenicians living all round Sicily, who had occupied promontories upon the sea coasts and the islets adjacent for the purpose of trading with the Sicels. But when the Hellenes began to arrive in considerable numbers by sea, the Phoenicians abandoned most of their stations, and drawing together took up their abode in Motye, Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymi, partly because they confided in their alliance, and also because these are the nearest points, for the voyage between Carthage and Sicily.

Chapter 3

1 These were the barbarians in Sicily, settled as I have said. Of the Hellenes, the first to arrive were Chalcidians from Euboea with Thucles, their founder. They founded Naxos and built the altar to Apollo Archegetes, which now stands outside the town, and upon which the deputies for the games sacrifice before sailing from Sicily.

2 Syracuse was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one of the Heraclids from Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the island upon which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water: in process of time the outer town also was taken within the walls and became populous.

3 Meanwhile Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from Naxos in the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by arms and founded Leontini and afterwards Catana; the Catanians themselves choosing Evarchus as their founder.

Chapter 4

1 About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from Megara, and after founding a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas, and afterwards leaving it and for a short while joining the Chalcidians at Leontini, was driven out by them and founded Thapsus. After his death his companions were driven out of Thapsus, and founded a place called the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given up the place and inviting them thither.

2 Here they lived two hundred and forty-five years; after which they were expelled from the city and the country by the Syracusan tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion, however, a hundred years after they had settled there, they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus; he having come from their mother country Megara to join them in its foundation.

3 Gela was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading a colony thither, in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The town took its name from the river Gelas, the place where the citadel now stands, and which was first fortified, being called Lindii. The institutions which they adopted were Dorian.

4 Near one hundred and eight years after the foundation of Gela, the Geloans founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so called from the river of that name, and made Aristonous and Pystilus their founders; giving their own institutions to the colony.

5 Zancle was originally founded by pirates from Cuma, the Chalcidian town in the country of the Opicans: afterwards, however, large numbers came from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, and helped to people the place; the founders being Perieres and Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis respectively. It first had the name of Zancle given it by the Sicels, because the place is shaped like a sickle, which the Sicels call Zanclon; but upon the original settlers being afterwards expelled by some Samians and other Ionians who landed in Sicily flying from the Medes,

6 and the Samians in their turn not long afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, the town was by him colonised with a mixed population, and its name changed to Messina, after his old country.

Chapter 5

1 Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most of those who went to the colony being Chalcidians; though they were joined by some exiles from Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called the Myletidae. The language was a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric, but the institutions which prevailed were the Chalcidian.

2 Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, Casmenae nearly twenty after Acrae.

3 Camarina was first founded by the Syracusans, close upon a hundred and thirty-five years after the building of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and Menecolus. But the Camarinaeans being expelled by arms by the Syracusans for having revolted, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time later receiving their land in ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, resettled Camarina, himself acting as its founder. Lastly, it was again depopulated by Gelo, and settled once more for the third time by the Geloans.

Chapter 6

1 Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting Sicily, and such the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were now bent upon invading; being ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole, although they had also the specious design of succouring their kindred and other allies in the island.

2 But they were especially incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens and invoked their aid more urgently than ever. The Egestaeans had gone to war with their neighbours the Selinuntines upon questions of marriage and disputed territory, and the Selinuntines had procured the alliance of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and sea. The Egestaeans now reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches, during the former Leontine war, and begged them to send a fleet to their aid, and among a number of other considerations urged as a capital argument, that if the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation of Leontini, to ruin the allies still left to Athens in Sicily, and to get the whole power of the island into their hands, there would be a danger of their one day coming with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid of their Dorian brethren, and as colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and joining these in pulling down the Athenian empire. The Athenians would, therefore, do well to unite with the allies still left to them, and to make a stand against the Syracusans; especially as they, the Egestaeans, were prepared to furnish money sufficient for the war.

3 The Athenians, hearing these arguments constantly repeated in their assemblies by the Egestaeans and their supporters, voted first to send envoys to Egesta, to see if there was really the money that they talked of in the treasury and temples, and at the same time to ascertain in what posture was the war with the Selinuntines.

Chapter 7

1 The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly despatched to Sicily. The same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the Corinthians expected, marched into the Argive territory, and ravaged a small part of the land, and took some yokes of oxen and carried off some corn. They also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and left them a few soldiers taken from the rest of the army; and after making a truce for a certain while, according to which neither Orneatae nor Argives were to injure each other's territory, returned home with the army.

2 Not long afterwards the Athenians came with thirty ships and six hundred heavy infantry, and the Argives joining them with all their forces, marched out and besieged the men in Orneae for one day; but the garrison escaped by night, the besiegers having bivouacked some way off. The next day the Argives, discovering it, razed Orneae to the ground, and went back again; after which the Athenians went home in their ships.

3 Meanwhile the Athenians took by sea to Methone on the Macedonian border some cavalry of their own and the Macedonian exiles that were at Athens, and plundered the country of Perdiccas.

4 Upon this the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who had a truce with Athens from one ten days to another, urging them to join Perdiccas in the war, which they refused to do. And the winter ended, and with it ended the sixteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.

Chapter 8

1 Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys arrived from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver, as a month's pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask to have sent them.

2 The Athenians held an assembly, and after hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys a report, as attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs generally, and in particular as to the money, of which, it was said, there was abundance in the temples and the treasury, voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, under the command of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of 8enophanes, who were appointed with full powers; they were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to restore Leontini upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to order all other matters in Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens.

3 Five days after this a second assembly was held, to consider the speediest means of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else might be required by the generals for the expedition;

4 and Nicias, who had been chosen to the command against his will, and who thought that the state was not well advised, but upon a slight and specious pretext was aspiring to the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter to achieve, came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise, and gave them the following counsel:—

Chapter 9

1 ‘Although this assembly was convened to consider the preparations to be made for sailing to Sicily, I think, notwithstanding, that we have still this question to examine, whether it be better to send out the ships at all, and that we ought not to give so little consideration to a matter of such moment, or let ourselves be persuaded by foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do.

2 And yet, individually, I gain in honour by such a course, and fear as little as other men for my person—not that I think a man need be any the worse citizen for taking some thought for his person and estate; on the contrary, such a man would for his own sake desire the prosperity of his country more than others—nevertheless, as I have never spoken against my convictions to gain honour, I shall not begin to do so now, but shall say what I think best.

3 Against your character any words of mine would be weak enough; if I were to advise your keeping what you have got and not risking what is actually yours for advantages which are dubious in themselves, and which you may or may not attain. I will, therefore, content myself with showing that your ardour is out of season, and your ambition not easy of accomplishment.

Chapter 10

1 I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go yonder and bring more back with you.

2 You imagine, perhaps, that the treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet—for nominal it has become, owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta—but which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not delay our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention was forced upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them than to us; and secondly, because in this very convention there are many points that are still disputed.

3 Again, some of the most powerful states have never yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some of these are at open war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not yet move) are restrained by truces renewed every ten days,

4 and it is only too probable that if they found our power divided, as we are hurrying to divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would have in the past valued as they would that of few others.

5 A man ought, therefore, to consider these points, and not to think of running risks with a country placed so critically, or of grasping at another empire before we have secured the one we have already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these years in revolt from us without being yet subdued, and others on the continents yield us but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the Egestaeans, our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help them, while the rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for punishment.

Chapter 11

1 And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to be ruled without difficulty. Now it is folly to go against men who could not be kept under even if conquered, while failure would leave us in a very different position from that which we occupied before the enterprise.

2 The Siceliots, again, to take them as they are at present, in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite bugbear of the Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less dangerous to us than before.

3 At present they might possibly come here as separate states for love of Lacedaemon; in the other case one empire would scarcely attack another; for after joining the Peloponnesians to overthrow ours, they could only expect to see the same hands overthrow their own in the same way.

4 The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there at all, and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away again as soon as possible. We all know that that which is farthest off and the reputation of which can least be tested, is the object of admiration; at the least reverse they would at once begin to look down upon us, and would join our enemies here against us.

5 You have yourselves experienced this with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, whom your unexpected success, as compared with what you feared at first, has made you suddenly despise, tempting you further to aspire to the conquest of Sicily.

6 Instead, however, of being puffed up by the misfortunes of your adversaries, you ought to think of breaking their spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence, and to understand that the one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians by their disgrace is how they may even now, if possible, overthrow us and repair their dishonour; inasmuch as military reputation is their oldest and chiefest study.

7 Our struggle, therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily, but how to defend ourselves most effectually against the oligarchical machinations of Lacedaemon.

Chapter 12

1 We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite from a great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our estates and persons, and that it is right to employ these at home on our own behalf, instead of using them on behalf of these exiles whose interest it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do nothing but talk themselves and leave the danger to others, and who if they succeed will show no proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down their friends with them.

2 And if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to command, who urges you to make the expedition, merely for ends of his own—especially if he be still too young to command—who seeks to be admired for his stud of horses, but on account of its heavy expenses hopes for some profit from his appointment, do not allow such an one to maintain his private splendour at his country's risk, but remember that such persons injure the public fortune while they squander their own, and that this is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide or hastily to take in hand.

Chapter 13

1 When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next him, not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely success is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to them the mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now threatened by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on the other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing between us, limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy their own possessions and to settle their own quarrels;

2 that the Egestaeans, for their part, be told to end by themselves with the Selinuntines the war which they began without consulting the Athenians; and that for the future we do not enter into alliance, as we have been used to do, with people whom we must help in their need, and who can never help us in ours.

Chapter 14

1 And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the commonwealth, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put the question to the vote, and take a second time the opinions of the Athenians. If you are afraid to move the question again, consider that a violation of the law cannot carry any prejudice with so many abettors, that you will be the physician of your misguided city, and that the virtue of men in office is briefly this, to do their country as much good as they can, or in any case no harm that they can avoid.’

Chapter 15

1 Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians that came forward spoke in favour of the expedition, and of not annulling what had been voted, although some spoke on the other side.

2 By far the warmest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes.

3 For the position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do with the ruin of the Athenian state.

4 Alarmed at the greatness of his license in his own life and habits, and of the ambition which he showed in all things soever that he undertook, the mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city.

5 Meanwhile he now came forward and gave the following advice to the Athenians:—

Chapter 16

1 ‘Athenians, I have a better right to command than others—I must begin with this as Nicias has attacked me—and at the same time I believe myself to be worthy of it. The things for which I am abused, bring fame to my ancestors and to myself, and to the country profit besides.

2 The Hellenes, after expecting to see our city ruined by the war, concluded it to be even greater than it really is, by reason of the magnificence with which I represented it at the Olympic games, when I sent into the lists seven chariots, a number never before entered by any private person, and won the first prize, and was second and fourth, and took care to have everything else in a style worthy of my victory. Custom regards such displays as honourable, and they cannot be made without leaving behind them an impression of power.

3 Again, any splendour that I may have exhibited at home in providing choruses or otherwise, is naturally envied by my fellow-citizens, but in the eyes of foreigners has an air of strength as in the other instance. And this is no useless folly, when a man at his own private cost benefits not himself only, but his city:

4 nor is it unfair that he who prides himself on his position should refuse to be upon an equality with the rest. He who is badly off has his misfortunes all to himself, and as we do not see men courted in adversity, on the like principle a man ought to accept the insolence of prosperity; or else, let him first mete out equal measure to all, and then demand to have it meted out to him.

5 What I know is that persons of this kind and all others that have attained to any distinction, although they may be unpopular in their lifetime in their relations with their fellow-men and especially with their equals, leave to posterity the desire of claiming connection with them even without any ground, and are vaunted by the country to which they belonged, not as strangers or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes.

