Book 4

Chapter 1

1 In the following summer, when the grain was coming into ear, ten Syracusan ships and as many Locrian ships sailed to Messene in Sicily and occupied it at the inhabitants’ invitation; and Messene revolted from Athens.

2 The Syracusans were chiefly moved to do this because they saw that the place offered an approach to Sicily, and feared that the Athenians might one day make it their base for an attack on them with greater forces. The Locrians acted out of hostility toward Rhegium, seeking to subdue its people by attacking from both sides.

3 At the same time the Locrians had invaded Rhegian territory with their whole army, to prevent the Rhegians from coming to the aid of Messene; they were also being urged on by Rhegian exiles who were with them. Rhegium had long been torn by civil strife and was at present incapable of resisting the Locrians, which made them all the more eager to attack.

4 After ravaging the country, the Locrian land forces withdrew, while the ships remained to guard Messene. Other ships being fitted out were also to anchor there and conduct the war from that base.

Chapter 2

1 At about the same time that spring, before the grain was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and settled down to ravage the land.

2 The Athenians sent off the forty ships for Sicily, as they had been preparing to do, with the two remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles; Pythodorus, the third of them, had already reached Sicily.

3 They instructed these generals, as they sailed past, to attend also to the Corcyraeans in the city, who were being plundered by the exiles in the mountains. Sixty Peloponnesian ships had sailed there to support the men in the mountains, in the belief that the severe famine in the city would make it easy for them to gain control.

4 Demosthenes, who held no public command after his return from Acarnania, had himself requested permission to use these ships around the Peloponnese; they authorized him to do so if he wished.

Chapter 3

1 As they sailed along the Laconian coast, they learned that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra. Eurymedon and Sophocles were eager to press on there, but Demosthenes urged them first to put in at Pylos and do what was needed before continuing their voyage. They objected; but a storm happened to arise and drove the ships into Pylos.

2 Demosthenes at once demanded that the place be fortified—this was why he had sailed with them—and pointed out its abundant supplies of timber and stone, its natural strength, and the fact that both the site itself and a wide stretch of the surrounding country were uninhabited. Pylos is about four hundred stades from Sparta, in what was once Messenian territory; the Lacedaemonians call it Coryphasium.

3 The generals replied that there were plenty of deserted headlands in the Peloponnese, if he wished to occupy them and put the city to expense. But he thought this place had particular advantages over others: it possessed a harbor, and the Messenians, who had ancient ties with the country and spoke the same language as the Lacedaemonians, could inflict the greatest harm by operating from it, while also providing a trustworthy garrison for the place.

Chapter 4

1 Unable to persuade either the generals or the soldiers, even after consulting the regimental commanders, he remained inactive, prevented by the weather from sailing; until the soldiers themselves, with time on their hands, felt an impulse to set to work and fortify the place.

2 They began the work without iron tools for dressing stone, carrying stones chosen as they found them and fitting each into place as best it would go. Where mortar was needed, they had no containers and carried it on their backs, bending forward to give it the best chance of staying there and clasping their hands behind them to keep it from falling off.

3 They hurried in every way to finish the most vulnerable points before the Lacedaemonians could come to the rescue. Most of the position was naturally strong and needed no wall.

Chapter 5

1 The Lacedaemonians happened to be celebrating a festival, and even when they heard the news they treated it lightly: when they marched out, they thought, the enemy would either refuse to face them or be easily taken by force. They were also held back to some extent because their army was still in Attica.

2 In six days the Athenians walled the landward side of the position and the other points most in need of defense. They left Demosthenes there with five ships to guard it, while with the greater part of the fleet they pressed on toward Corcyra and Sicily.

Chapter 6

1 When the Peloponnesians in Attica learned that Pylos had been occupied, they withdrew home in haste. The Lacedaemonians and King Agis regarded the affair at Pylos as their own concern; moreover, since they had invaded early and the grain was still green, most of the troops were short of food, and a spell of weather more severe than was usual for the season bore hard on the army.

2 Thus several causes combined to hasten their withdrawal and make this the shortest of their invasions: they remained in Attica for only fifteen days.

Chapter 7

1 At the same time Simonides, an Athenian general, gathered a few Athenians from the garrisons and a large force of the allies in that region, and took Eion on the Thracian coast, a colony of Mende then hostile to Athens, through betrayal from within. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans immediately came to its aid; he was driven out and lost many of his soldiers.

Chapter 8

1 After the Peloponnesians returned from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the nearest of the perioeci immediately marched to the relief of Pylos. The other Lacedaemonians came up more slowly, having only just returned from another campaign.

2 They also sent word throughout the Peloponnese to come to Pylos as quickly as possible, and summoned their sixty ships from Corcyra. These were hauled over the isthmus of Leucas and, escaping the notice of the Athenian ships at Zacynthus, reached Pylos, where the land army was already present.

3 While the Peloponnesians were still approaching by sea, Demosthenes managed to slip out two ships ahead of them, to tell Eurymedon and the Athenians aboard the ships at Zacynthus to come at once, since the position was in danger.

4 The ships sailed with all speed on Demosthenes’ errand, while the Lacedaemonians prepared to assault the fort by land and sea together, expecting an easy capture of a structure hastily built and held by few men.

5 As they also expected the Athenian ships to come to the rescue from Zacynthus, they intended, if they had not already taken the place, to block the entrances to the harbor and prevent the Athenians from anchoring within it.

6 For the island called Sphacteria stretches along the harbor close to its mouth, sheltering it and narrowing its entrances: the one by Pylos and the Athenian fort allows passage for two ships, the other, toward the rest of the mainland, for eight or nine. The whole island was wooded and trackless, being uninhabited, and was about fifteen stades long.

7 They therefore intended to close the entrances with ships packed closely together, bows facing outward. Fearing that the enemy might use the island as a base against them, they sent hoplites across to it and posted others along the mainland.

8 In this way, they thought, both island and mainland would be hostile to the Athenians, with nowhere to land: the seaward coast of Pylos itself, outside the harbor entrance, had no harbors to give them a base from which to help their own men. They themselves could thus, in all probability, reduce the position by siege without a sea battle or any danger, since it had no grain and had been occupied with scant preparation.

9 Having settled on this plan, they sent the hoplites across to the island, selecting them by lot from all the companies. Others had crossed earlier, taking turns, but the last contingent, which was cut off there, numbered four hundred and twenty, besides the Helots who attended them. Their commander was Epitadas son of Molobrus.

Chapter 9

1 Demosthenes, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were about to attack with fleet and infantry together, made his own preparations. He hauled up beneath the fort the triremes still remaining from those left with him, protected them with a palisade, and armed their sailors with poor shields, most of them wickerwork. There was no way to obtain arms in an uninhabited place; even these had come from some Messenians who happened to have arrived in a thirty-oared raiding ship and a light vessel. About forty of these Messenians were hoplites, whom he employed with the rest.

2 He posted most of his men, armed and unarmed alike, on the strongest and most thoroughly fortified parts of the position facing the mainland, with orders to repel the infantry if it attacked. He himself chose sixty hoplites from the whole force and a few archers, and went outside the wall toward the sea, where he particularly expected the enemy to attempt a landing. The ground was difficult and rocky, facing the open sea; but as their wall was weakest there, he thought the enemy would be eager to force an entry at that point.

3 For they themselves had never expected to be defeated at sea and had not built a strong wall there; if the enemy forced a landing, the position could be taken.

4 He therefore advanced on this side to the water’s edge and drew up his hoplites to keep the enemy out if he could, encouraging them with these words.

Chapter 10

1 “Men who share this danger with me, let none of you, in a crisis like this, wish to appear shrewd by calculating every peril that surrounds us, rather than advance boldly against the enemy, without stopping to reflect, and so win through. Situations as desperate as ours leave the least room for calculation and demand that we face the danger with the greatest speed.

2 “I see most of the advantages on our side, if we are willing to stand firm and do not, in terror at their numbers, surrender the superior means we possess.

3 “For I count the difficulty of approaching this ground as ours: it becomes our ally if we stand, but if we retreat, difficult though it is, it will be easy to cross with no one to bar the way. And we shall find the enemy more formidable because retreat will not be easy for him, even if we press him hard. On board his ships he is easiest to repel; once ashore, he is already on equal terms.

4 “Nor need we fear their numbers too much. Many though they are, they will fight only a few at a time, for want of room to bring their ships in. This is not a larger army on land, fighting on equal terms, but one attacking from ships, which need many favorable circumstances to coincide at sea.

5 “I therefore judge their difficulties a match for our small numbers. And I call on you as Athenians, who know from experience in making seaborne landings against others that a man who stands firm, and does not fall back in fear of the roar and the terrifying onset of the ships, can never be forced aside: now stand firm yourselves, and by holding them off at the very edge of the surf, save both ourselves and this position.”

Chapter 11

1 Demosthenes’ encouragement gave the Athenians greater confidence; they went down and formed their line at the water’s edge.

2 The Lacedaemonians got under way and assaulted the fort with their land army and, simultaneously, with forty-three ships. Their admiral was Thrasymelidas son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. He attacked at the very point Demosthenes had expected.

3 The Athenians defended themselves on both sides, against land and sea. The attackers divided their ships into small groups, since there was no room for more to put in, and made their runs in turns, allowing one group to rest while another attacked. They strained every effort and urged one another on, hoping somehow to drive the defenders back and take the fort.

4 Brasidas was the most conspicuous of them all. Commanding a trireme, he saw that the difficult shore made the captains and helmsmen hesitate even where a landing seemed possible, as they took care not to wreck their ships. He shouted that it was unworthy to spare timber and look on while the enemy held the fort they had built on Lacedaemonian soil. He urged them to smash their own ships in forcing a landing, and called on the allies not to shrink from giving their ships to the Lacedaemonians in the present emergency, in return for the great benefits they had received: they must run aground, land by every means, and master both the men and the position.