6 Such are my aspirations, and however I am abused for them in private, the question is whether any one manages public affairs better than I do. Having united the most powerful states of Peloponnese, without great danger or expense to you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake their all upon the issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although victorious in the battle, they have never since fully recovered confidence.

Chapter 17

1 Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find fitting arguments to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians, and by its ardour win their confidence and prevail. And do not be afraid of my youth now, but while I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears fortunate, avail yourselves to the utmost of the services of us both.

2 Neither rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground that you would be going to attack a great power. The cities in Sicily are peopled by motley rabbles, and easily change their institutions and adopt new ones in their stead;

3 and consequently the inhabitants, being without any feeling of patriotism, are not provided with arms for their persons, and have not regularly established themselves on the land; every man thinks that either by fair words or by party strife he can obtain something at the public expense, and then in the event of a catastrophe settle in some other country, and makes his preparations accordingly.

4 From a mob like this you need not look for either unanimity in counsel or concert in action; but they will probably one by one come in as they get a fair offer, especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are told.

5 Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry as they boast; just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous as each state reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their numbers, and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout this war.

6 The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will be found as I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages, for we shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will the powers at home prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly.

7 Our fathers with these very adversaries, which it is said we shall now leave behind us when we sail, and the Mede as their enemy as well, were able to win the empire, depending solely on their superiority at sea.

8 The Peloponnesians had never so little hope against us at present; and let them be ever so sanguine, although strong enough to invade our country even if we stay at home, they can never hurt us with their navy, as we leave one of our own behind us that is a match for them.

Chapter 18

1 In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to assist them, without objecting that they have not assisted us. We did not take them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas, but that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from coming over here and attacking us.

2 It is thus that empire has been won, both by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant readiness to support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite assistance; since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom they ought to assist, we should make but few new conquests, and should imperil those we have already won. Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made.

3 And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs.

4 Be convinced then that we shall augment our power at home by this adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily, and letting them see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and at the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily may, of the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small advantage of ourselves and our allies.

5 The faculty of staying if successful, or of returning, will be secured to us by our navy, as we shall be superior at sea to all the Siceliots put together.

6 And do not let the do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his setting of the young against the old, turn you from your purpose, but in the good old fashion by which our fathers, old and young together, by their united counsels brought our affairs to their present height, do you endeavour still to advance them; understanding that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one without the other, but that levity, sobriety, and deliberate judgment are strongest when united, and that, by sinking into inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in word but in deed.

7 In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of life is to take one's character and institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can.’

Chapter 19

1 Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them of their oaths and imploring their assistance, the Athenians became more eager for the expedition than before.

2 Nicias, perceiving that it would be now useless to try to deter them by the old line of argument, but thinking that he might perhaps alter their resolution by the extravagance of his estimates, came forward a second time and spoke as follows:—

Chapter 20

1 ‘I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition, and therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to give you my opinion at the present juncture.

2 From all that I hear we are going against cities that are great and not subject to one another, or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from enforced servitude to an easier condition, or in the least likely to accept our rule in exchange for freedom; and, to take only the Hellenic towns, they are very numerous for one island.

3 Besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect to join us from their connection with Leontini, there are seven others armed at all points just like our own power, particularly Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our expedition.

4 These are full of heavy infantry, archers, and darters, have galleys in abundance and crowds to man them; they have also money, partly in the hands of private persons, partly in the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from some of the barbarians as well. But their chief advantage over us lies in the number of their horses, and in the fact that they grow their corn at home instead of importing it.

Chapter 21

1 Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are not to be shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry; especially if the cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be left without friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us with horse to defend ourselves with.

2 It would be disgraceful to have to retire under compulsion, or to send back for reinforcements, owing to want of reflection at first: we must therefore start from home with a competent force, seeing that we are going to sail far from our country, and upon an expedition not like any which you may have undertaken in the quality of allies, among your subject states here in Hellas, where any additional supplies needed were easily drawn from the friendly territory; but we are cutting ourselves off, and going to a land entirely strange, from which during four months in winter it is not even easy for a messenger to get to Athens.

Chapter 22

1 I think, therefore, that we ought to take great numbers of heavy infantry, both from Athens and from our allies, and not merely from our subjects, but also any we may be able to get for love or for money in Peloponnese, and great numbers also of archers and slingers, to make head against the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must have an overwhelming superiority at sea, to enable us the more easily to carry in what we want; and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels, that is to say, wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the mills compelled to serve for pay in the proper proportion; in order that in case of our being weather-bound the armament may not want provisions, as it is not every city that will be able to entertain numbers like ours. We must also provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, so as not to be dependent upon others; and above all we must take with us from home as much money as possible, as the sums talked of as ready at Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any other way.

Chapter 23

1 Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that of the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry in the field, but even at all points superior to him, we shall still find it difficult to conquer Sicily or save ourselves.

2 We must not disguise from ourselves that we go to found a city among strangers and enemies, and that he who undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared to become master of the country the first day he lands, or failing in this to find everything hostile to him.

3 Fearing this, and knowing that we shall have need of much good counsel and more good fortune—a hard matter for mortal men to aspire to—I wish as far as may be to make myself independent of fortune before sailing, and when I do sail, to be as safe as a strong force can make me.

4 This I believe to be surest for the country at large, and safest for us who are to go on the expedition. If any one thinks differently I resign to him my command.’

Chapter 24

1 With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to sail on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible.

2 The Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage taken away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more eager for it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what Nicias had thought, as it was held that he had given good advice, and that the expedition would be the safest in the world.

3 All alike fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt that they should come safe home again; while the idea of the common people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for the future.

4 With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked it not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept quiet.

Chapter 25

1 At last one of the Athenians came forward and called upon Nicias and told him that he ought not to make excuses or put them off, but say at once before them all what forces the Athenians should vote him.

2 Upon this he said, not without reluctance, that he would advise upon that matter more at leisure with his colleagues; as far however as he could see at present, they must sail with at least one hundred galleys—the Athenians providing as many transports as they might determine, and sending for others from the allies—not less than five thousand heavy infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and if possible more; and the rest of the armament in proportion; archers from home and from Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might seem desirable, being got ready by the generals and taken with them.

Chapter 26

1 Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals should have full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and of the expedition generally, to do as they judged best for the interests of Athens.

2 After this the preparations began; messages being sent to the allies and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city had just recovered from the plague and the long war, and a number of young men had grown up and capital had accumulated by reason of the truce, everything was the more easily provided.

Chapter 27

1 In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermae in the city of Athens, that is to say the customary square figures so common in the doorways of private houses and temples, had in one night most of them their faces mutilated.

2 No one knew who had done it, but large public rewards were offered to find the authors; and it was further voted that any one who knew of any other act of impiety having been committed should come and give information without fear of consequences, whether he were citizen, alien, or slave.

3 The matter was taken up the more seriously, as it was thought to be ominous for the expedition, and part of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and to upset the democracy.

Chapter 28

1 Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body servants, not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations of other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic, and of mock celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take place in private houses.

2 Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken hold of by those who could least endure him, because he stood in the way of their obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people, and who thought that if he were once removed the first place would be theirs. These accordingly magnified the manner and loudly proclaimed that the affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were part and parcel of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that nothing of all this had been done without Alcibiades; the proofs alleged being the general and undemocratic license of his life and habits.

Chapter 29

1 Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question, and also before going on the expedition, the preparations for which were now complete, offered to stand his trial, that it might be seen whether he was guilty of the acts imputed to him; desiring to be punished if found guilty, but, if acquitted, to take the command.

2 Meanwhile he protested against their receiving slanders against him in his absence, and begged them rather to put him to death at once if he were guilty, and pointed out the imprudence of sending him out at the head of so large an army, with so serious a charge still undecided.

3 But his enemies feared that he would have the army for him if he were tried immediately, and that the people might relent in favour of the man whom they already caressed as the cause of the Argives and some of the Mantineans joining in the expedition, and did their utmost to get this proposition rejected, putting forward other orators who said that he ought at present to sail and not delay the departure of the army, and be tried on his return within a fixed number of days; their plan being to have him sent for and brought home for trial upon some graver charge, which they would the more easily get up in his absence. Accordingly it was decreed that he should sail.

Chapter 30

1 After this the departure for Sicily took place, it being now about midsummer. Most of the allies, with the corn transports and the smaller craft and the rest of the expedition, had already received orders to muster at Corcyra, to cross the Ionian sea from thence in a body to the Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves, and such of their allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piraeus upon a day appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for putting out to sea.

2 With them also went down the whole population, one may say, of the city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of the country each escorting those that belonged to them, their friends, their relatives, or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their way, as they thought of the conquests which they hoped to make, or of the friends whom they might never see again, considering the long voyage which they were going to make from their country.

Chapter 31

1 Indeed, at this moment, when they were now upon the point of parting from one another, the danger came more home to them than when they voted for the expedition; although the strength of the armament, and the profuse provision which they remarked in every department, was a sight that could not but comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of the crowd, they simply went to see a sight worth looking at and passing all belief.Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single city up to that time.

2 In mere number of ships and heavy infantry that against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same when going against Potidaea under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing as it did four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and one hundred galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and many allies besides.

3 But these were sent upon a short voyage and with a scanty equipment. The present expedition was formed in contemplation of a long term of service by land and sea alike, and was furnished with ships and troops so as to be ready for either as required. The fleet had been elaborately equipped at great cost to the captains and the state; the treasury giving a drachma a day to each seaman, and providing empty ships, sixty men of war and forty transports, and manning these with the best crews obtainable; while the captains gave a bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury to the thranitae and crews generally, besides spending lavishly upon figure-heads and equipments, and one and all making the utmost exertions to enable their own ships to excel in beauty and fast sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been picked from the best muster-rolls, and vied with each other in paying great attention to their arms and personal accoutrements.

4 From this resulted not only a rivalry among themselves in their different departments, but an idea among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a display of power and resources than an armament against an enemy.

5 For if any one had counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private outlay of individuals—that is to say, the sums which the state had already spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the hands of the generals, and those which individuals had expended upon their personal outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and were still to lay out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey money which each was likely to have provided himself with, independently of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage of such length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for the purpose of exchange—it would have been found that many talents in all were being taken out of the city.

6 Indeed the expedition became not less famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was the longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most ambitious in its objects considering the resources of those who undertook it.

Chapter 32

1 The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which they meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers customary before putting out to sea were offered, not in each ship by itself, but by all together to the voice of a herald; and bowls of wine were mixed through all the armament, and libations made by the soldiers and their officers in gold and silver goblets.

2 In their prayers joined also the crowds on shore, the citizens and all others that wished them well. The hymn sung and the libations finished, they put out to sea, and first sailing out in column then raced each other as far as Aegina, and so hastened to reach Corcyra where the rest of the allied forces were also assembling.

3 Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the expedition, but for a long while met with no credence whatever. Indeed, an assembly was held in which speeches, as will be seen, were delivered by different orators, believing or contradicting the report of the Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates, son of Hermon, came forward, being persuaded that he knew the truth of the matter, and gave the following counsel:—

Chapter 33

1 ‘Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have been when I speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I know that those who either make or repeat statements thought not worthy of belief not only gain no converts, but are thought fools for their pains, I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my tongue when the state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can speak with more authority on the matter than other persons.

2 Much as you wonder at it, the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us with a large force, naval and military, professedly to help the Egestaeans and to restore Leontini, but really to conquer Sicily, and above all our city, which once gained, the rest, they think, will easily follow.

3 Make up your minds, therefore, to see them speedily here, and see how you can best repel them with the means under your hands, and do not be taken off your guard through despising the news, or neglect the common weal through disbelieving it.