Chapter 12

1 So he pressed the others on, and, compelling his own helmsman to run the ship aground, moved toward the gangway. As he tried to disembark, the Athenians drove him back; after many wounds he fainted, and as he collapsed onto the outrigger, his shield slipped into the sea. It was washed ashore and picked up by the Athenians, who later used it for the trophy they set up to commemorate this assault.

2 The others were eager enough, but could not land, both because of the difficulty of the ground and because the Athenians stood firm without yielding a step.

3 Fortune had so reversed their positions that the Athenians, on land—and Laconian land at that—were repelling a naval attack, while the Lacedaemonians were trying to land from ships against the Athenians on their own soil, now hostile to them. For at that time the prevailing reputation of the one people was to be preeminently land fighters, unsurpassed in infantry, and of the other to be seamen, far superior in their fleet.

Chapter 13

1 After attacking throughout that day and part of the next, they ceased. On the third day they sent some of their ships to Asine for timber to make siege engines, believing that, though the wall facing the harbor was high, they could take it with engines, since a landing was easiest there.

2 Meanwhile the Athenian ships arrived from Zacynthus, forty in number: some of the guard ships from Naupactus and four Chian ships had joined them in coming to the rescue.

3 They saw both mainland and island crowded with hoplites, and the enemy ships inside the harbor, not coming out. At a loss where to anchor, they sailed for the moment to the nearby uninhabited island of Prote and spent the night there. The next day they prepared for a sea battle and put out, intending to fight in open water if the enemy would sail out to meet them, and otherwise to sail into the harbor themselves.

4 The enemy neither put out to meet them nor had carried out their intended blockade of the entrances. Instead, they remained quietly on shore, manning their ships and making ready to fight, if anyone sailed in, within the harbor, which was no small one.

Chapter 14

1 Recognizing this, the Athenians charged them through both entrances. Most of the enemy ships were already afloat with bows facing them; these they attacked and put to flight. Pursuing over a short distance, they damaged many and captured five, one of them with its crew, and rammed the rest after they had fled to shore. Some were struck while still being manned, before they could put out; others the Athenians took in tow and dragged away empty, their men having fled.

2 The Lacedaemonians saw what was happening and felt the disaster bitterly, above all because their men were being cut off on the island. They rushed to help, wading into the sea in their armor, seizing the ships and pulling against those towing them away. Each man felt that a task was being held back unless he was there himself to take a hand.

3 There was a great tumult, and each side reversed its manner of fighting over the ships: in their ardor and consternation the Lacedaemonians were, so to speak, fighting a sea battle from the land, while the Athenians, victorious and eager to exploit their present good fortune to the utmost, fought a land battle from their ships.

4 After inflicting much hardship and many wounds on one another, they drew apart. The Lacedaemonians saved the empty ships, apart from those captured at the outset.

5 When each side had returned to its camp, the Athenians set up a trophy, gave back the dead, and took possession of the wrecks. They immediately began sailing around the island and keeping it under guard, since the men there were cut off. The Peloponnesians on the mainland, now reinforced from every quarter, remained in position at Pylos.

Chapter 15

1 When news of the events at Pylos reached Sparta, the Lacedaemonians resolved that, as in a great calamity, their authorities should go down to the camp, inspect the situation, and at once decide what seemed best.

2 Seeing that it was impossible to help the men, and unwilling to risk their dying of hunger or being overwhelmed by superior numbers and captured, they decided, if the Athenian generals agreed, to conclude a truce concerning Pylos, send envoys to Athens to negotiate a settlement, and try to recover the men as quickly as possible.

Chapter 16

1 The generals accepted the proposal, and a truce was made on these terms. The Lacedaemonians were to bring to Pylos and hand over to the Athenians the ships with which they had fought, together with every warship in Laconia, and were to make no armed attack on the fort by land or sea. The Athenians were to allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send food to the men on the island in a fixed ration, with the barley meal already kneaded: for each man, two Attic choenices of meal, two cotylae of wine, and meat; for each servant, half that allowance. These supplies were to be sent in under Athenian supervision, and no boat was to sail in secretly. The Athenians were to keep their watch on the island no less strictly, but without landing, and were to make no armed attack on the Peloponnesian army by land or sea.

2 If either side violated any of these terms, however slightly, the truce was then to be at an end. It was to remain in force until the Lacedaemonian envoys returned from Athens; the Athenians were to send them there in a trireme and bring them back. On their return the truce was to end, and the Athenians were to restore the ships in the same condition in which they had received them.

3 The truce was concluded on these terms, the ships, about sixty in number, were handed over, and the envoys were sent away. On reaching Athens they spoke as follows.

Chapter 17

1 “Athenians, the Lacedaemonians have sent us to negotiate concerning the men on the island, and to persuade you to a course that will serve your interests while bringing us as honorable an outcome to our misfortune as present circumstances allow.

2 “If we speak at greater length, we do not depart from our custom: it is our practice to use few words where few suffice, but more when the occasion calls for explaining a matter of importance and accomplishing through speech what must be done.

3 “Receive our words without hostility, not as though we were teaching you because you lacked understanding, but as a reminder to men already informed of how to deliberate well.

4 “For you can turn your present good fortune to noble account, keeping what you have won and gaining honor and renown besides, without suffering the fate of those who receive some unaccustomed blessing. Because their present success has come beyond their expectations, they always reach out in hope of more.

5 “But those who have experienced the most reversals in either direction have the best reason to distrust prosperity. That lesson, one would naturally expect, experience has taught your city and ours above all.

Chapter 18

1 “Recognize it by looking at our present misfortunes. We, who possess the greatest standing among the Greeks, have come before you, though once we thought ourselves better able to grant what we now come to ask of you.

2 “Yet this has not happened to us through lack of power, nor through arrogance born of an increase in it: with our resources unchanged, we have erred in judgment, a risk to which all alike are exposed.

3 “You therefore have no reason to think that, because of your city’s present strength and the gains it has made, fortune too will always be on your side.

4 “Prudent men are those who secure their blessings against uncertainty—and the same men would meet misfortune with greater understanding. They recognize that war does not attend upon them within whatever limits they choose to set its conduct, but according to the course their fortunes prescribe. Such men are least likely to stumble, because they do not grow elated by trusting to success in war, and are most willing to end it while their fortunes are still good.

5 “This is what you now have a fine opportunity to do with us, Athenians. Do not refuse our advice and perhaps suffer a reverse later—there are many ways it could happen—and so be thought to have won even your present successes by chance, when you can leave behind for the future an unchallenged reputation for strength and understanding.

Chapter 19

1 “The Lacedaemonians invite you to make a treaty and end the war. They offer peace, alliance, and close ties of friendship and mutual intimacy besides, asking in return for the men on the island. They judge it better for both sides not to hazard the outcome—whether some chance of rescue might allow the men to break free, or whether they might instead be reduced by siege and captured.

2 “We believe that great enmities are most securely ended not when a man takes revenge, gains the upper hand in war, and binds his opponent by compulsory oaths to an unequal settlement, but when, though able to do this, he makes fair terms, surpasses his opponent in generosity, and reaches a moderate agreement beyond what the other had expected.

3 “For the former enemy now feels bound not to retaliate as a victim of force, but to repay generosity, and a sense of honor makes him more willing to abide by the agreement.

4 “Men behave in this way more readily toward their bitterest enemies than toward those with whom their differences have been slight. It is their nature to respond gladly to a voluntary concession by yielding in their turn, but to risk a struggle against overbearing arrogance even against their better judgment.

Chapter 20

1 “For both of us, now if ever is the right time for reconciliation, before some irreparable event intervenes and overtakes us, compelling us to bear you an everlasting personal hatred in addition to our public enmity, and depriving you of the advantages we now offer.

2 “While the issue is still undecided, while you can gain glory and our friendship, and we can lay aside our misfortune on reasonable terms before any disgrace, let us be reconciled. Let us choose peace in place of war for ourselves, and give the other Greeks a respite from suffering. For this they will consider you chiefly responsible. They are at war without any clear knowledge of which side began it; but if peace is made, a matter now chiefly in your power, they will give you the credit.

3 “If you so resolve, you can become firm friends with the Lacedaemonians at their own invitation, by doing them a kindness rather than forcing them.

4 “Consider how many advantages this is likely to hold. For if you and we speak with one voice, you know that the rest of the Greeks, being weaker, will show us the greatest deference.”

Chapter 21

1 Such was the speech of the Lacedaemonians. They thought that the Athenians had previously desired a treaty and been prevented by their opposition, and that now, when peace was offered, they would gladly accept it and give back the men.

2 But the Athenians thought that, with the men on the island in their grasp, a treaty was already theirs for the making whenever they wished, and they reached out for more.

3 They were urged on chiefly by Cleon son of Cleaenetus, who was at that time a leader of the people and the most persuasive speaker with the multitude. He induced them to reply that the men on the island must first surrender their arms and themselves, and be brought to Athens. Once they had arrived, the Lacedaemonians must restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea—places they had not taken in war, but had obtained under the earlier agreement, when the Athenians, beset by misfortunes and then in greater need of a treaty, had yielded them. Only then could they recover their men and conclude a treaty for whatever term both sides approved.

Chapter 22

1 The envoys made no objection to the reply, but asked the Athenians to choose representatives to meet with them, so that, speaking and listening on each point, they might quietly reach agreement on whatever they could persuade one another to accept.

2 At this Cleon pressed them hard. He had known before, he said, that they had no just purpose in mind, and now it was plain: they would say nothing before the people, but wished to confer with a few men. If their intentions were sound, he demanded that they state them before everyone.

3 The Lacedaemonians saw that they could not speak before the people of any concessions their misfortune might lead them to contemplate: if they made an offer and failed to secure agreement, they would be discredited with their allies. They also saw that the Athenians would not accept their proposals on moderate terms. They therefore left Athens without accomplishing anything.

Chapter 23

1 On their return, the truce at Pylos ended at once, and the Lacedaemonians demanded their ships back, as had been agreed. But the Athenians alleged a raid on the fort in breach of the truce, together with other offenses that seemed insignificant, and refused to return them. They insisted on the provision that the truce was void if any part of it whatever was violated. The Lacedaemonians disputed this, denounced the withholding of the ships as an injustice, and went away to resume the war.

2 Both sides now fought with all their strength at Pylos. By day the Athenians kept two ships constantly circling the island in opposite directions; at night the whole fleet lay around it, except on the seaward side when the wind blew. Twenty ships had also arrived from Athens for the blockade, bringing the total to seventy. The Peloponnesians remained encamped on the mainland and made attacks on the wall, watching for any opportunity that might arise to save their men.

Chapter 24

1 Meanwhile in Sicily, the Syracusans and their allies brought up the rest of the fleet they were equipping to join the ships on guard at Messene, and waged war

2 from Messene. The Locrians were especially insistent on this, out of hatred for the Rhegians, and had themselves invaded their territory with their entire force.

3 They also wished to try their strength in a naval battle, seeing how few Athenian ships were present and learning that the larger fleet, which was to have come to Sicily, was blockading the island.

4 For if they gained command at sea, they hoped that by attacking Rhegium with their army and fleet they would easily subdue it, and their position would at once become strong. Rhegium, at the extremity of Italy, and Messene, at that of Sicily, lie close together; the Athenians would thus be unable to maintain a station there and command the strait.

5 The strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messene, where Sicily lies nearest the mainland. This is the place called Charybdis, through which Odysseus is said to have sailed. Its narrowness, and the currents of water pouring into it from the two great seas, the Tyrrhenian and the Sicilian, naturally gave it a reputation for danger.

Chapter 25

1 In this stretch of water, then, the Syracusans and their allies, with a little more than thirty ships, were compelled late in the day to fight a naval battle over a vessel making the crossing. They put out against sixteen Athenian ships and eight Rhegian.

2 Defeated by the Athenians, they sailed off in haste, each as chance allowed, to their respective camps at Messene and Rhegium, with the loss of one ship. Night overtook the action.

3 After this the Locrians withdrew from Rhegian territory, while the ships of the Syracusans and their allies gathered and anchored at Peloris in the territory of Messene. Their land army was there as well.

4 The Athenians and Rhegians sailed up and, seeing the ships empty, attacked them; but an iron grappling hook was thrown onto one of their own ships, which they lost, though its men swam away.

5 After this the Syracusans embarked and sailed along the coast toward Messene under tow. The Athenians attacked again, but the Syracusans turned their bows out to sea and struck first, costing the Athenians another ship.

6 Thus the Syracusans made their way into the harbor at Messene without coming off worse either in their passage along the coast or in the naval action as it developed.

7 The Athenians then sailed to Camarina, having received word that Archias and his associates were betraying it to the Syracusans. Meanwhile the Messenians marched out with their whole force by land, and with their ships at the same time, against neighboring Naxos, a Chalcidian city.

8 On the first day they confined the Naxians within their walls and ravaged the countryside. On the next they sailed round with their ships and ravaged the land by the Acesines River, while their infantry advanced against the city.

9 Meanwhile many Sicels were descending from the heights to bring help against the Messenians. When the Naxians saw them, they took courage and encouraged one another, believing that the Leontines and their other Greek allies were coming to their aid. They suddenly rushed out of the city and fell on the Messenians, routed them, and killed more than a thousand. The rest made their way home with difficulty, for the barbarians also attacked them along the roads and destroyed the greater part of them.

10 The ships put in at Messene and later dispersed to their several homes. The Leontines and their allies, together with the Athenians, immediately marched against Messene in its weakened condition. The Athenians made an attempt with their ships against the harbor, while the infantry attacked the city.

11 But the Messenians, with some Locrians under Demoteles who had been left as a garrison after the disaster, made a sudden sortie. Falling on the Leontine army, they routed the greater part of it and killed many. When the Athenians saw this, they disembarked to give help and, coming upon the Messenians in disorder, drove them back into the city. They set up a trophy and withdrew to Rhegium.

12 After this the Greeks in Sicily continued their land campaigns against one another without the Athenians.

Chapter 26

1 At Pylos the Athenians were still besieging the Lacedaemonians on the island, and the Peloponnesian army on the mainland remained in position.

2 The blockade was arduous for the Athenians, who lacked both food and water. There was only one spring, in the citadel of Pylos itself, and that a small one; most of the men dug through the shingle beside the sea and drank the sort of water one would expect.

3 They were also cramped, encamped in so small a space. As there was no anchorage for the ships, some took their food on shore in turns, while the others lay at anchor out at sea.

4 Above all, they were dispirited by the unexpected length of the siege. They had thought that in a few days they would starve out men confined to a deserted island and drinking brackish water.

5 The reason was that the Lacedaemonians had invited anyone willing to bring ground grain, wine, cheese, or any other food useful in a siege into the island, setting a high price for its delivery and promising freedom to any Helot who brought it in.

6 Others ran the risk of bringing supplies, but the Helots in particular did so. They set out from whatever part of the Peloponnese they could and landed, while it was still night, on the seaward side of the island.

7 They watched especially for a wind to carry them in. With a wind blowing from the open sea, they more easily escaped the vigilance of the triremes, which could no longer maintain their stations around the island. The suppliers were reckless in making their approach: they ran their boats ashore, a value having been set on them for compensation, and the hoplites kept watch at the island's landing places. Those who ventured out in calm weather were captured.

8 Swimmers also came through the harbor underwater, towing on a cord skins filled with poppy seed mixed with honey and crushed flaxseed. At first they escaped detection, but later guards were posted against them.

9 Both sides devised every possible means, the one to get provisions in, the other to prevent their passing unnoticed.

Chapter 27

1 At Athens, reports of the army's distress and of food being brought to the men on the island caused perplexity and fear that winter would overtake the blockade. They saw that bringing supplies round the Peloponnese would then be impossible, especially to a deserted place, when even in summer they could not send enough. Nor could the fleet maintain its blockade on a coast without harbors. Either the men would survive when the Athenians relaxed their watch, or, waiting for stormy weather, they would sail out in the boats that brought them food.

2 Above all they feared the Lacedaemonians, believing that these must have some strong ground for confidence, since they no longer sent heralds to them. They regretted not having accepted the agreement.

3 Cleon, aware that they suspected him over his obstruction of the settlement, declared that the men bringing the reports were not telling the truth. The men who had arrived urged the Athenians, if they did not believe them, to send inspectors; and Cleon himself was chosen as an inspector, together with Theagenes.

4 He realized that he would be compelled either to repeat the very statements he was attacking, or to contradict them and be exposed as a liar. Seeing also that the Athenians were minded to make a greater military effort, he urged them not to send inspectors or waste the opportunity in delay, but, if they believed the reports true, to sail against the men.

5 He pointedly reproached Nicias son of Niceratus, who was a general and his enemy: it would be easy, with a force properly equipped, to sail out and capture the men on the island, if the generals were men. He himself, at any rate, would do it if he were in command.

Chapter 28

1 Some of the Athenians began to shout at Cleon, asking why he did not sail now, if he thought it so easy. Nicias, faced also with Cleon's reproaches, told him that, so far as the generals were concerned, he might take whatever force he wished and make the attempt.

2 At first Cleon was ready, thinking that Nicias was only making a verbal offer; but when he understood that he truly meant to hand over the command, he drew back and said that Nicias, not he, was the general. He was now afraid, and had not expected Nicias to venture to give way to him.

3 But Nicias renewed his offer, resigned the command at Pylos, and called the Athenians to witness. As crowds will do, the more Cleon tried to evade the voyage and retreat from what he had said, the more they urged Nicias to surrender the command and shouted at Cleon to sail.

4 With no way left to escape his own words, he undertook the voyage. Coming forward, he declared that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians and would sail without taking a single man from the city: he would take the Lemnians and Imbrians who were present, the peltasts who had come as reinforcements from Aenus and elsewhere, and four hundred archers. With these, added to the soldiers at Pylos, he said he would within twenty days either bring the Lacedaemonians back alive or kill them where they were.

5 His reckless words provoked some laughter among the Athenians. Yet the more sober-minded were pleased, reckoning that they would gain one of two benefits: either they would be rid of Cleon, which they thought more likely, or, if their judgment proved mistaken, he would subdue the Lacedaemonians for them.

Chapter 29

1 When he had settled everything in the assembly and the Athenians had voted him authority for the voyage, he chose Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, to share his command, and made haste to put to sea.

2 He chose Demosthenes because he had learned that he was planning a landing on the island. The soldiers, suffering from the scant resources of the place, and more besieged than besiegers, were eager to risk a decisive action. The burning of the island had also given Demosthenes fresh confidence.

3 Previously he had been afraid because the greater part of the island was wooded and pathless, having always been uninhabited; he thought this favored the enemy. Even if a large army landed, they could attack from concealment and inflict losses. Their own mistakes and preparations would not be so readily visible to the Athenians through the woods, while every error of the Athenian army would be plain to them. Thus they could strike unexpectedly wherever they wished, for the initiative would lie with them.

4 If, on the other hand, he were forced to close with them in the dense woods, he thought that a smaller force familiar with the country would have the advantage over a larger one that did not know it. His own army, large though it was, might be destroyed without its plight being noticed, since the men could not see where they needed to help one another.

Chapter 30

1 These thoughts weighed on him especially because of the disaster in Aetolia, which had been due in part to the woods.

2 Cramped for space, the soldiers had been compelled to put in at the extremities of the island and take their midday meal under the protection of an advance guard. One of them accidentally set fire to a small patch of woodland; a wind then arose, and before they knew it most of the woods had burned down.

3 Demosthenes could now see the Lacedaemonians more clearly and saw that they were more numerous than he had supposed, for he had previously suspected that the food was being brought in for fewer men. The island, too, was easier to land on. He therefore set about preparing the Athenians to press the assault with greater earnestness, as against a worthy enemy, sending for troops from the neighboring allies and making the other preparations.