4 Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at the force or daring of the enemy. They will not be able to do us more hurt than we shall do them; nor is the greatness of their armament altogether without advantage to us. Indeed, the greater it is the better, with regard to the rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay will make more ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away, disappointed of the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a moment that they will get what they want), it will be a most glorious exploit for us, and in my judgment by no means an unlikely one.

5 Few indeed have been the large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian, that have gone far from home and been successful. They cannot be more numerous than the people of the country and their neighbours, all of whom fear leagues together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies in a foreign land, to those against whom their plans were laid none the less they leave renown, although they may themselves have been the main cause of their own discomfort.

6 Thus these very Athenians rose by the defeat of the Mede, in a great measure due to accidental causes, from the mere fact that Athens had been the object of his attack; and this may very well be the case with us also.

Chapter 34

1 Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance of others, and despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the danger is common to all, and to Italy to get them to become our allies, or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians.

2 I also think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by no means there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear that the Athenians may one day attack their city, and they may perhaps think that they might themselves suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if not in another. They are the best able to do so, if they will, of any of the present day, as they possess most gold and silver, by which war, like everything else, flourishes.

3 Let us also send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask them to come here and help us as soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in Hellas.

4 But the true thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the present moment, is what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see, and what I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together, or at least as many as possible besides ourselves, would only launch the whole of our actual navy with two months' provisions, and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, and show them that before fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their passage across the Ionian sea, we should strike dismay into their army, and set them on thinking that we have a base for our defensive—for Tarentum is ready to receive us—while they have a wide sea to cross with all their armament, which could with difficulty keep its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to attack as it came on slowly and in small detachments.

5 On the other hand, if they were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast sailors and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not choose to do so, we could retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed with few provisions just to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate places, and would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of their armament, and being further discouraged by not knowing for certain whether the cities would receive them.

6 In my opinion this consideration alone would be sufficient to deter them from putting out from Corcyra; and what with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts, they would let the season go on until winter was upon them, or, confounded by so unexpected a circumstance, would break up the expedition, especially as their most experienced general has, as I hear, taken the command against his will, and would grasp at the first excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours.

7 We should also be reported, I am certain, as more numerous than we really are, and men's minds are affected by what they hear, and besides the first to attack, or to show that they mean to defend themselves against an attack, inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for the emergency.

8 This would just be the case with the Athenians at present. They are now attacking us in the belief that we shall not resist, having a right to judge us severely because we did not help the Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if they were to see us showing a courage for which they are not prepared, they would be more dismayed by the surprise than they could ever be by our actual power.

9 I could wish to persuade you to show this courage; but if this cannot be, at all events lose not a moment in preparing generally for the war; and remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is best shown by bravery in action, but that for the present the best course is to accept the preparations which fear inspires as giving the surest promise of safety, and to act as if the danger was real. That the Athenians are coming to attack us, and are already upon the voyage, and all but here—this is what I am sure of.’

Chapter 35

1 Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were at great strife among themselves; some contending that the Athenians had no idea of coming and that there was no truth in what he said; some asking if they did come what harm they could do that would not be repaid them tenfold in return; while others made light of the whole affair and turned it into ridicule. In short, there were few that believed Hermocrates and feared for the future.

2 Meanwhile Athenagoras, the leader of the people and very powerful at that time with the masses, came forward and spoke as follows:—

Chapter 36

1 ‘For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they may be as misguided as they are supposed to be, and that they may come here to become our subjects, is either a coward or a traitor to his country; while as for those who carry such tidings and fill you with so much alarm, I wonder less at their audacity than at their folly if they flatter themselves that we do not see through them.

2 The fact is that they have their private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw the city into consternation to have their own terrors cast into the shade by the public alarm. In short, this is what these reports are worth; they do not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who are always causing agitation here in Sicily.

3 However, if you are well advised, you will not be guided in your calculation of probabilities by what these persons tell you, but by what shrewd men and of large experience, as I esteem the Athenians to be, would be likely to do.

4 Now it is not likely that they would leave the Peloponnesians behind them, and before they have well ended the war in Hellas wantonly come in quest of a new war quite as arduous, in Sicily; indeed, in my judgment, they are only too glad that we do not go and attack them, being so many and so great cities as we are.

Chapter 37

1 However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily better able to go through with the war than Peloponnese, as being at all points better prepared, and our city by itself far more than a match for this pretended army of invasion, even were it twice as large again. I know that they will not have horses with them, or get any here, except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring a force of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which will already have enough to do to come all this distance, however lightly laden, not to speak of the transport of the other stores required against a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight quantity.

2 In fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I do not well see how they could avoid annihilation if they brought with them another city as large as Syracuse, and settled down and carried on war from our frontier; much less can they hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile to them, as all Sicily will be, and with only a camp pitched from the ships, and composed of tents and bare necessaries, from which they would not be able to stir far for fear of our cavalry.

Chapter 38

1 But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and as I have reason to know are looking after their possessions at home, while persons here invent stories that neither are true nor ever will be.

2 Nor is this the first time that I see these persons, when they cannot resort to deeds, trying by such stories and by others even more abominable to frighten your people and get into their hands the government: it is what I see always. And I cannot help fearing that trying so often they may one day succeed, and that we, as long as we do not feel the smart, may prove too weak for the task of prevention, or, when the offenders are known, of pursuit.

3 The result is that our city is rarely at rest, but is subject to constant troubles and to contests as frequent against herself as against the enemy, not to speak of occasional tyrannies and infamous cabals.

4 However, I will try, if you will support me, to let nothing of this happen in our time, by gaining you, the many, and by chastising the authors of such machinations, not merely when they are caught in the act—a difficult feat to accomplish—but also for what they have the wish though not the power to do; as is necessary to punish an enemy not only for what he does, but also beforehand for what he intends to do, if the first to relax precaution would not be also the first to suffer. I shall also reprove, watch, and on occasion warn the few—the most effectual way, in my opinion, of turning them from their evil courses.

5 And after all, as I have often asked—What would you have, young men? Would you hold office at once? The law forbids it, a law enacted rather because you are not competent than to disgrace you when competent. Meanwhile you would not be on a legal equality with the many! But how can it be right that citizens of the same state should be held unworthy of the same privileges?

Chapter 39

1 It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor equitable, but that the holders of property are also the best fitted to rule. I say, on the contrary, first, that the word “demos,” or people, includes the whole state, oligarchy only a part; next, that if the best guardians of property are the rich, and the best counsellors the wise, none can hear and decide so well as the many; and that all these talents, severally and collectively, have their just place in a democracy.

2 But an oligarchy gives the many their share of the danger, and not content with the largest part takes and keeps the whole of the profit; and this is what the powerful and young among you aspire to, but in a great city cannot possibly obtain.

Chapter 40

1 But even now, foolish men, most senseless of all the Hellenes that I know, if you have no sense of the wickedness of your designs, or most criminal if you have that sense and still dare to pursue them,—even now, if it is not a case for repentance, you may still learn wisdom, and thus advance the interest of the country, the common interest of us all. Reflect that in the country's prosperity the men of merit in your ranks will have a share and a larger share than the great mass of your fellow-countrymen, but that if you have other designs you run a risk of being deprived of all; and desist from reports like these, as the people know your object and will not put up with it.

2 If the Athenians arrive, this city will repulse them in a manner worthy of itself; we have, moreover, generals who will see to this matter. And if nothing of this be true, as I incline to believe, the city will not be thrown into a panic by your intelligence, or impose upon itself a self-chosen servitude by choosing you for its rulers; the city itself will look into the matter, and will judge your words as if they were acts, and instead of allowing itself to be deprived of its liberty by listening to you, will strive to preserve that liberty, by taking care to have always at hand the means of making itself respected.’

Chapter 41

1 Such were the words of Athenagoras. One of the generals now stood up and stopped any other speakers coming forward, adding these words of his own with reference to the matter in hand:—

2 ‘It is not well for speakers to utter calumnies against one another, or for their hearers to entertain them; we ought rather to look to the intelligence that we have received, and see how each man by himself and the city as a whole may best prepare to repel the invaders.

3 Even if there be no need, there is no harm in the state being furnished with horses and arms and all other insignia of war;

4 and we will undertake to see to and order this, and to send round to the cities to reconnoitre and do all else that may appear desirable. Part of this we have seen to already, and whatever we discover shall Syracusans departed from the assembly.

Chapter 42

1 In the meantime the Athenians with all their allies had now arrived at Corcyra. Here the generals began by again reviewing the armament, and made arrangements as to the order in which they were to anchor and encamp, and dividing the whole fleet into three divisions, allotted one to each of their number, to avoid sailing all together and being thus embarrassed for water, harbourage, or provisions at the stations which they might touch at, and at the same time to be generally better ordered and easier to handle, by each squadron having its own commander.

2 Next they sent on three ships to Italy and Sicily to find out which of the cities would receive them, with instructions to meet them on the way and let them know before they put in to land.

Chapter 43

1 After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra, and proceeded to cross to Sicily with an armament now consisting of one hundred and thirty-four galleys in all (besides two Rhodian fifty-oars) of which one hundred were Athenian vessels—sixty men-of-war, and forty troopships—and the remainder from Chios and the other allies; five thousand and one hundred heavy infantry in all, that is to say, fifteen hundred Athenian citizens from the rolls at Athens and seven hundred Thetes shipped as marines, and the rest allied troops, some of them Athenian subjects, and besides these five hundred Argives, and two hundred and fifty Mantineans serving for hire; four hundred and eighty archers in all, eighty of whom were Cretans, seven hundred slingers from Rhodes, one hundred and twenty light-armed exiles from Megara, and one horse-transport carrying thirty horses.

Chapter 44

1 Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the war. The supplies for this force were carried by thirty ships of burden laden with corn, which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons and carpenters, and the tools for raising fortifications, accompanied by one hundred boats, like the former pressed into the service, besides many other boats and ships of burden which followed the armament voluntarily for purposes of trade; all of which now left Corcyra and struck across the Ionian sea together.

2 The whole force making land at the Iapygian promontory and Tarentum, with more or less good fortune, coasted along the shores of Italy, the cities shutting their markets and gates against them, and according them nothing but water and liberty to anchor, and Tarentum and Locri not even that, until they arrived at Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy.

3 Here at length they reunited, and not gaining admission within the walls pitched a camp outside the city in the precinct of Artemis, where a market was also provided for them, and drew their ships on shore and kept quiet. Meanwhile they opened negotiations with the Rhegians, and called upon them as Chalcidians to assist their Leontine kinsmen; to which the Rhegians replied that they would not side with either party, but should await the decision of the rest of the Italiots, and do as they did.

4 Upon this the Athenians now began to consider what would be the best action to take in the affairs of Sicily, and meanwhile waited for the ships sent on to come back from Egesta, in order to know whether there was really there the money mentioned by the messengers at Athens.

Chapter 45

1 In the meantime came in from all quarters to the Syracusans, as well as from their own officers sent to reconnoitre, the positive tidings that the fleet was at Rhegium; upon which they laid aside their incredulity and threw themselves heart and soul into the work of preparation. Guards or envoys, as the case might be, were sent round to the Sicels, garrisons put into the posts of the Peripoli in the country, horses and arms reviewed in the city to see that nothing was wanting, and all other steps taken to prepare for a war which might be upon them at any moment.

Chapter 46

1 Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent on came from Egesta to the Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that so far from there being the sums promised, all that could be produced was thirty talents.

2 The generals were not a little disheartened at being thus disappointed at the outset, and by the refusal to join in the expedition of the Rhegians, the people they had first tried to gain and had had most reason to count upon, from their relationship to the Leontines and constant friendship for Athens. If Nicias was prepared for the news from Egesta, his two colleagues were taken completely by surprise.

3 The Egestaeans had had recourse to the following stratagem, when the first envoys from Athens came to inspect their resources. They took the envoys in question to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the treasures deposited there; bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a large number of other pieces of plate, which from being in silver gave an impression of wealth quite out of proportion to their really small value. They also privately entertained the ships' crews, and collected all the cups of gold and silver that they could find in Egesta itself or could borrow in the neighbouring Phoenician and Hellenic towns, and each brought them to the banquets as their own;

4 and as all used pretty nearly the same, and everywhere a great quantity of plate was shown, the effect was most dazzling upon the Athenian sailors, and made them talk loudly of the riches they had seen when they got back to Athens.

5 The dupes in question—who had in their turn persuaded the rest—when the news got abroad that there was not the money supposed at Egesta, were much blamed by the soldiers.

Chapter 47

1 Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The opinion of Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the main object of the expedition, and if the Egestaeans could provide money for the whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could not, to require them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between them and the Selinuntines either by force or by agreement, and then to coast past the other cities, and after displaying the power of Athens and proving their zeal for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they should have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the Leontines, or of bringing over some of the other cities), and not to endanger the state by wasting its home resources.

Chapter 48

1 Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not disgrace itself by going away without having done anything; heralds must be sent to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and efforts be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans, and to obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn and troops; and first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the passage and entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent harbour and base for the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing who would be their allies in the war, they might at length attack Syracuse and Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with Egesta and the former ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini.

Chapter 49

1 Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight to Syracuse, and fight their battle at once under the walls of the town while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at its height.

2 Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed time to run on without showing itself, men's courage revived, and they saw it appear at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly, while Syracuse still trembled at their coming, they would have the best chance of gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a complete panic into the enemy by the aspect of their numbers—which would never appear so considerable as at present—by the anticipation of coming disaster, and above all by the immediate danger of the engagement.

3 They might also count upon surprising many in the fields outside, incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his property the army would not want for booty if it sat down in force before the city.

4 The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less disposed to enter into alliance with the Syracusans, and would join the Athenians, without waiting to see which were the strongest. They must make Megara their naval station as a place to retreat to and a base from which to attack: it was an uninhabited place at no great distance from Syracuse either by land or by sea.

Chapter 50

1 After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed in his own vessel across to Messina with proposals of alliance, but met with no success, the inhabitants answering that they could not receive him within their walls, though they would provide him with a market outside. Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium.

2 Immediately upon his return the generals manned and victualled sixty ships out of the whole fleet and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament behind them at Rhegium with one of their number.

3 Received by the Naxians, they then coasted on to Catana, and being refused admittance by the inhabitants, there being a Syracusan party in the town, went on to the river Terias.

4 Here they bivouacked, and the next day sailed in single file to Syracuse with all their ships except ten which they sent on in front to sail into the great harbour and see if there was any fleet launched, and to proclaim by herald from shipboard that the Athenians were come to restore the Leontines to their country, as being their allies and kinsmen, and that such of them, therefore, as were in Syracuse should leave it without fear and join their friends and benefactors the Athenians.

5 After making this proclamation and reconnoitring the city and the harbours, and the features of the country which they would have to make their base of operations in the war, they sailed back to Catana.

Chapter 51

1 An assembly being held here, the inhabitants refused to received the armament, but invited the generals to come in and say what they desired; and while Alcibiades was speaking and the citizens were intent on the assembly, the soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up postern-gate without being observed, and getting inside the town, flocked into the marketplace.

2 The Syracusan party in the town no sooner saw the army inside than they became frightened and withdrew, not being at all numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians and invited them to fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium.

3 After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and put off, this time with all the armament, for Catana, and fell to work at their camp immediately upon their arrival.

Chapter 52

1 Meanwhile word was brought them from Camarina that if they went there the town would go over to them, and also that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. The Athenians accordingly sailed along shore with all their armament, first to Syracuse, where they found no fleet manning, and so always along the coast to Camarina, where they brought to at the beach, and sent a herald to the people, who, however, refused to receive them, saying that their oaths bound them to receive the Athenians only with a single vessel, unless they themselves sent for more.

2 Disappointed here, the Athenians now sailed back again, and after landing and plundering on Syracusan territory and losing some stragglers from their light infantry through the coming up of the Syracusan horse, so got back to Catana.

Chapter 53

1 There they found the Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades, with orders for him to sail home to answer the charges which the state brought against him, and for certain others of the soldiers who with him were accused of sacrilege in the matter of the mysteries and of the Hermae.

2 For the Athenians, after the departure of the expedition, had continued as active as ever in investigating the facts of the mysteries and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing the informers, in their suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently, arresting and imprisoning the best citizens upon the evidence of rascals, and preferring to sift the matter to the bottom sooner than to let an accused person of good character pass unquestioned, owing to the rascality of the informer.

3 The commons had heard how oppressive the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had become before it ended, and further that that tyranny had been put down at last, not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians, and so were always in fear and took everything suspiciously.

Chapter 54

1 Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and Harmodius was undertaken in consequence of a love affair, which I shall relate at some length, to show that the Athenians are not more accurate than the rest of the world in their accounts of their own tyrants and of the facts of their own history.

2 Pisistratus dying at an advanced age in possession of the tyranny, was succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias, and not Hipparchus, as is vulgarly believed. Harmodius was then in the flower of youthful beauty, and Aristogiton, a citizen in the middle rank of life, was his lover and possessed him.

3 Solicited without success by Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, Harmodius told Aristogiton, and the enraged lover, afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might take Harmodius by force, immediately formed a design, such as his condition in life permitted, for overthrowing the tyranny.

4 In the meantime Hipparchus, after a second solicitation of Harmodius, attended with no better success, unwilling to use violence, arranged to insult him in some covert way.

5 Indeed, generally their government was not grievous to the multitude, or in any way odious in practice; and these tyrants cultivated wisdom and virtue as much as any, and without exacting from the Athenians more than a twentieth of their income, splendidly adorned their city, and carried on their wars, and provided sacrifices for the temples.

6 For the rest, the city was left in full enjoyment of its existing laws, except that care was always taken to have the offices in the hands of some one of the family. Among those of them that held the yearly archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, son of the tyrant Hippias, and named after his grandfather, who dedicated during his term of office the altar to the twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct.

7 The Athenian people afterwards built on to and lengthened the altar in the market-place, and obliterated the inscription; but that in the Pythian precinct can still be seen, though in faded letters, and is to the following effect:— / Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, / Set up this record of his archonship / In precinct of Apollo Pythias.

Chapter 55

1 That Hippias was the eldest son and succeeded to the government, is what I positively assert as a fact upon which I have had more exact accounts than others, and may be also ascertained by the following circumstance. He is the only one of the legitimate brothers that appears to have had children; as the altar shows, and the pillar placed in the Athenian Acropolis, commemorating the crime of the tyrants, which mentions no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but five of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, son of Hyperechides; and naturally the eldest would have married first.

2 Again, his name comes first on the pillar after that of his father, and this too is quite natural, as he was the eldest after him, and the reigning tyrant.

3 Nor can I ever believe that Hippias would have obtained the tyranny so easily, if Hipparchus had been in power when he was killed, and he, Hippias, had had to establish himself upon the same day; but he had no doubt been long accustomed to over-awe the citizens, and to be obeyed by his mercenaries, and thus not only conquered, but conquered with ease, without experiencing any of the embarrassment of a younger brother unused to the exercise of authority.

4 It was the sad fate which made Hipparchus famous that got him also the credit with posterity of having been tyrant.

Chapter 56

1 To return to Harmodius; Hipparchus having been repulsed in his solicitations insulted him as he had resolved, by first inviting a sister of his, a young girl, to come and bear a basket in a certain procession, and then rejecting her, on the plea that she had never been invited at all owing to her unworthiness.

2 If Harmodius was indignant at this, Aristogiton for his sake now became more exasperated than ever; and having arranged everything with those who were to join them in the enterprise, they only waited for the great feast of the Panathenaea, the sole day upon which the citizens forming part of the procession could meet together in arms without suspicion. Aristogiton and Harmodius were to begin, but were to be supported immediately by their accomplices against the bodyguard.

3 The conspirators were not many, for better security, besides which they hoped that those not in the plot would be carried away by the example of a few daring spirits, and use the arms in their hands to recover their liberty.

Chapter 57

1 At last the festival arrived; and Hippias with his bodyguard was outside the city in the Ceramicus, arranging how the different parts of the procession were to proceed. Harmodius and Aristogiton had already their daggers and were getting ready to act,

2 when seeing one of their accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who was easy of access to every one, they took fright, and concluded that they were discovered and on the point of being taken;

3 and eager if possible to be revenged first upon the man who had wronged them and for whom they had undertaken all this risk, they rushed, as they were, within the gates, and meeting with Hipparchus by the Leocorium recklessly fell upon him at once, infuriated, Aristogiton by love, and Harmodius by insult, and smote him and slew him.

4 Aristogiton escaped the guards at the moment, through the crowd running up, but was afterwards taken and dispatched in no merciful way: Harmodius was killed on the spot.

Chapter 58

1 When the news was brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he at once proceeded not to the scene of action, but to the armed men in the procession, before they, being some distance away, knew anything of the matter, and composing his features for the occasion, so as not to betray himself, pointed to a certain spot, and bade them repair thither without their arms.

2 They withdrew accordingly, fancying he had something to say; upon which he told the mercenaries to remove the arms, and there and then picked out the men he thought guilty and all found with daggers, the shield and spear being the usual weapons for a procession.

Chapter 59

1 In this way offended love first led Harmodius and Aristogiton to conspire, and the alarm of the moment to commit the rash action recounted.

2 After this the tyranny pressed harder on the Athenians, and Hippias, now grown more fearful, put to death many of the citizens, and at the same time began to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge in case of revolution.

3 Thus, although an Athenian, he gave his daughter, Archedice, to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus, seeing that they had great influence with Darius. And there is her tomb in Lampsacus with this inscription:— / Archedice lies buried in this earth, / Hippias her sire, and Athens gave her birth; / Unto her bosom pride was never known, / Though daughter, wife, and sister to the throne.

4 Hippias, after reigning three years longer over the Athenians was deposed in the fourth by the Lacedaemonians and the banished Alcmaeonidae, and went with a safe conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides at Lampsacus, and from thence to King Darius; from whose court he set out twenty years after, in his old age, and came with the Medes to Marathon.

Chapter 60

1 With these events in their minds, and recalling everything they knew by hearsay on the subject, the Athenian people grew difficult of humour and suspicious of the persons charged in the affair of the mysteries, and persuaded that all that had taken place was part of an oligarchical and monarchical conspiracy.

2 In the state of irritation thus produced, many persons of consideration had been already thrown into prison, and far from showing any signs of abating, public feeling grew daily more savage, and more arrests were made; until at last one of those in custody, thought to be the most guilty of all, was induced by a fellow-prisoner to make a revelation, whether true or not is a matter on which there are two opinions, no one having been able, either then or since, to say for certain who did the deed.

3 However this may be, the other found arguments to persuade him, that even if he had not done it, he ought to save himself by gaining a promise of impunity, and free the state of its present suspicions; as he would be surer of safety if he confessed after promise of impunity than if he denied and were brought to trial.

4 He accordingly made a revelation, affecting himself and others in the affair of the Hermae; and the Athenian people, glad at last, as they supposed, to get at the truth, and furious until then at not being able to discover those who had conspired against the commons, at once let go the informer and all the rest whom he had not denounced, and bringing the accused to trial executed as many as were apprehended, and condemned to death such as had fled and set a price upon their heads.

5 In this it was, after all, not clear whether the sufferers had been punished unjustly, while in any case the rest of the city received immediate and manifest relief.