4 Cleon sent a messenger ahead to announce his coming and arrived at Pylos with the troops he had requested. When the two commanders met, they first sent a herald to the army on the mainland, inviting them, if they wished, to order the men on the island to surrender themselves and their arms without a struggle. The men would be held in reasonable custody until some broader agreement was reached.

Chapter 31

1 When the offer was rejected, they waited one day. On the next, during the night, they embarked all the hoplites on a few ships and put out; shortly before dawn they landed on both sides of the island, from the open sea and from the harbor, about eight hundred hoplites in all, and ran forward against the first guard post on the island.

2 The enemy were disposed as follows. At this first post there were about thirty hoplites. The greater part of the force, with Epitadas their commander, held the center of the island, where the ground was most level and the water was. A small detachment guarded the very end of the island facing Pylos, a place precipitous toward the sea and least open to attack from the land. There was also an old fort there, built of stones picked out for the purpose, which they thought would serve them if they were compelled to make a hard-pressed retreat. Such was their disposition.

Chapter 32

1 The Athenians at once destroyed the first guards they rushed upon, some still in their beds, others taking up their arms. Their landing had gone unnoticed, since the guards thought the ships were sailing to their customary night stations for the blockade.

2 At daybreak the rest of the force began to land: from a little more than seventy ships, everyone except the rowers on the lowest tier, each with whatever equipment he had; eight hundred archers and at least as many peltasts; the Messenians who had come to help; and all the other men holding Pylos, except the guards on the wall.

3 Under Demosthenes' orders they spread out in detachments of two hundred or more, and in some places fewer, occupying the highest ground. His purpose was to reduce the enemy, surrounded on every side, to the greatest possible perplexity: they would not know which way to face, but would be caught between the masses of their opponents. If they advanced against those in front, they would be struck from behind; if against those on the flank, from the forces ranged on either side.

4 Whichever way they moved, the enemy light troops would always be at their backs, and these were the hardest to deal with. They could fight at long range with arrows, javelins, stones, and slings, yet could not themselves be charged: even in flight they had the advantage, and when the enemy withdrew they pressed upon them. Such was the plan on which Demosthenes had first conceived the landing and which he now put into effect.

Chapter 33

1 When Epitadas and the main body of the men on the island saw the first guard post destroyed and an army advancing against them, they formed up and moved against the Athenian hoplites, wishing to come to close quarters. These stood directly in front of them, while the light troops were on their flanks and behind them.

2 They could neither engage the hoplites nor bring their own skill to bear. The light troops held them off with missiles from either side, while the hoplites remained still instead of advancing to meet them. Wherever the light troops pressed them closest, they charged and drove them back; but these turned and defended themselves again. Lightly equipped, they easily gained a head start in flight over ground that was difficult and rough from its former desolation, where the Lacedaemonians in their armor could not pursue them.

Chapter 34

1 For a short time they skirmished with one another in this way. But the Lacedaemonians could no longer dash out swiftly wherever they were attacked, and the light troops recognized that their defense was growing slower. The sight of their own overwhelming numbers had given them most of their confidence; familiarity, too, had made the enemy seem less formidable, since they had not immediately suffered as they had expected when they first landed, their minds cowed by the thought that they were going against Lacedaemonians. Now, despising them, they raised a shout and rushed at them together, pelting them with stones, arrows, and javelins, whatever each man had at hand.

2 The shout accompanying the onrush struck terror into men unaccustomed to such fighting. Dense clouds of dust rose from the newly burned woods, and it was impossible to see what lay ahead through the arrows and stones hurled by so many men and flying together with the dust.

3 The Lacedaemonians' position now became desperate. Their felt caps could not keep out the arrows, and their spearshafts were splintered under the bombardment. They had no means of helping themselves: their eyes could not see ahead, and the louder shouting of the enemy drowned out their own orders. Danger surrounded them on every side, and they had no hope of finding a way to defend themselves and survive.

Chapter 35

1 At last, with many already wounded as they continually wheeled about in the same place, they closed ranks and moved toward the fort at the end of the island, which was not far away, and toward their own guards there.

2 Once they gave ground, the light troops, emboldened, pressed them with far louder cries. Any Lacedaemonians caught in the retreat were killed, but most escaped to the fort, where they joined the guards and formed a defensive line along its entire assailable front.

3 The Athenians followed, but the strength of the position prevented them from passing round and surrounding the enemy. Instead, they advanced against them from the front and tried to drive them back.

4 For a long time, through most of the day, both sides held out, tormented by battle, thirst, and sun: the one trying to dislodge the enemy from the height, the other refusing to yield. The Lacedaemonians defended themselves more easily than before, since they were no longer being surrounded on their flanks.

Chapter 36

1 When no end was in sight, the Messenian general approached Cleon and Demosthenes and told them that they were laboring in vain. If they would give him a detachment of archers and light troops to work his way round behind the enemy by whatever route he could find, he thought he could force an entry.

2 Receiving the men he requested, he started from a concealed point so that the enemy would not see him. He made his way along the cliff-bound part of the island wherever passage offered, through ground the Lacedaemonians had left unguarded in reliance on its natural strength. With great difficulty he got round unnoticed and suddenly appeared on the height behind them. The surprise appalled the enemy, while the sight of what they had been awaiting gave the Athenians far greater confidence.

3 The Lacedaemonians, now struck from both sides, found themselves in the same predicament as the men at Thermopylae, to compare a small event with a great one. Those men had been destroyed when the Persians came round by the path; these, likewise caught between two forces, could no longer hold out. Few fighting against many, and with their bodies weakened by lack of food, they fell back; the Athenians now controlled the approaches.

Chapter 37

1 Cleon and Demosthenes realized [that] if the enemy yielded even a little further, their own army would destroy them. They stopped the battle and held their men back, wishing to bring the Lacedaemonians alive to the Athenians: perhaps, on hearing a proclamation, they might break in spirit, surrender their arms, and succumb to the terror of their present plight.

2 They proclaimed that, if the men wished, they might surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians, to be dealt with as the Athenians should decide.

Chapter 38

1 On hearing this, most of the men lowered their shields and waved their hands to signal their acceptance of the proclamation. A truce followed, and Cleon and Demosthenes met for talks with Styphon son of Pharax on the other side. Of the commanders before him, Epitadas, the first, was dead; Hippagretus, who had been appointed next, lay among the dead, still alive but taken for dead. Styphon himself had been appointed third in command under the law, to take over if anything happened to the other two.

2 Styphon and his companions said that they wished to communicate by herald with the Lacedaemonians on the mainland and ask what they should do.

3 The Athenians would allow none of them to leave, but themselves summoned heralds from the mainland. After two or three exchanges of questions, the last man to cross over to them from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland delivered this message: “The Lacedaemonians instruct you to decide for yourselves about your own fate, doing nothing dishonorable.” They consulted among themselves and surrendered their arms and their persons.

4 The Athenians kept them under guard for that day and the following night. On the next day they set up a trophy on the island, made their other preparations for sailing, and assigned the prisoners to the captains of the triremes for safekeeping. The Lacedaemonians sent a herald and recovered their dead.

5 The numbers killed on the island and taken alive were these. Four hundred and twenty hoplites had crossed over in all; of these, two hundred and ninety-two were brought back alive, and the rest were dead. About a hundred and twenty of the survivors were Spartans. Few Athenians were killed, for the fighting was not a pitched battle.

Chapter 39

1 The whole time for which the men on the island were besieged, from the sea battle to the battle on the island, was seventy-two days.

2 For about twenty of these days, while the envoys were away negotiating the treaty, they received provisions; for the rest they lived on supplies brought in by those who sailed across in secret. Some grain and other food were found left on the island: Epitadas, their commander, had allotted each man less than the available supplies allowed.

3 The Athenians and Peloponnesians now each withdrew their forces from Pylos and returned home. Cleon's promise, wild though it was, had come true: within twenty days he brought back the men, just as he had undertaken to do.

Chapter 40

1 Of all the events of the war, this was the one that most confounded the Greeks' expectations. They had believed that neither hunger nor any other extremity would induce the Lacedaemonians to surrender their arms: they would hold them to the last, fighting as best they could, and die.

2 They could not believe that the men who surrendered were of the same quality as those who died. Later, when one of the Athenian allies spitefully asked a prisoner from the island whether those of his comrades who had died were brave and honorable men, he answered that the spindle—meaning the arrow—would be worth a great deal if it could distinguish the brave. He meant that stones and arrows killed whoever happened to be in their way.

Chapter 41

1 When the men had been brought to Athens, the Athenians resolved to keep them in chains until some agreement was reached, but if the Peloponnesians invaded their land before then, to bring them out and put them to death.

2 They stationed a garrison at Pylos. The Messenians at Naupactus, treating it as their native land—for Pylos belongs to the territory that was once Messenia—sent the most suitable of their own men there; these raided Laconia and did very great damage, aided by their common language with its inhabitants.

3 The Lacedaemonians, unaccustomed until then to raids and warfare of this kind, were deeply troubled. Helots were deserting, and they feared that disorders in the countryside might spread still further. Though unwilling to reveal their distress to the Athenians, they sent embassies to them and tried to recover both Pylos and the men.

4 But the Athenians reached for greater gains, and though the envoys came repeatedly, sent them away without accomplishing anything. Such were the events at Pylos.

Chapter 42

1 Immediately afterward, in the same summer, the Athenians campaigned against Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand hoplites of their own, and two hundred cavalry carried in horse transports. Allied troops from Miletus, Andros, and Carystus accompanied them. Nicias son of Niceratus commanded, with two colleagues.

2 They sailed in and at dawn landed between Chersonesus and Rheitus, on the beach below the Solygean hill. In ancient times the Dorians had established themselves on this hill and made war on the Corinthians in the city, who were Aeolians; a village called Solygea now stands on it. From the beach where the ships landed, this village is twelve stades away, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty.

3 The Corinthians, forewarned from Argos that the Athenian force was coming, had long before marched to the Isthmus with their entire strength, except for those living beyond it. Five hundred of their men were also absent on garrison duty in Ambracia and Leucas. All the rest watched together for the Athenians, to see where they would land.

4 But the Athenians sailed in by night undetected. When signals were raised to warn the Corinthians, they left half their men at Cenchreae, in case the Athenians should go toward Crommyon, and hurried to the rescue.

Chapter 43

1 Battus, one of the generals—there were two present at the battle—took a company to defend the unwalled village of Solygea, while Lycophron engaged the enemy with the rest.

2 The Corinthians first attacked the Athenian right wing, which had just landed in front of Chersonesus, and then the rest of the army. The fighting was fierce and entirely at close quarters.

3 The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians—the latter were posted at the extreme end of the line—stood against the Corinthians and with difficulty drove them back. They withdrew to a stone wall, for the whole ground rose steeply, and from their higher position hurled stones; then, singing the paean, they advanced again. The Athenians met them, and the battle was once more hand to hand.

4 A Corinthian company came to support its own left wing, routed the Athenian right, and pursued it to the sea. But from the ships the Athenians and Carystians turned back to face them again.

5 The rest of the two armies fought without interruption, above all the Corinthian right wing, where Lycophron stood defending against the Athenian left: they expected the Athenians to attempt an attack on the village of Solygea.

Chapter 44

1 For a long time they held their ground, neither yielding to the other. At last the Corinthians broke and withdrew toward the hill—the Athenian cavalry had been of service in the fighting, while their opponents had none. There they grounded their arms and remained still, making no further descent.

2 It was in this rout, on their right wing, that most of their men were killed, including Lycophron the general. The rest of the army, when forced back in this way, withdrew to the heights and took up a position, without any prolonged pursuit or headlong flight.

3 When the Corinthians no longer advanced to fight them, the Athenians stripped the enemy dead and gathered their own, and at once set up a trophy.

4 The half of the Corinthian force stationed at Cenchreae, watching lest the Athenians sail toward Crommyon, could not see the battle because Mount Oneum lay in the way. But when they saw the dust and [when] they understood what it meant, they came to the rescue at once. The older Corinthians from the city also came out to help when they learned what had happened.

5 Seeing all these men advancing, the Athenians supposed that reinforcements were coming from the neighboring Peloponnesian communities. They hurried back to the ships with their spoils and their own dead, except for two whom they could not find and left behind.

6 They boarded their ships and crossed to the islands nearby. From there they sent a herald and recovered under truce the dead they had left behind. Two hundred and twelve Corinthians died in the battle, and a little fewer than fifty Athenians.

Chapter 45

1 Putting out from the islands, the Athenians sailed that same day to Crommyon in Corinthian territory, a hundred and twenty stades from the city. They anchored, laid waste the land, and encamped for the night.

2 The next day they sailed first along the coast to Epidaurian territory and made a landing there; then they came to Methana, between Epidaurus and Troezen. They walled off the isthmus of the peninsula [in which Methone stands] and established a garrison, from which they afterward raided the lands of Troezen, Haliae, and Epidaurus. When they had finished fortifying the place, they sailed home with their ships.

Chapter 46

1 At about the same time as these events, Eurymedon and Sophocles, who had left Pylos with the Athenian ships bound for Sicily, arrived at Corcyra. Together with the people of the city, they marched against the Corcyraeans established on Mount Istone, who had crossed over after the civil strife and now controlled the countryside and were doing great damage.

2 They attacked and took the fortification. The men, who had fled together to a height, agreed to surrender their mercenaries, lay down their own arms, and leave the Athenian people to decide their fate.

3 The generals transported them to the island of Ptychia to be kept under guard until they could be sent to Athens. They were protected by a truce, on the condition that if any one of them was caught escaping, it would be void for them all.

4 But the leaders of the Corcyraean people, afraid that the Athenians might not execute the prisoners when they arrived, devised the following scheme.

5 They secretly sent friends to persuade a few of the men on the island. These were instructed to speak as though out of goodwill: their best course was to escape as quickly as possible, and the speakers would themselves provide a boat, for the Athenian generals were about to hand them over to the Corcyraean people.

Chapter 47

1 When they had been persuaded and the boat had been arranged, they were caught sailing away. The truce was now void, and all the prisoners were handed over to the Corcyraeans.

2 The Athenian generals contributed in no small measure to this outcome, making the pretext secure and emboldening the authors of the scheme to attempt it: they made it plain that, since they themselves were sailing to Sicily, they were unwilling to have the men conveyed by others, who would then receive the honor of bringing them in.

3 The Corcyraeans took charge of the prisoners and shut them in a large building. Later they brought them out twenty at a time, bound to one another, and led them between two ranks of hoplites drawn up on either side. The soldiers struck and stabbed them whenever anyone recognized a personal enemy; men carrying whips walked beside them and hurried on those who moved too slowly.

Chapter 48

1 They brought out and killed about sixty men in this way without those inside the building knowing it; they thought the men were being taken somewhere else to be resettled. But when they realized what was happening and someone told them, they called on the Athenians to kill them themselves, if they wished. They would no longer leave the building and declared that, so far as they could prevent it, they would let no one enter.

2 The Corcyraeans had no intention of forcing their way through the doors. Instead they climbed onto the building, broke open the roof, and hurled tiles and shot arrows down on them.

3 The prisoners defended themselves as best they could, while most also began to take their own lives. They drove the arrows shot at them into their throats, or hanged themselves with cords from some beds that happened to be inside, and with strips torn from their clothes. Through most of the night—for night fell upon their suffering—they destroyed themselves by every means, or died under the missiles from above.

4 When day came, the Corcyraeans piled the bodies on wagons like loads of freight and carried them outside the city. The women captured in the fortification they sold into slavery.

5 In this way the Corcyraeans from the mountain were destroyed by the people, and the civil strife, after reaching such great proportions, came to this end—at least for the duration of this war. Of the opposing party no remnant of any account was left.

6 The Athenians sailed away to Sicily, their original destination, and fought there alongside their allies.

Chapter 49

1 At the close of the summer the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians together made an expedition against Anactorium, a Corinthian city at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and took it by treachery. The Acarnanians expelled [the Corinthians] and themselves occupied the place with settlers drawn from all their communities. And the summer ended.

Chapter 50

1 In the following winter Aristides son of Archippus, one of the generals commanding the Athenian tribute-collecting ships sent out to the allies, arrested at Eion on the Strymon a Persian named Artaphernes, who was traveling from the King to Lacedaemon.

2 He was brought to Athens, where the Athenians translated his letters from the Assyrian script and read them. Among much else, their chief message to the Lacedaemonians was that the King did not understand what they wanted: many envoys had come, but no two said the same thing. If, then, they wished to make any clear proposal, they should send men to him with the Persian.

3 Later the Athenians sent Artaphernes to Ephesus in a trireme, together with envoys of their own. These learned there that King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes had recently died—his death fell at about this time—and returned home.

Chapter 51

1 In the same winter the Chians dismantled their new wall at the Athenians' command, who suspected them of planning revolt. They did, however, secure from the Athenians pledges and the strongest possible assurance that no change would be planned in their affairs. And the winter ended, and the seventh year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Chapter 52

1 At the very beginning of the following summer there was a partial eclipse of the sun about the new moon, and an earthquake early in the same month.

2 The exiles from Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, operating chiefly from the mainland, hired mercenaries from the Peloponnese and gathered others locally. They took Rhoeteum, but on receiving two thousand Phocaean staters gave it back without doing any damage.

3 After this they marched against Antandrus and took the city through treachery. Their intention was to liberate the other cities known as the Actaean cities, once held by the Mytilenaeans but now in Athenian hands, and above all Antandrus. Once they had made it secure, it would be easy to build ships there, with timber available on the spot and from nearby Ida, and to furnish the other equipment. Using it as a base, they could readily ravage Lesbos close by and subdue the Aeolian towns on the mainland. Such were the preparations they intended to make.

Chapter 53

1 In the same summer the Athenians campaigned against Cythera with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, and a few cavalry, taking with them Milesians and some other allied troops. Their generals were Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus.

2 Cythera is an island lying off Laconia opposite Malea. Its inhabitants are Lacedaemonians of the perioeci; each year an official called the Cytherodices crossed over from Sparta, and the Lacedaemonians regularly sent a garrison of hoplites and took great care of the place.

3 It was a landfall for their merchant ships coming from Egypt and Libya; it also kept pirates from harassing Laconia so much by sea, the only direction from which it could be harmed, since its whole coast faces the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

Chapter 54

1 The Athenians landed their force and took the coastal town called Scandea with ten ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites. The rest of the army disembarked on the side of the island facing Malea and advanced toward the Cytherians' town [on the sea], where they at once found the entire population encamped.

2 In the battle that followed the Cytherians held their ground for a short time, then broke and fled to the upper town. Later they agreed with Nicias and his fellow commanders to leave their fate to the Athenians, on condition that they should not be put to death.

3 Nicias had already held discussions with some of the Cytherians, and for this reason the settlement was reached more quickly and on terms more favorable to them, both for the moment and for the future. Otherwise the Athenians would have removed the Cytherians, since they were Lacedaemonians and their island lay so close to Laconia.

4 After the agreement the Athenians took possession of Scandea, the little town at the harbor, and placed a garrison on Cythera. They then sailed to Asine, Helos, and most of the coastal places, landing and encamping wherever the opportunity offered, and laid waste the land for about seven days.

Chapter 55

1 The Lacedaemonians saw the Athenians holding Cythera and expected them to make similar landings on their own soil. Nowhere did they oppose them with their full strength; instead they sent garrisons throughout the country, assigning as many hoplites as each place required. In other respects too they kept a close watch, fearing some disturbance of their established order: the disaster on the island had been as great as it was unexpected, Pylos and Cythera were occupied, and on every side they were beset by a war swift in its movements and impossible to guard against.

2 They therefore departed from their usual practice and raised four hundred cavalry and a force of archers. In military affairs they now became more hesitant than ever, involved as they were in a naval struggle contrary to the character of their existing armament, and that against the Athenians, who always regarded an unattempted enterprise as a failure to achieve what they believed possible.