Chapter 61

1 To return to Alcibiades: public feeling was very hostile to him, being worked on by the same enemies who had attacked him before he went out; and now that the Athenians fancied that they had got at the truth of the matter of the Hermae, they believed more firmly than ever that the affair of the mysteries also, in which he was implicated, had been contrived by him in the same intention and was connected with the plot against the democracy.

2 Meanwhile it so happened that, just at the time of this agitation, a small force of Lacedaemonians had advanced as far as the Isthmus, in pursuance of some scheme with the Boeotians. It was now thought that this had come by appointment, at his instigation, and not on account of the Boeotians, and that if the citizens had not acted on the information received, and forestalled them by arresting the prisoners, the city would have been betrayed. The citizens went so far as to sleep one night armed in the temple of Theseus within the walls.

3 The friends also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at this time suspected of a design to attack the commons; and the Argive hostages deposited in the islands were given up by the Athenians to the Argive people to be put to death upon that account:

4 in short, everywhere something was found to create suspicion against Alcibiades. It was therefore decided to bring him to trial and execute him, and the Salaminia was sent to Sicily for him and the others named in the information, with instructions to order him to come and answer the charges against him,

5 but not to arrest him, because they wished to avoid causing any agitation in the army or among the enemy in Sicily, and above all to retain the services of the Mantineans and Argives, who, it was thought, had been induced to join by his influence.

6 Alcibiades, with his own ship and his fellow-accused, accordingly sailed off with the Salaminia from Sicily, as though to return to Athens, and went with her as far as Thurii, and there they left the ship and disappeared, being afraid to go home for trial with such a prejudice existing against them.

7 The crew of the Salaminia stayed some time looking for Alcibiades and his companions, and at length, as they were nowhere to be found, set sail and departed. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, crossed in a boat not long after from Thurii to Peloponnese; and the Athenians passed sentence of death by default upon him and those in his company.

Chapter 62

1 The Athenian generals left in Sicily now divided the armament into two parts, and each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole for Selinus and Egesta, wishing to know whether the Egestaeans would give the money, and to look into the question of Selinus and ascertain the state of the quarrel between her and Egesta.

2 Coasting along Sicily, with the shore on their left, on the side towards the Tyrrhene Gulf, they touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in that part of the island, and being refused admission resumed their voyage.

3 On their way they took Hyccara, a petty Sicanian seaport, nevertheless at war with Egesta, and making slaves of the inhabitants gave up the town to the Egestaeans, some of whose horse had joined them; after which the army proceeded through the territory of the Sicels until it reached Catana, while the fleet sailed along the coast with the slaves on board.

4 Meanwhile Nicias sailed straight from Hyccara along the coast and went to Egesta, and after transacting his other business and receiving thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They now sold their slaves for the sum of one hundred and twenty talents,

5 and sailed round to their Sicel allies to urge them to send troops; and meanwhile went with half their own force to the hostile town of Hybla in the territory of Gela, but did not succeed in taking it.

Chapter 63

1 Summer was now over. The winter following, the Athenians at once began to prepare for moving on Syracuse, and the Syracusans on their side for marching against them.

2 From the moment when the Athenians failed to attack them instantly as they at first feared and expected, every day that passed did something to revive their courage; and when they saw them sailing far away from them on the other side of Sicily, and going to Hybla only to fail in their attempts to storm it, they thought less of them than ever, and called upon their generals, as the multitude is apt to do in its moments of confidence, to lead them to Catana, since the enemy would not come to them.

3 Parties also of the Syracusan horse employed in reconnoitring constantly rode up to the Athenian armament, and among other insults asked them whether they had not really come to settle with the Syracusans in a foreign country rather than to resettle the Leontines in their own.

Chapter 64

1 Aware of this, the Athenian generals determined to draw them out in mass as far as possible from the city, and themselves in the meantime to sail by night along shore, and take up at their leisure a convenient position. This they knew they could not so well do, if they had to disembark from their ships in front of a force prepared for them, or to go by land openly. The numerous cavalry of the Syracusans (a force which they were themselves without), would then be able to do the greatest mischief to their light troops and the crowd that followed them; but this plan would enable them to take up a position in which the horse could do them no hurt worth speaking of, some Syracusan exiles with the army having told them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they afterwards occupied. In pursuance of their idea, the generals imagined the following stratagem.

2 They sent to Syracuse a man devoted to them, and by the Syracusan generals thought to be no less in their interest; he was a native of Catana, and said he came from persons in that place, whose names the Syracusan generals were acquainted with, and whom they knew to be among the members of their party still left in the city.

3 He told them that the Athenians passed the night in the town, at some distance from their arms, and that if the Syracusans would name a day and come with all their people at daybreak to attack the armament, they, their friends, would close the gates upon the troops in the city, and set fire to the vessels, while the Syracusans would easily take the camp by an attack upon the stockade. In this they would be aided by many of the Catanians, who were already prepared to act, and from whom he himself came.

Chapter 65

1 The generals of the Syracusans, who did not want confidence, and who had intended even without this to march on Catana, believed the man without any sufficient inquiry, fixed at once a day upon which they would be there, and dismissed him, and the Selinuntines and others of their allies having now arrived, gave orders for all the Syracusans to march out in mass. Their preparations completed, and the time fixed for their arrival being at hand, they set out for Catana, and passed the night upon the river Symaethus, in the Leontine territory.

2 Meanwhile the Athenians no sooner knew of their approach than they took all their forces and such of the Sicels or others as had joined them, put them on board their ships and boats, and sailed by night to Syracuse.

3 Thus, when morning broke the Athenians were landing opposite the Olympieum ready to seize their camping ground, and the Syracusan horse having ridden up first to Catana and found that all the armament had put to sea, turned back and told the infantry, and then all turned back together, and went to the relief of the city.

Chapter 66

1 In the meantime, as the march before the Syracusans was a long one, the Athenians quietly sate down their army in a convenient position, where they could begin an engagement when they pleased, and where the Syracusan cavalry would have least opportunity of annoying them, either before or during the action, being fenced off on one side by walls, houses, trees, and by a marsh, and on the other by cliffs.

2 They also felled the neighbouring trees and carried them down to the sea, and formed a palisade alongside of their ships, and with stones which they picked up and wood hastily raised a fort at Daskon, the most vulnerable point of their position, and broke down the bridge over the Anapus.

3 These preparations were allowed to go on without any interruption from the city, the first hostile force to appear being the Syracusan cavalry, followed afterwards by all the foot together. At first they came close up to the Athenian army, and then, finding that they did not offer to engage, crossed the Helorine road and encamped for the night.

Chapter 67

1 The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, their dispositions being as follows:—Their right wing was occupied by the Argives and Mantineans, the centre by the Athenians, and the rest of the field by the other allies. Half their army was drawn up eight deep in advance, half close to their tents in a hollow square, formed also eight deep, which had orders to look out and be ready to go to the support of the troops hardest pressed. The camp followers were placed inside this reserve.

2 The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed their heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the mass-levy of their own people, and such allies as had joined them, the strongest contingent being that of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of the Geloans, numbering two hundred in all, with about twenty horse and fifty archers from Camarina. The cavalry was posted on their right, full twelve hundred strong, and next to it the darters.

3 As the Athenians were about to begin the attack, Nicias went along the lines, and addressed these words of encouragement to the army and the nations composing it:—

Chapter 68

1 ‘Soldiers, a long exhortation is little needed by men like ourselves, who are here to fight in the same battle, the force itself being, to my thinking, more fit to inspire confidence than a fine speech with a weak army.

2 Where we have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the first of the islanders in the ranks together, it were strange indeed, with so many and so brave companions in arms, if we did not feel confident of victory; especially when we have mass-levies opposed to our picked troops, and what is more, Siceliots, who may disdain us but will not stand against us, their skill not being at all commensurate to their rashness.

3 You may also remember that we are far from home and have no friendly land near, except what your own swords shall win you; and here I put before you a motive just the reverse of that which the enemy are appealing to; their cry being that they shall fight for their country, mine that we shall fight for a country that is not ours, where we must conquer or hardly get away, as we shall have their horse upon us in great numbers.

4 Remember, therefore, your renown, and go boldly against the enemy, thinking the present strait and necessity more terrible than they.’

Chapter 69

1 After this address Nicias at once led on the army. The Syracusans were not at that moment expecting an immediate engagement, and some had even gone away to the town, which was close by; these now ran up as hard as they could, and though behind time, took their places here or there in the main body as fast as they joined it. Want of zeal or daring was certainly not the fault of the Syracusans, either in this or the other battles, but although not inferior in courage, so far as their military science might carry them, when this failed them they were compelled to give up their resolution also. On the present occasion, although they had not supposed that the Athenians would begin the attack, and although constrained to stand upon their defence at short notice, they at once took up their arms and advanced to meet them.

2 First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers of either army began skirmishing, and routed or were routed by one another, as might be expected between light troops; next, soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and trumpeters urged on the heavy infantry to the charge;

3 and thus they advanced, the Syracusans to fight for their country, and each individual for his safety that day and liberty hereafter; in the enemy's army, the Athenians to make another's country theirs and to save their own from suffering by their defeat; the Argives and independent allies to help them in getting what they came for, and to earn by victory another sight of the country they had left behind; while the subject allies owed most of their ardour to the desire of self-preservation, which they could only hope for if victorious; next to which, as a secondary motive, came the chance of serving on easier terms, after helping the Athenians to a fresh conquest.

Chapter 70

1 The armies now came to close quarters, and for a long while fought without either giving ground. Meanwhile there occurred some claps of thunder with lightning and heavy rain, which did not fail to add to the fears of the party fighting for the first time, and very little acquainted with war; while to their more experienced adversaries these phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of year, and much more alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy.

2 At last the Argives drove in the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians routed the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus cut in two and betook itself to flight.

3 The Athenians did not pursue far, being held in check by the numerous and undefeated Syracusan horse, who attacked and drove back any of their heavy infantry whom they saw pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite of which the victors followed so far as was safe in a body, and then went back and set up a trophy.

4 Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied at the Helorine road, where they reformed as well as they could under the circumstances, and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might lay hands on some of the treasures there. The rest returned to the town.

Chapter 71

1 The Athenians, however did not go to the temple, but collected their dead and laid them upon a pyre, and passed the night upon the field. The next day they gave the enemy back their dead under truce, to the number of about two hundred and sixty, Syracusans and allies, and gathered together the bones of their own, some fifty, Athenians and allies, and taking the spoils of the enemy, sailed back to Catana.

2 It was now winter; and it did not seem possible for the moment to carry on the war before Syracuse, until horse should have been sent for from Athens and levied among the allies in Sicily—to do away with their utter inferiority in cavalry—and money should have been collected in the country and received from Athens, and until some of the cities, which they hoped would be now more disposed to listen to them after the battle, should have been brought over, and corn and all other necessaries provided, for a campaign in the spring against Syracuse.

Chapter 72

1 With this intention they sailed off to Naxos and Catana for the winter. Meanwhile the Syracusans burned their dead, and then held an assembly,

2 in which Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a man who with a general ability of the first order had given proofs of military capacity and brilliant courage in the war, came forward and encouraged them, and told them not to let what had occurred make them give way,

3 since their spirit had not been conquered, but their want of discipline had done the mischief. Still they had not been beaten by so much as might have been expected, especially as they were, one might say, novices in the art of war, an army of artisans opposed to the most practised soldiers in Hellas.

4 What had also done great mischief was the number of the generals (there were fifteen of them) and the quantity of orders given, combined with the disorder and insubordination of the troops. But if they were to have a few skilful generals, and used this winter in preparing their heavy infantry, finding arms for such as had not got any, so as to make them as numerous as possible, and forcing them to attend to their training generally, they would have every chance of beating their adversaries, courage being already theirs and discipline in the field having thus been added to it. Indeed, both these qualities would improve, since danger would exercise them in discipline, while their courage would be led to surpass itself by the confidence which skill inspires.