3 At the same time, so many unforeseen blows of fortune in so short a period filled them with the greatest dismay; they feared that another disaster like the one on the island might befall them.

4 This made them less bold in battle, and they imagined that every move they made would go wrong. Their confidence had become insecure because, until then, they had been strangers to misfortune.

Chapter 56

1 Thus, while the Athenians were ravaging the coast, the Lacedaemonians generally remained quiet: wherever a landing took place within a garrison's district, its men thought themselves outnumbered, and their spirits were in this condition. One garrison did offer resistance, near Cotyrta and Aphroditia. Its charge scattered the dispersed mass of light-armed troops, but when the hoplites stood against it, it withdrew again. A few of its men were killed and their arms taken; the Athenians set up a trophy and sailed back to Cythera.

2 From there they sailed round to Epidaurus Limera, ravaged part of its territory, and came to Thyrea. This lies in the country called Cynuria, on the border between Argive and Laconian territory. The Lacedaemonians, who held it, had given it to the expelled Aeginetans as a home, in return for their help at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots, and because, though subject to Athens, they had always stood by Lacedaemonian policy.

Chapter 57

1 While the Athenians were still approaching by sea, the Aeginetans abandoned the wall they were then building on the shore and withdrew to the upper town where they lived, about ten stades from the sea.

2 One of the Lacedaemonian garrisons stationed about the country had been helping them build the wall. Though the Aeginetans begged them, its men refused to enter the fortifications with them, thinking it dangerous to be shut up inside. They withdrew to the heights and, believing themselves no match for the enemy, remained quiet.

3 Meanwhile the Athenians landed, advanced at once with their whole army, and took Thyrea. They burned the town and plundered everything in it, then returned to Athens with all the Aeginetans who had not been killed in the fighting, and with Tantalus son of Patrocles, the Lacedaemonian commander stationed among them, who had been wounded and captured alive.

4 They also brought a few men from Cythera whom they thought it safer to remove. The Athenians resolved to confine these on the islands, and to let the other Cytherians live in their own land and pay four talents in tribute. All the captured Aeginetans were to be put to death because of the long-standing enmity, and Tantalus was to be chained up with the other Lacedaemonians taken on the island.

Chapter 58

1 In the same summer, in Sicily, the Camarinaeans and Geloans first concluded an armistice with one another. Then the other Siceliots too assembled at Gela, with envoys from every city, and entered into talks to see whether they could reach a settlement. Many opinions were expressed on either side as they disputed and pressed their claims, each according to the losses they thought they had suffered. Hermocrates son of Hermon, a Syracusan, whose influence did most to persuade them, addressed the gathering as follows.

Chapter 59

1 “Men of Sicily, I speak as a citizen neither of the least of your cities nor of the one most afflicted by the war, but to set before you openly the course I believe best for all Sicily.

2 “Why should anyone speak at length about the hardships of war, rehearsing every evil it contains to people who know them already? No one is forced into it through ignorance, nor deterred by fear if he thinks he will gain an advantage. Rather, to one side the gains seem greater than the dangers, while the other is willing to face those dangers rather than suffer any immediate loss.

3 “But if either side is pursuing these very aims at the wrong moment, advice to seek a settlement is useful.

4 “For us too, to heed it now would be of the greatest value. Each of us, believing of course that he was arranging his own affairs well, first went to war; now, through argument with one another, we are trying to come to terms. And if it should prove impossible for each to go away with his equal share, we shall fight again.

Chapter 60

1 “Yet we must recognize that, if we are wise, this gathering will concern not merely our separate interests, but whether we can still save the whole of Sicily from the designs which, in my judgment, Athens has upon it. And we must regard the Athenians as far more compelling mediators in these disputes than any words of mine. Possessing the greatest power among the Greeks, they are here with a few ships, watching for our mistakes; under the lawful name of alliance, they give a fair appearance to their natural hostility and turn it to their advantage.

2 “For if we choose war and bring them in—men who march even against those who do not invite them—if we injure ourselves at our own expense and at the same time advance their empire, we may well expect that, once they see us worn down, they will one day come with a larger fleet and attempt to subject all this country to themselves.

Chapter 61

1 “Yet if we are wise, each of us should call in allies and expose his own land to fresh dangers to acquire what he does not possess, rather than to damage what he already has. We must recognize that civil strife does more than anything else to destroy cities, and Sicily too: all of us who inhabit it are threatened together, yet city is divided against city.

2 “Knowing this, we must make peace, individual with individual and city with city, and try together to save the whole of Sicily. No one should suppose that the Dorians among us are enemies of Athens, while the Chalcidians are safe through their Ionian kinship.

3 “For the Athenians are not attacking these two peoples out of hatred for one of them because their origins are distinct, but out of desire for the good things of Sicily, which we possess in common.

4 “They have made this plain now in answering the appeal of the Chalcidian people: though these have never yet helped them under the alliance, they themselves have been all the more eager to fulfill their treaty obligations.

5 “That the Athenians should seek these advantages and provide for them in advance is entirely understandable. I blame not those who wish to rule, but those who are too ready to submit. For it is always human nature to rule whoever yields, and to guard against whoever attacks.

6 “But if, knowing this, we fail to take proper precautions, if any of us has come here without judging it his first duty to set right the danger that threatens us all, we are at fault.

7 “The quickest deliverance from it would come if we reached agreement with one another. For the Athenians are not operating from their own country, but from that of those who invited them. In this way our differences are ended without trouble, not by meeting war with war, but by peace. And those who came at our invitation, with a fair pretext for an unjust purpose, will depart with good reason, their purpose unfulfilled.

Chapter 62

1 “So great, then, is the advantage that sound deliberation offers us against the Athenians.

2 “And peace, which everyone agrees is best—how can we fail to establish it among ourselves as well? If one of you enjoys some advantage and another suffers the reverse, do you suppose that quiet will not do more than war to end the suffering and preserve the advantage for each, or that peace does not make honors and splendor safer, along with all the other benefits one might describe at length, just as one might discuss warfare? Consider these things, and do not disregard my words; rather, let each man see in them the prospect of his own deliverance.

3 “And if anyone thinks that either justice or force guarantees him some achievement, let him not bitterly resent an unexpected disappointment. Let him recognize that many before now have pursued wrongdoers for vengeance, while others have hoped to gain more through their power: the former, far from avenging themselves, have not even survived, while the latter, instead of gaining more, have lost what was already their own as well.

4 “For vengeance does not succeed by right merely because a wrong has been done; nor is strength secure merely because it is hopeful. The incalculable future has the widest sway, and, though the most treacherous of all things, proves also the most useful: since we fear it equally, we approach one another with greater foresight.

Chapter 63

1 “Now, then, alarmed on both counts—by this fear of the unseen, because it cannot be reckoned, and by the Athenians already here, a present terror—and judging that these obstacles have sufficiently thwarted whatever each of us thought to accomplish but failed to achieve, let us send away the enemies who stand over our country. Let us come to terms ourselves, preferably for all time; failing that, let us make a truce for as long as possible and put off our private disputes until another day.

2 “In short, let us understand that, if you listen to me, each of us will have a free city, from which, as our own masters, we can repay good and evil alike with equal valor. But if we reject this counsel and submit to others, there will be no question of punishing anyone: even with the best of fortune, we shall be forced to become friends to our bitterest enemies and enemies to those with whom we should not quarrel.

Chapter 64

1 “For my part, as I said at the outset, though I represent the greatest city and am more often the attacker than the defender, I consider it right to foresee these dangers and make concessions. I will not injure my enemies so much that I suffer still greater harm myself, nor pursue victory so foolishly as to think myself as fully master of fortune, which I do not command, as of my own judgment. I will yield as far as is reasonable.

2 “And I ask the rest of you to do the same as I do: make these concessions to one another, not under compulsion from the enemy.

3 “For there is no disgrace in kinsmen yielding to kinsmen—a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to his own kindred. We are all, in short, neighbors, sharing a single country surrounded by the sea and called by a single name, Siceliots. We shall fight, I suppose, when occasion arises, and we shall make peace again among ourselves through common discussion;

4 “but against invaders of another race we shall always defend ourselves together, if we are wise, since harm to individuals endangers us all. Never again shall we bring in allies from outside, or even mediators.

5 “For by acting in this way we shall not deprive Sicily of two present blessings—deliverance from the Athenians and from war among ourselves—and in the future we shall inhabit it ourselves in freedom, less exposed to the designs of others.”

Chapter 65

1 Hermocrates spoke to this effect, and the Siceliots took his advice. Among themselves they agreed to end the war, each retaining what they held; Morgantina, however, was to belong to the Camarinaeans, who would pay the Syracusans a fixed sum of money.

2 The allies of the Athenians summoned the Athenian commanders and said that they would make a settlement, and that the truce would include them as well. With their approval the agreement was concluded, and afterward the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily.

3 When the generals returned, the Athenians at home punished Pythodorus and Sophocles with exile and imposed a fine on the third, Eurymedon, alleging that, although they could have subdued Sicily, they had been bribed to withdraw.

4 So thoroughly had their present good fortune persuaded them that they expected nothing to stand in their way, and thought they could achieve the possible and the more difficult alike, with ample resources or with inadequate ones. The cause was their success in most undertakings beyond all calculation, which lent strength to their hopes.

Chapter 66

1 During the same summer the Megarians in the city were hard pressed both by the Athenians, who invaded their country with their whole army twice every year, and by their own exiles at Pegae. These men, driven out by the people in the civil strife, were inflicting serious damage through their raids. The citizens began discussing among themselves the need to readmit the exiles rather than let the city be ruined from both sides.

2 The friends of those outside heard the talk and themselves began to urge this policy more openly than before.

3 The leaders of the people, realizing that under these hardships the people would not be able to stand firm with them, grew afraid and entered into discussions with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes. They wished to surrender the city, believing this less dangerous to themselves than the return of the men they had expelled. They agreed that the Athenians should first seize the Long Walls, which extended about eight stades from the city to Nisaea, their harbor. This would prevent the Peloponnesians from coming to its aid from Nisaea, where they alone supplied the garrison to keep Megara securely in their hands. Afterward they would try to surrender the upper city too: once the walls had been taken, its inhabitants would be more likely to come over.

Chapter 67

1 When both parties had completed their preparations in word and deed, the Athenians sailed under cover of night to Minoa, the Megarians' island, with six hundred hoplites commanded by Hippocrates, and took up a position in a nearby excavation from which bricks had been made for the walls.

2 The men with Demosthenes, the other general—light-armed Plataeans and other patrol troops—lay in ambush at the sanctuary of Enyalius, which was nearer still. No one knew of their presence that night except the men whose business it was to know.

3 As dawn approached, the Megarians who were betraying the city acted as follows. They had long been contriving to secure the opening of the gates: pretending to be raiders, they had made a practice, with the commander's consent, of taking a small boat with oars on both sides down to the sea on a wagon through the ditch at night, and sailing out. Before daylight they would bring it back on the wagon to the wall and take it in through the gates. Their purpose was to keep their patrol hidden from the Athenians on Minoa, since no vessel was visible in the harbor.

4 On this occasion the wagon was already at the gates. When they were opened as usual, ostensibly for the boat, the Athenians saw it and ran at full speed from their ambush: this was the agreed signal. They wanted to get there before the gates could be shut again, while the wagon was still between them and prevented their closing. At the same time the Megarians acting with them killed the guards at the gates.

5 The Plataeans and patrol troops with Demosthenes were the first to rush in, at the place where the trophy now stands. The nearest Peloponnesians became aware of them, and fighting began immediately inside the gates. The Plataeans defeated those who came to the rescue and secured the gates for the advancing Athenian hoplites.

Chapter 68

1 Then, as each successive body of Athenians came inside, it advanced to the wall.

2 A few of the Peloponnesian garrison at first stood their ground and defended themselves, and some of them were killed. Most, however, took to flight, terrified by the enemy's sudden attack in the night and by the Megarian traitors fighting against them; they thought that all the Megarians had betrayed them.

3 For the Athenian herald had also, on his own initiative, proclaimed that any Megarian who wished could come and join the Athenians under arms. When they heard this, they held out no longer, but, convinced that the whole city was indeed fighting against them, fled to Nisaea.

4 At dawn, with the walls already captured and the Megarians in the city in confusion, the men who had been negotiating with the Athenians, together with a considerable body of others privy to the plan, said that they must open the gates and march out to battle.

5 They had agreed that, when the gates were opened, the Athenians would rush in. They themselves were to be clearly recognizable—they would smear themselves with oil—so that they would not be harmed. They felt all the safer about opening the gates because the four thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred cavalry from Eleusis had also arrived, having marched through the night as arranged.

6 They had already anointed themselves and were at the gates when someone who knew of the plot revealed it to the other party. These men gathered together and came in a body, declaring that they must neither march out—they had never dared do so before, even when stronger—nor expose the city to manifest danger. If anyone refused to obey, the battle would be fought on the spot. They gave no sign that they knew what was being done, but insisted that their advice was for the best, while remaining on guard at the gates. Thus the conspirators could not carry out their purpose.

Chapter 69

1 The Athenian generals, realizing that some obstacle had arisen and that they could not take the city by force, immediately began to build a wall around Nisaea. They thought that, if they captured it before relief arrived, this would hasten

2 the surrender of Megara as well. Iron tools, masons, and the other necessities quickly arrived from Athens. Starting from the wall they held, they built a cross-wall on the side facing Megara; from there the army divided the work of digging a ditch and building walls down to the sea on either side of Nisaea. They used stones and bricks from the suburb, and cut down trees and timber to make palisades wherever anything was needed. The houses of the suburb themselves served as fortifications when fitted with battlements.

3 They worked throughout that day. By the afternoon of the next the wall was all but complete, and the men in Nisaea became afraid. They were short of grain, having drawn their supplies day by day from the upper city; they did not think the Peloponnesians would come quickly to their relief, and they regarded the Megarians as enemies. They therefore agreed with the Athenians to surrender their arms, each man to be released for a fixed sum of money. The Athenians, however, were to dispose as they pleased of the Lacedaemonians—the commander and any others who were there.

4 Having agreed to these terms, they came out. The Athenians severed the Long Walls from the city of the Megarians, took possession of Nisaea, and made their further preparations.

Chapter 70

1 At this time Brasidas son of Tellis, the Lacedaemonian, happened to be near Sicyon and Corinth, preparing an expedition to Thrace. When he learned of the capture of the walls, he feared both for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and that Megara might be taken. He sent to the Boeotians, ordering them to meet him with an army as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus—a village of the Megarid below Mount Geraneia—and himself went there with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian hoplites, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and as many of his own men as had already assembled. He thought he would still find Nisaea untaken.

2 When he learned what had happened—he had reached Tripodiscus in the night—he picked three hundred men from the army and, before his presence became known, approached the city of the Megarians undetected by the Athenians, who were near the sea. His professed purpose was to make an attempt on Nisaea, and he meant to do so in fact if he could; but his chief aim was to enter the city of the Megarians and secure it. He asked them to admit his men, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea.

Chapter 71

1 But the factions among the Megarians were afraid: one feared that he would bring back the exiles and expel them; the other, that the people, fearing precisely this, would attack them and the city would be destroyed in fighting within itself while the Athenians lay close by in wait. They did not admit him; both parties preferred to remain quiet and watch what would happen.

2 For both expected a battle between the Athenians and the relieving force, and thought it would then be safer for them to join whichever side they favored, once it had won. Brasidas, unable to persuade them, withdrew to the rest of his army.

Chapter 72

1 At dawn the Boeotians arrived. Even before Brasidas sent to them, they had intended to relieve Megara, regarding the danger as their own, and had already assembled their whole army at Plataea. When the messenger also arrived, they became far more eager, and sent two thousand two hundred hoplites and six hundred cavalry, returning home with the greater part of their forces.

2 The entire army was now assembled, with no fewer than six thousand hoplites. The Athenian hoplites were drawn up near Nisaea and the sea, while their light-armed troops were scattered over the plain. The Boeotian cavalry fell upon the light-armed troops unawares and drove them toward the sea: until then no relief had yet reached the Megarians from any quarter.

3 The Athenian cavalry rode out against them and came to close quarters. A prolonged cavalry battle followed, in which each side claims to have held its own.

4 The Boeotian cavalry commander and a few others rode right up to Nisaea, where the Athenians killed and stripped them. Holding these bodies, the Athenians returned them under truce and raised a trophy. Neither side, however, gained a decisive result in the action as a whole before they separated, the Boeotians returning to their own men and the Athenians to Nisaea.

Chapter 73

1 After this Brasidas and the army moved nearer the sea and the city of the Megarians. They occupied suitable ground, formed their line, and waited, expecting the Athenians to attack them and knowing that the Megarians were watching to see which side would win.

2 They thought this served them well on both counts. They would not be the first to attack or willingly initiate a dangerous battle; yet, having openly shown themselves ready to defend themselves, they could justly claim a victory without a struggle. At the same time the effect upon the Megarians would be favorable.

3 For if they had not appeared, it would have been no question of chance: they would certainly have lost the city at once, as though defeated. Now the Athenians might themselves prove unwilling to fight, allowing them to achieve their purpose without a battle. And that was what happened.

4 For the Megarians saw the Athenians come out and form up beside the Long Walls, but then remain still, since their opponents were not advancing either. The Athenian generals, too, reckoned that the risk was unequal. Having already achieved most of their aims, they would be initiating battle against superior numbers, with Megara to gain if they won, but the finest of their hoplites to lose if they failed. On the other side, each contingent risked only a fraction of the whole force, even of the force now assembled, and could reasonably be willing to venture. After they had waited for a time and neither side attempted anything, the Athenians withdrew first to Nisaea, and then the Peloponnesians returned to their starting point. Thus the Megarian friends of the exiles, now more confident, opened the gates to Brasidas himself and the commanders from the cities, regarding him as the victor, since the Athenians were no longer willing to fight. They admitted them and entered into discussions; those who had negotiated with the Athenians were already cowed.

Chapter 74

1 Later, when the allies had dispersed to their cities, Brasidas himself returned to Corinth and prepared the expedition to Thrace, his original destination.

2 When the Athenians too had gone home, those Megarians in the city who had been most deeply involved in the dealings with them knew that they had been detected and immediately slipped away. The rest conferred with the friends of the exiles and brought back the men from Pegae, binding them by solemn oaths to bear no grudges and to advise what was best for the city.

3 But once in office, they held a review of the men under arms, separated the companies, and selected about a hundred men from among their enemies and those thought to have been most deeply involved in the dealings with the Athenians. They compelled the people to pass judgment on these men by an open vote, and, when they had been condemned, put them to death and established a thoroughgoing oligarchy in the city.

4 This change of government, brought about by a very few men through civil strife, endured for a remarkably long time.

Chapter 75

1 During the same summer, as the Mytilenaeans were about to fortify Antandrus as they had planned, the Athenian generals commanding the money-collecting ships, Demodocus and Aristides, were in the Hellespont; their third colleague, Lamachus, had sailed into the Pontus with ten ships. When they learned of the preparations at the place, they feared that it might become like Anaea opposite Samos. The Samian exiles established there helped the Peloponnesians by sending pilots for their fleets, stirred up trouble among the Samians in the city, and received those who left it. They therefore gathered an army from the allies and sailed to Antandrus, defeated in battle the men who came out from it, and recovered the place.

2 Not long afterward Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus, lost his ships while anchored in the Cales River in the territory of Heraclea: rain had fallen upstream, and the torrent came down suddenly. He and his army traveled on foot through the country of the Bithynian Thracians, who live across the water in Asia, and reached Chalcedon, a Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

Chapter 76

1 In the same summer Demosthenes, the Athenian general, arrived at Naupactus with forty ships, immediately after the withdrawal from the Megarid.