5 The generals should be few and elected with full powers, and an oath should be taken to leave them entire discretion in their command: if they adopted this plan, their secrets would be better kept, all preparations would be properly made, and there would be no room for excuses.

Chapter 73

1 The Syracusans heard him, and voted everything as he advised, and elected three generals, Hermocrates himself, Heraclides, son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus, son of Execestes.

2 They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon to procure a force of allies to join them, and to induce the Lacedaemonians for their sakes openly to address themselves in real earnest to the war against the Athenians, that they might either have to leave Sicily or be less able to send reinforcements to their army there.

Chapter 74

1 The Athenian forces at Catana now at once sailed against Messina, in the expectation of its being betrayed to them. The intrigue, however, after all came to nothing: Alcibiades, who was in the secret, when he left his command upon the summons from home, foreseeing that he would be outlawed, gave information of the plot to the friends of the Syracusans in Messina, who had at once put to death its authors, and now rose in arms against the opposite faction with those of their way of thinking, and succeeded in preventing the admission of the Athenians.

2 The latter waited for thirteen days, and then, as they were exposed to the weather and without provisions, and met with no success, went back to Naxos, where they made places for their ships to lie in, erected a palisade round their camp, and retired into winter quarters; meanwhile they sent a galley to Athens for money and cavalry to join them in the spring.

Chapter 75

1 During the winter the Syracusans built a wall on to the city, so as to take in the statue of Apollo Temenites, all along the side looking towards Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation longer and more difficult, in case of their being defeated, and also erected a fort at Megara and another in the Olympieum, and stuck palisades along the sea wherever there was a landing place.

2 Meanwhile, as they knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched with all their people to Catana, and ravaged the land and set fire to the tents and encampment of the Athenians, and so returned home.

3 Learning also that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina, on the strength of the alliance concluded in the time of Laches, to gain, if possible, that city, they sent another from Syracuse to oppose them. They had a shrewd suspicion that the Camarinaeans had not sent what they did send for the first battle very willingly; and they now feared that would refuse to assist them at all in future, after seeing the success of the Athenians in the action, and would join the latter on the strength of their old friendship.

4 Hermocrates, with some others, accordingly arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus and others from the Athenians; and an assembly of the Camarinaeans having been convened, Hermocrates spoke as follows, in the hope of prejudicing them against the Athenians:—

Chapter 76

1 ‘Camarinaeans, we did not come on this embassy because we were afraid of your being frightened by the actual forces of the Athenians, but rather of your being gained by what they would say to you before you heard anything from us.

2 They are come to Sicily with the pretext that you know, and the intention which we all suspect, in my opinion less to restore the Leontines to their homes than to oust us from ours; as it is out of all reason that they should restore in Sicily the cities that they lay waste in Hellas, or should cherish the Leontine Chalcidians because of their Ionian blood, and keep in servitude the Euboean Chalcidians, of whom the Leontines are a colony.

3 No; but the same policy which has proved so successful in Hellas is now being tried in Sicily. After being chosen as the leaders of the Ionians and of the other allies of Athenian origin, to punish the Mede, the Athenians accused some of failure in military service, some of fighting against each other, and others, as the case might be, upon any colourable pretext that could be found, until they thus subdued them all.

4 In fine, in the struggle against the Medes, the Athenians did not fight for the liberty of the Hellenes, or the Hellenes for their own liberty, but the former to make their countrymen serve them instead of him, the latter to change one master for another, wiser indeed than the first, but wiser for evil.

Chapter 77

1 But we are not now come to declare to an audience familiar with them the misdeeds of a state so open to accusation as is the Athenian, but much rather to blame ourselves, who, with the warnings we possess in the Hellenes in those parts that have been enslaved through not supporting each other, and seeing the same sophisms being now tried upon ourselves—such as restorations of Leontine kinsfolk and support of Egestaean allies—do not stand together and resolutely show them that here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines, or islanders, who change continually, but always serve a master, sometimes the Mede and sometimes some other, but free Dorians from independent Peloponnese, dwelling in Sicily.

2 Or, are we waiting until we be taken in detail, one city after another; knowing as we do that in no other way can we be conquered, and seeing that they turn to this plan, so as to divide some of us by words, to draw some by the bait of an alliance into open war with each other, and to ruin others by such flattery as different circumstances may render acceptable? And do we fancy when destruction first overtakes a distant fellow-countryman that the danger will not come to each of us also, or that he who suffers before us will suffer in himself alone?

Chapter 78

1 As for the Camarinaean, who says that it is the Syracusan, not he, that is the enemy of the Athenian, and who thinks it hard to have to encounter risk in behalf of my country, I would have him bear in mind that he will fight in my country, not more for mine than for his own, and by so much the more safely in that he will enter on the struggle not alone, after the way has been cleared by my ruin, but with me as his ally; and that the object of the Athenian is not so much to punish the enmity of the Syracusan as to use me as a blind to secure the friendship of the Camarinaean.

2 As for him who envies or even fears us (and envied and feared great powers must always be), and who on this account wishes Syracuse to be humbled to teach us a lesson, but would still have her survive in the interest of his own security, the wish that he indulges is not humanly possible. A man can control his own desires, but he cannot likewise control circumstances.

3 And in the event of his calculations proving mistaken, he may live to bewail his own misfortune, and wish to be again envying my prosperity.An idle wish, if he now sacrifice us and refuse to take his share of perils which are the same, in reality though not in name, for him as for us; what is nominally the preservation of our power being really his own salvation.

4 It was to be expected that you, of all people in the world, Camarinaeans, being our immediate neighbours and the next in danger, would have foreseen this, and instead of supporting us in the lukewarm way that you are now doing, would rather come to us of your own accord, and be now offering at Syracuse the aid which you would have asked for at Camarina, if to Camarina the Athenians had first come, to encourage us to resist the invader. Neither you, however, nor the rest have as yet bestirred yourselves in this direction.

Chapter 79

1 Fear perhaps will make you study to do right both by us and by the invaders, and plead that you have an alliance with the Athenians. But you made that alliance, not against your friends, but against the enemies that might attack you, and to help the Athenians when they were wronged by others, not when as now they are wronging their neighbours.

2 Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians though they be, refuse to help to restore the Chalcidian Leontines; and it would be strange if, while they suspect the gist of this fine pretence and are wise without reason, you, with every reason on your side, should yet choose to assist your natural enemies, and should join with their direst foes in undoing those whom nature has made your own kinsfolk.

3 This is not to do right; but you should help us without fear of their armament, which has no terrors if we hold together, but only if we let them succeed in their endeavours to separate us; since even after attacking us by ourselves and being victorious in battle, they had to go off without effecting their purpose.

Chapter 80

1 United, therefore, we have no cause to despair, but rather new encouragement to league together; especially as succors will come to us from the Peloponnesians, in military matters the undoubted superiors of the Athenians. And you need not think that your prudent policy of taking sides with neither, because allies of both, is either safe for you or fair to us.

2 Practically it is not as fair as it pretends to be. If the vanquished be defeated, and the victor conquer, through your refusing to join, what is the effect of your abstention but to leave the former to perish unaided, and to allow the latter to offend unhindered? And yet it were more honourable to join those who are not only the injured party, but your own kindred, and by so doing to defend the common interests of Sicily and save your friends the Athenians from doing wrong.

3 In conclusion, we Syracusans say that it is useless for us to demonstrate either to you or to the rest what you know already as well as we do; but we entreat, and if our entreaty fail, we protest that we are menaced by our eternal enemies the Ionians, and are betrayed by you our fellow Dorians.

4 If the Athenians reduce us, they will owe their victory to your decision, but in their own name will reap the honour, and will receive as the prize of their triumph the very men who enabled them to gain it. On the other hand, if we are the conquerors, you will have to pay for having been the cause of our danger.

5 Consider, therefore; and now make your choice between the security which present servitude offers and the prospect of conquering with us and so escaping disgraceful submission to an Athenian master and avoiding the lasting enmity of Syracuse.’

Chapter 81

1 Such were the words of Hermocrates; after whom Euphemus, the Athenian ambassador, spoke as follows:—

Chapter 82

1 ‘Although we came here only to renew the former alliance, the attack of the Syracusans compels us to speak of our empire and of the good right we have to it.

2 The best proof of this the speaker himself furnished, when he called the Ionians eternal enemies of the Dorians. It is the fact; and the Peloponnesian Dorians being our superiors in numbers and next neighbours, we Ionians looked out for the best means of escaping their domination.

3 After the Median war we had a fleet, and so got rid of the empire and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians, who had no right to give orders to us more than we to them, except that of being the strongest at that moment; and being appointed leaders of the king's former subjects, we continue to be so, thinking that we are least likely to fall under the dominion of the Peloponnesians, if we have a force to defend ourselves with, and in strict truth having done nothing unfair in reducing to subjection the Ionians and islanders, the kinsfolk whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved.

4 They, our kinsfolk, came against their mother country, that is to say against us, together with the Mede, and instead of having the courage to revolt and sacrifice their property as we did when we abandoned our city, chose to be slaves themselves, and to try to make us so.

Chapter 83

1 We, therefore, deserve to rule because we placed the largest fleet and an unflinching patriotism at the service of the Hellenes, and because these, our subjects, did us mischief by their ready subservience to the Medes; and, desert apart, we seek to strengthen ourselves against the Peloponnesians.

2 We make no fine professions of having a right to rule because we overthrew the barbarian single-handed, or because we risked what we did risk for the freedom of the subjects in question any more than for that of all, and for our own: no one can be quarrelled with for providing for his proper safety. If we are now here in Sicily, it is equally in the interest of our security, with which we perceive that your interest also coincides.

3 We prove this from the conduct which the Syracusans cast against us and which you somewhat too timorously suspect; knowing that those whom fear has made suspicious, may be carried away by the charm of eloquence for the moment, but when they come to act follow their interests.

4 Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas, and fear makes us now come, with the help of our friends, to order safely matters in Sicily, and not to enslave any but rather to prevent any from being enslaved.

Chapter 84

1 Meanwhile, let no one imagine that we are interesting ourselves in you without your having anything to do with us, seeing that if you are preserved and able to make head against the Syracusans, they will be less likely to harm us by sending troops to the Peloponnesians.

2 In this way you have everything to do with us, and on this account it is perfectly reasonable for us to restore the Leontines, and to make them, not subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but as powerful as possible, to help us by annoying the Syracusans from their frontier.

3 In Hellas we are alone a match for our enemies; and as for the assertion that it is out of all reason that we should free the Sicilian, while we enslave the Chalcidian, the fact is that the latter is useful to us by being without arms and contributing money only; while the former, the Leontines and our other friends, cannot be too independent.

Chapter 85

1 Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is unreasonable if expedient, no one a kinsman unless sure; but friendship or enmity is everywhere an affair of time and circumstance. Here, in Sicily, our interest is not to weaken our friends, but by means of their strength to cripple our enemies. Why doubt this? In Hellas we treat our allies as we find them useful.

2 The Chians and Methymnians govern themselves and furnish ships; most of the rest have harder terms and pay tribute in money; while others, although islanders and easy for us to take, are free altogether, because they occupy convenient positions round Peloponnese.

3 In our settlement of the states here in Sicily, we should, therefore, naturally be guided by our interest, and by fear, as we say, of the Syracusans. Their ambition is to rule you, their object to use the suspicions that we excite to unite you, and then, when we have gone away without effecting anything, by force or through your isolation, to become the masters of Sicily. And masters they must become, if you unite with them; as a force of that magnitude would be no longer easy for us to deal with united, and they would be more than a match for you as soon as we were away.

Chapter 86

1 Any other view of the case is condemned by the facts. When you first asked us over, the fear which you held out was that of danger to Athens if we let you come under the dominion of Syracuse;

2 and it is not right now to mistrust the very same argument by which you claimed to convince us, or to give way to suspicion because we are come with a larger force against the power of that city. Those whom you should really distrust are the Syracusans.

3 We are not able to stay here without you, and if we proved perfidious enough to bring you into subjection, we should be unable to keep you in bondage, owing to the length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding large, and in a military sense continental, towns: they, the Syracusans, live close to you, not in a camp, but in a city greater than the force we have with us, plot always against you, never let slip an opportunity once offered,

4 as they have shown in the case of the Leontines and others, and now have the face, just as if you were fools, to invite you to aid them against the power that hinders this, and that has thus far maintained Sicily independent.

5 We, as against them, invite you to a much more real safety, when we beg you not to betray that common safety which we each have in the other, and to reflect that they, even without allies, will, by their numbers, have always the way open to you, while you will not often have the opportunity of defending yourselves with such numerous auxiliaries; if, through your suspicions, you once let these go away unsuccessful or defeated, you will wish to see if only a handful of them back again, when the day is past in which their presence could do anything for you.

Chapter 87

1 But we hope, Camarinaeans, that the calumnies of the Syracusans will not be allowed to succeed either with you or with the rest: we have told you the whole truth upon the things we are suspected of, and will now briefly recapitulate, in the hope of convincing you.

2 We assert that we are rulers in Hellas in order not to be subjects; liberators in Sicily that we may not be harmed by the Sicilians; that we are compelled to interfere in many things, because we have many things to guard against; and that now, as before, we are come as allies to those of you who suffer wrong in this island, not without invitation but upon invitation.

3 Accordingly, instead of making yourselves judges or censors of our conduct, and trying to turn us, which it were now difficult to do, so far as there is anything in our interfering policy or in our character, that chimes in with your interest, this take and make use of; and be sure that far from being injurious to all alike, to most of the Hellenes that policy is even beneficial.

4 Thanks to it, all men in all places, even where we are not, who either apprehend or meditate aggression, from the near prospect before them, in the one case, of obtaining our intervention in their favour, in the other, of our arrival making the venture dangerous, find themselves constrained, respectively, to be moderate against their will, and to be preserved without trouble of their own.

5 Do not you reject this security that is open to all who desire it, and is now offered to you; but do like others, and instead of being always on the defensive against the Syracusans, unite with us, and in your turn at last threaten them.’

Chapter 88

1 Such were the words of Euphemus. What the Camarinaeans felt was this. Sympathising with the Athenians, except in so far as they might be afraid of their subjugating Sicily, they had always been at enmity with their neighbour Syracuse. From the very fact, however, that they were their neighbours, they feared the Syracusans most of the two, and being apprehensive of their conquering even without them, both sent them in the first instance the few horsemen mentioned, and for the future determined to support them most in fact, although as sparingly as possible; but for the moment in order not to seem to slight the Athenians, especially as they had been successful in the engagement, to answer both alike.

2 Agreeably to this resolution they answered that as both the contending parties happened to be allies of theirs, they thought it most consistent with their oaths, at present, to side with neither; with which answer the ambassadors of either party departed.

3 In the meantime, while Syracuse pursued her preparations for war, the Athenians were encamped at Naxos, and tried by negotiation to gain as many of the Sicels as possible.

4 Those more in the low lands, and subjects of Syracuse, mostly held aloof; but the peoples of the interior who had never been otherwise than independent, with few exceptions, at once joined the Athenians, and brought down corn to the army, and in some cases even money.

5 The Athenians marched against those who refused to join, and forced some of them to do so; in the case of others they were stopped by the Syracusans sending garrisons and reinforcements. Meanwhile the Athenians moved their winter quarters from Naxos to Catana, and reconstructed the camp burnt by the Syracusans, and stayed there the rest of the winter.

6 They also sent a galley to Carthage, with proffers of friendship, on the chance of obtaining assistance, and another to Tyrrhenia; some of the cities there having spontaneously offered to join them in the war. They also sent round to the Sicels and to Egesta, desiring them to send them as many horses as possible, and meanwhile prepared bricks, iron, and all other things necessary for the work of circumvallation, intending by the spring to begin hostilities.

7 In the meantime the Syracusan envoys despatched to Corinth and Lacedaemon tried as they passed along the coast to persuade the Italiots to interfere with the proceedings of the Athenians, which threatened Italy quite as much as Syracuse, and having arrived at Corinth made a speech calling on the Corinthians to assist them on the ground of their common origin.

8 The Corinthians voted at once to aid them heart and soul themselves, and then sent on envoys with them to Lacedaemon, to help them to persuade her also to prosecute the war with the Athenians more openly at home and to send succors to Sicily.

9 The envoys from Corinth having reached Lacedaemon found there Alcibiades with his fellow-refugees, who had at once crossed over in a trading vessel from Thurii, first to Cyllene in Elis, and afterwards from thence to Lacedaemon; upon the Lacedaemonians' own invitation, after first obtaining a safe conduct, as he feared them for the part he had taken in the affair of Mantinea.

10 The result was that the Corinthians, Syracusans, and Alcibiades, pressing all the same request in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians, succeeded in persuading them; but as the Ephors and the authorities, although resolved to send envoys to Syracuse to prevent their surrendering to the Athenians, showed no disposition to send them any assistance, Alcibiades now came forward and inflamed and stirred the Lacedaemonians by speaking as follows:—

Chapter 89

1 ‘I am forced first to speak to you of the prejudice with which I am regarded, in order that suspicion may not make you disinclined to listen to me upon public matters.

2 The connection with you as your Proxeni, which the ancestors of our family by reason of some discontent renounced, I personally tried to renew by my good offices towards you, in particular upon the occasion of the disaster at Pylos. But although I maintained this friendly attitude, you yet chose to negotiate the peace with the Athenians through my enemies, and thus to strengthen them and to discredit me.

3 You had therefore no right to complain if I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and seized other occasions of thwarting and injuring you; and the time has now come when those among you, who in the bitterness of the moment may have been then unfairly angry with me, should look at the matter in its true light, and take a different view. Those again who judged me unfavourably, because I leaned rather to the side of the commons, must not think that their dislike is any better founded.

4 We have always been hostile to tyrants, and all who oppose arbitrary power are called commons; hence we continued to act as leaders of the multitude; besides which, as democracy was the government of the city, it was necessary in most things to conform to established conditions.

5 However, we endeavoured to be more moderate than the licentious temper of the times; and while there were others, formerly as now, who tried to lead the multitude astray, the same who banished me,

6 our party was that of the whole people, our creed being to do our part in preserving the form of government under which the city enjoyed the utmost greatness and freedom, and which we had found existing. As for democracy, the men of sense among us knew what it was, and I perhaps as well as any, as I have the more cause to complain of it; but there is nothing new to be said of a patent absurdity—meanwhile we did not think it safe to alter it under the pressure of your hostility.

Chapter 90

1 So much then for the prejudices with which I am regarded: I now can call your attention to the questions you must consider, and upon which superior knowledge perhaps permits me to speak.

2 We sailed to Sicily first to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and after them the Italiots also, and finally to assail the empire and city of Carthage.

3 In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, we were then to attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the entire force of the Hellenes lately acquired in those parts, and taking a number of barbarians into our pay, such as the Iberians and others in those countries, confessedly the most warlike known, and building numerous galleys in addition to those which we had already, timber being plentiful in Italy; and with this fleet blockading Peloponnese from the sea and assailing it with our armies by land, taking some of the cities by storm, drawing works of circumvallation round others, we hoped without difficulty to effect its reduction, and after this to rule the whole of the Hellenic name.

4 Money and corn meanwhile for the better execution of these plans were to be supplied in sufficient quantities by the newly acquired places in those countries, independently of our revenues here at home.

Chapter 91

1 You have thus heard the history of the present expedition from the man who most exactly knows what our objects were; and the remaining generals will, if they can, carry these out just the same. But that the states in Sicily must succumb if you do not help them, I will now show.

2 Although the Siceliots, with all their inexperience, might even now be saved if their forces were united, the Syracusans alone, beaten already in one battle with all their people and blockaded from the sea, will be unable to withstand the Athenian armament that is now there.

3 But if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls also, and Italy immediately afterwards; and the danger which I just now spoke of from that quarter will before long be upon you.

4 None need therefore fancy that Sicily only is in question; Peloponnese will be so also, unless you speedily do as I tell you, and send on board ship to Syracuse troops that shall be able to row their ships themselves, and serve as heavy infantry the moment that they land; and what I consider even more important than the troops, a Spartan as commanding officer to discipline the forces already on foot and to compel recusants to serve. The friends that you have already will thus become more confident, and the waverers will be encouraged to join you.

5 Meanwhile you must carry on the war here more openly, that the Syracusans seeing that you do not forget them, may put heart into their resistance, and that the Athenians may be less able to reinforce their armament.

6 You must fortify Decelea in Attica, the blow of which the Athenians are always most afraid and the only one that they think they have not experienced in the present war; the surest method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears, and to choose this means of attacking him, since every one naturally knows best his own weak points and fears accordingly.

7 The fortification in question, while it benefits you, will create difficulties for your adversaries, of which I shall pass over many, and shall only mention the chief. Whatever property there is in the country will most of it become yours, either by capture or surrender; and the Athenians will at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, of their present gains from their land and from the law courts, and above all of the revenue from their allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they lose their awe of Athens, and see you addressing yourselves with vigour to the war.

Chapter 92

1 The zeal and speed with which all this shall be done depends, Lacedaemonians, upon yourselves; as to its possibility, I am quite confident, and I have little fear of being mistaken.

2 Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think any the worse of me if after having hitherto passed as a lover of my country, I now actively join its worst enemies in attacking it, or will suspect what I say as the fruit of an outlaw's enthusiasm.

3 I am an outlaw from the iniquity of those who drove me forth, not, if you will be guided by me, from your service: my worst enemies are not you who only harmed your foes, but they who forced their friends to become enemies;

4 and love of country is what I do not feel when I am wronged, but what I felt when secure in my rights as a citizen. Indeed I do not consider that I am now attacking a country that is still mine; I am rather trying to recover one that is mine no longer; and the true lover of his country is not he who consents to lose it unjustly rather than attack it, but he who longs for it so much that he will go all lengths to recover it.

5 For myself, therefore, Lacedaemonians, I beg you to use me without scruple for danger and trouble of every kind, and to remember the argument in every one's mouth, that if I did you great harm as an enemy, I could likewise do you good service as a friend, inasmuch as I know the plans of the Athenians, while I only guessed yours. For yourselves I entreat you to believe that your most capital interests are now under deliberation; and I urge you to send without hesitation the expeditions to Sicily and Attica; by the presence of a small part of your forces you will save important cities in that island, and you will destroy the power of Athens both present and prospective; after this you will dwell in security and enjoy the supremacy over all Hellas, resting not on force but upon consent and affection.’

Chapter 93

1 Such were the words of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians, who had themselves before intended to march against Athens, but were still waiting and looking about them, at once became much more in earnest when they received this particular information from Alcibiades, and considered that they had heard it from the man who best knew the truth of the matter.

2 Accordingly they now turned their attention to the fortifying of Decelea and sending immediate aid to the Sicilians; and naming Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, to the command of the Syracusans, bade him consult with that people and with the Corinthians and arrange for succors reaching the island, in the best and speediest way possible under the circumstances.

3 Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send him at once two ships to Asine, and to prepare the rest that they intended to send, and to have them ready to sail at the proper time. Having settled this, the envoys departed from Lacedaemon.

4 In the meantime arrived the Athenian galley from Sicily sent by the generals for money and cavalry; and the Athenians, after hearing what they wanted, voted to send the supplies for the armament and the cavalry. And the winter ended, and with it ended the seventeenth year of the present war of which Thucydides is the historian.

Chapter 94

1 The next summer, at the very beginning of the season, the Athenians in Sicily put out from Catana, and sailed along shore to Megara in Sicily, from which, as I have mentioned above, the Syracusans expelled the inhabitants in the time of their tyrant Gelo, themselves occupying the territory.

2 Here the Athenians landed and laid waste the country, and after an unsuccessful attack upon a fort of the Syracusans, went on with the fleet and army to the river Terias, and advancing inland laid waste the plain and set fire to the corn; and after killing some of a small Syracusan party which they encountered, and setting up a trophy, went back again to their ships.

3 They now sailed to Catana and took in provisions there, and going with their whole force against Centoripa, a town of the Sicels, acquired it by capitulation, and departed, after also burning the corn of the Inessaens and Hybleans.

4 Upon their return to Catana they found the horsemen arrived from Athens, to the number of two hundred and fifty (with their equipments, but without their horses which were to be procured upon the spot), and thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents of silver.

Chapter 95

1 The same spring the Lacedaemonians marched against Argos, and went as far as Cleonae, when an earthquake occurred and caused them to return. After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatid, which is on their border, and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for no less than twenty-five talents.

2 The same summer, not long after, the Thespian commons made an attack upon the party in office, which was not successful, but succors arrived from Thebes, and some were caught, while others took refuge at Athens.

Chapter 96

1 The same summer the Syracusans learned that the Athenians had been joined by their cavalry, and were on the point of marching against them; and seeing that without becoming masters of Epipolae, a precipitous spot situated exactly over the town, the Athenians could not, even if victorious in battle, easily invest them, they determined to guard its approaches, in order that the enemy might not ascend unobserved by this, the sole way by which ascent was possible,

2 as the remainder is lofty ground, and falls right down to the city, and can all be seen from inside; and as it lies above the rest the place is called by the Syracusans Epipolae or Overtown.

3 They accordingly went out in mass at daybreak into the meadow along the river Anapus, their new generals, Hermocrates and his colleagues, having just come into office, and held a review of their heavy infantry, from whom they first selected a picked body of six hundred, under the command of Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae, and to be ready to muster at a moment's notice to help wherever help should be required.

Chapter 97

1 Meanwhile the Athenians, the very same morning, were holding a review, having already made land unobserved with all the armament from Catana, opposite a place called Leon, not much more than half a mile from Epipolae, where they disembarked their army, bringing the fleet to anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula running out into the sea, with a narrow isthmus, and not far from the city of Syracuse either by land or water.

2 While the naval force of the Athenians threw a stockade across the isthmus and remained quiet at Thapsus, the land army immediately went on at a run to Epipolae, and succeeded in getting up by Euryelus before the Syracusans perceived them, or could come up from the meadow and the review.

3 Diomilus with his six hundred and the rest advanced as quickly as they could, but they had nearly three miles to go from the meadow before reaching them.

4 Attacking in this way in considerable disorder, the Syracusans were defeated in battle at Epipolae and retired to the town, with a loss of about three hundred killed, and Diomilus among the number.

5 After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans their dead under truce, and next day descended to Syracuse itself; and no one coming out to meet them, reascended and built a fort at Labdalum, upon the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae, looking towards Megara, to serve as a magazine for their baggage and money, whenever they advanced to give battle or to work at the lines.

Chapter 98

1 Not long afterwards three hundred cavalry came to them from Egesta, and about a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and others; and thus, with the two hundred and fifty from Athens, for whom they had got horses from the Egestaeans and Catanians, besides others that they bought, they now mustered six hundred and fifty cavalry in all.

2 After posting a garrison in Labdalum, they advanced to Syca, where they sate down and quickly built the Circle or centre of their wall of circumvallation. The Syracusans, appalled at the rapidity with which the work advanced, determined to go out against them and give battle and interrupt it;

3 and the two armies were already in battle array, when the Syracusan generals observed that their troops found such difficulty in getting into line, and were in such disorder, that they led them back into the town, except part of the cavalry. These remained and hindered the Athenians from carrying stones or dispersing to any great distance,

4 until a tribe of the Athenian heavy infantry, with all the cavalry, charged and routed the Syracusan horse with some loss; after which they set up a trophy for the cavalry action.

Chapter 99

1 The next day the Athenians began building the wall to the north of the Circle, at the same time collecting stone and timber, which they kept laying down towards Trogilus along the shortest line for their works from the great harbour to the sea;

2 while the Syracusans, guided by their generals, and above all by Hermocrates, instead of risking any more general engagements, determined to build a counterwork in the direction in which the Athenians were going to carry their wall. If this could be completed in time the enemy's lines would be cut; and meanwhile, if he were to attempt to interrupt them by an attack, they would send a part of their forces against him, and would secure the approaches beforehand with their stockade, while the Athenians would have to leave off working with their whole force in order to attend to them.

3 They accordingly sallied forth and began to build, starting from their city, running a cross wall below the Athenian Circle, cutting down the olives and erecting wooden towers.

4 As the Athenian fleet had not yet sailed round into the great harbour, the Syracusans still commanded the sea-coast, and the Athenians brought their provisions by land from Thapsus.

Chapter 100

1 The Syracusans now thought the stockades and stonework of their counter-wall sufficiently far advanced; and as the Athenians, afraid of being divided and so fighting at a disadvantage, and intent upon their own wall, did not come out to interrupt them, they left one tribe to guard the new work and went back into the city. Meanwhile the Athenians destroyed their pipes of drinking-water carried underground into the city; and watching until the rest of the Syracusans were in their tents at midday, and some even gone away into the city, and those in the stockade keeping but indifferent guard, appointed three hundred picked men of their own, and some men picked from the light troops and armed for the purpose, to run suddenly as fast as they could to the counterwork, while the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, the one with one of the generals to the city in case of a sortie, the other with the other general to the stockade by the postern gate.

2 The three hundred attacked and took the stockade, abandoned by its garrison, who took refuge in the outworks round the statue of Apollo Temenites. Here the pursuers burst in with them, and after getting in were beaten out by the Syracusans, and some few of the Argives and Athenians slain;

3 after which the whole army retired, and having demolished the counterwork and pulled up the stockade, carried away the stakes to their own lines, and set up a trophy.

Chapter 101

1 The next day the Athenians from the Circle proceeded to fortify the cliff above the marsh which on this side of Epipolae looks towards the great harbour; this being also the shortest line for their work to go down across the plain and the marsh to the harbour.

2 Meanwhile the Syracusans marched out and began a second stockade, starting from the city, across the middle of the marsh, digging a trench alongside to make it impossible for the Athenians to carry their wall down to the sea.

3 As soon as the Athenians had finished their work at the cliff they again attacked the stockade and ditch of the Syracusans. Ordering the fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the great harbour of Syracuse, they descended at about dawn from Epipolae into the plain, and laying doors and planks over the marsh where it was muddy and firmest, crossed over on these, and by daybreak took the ditch and the stockade, except a small portion which they captured afterwards.

4 A battle now ensued, in which the Athenians were victorious, the right wing of the Syracusans flying to the town and the left to the river. The three hundred picked Athenians, wishing to cut off their passage, pressed on at a run to the bridge,

5 when the alarmed Syracusans, who had with them most of their cavalry, closed and routed them, hurling them back upon the Athenian right wing, the first tribe of which was thrown into a panic by the shock.

6 Seeing this, Lamachus came to their aid from the Athenian left with a few archers and with the Argives, and crossing a ditch, was left alone with a few that had crossed with him, and was killed with five or six of his men. These the Syracusans managed immediately to snatch up in haste and get across the river into a place of security, themselves retreating as the rest of the Athenian army now came up.

Chapter 102

1 Meanwhile those who had at first fled for refuge to the city, seeing the turn affairs were taking, now rallied from the town and formed against the Athenians in front of them, sending also a part of their number to the Circle on Epipolae, which they hoped to take while denuded of its defenders.

2 These took and destroyed the Athenian outwork of a thousand feet, the Circle itself being saved by Nicias, who happened to have been left in it through illness, and who now ordered the servants to set fire to the engines and timber thrown down before the wall; want of men, as he was aware, rendering all other means of escape impossible.

3 This step was justified by the result, the Syracusans not coming any further on account of the fire, but retreating. Meanwhile succors were coming up from the Athenians below, who had put to flight the troops opposed to them; and the fleet also, according to orders, was sailing from Thapsus into the great harbour.

4 Seeing this, the troops on the heights retired in haste, and the whole army of the Syracusans re-entered the city, thinking that with their present force they would no longer be able to hinder the wall reaching the sea.

Chapter 103

1 After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans their dead under truce, receiving in return Lamachus and those who had fallen with him. The whole of their forces, naval and military, being now with them, they began from Epipolae and the cliffs and enclosed the Syracusans with a double wall down to the sea.

2 Provisions were now brought in for the armament from all parts of Italy; and many of the Sicels, who had hitherto been looking to see how things went, came as allies to the Athenians: there also arrived three ships of fifty oars from Tyrrhenia. Meanwhile everything else progressed favourably for their hopes.

3 The Syracusans began to despair of finding safety in arms, no relief having reached them from Peloponnese, and were now proposing terms of capitulation among themselves and to Nicias, who after the death of Lamachus was left sole commander.

4 No decision was come to, but as was natural with men in difficulties and besieged more straitly than before, there was much discussion with Nicias and still more in the town. Their present misfortunes had also made them suspicious of one another; and the blame of their disasters was thrown upon the ill-fortune or treachery of the generals under whose command they had happened; and these were deposed and others, Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias, elected in their stead.

Chapter 104

1 Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian, Gylippus, and the ships from Corinth were now off Leucas, intent upon going with all haste to the relief of Sicily. The reports that reached them being of an alarming kind, and all agreeing in the falsehood that Syracuse was already completely invested, Gylippus abandoned all hope of Sicily, and wishing to save Italy, rapidly crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum with the Corinthian, Pythen, two Laconian, and two Corinthian vessels, leaving the Corinthians to follow him after manning, in addition to their own ten, two Leucadian and two Ambraciot ships.

2 From Tarentum Gylippus first went on an embassy to Thurii, and claimed anew the rights of citizenship which his father had enjoyed; failing to bring over the townspeople, he weighed anchor and coasted along Italy. Opposite the Terinaean gulf he was caught by the wind which blows violently and steadily from the north in that quarter, and was carried out to sea; and after experiencing very rough weather, remade Tarentum, where he hauled ashore and refitted such of his ships as had suffered most from the tempest.

3 Nicias heard of his approach, but, like the Thurians, despised the scanty number of his ships, and set down piracy as the only probable object of the voyage, and so took no precautions for the present.

Chapter 105

1 About the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians invaded Argos with their allies, and laid waste most of the country. The Athenians went with thirty ships to the relief of the Argives, thus breaking their treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner.

2 Up to this time incursions from Pylos, descents on the coasts of the rest of Peloponnese, instead of on the Laconian, had been the extent of their cooperation with the Argives and Mantineans; and although the Argives had often begged them to land, if only for a moment, with their heavy infantry in Laconia, lay waste ever so little of it with them, and depart, they had always refused to do so. Now, however, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus, Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and plundered the country; and thus furnished the Lacedaemonians with a better pretext for hostilities against Athens.

3 After the Athenians had retired from Argos with their fleet, and the Lacedaemonians also, the Argives made an incursion into the Phliasid, and returned home after ravaging their land and killing some of the inhabitants.