2 For certain men in the Boeotian cities were negotiating with Hippocrates and him, wishing to change the established order and turn it into a democracy on the Athenian model. Chiefly at the instigation of Ptoeodorus, an exile from Thebes, the following plan had been prepared for them.

3 Some men were to betray Siphae, a coastal town in the territory of Thespiae on the Crisaean Gulf. Others from Orchomenus were offering to surrender Chaeronea, which belongs to Orchomenus, formerly called Minyan but now Boeotian. The Orchomenian exiles were especially active in the scheme and were hiring men from the Peloponnese. Chaeronea lies on the edge of Boeotia beside Phanotis in Phocis, and some Phocians were also involved.

4 The Athenians were to occupy Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo in the territory of Tanagra facing Euboea. All these operations were to take place together on an appointed day, so that the Boeotians would not bring their combined forces to the relief of Delium, but would each attend to disturbances in their own territory.

5 If the attempt succeeded and Delium was fortified, they confidently hoped that, even if no immediate change occurred in the Boeotian governments, the occupation of these positions, the raiding of the country, and the presence of a nearby refuge for each group would prevent affairs from remaining as they were. In time, with the Athenians supporting the rebels while their opponents could not unite their strength, they would bring matters into a favorable state.

Chapter 77

1 Such was the plot being prepared. Hippocrates himself intended to march from Athens with an army against the Boeotians when the time came, but sent Demosthenes ahead with the forty ships to Naupactus. He was to gather an army there from the Acarnanians and the other allies of that region and sail to Siphae, which was to be betrayed to him. They had appointed a day on which these operations were to be carried out together.

2 Demosthenes arrived and found that the people of Oeniadae had been compelled by all the Acarnanians to join the Athenian alliance. He himself called out the entire allied force in that region, marched first against Salynthius and the Agraeans, and won them over. He then made his remaining preparations to present himself at Siphae when the time came.

Chapter 78

1 At about the same time in the summer, Brasidas was marching toward the Thracian region with seventeen hundred hoplites. When he reached Heraclea in Trachis, he sent a messenger ahead to his friends at Pharsalus, asking them to escort him and his army through the country. Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, who was proxenus for the Chalcidians, came to Melitaea in Achaea; only then did he proceed.

2 Other Thessalians also escorted him, as did Niconidas from Larisa, a friend of Perdiccas. For Thessaly was not easy to cross without a guide even in ordinary circumstances, and still less with an army. Throughout Greece alike, passage through a neighbor's territory without obtaining consent had come to be regarded with suspicion. Moreover, the Thessalian people had always been well disposed toward the Athenians.

3 Thus, had Thessaly been governed by equal laws rather than by a narrow ruling class, he would never have made his way through. Even as it was, while he was marching, men opposed to his escorts met him at the Enipeus River and tried to stop him, saying that he was doing wrong to pass through without the consent of the community.

4 His guides said that they would not take him through against their will, but were escorting him as his hosts because he had arrived unexpectedly. Brasidas himself said that he was passing through as a friend to the land and people of Thessaly, and was taking up arms against his enemies the Athenians, not against them. He knew of no enmity between Thessalians and Lacedaemonians that should prevent either from using the other's territory. Nor would he now advance against their wishes—indeed, he could not—but he did not think it right that he should be barred.

5 On hearing this they went away. At his guides' urging, Brasidas pressed on at speed without a pause, before any larger force could gather to stop him. On the same day that he left Melitaea he reached Pharsalus and encamped beside the Apidanus River; from there he went to Phacium, and from Phacium to Perrhaebia.

6 At this point his Thessalian guides turned back. The Perrhaebians, who were subjects of the Thessalians, conducted him to Dium in the dominions of Perdiccas, a small Macedonian town below Olympus facing Thessaly.

Chapter 79

1 In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before anyone could prepare to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice.

2 For the successes of the Athenians had alarmed both those in the Thracian region who had revolted from them and Perdiccas, and they had brought the army out of the Peloponnese. The Chalcidians believed that the Athenians would turn against them first; the neighboring cities that had not revolted also secretly joined in bringing the army. Perdiccas, though not openly at war with Athens, was himself afraid on account of their old quarrels, and above all wished to subdue Arrhabaeus, king of the Lyncestians.

3 The present misfortunes of the Lacedaemonians helped them obtain an army from the Peloponnese more easily.

Chapter 80

1 For the Athenians were pressing hard upon the Peloponnese, and not least upon Lacedaemonian territory. The Lacedaemonians hoped that the best way to divert them was to send an army against their allies and inflict trouble in return—especially since the allies were ready to maintain it and were inviting them to support a revolt.

2 At the same time they welcomed a pretext for sending away some of the Helots, lest, in the present circumstances, with Pylos occupied, they attempt a revolution.

3 Indeed, their fear of the Helots' fierce temper and their numbers had led them to take the following measure; for most Lacedaemonian arrangements had always been directed above all toward guarding against the Helots. They proclaimed that any Helots who claimed to have served them best in war should submit their claims for judgment, with freedom as the promised reward. This was a test: they thought that those whose spirit led each to claim that he should be freed before the rest would also be the most likely to attack them.

4 They selected about two thousand. These crowned themselves with garlands and went round the sanctuaries as men now free; but not long afterward the Lacedaemonians made them disappear, and no one knew how any one of them had been killed.

5 On this occasion, too, they readily sent seven hundred Helots as hoplites with Brasidas; the rest he recruited for pay from the Peloponnese and led out himself.

Chapter 81

1 The Lacedaemonians sent Brasidas himself, who was especially eager to go, and whom the Chalcidians were also eager to have. In Sparta he was considered a man of energy in every undertaking, and once abroad he proved of the greatest value to the Lacedaemonians.

2 For the moment, by showing himself just and moderate toward the cities, he brought most of them to revolt and took some places by betrayal. Thus, when the Lacedaemonians wished to reach a settlement—as they did—they had places to restore and others to recover in exchange, and could obtain relief from the war in the Peloponnese. And in the later war, after the events in Sicily, the excellence and intelligence Brasidas had then displayed did more than anything to inspire the Athenian allies with a longing for the Lacedaemonians: some knew these qualities from experience, others believed in them from report.

3 For he was the first to go abroad, and, by appearing a good man in every respect, left a firm expectation that the others were like him.

Chapter 82

1 At the time, then, when the Athenians learned of his arrival in the Thracian region, they declared Perdiccas an enemy, believing him responsible for his passage, and tightened their watch over their allies there.

Chapter 83

1 Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, on an expedition against his neighbor Arrhabaeus son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians. He had a quarrel with him and wished to subjugate him.

2 But when he and Brasidas reached the entrance to Lyncus with the army, Brasidas said that before resorting to war he wished first to go and negotiate with Arrhabaeus, and, if possible, make him an ally of the Lacedaemonians.

3 Arrhabaeus himself had also made overtures through a herald, declaring his readiness to submit to Brasidas as an impartial judge. The Chalcidian envoys accompanying the expedition urged Brasidas not to remove the dangers facing Perdiccas, so that they might have him more willing to serve their own purposes as well.

4 Moreover, Perdiccas' representatives at Lacedaemon had said something to the effect that he would make many of the places around him their allies. On this understanding Brasidas claimed a greater right to conduct the business with Arrhabaeus in the common interest.

5 Perdiccas said that he had not brought Brasidas to judge their disputes, but rather to overthrow whatever enemies he himself pointed out; and that, since he was maintaining half the army, Brasidas would wrong him by entering into discussions with Arrhabaeus.

6 Nevertheless, Brasidas met him against Perdiccas' will and despite their quarrel, and, persuaded by his arguments, withdrew the army before invading his territory. After this Perdiccas contributed a third of its maintenance instead of half, considering himself wronged.

Chapter 84

1 In the same summer, immediately afterward, Brasidas, with a force that included Chalcidians, marched against Acanthus, a colony of Andros, shortly before the grape harvest.

2 The inhabitants were divided over admitting him: on one side were those who had joined the Chalcidians in bringing him, on the other the people. Yet fear for the crop, still outside the walls, led the mass of the citizens to yield to Brasidas' proposal that they admit him alone, hear him, and then deliberate. They admitted him; and, appearing before the people—he was not an incapable speaker, for a Lacedaemonian—he spoke as follows.

Chapter 85

1 “Men of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me and this army to make good the declaration we made at the beginning of the war: that we would fight the Athenians to liberate Greece.

2 “If we have been slow to arrive, let no one blame us. Our expectations of the war at home were disappointed: we had hoped that we ourselves could quickly overthrow the Athenians without exposing you to danger. Now that the opportunity has offered, we have come, and together with you we shall try to bring them down.

3 “But I am astonished that you have closed your gates against me, and that my arrival should be unwelcome.

4 “For we Lacedaemonians believed that we were coming to allies—at least in sentiment, even before we actually arrived—and that you would welcome us. On that belief we took this great risk, traveling for many days through foreign territory and offering our whole-hearted effort.

5 “If you have something else in mind, or intend to oppose both your own freedom and that of the other Greeks, it would be a grave matter.

6 “For it is not merely that you yourselves resist: wherever else I go, people will be less ready to join me. They will find it troubling that you, the first people I approached, did not receive me—you who possess a city of such standing and are reputed to have good judgment. I shall have no credible explanation to offer; they will think either that the freedom I bring is unjust, or that I have come too weak and powerless to protect them against the Athenians if they attack.

7 “Yet when I brought relief to Nisaea with this very army, which [I] now command, the Athenians, though more numerous, refused to engage. It is therefore unlikely that they will send against you by sea a force as large as their army at Nisaea.

Chapter 86

1 “I have come not to harm the Greeks but to liberate them. I have bound the Lacedaemonian authorities by the most solemn oaths that whatever allies I win over shall be autonomous. Nor have we come to acquire you as allies by force or fraud, but, on the contrary, to ally ourselves with you, whom the Athenians have enslaved.

2 “I therefore claim that I should neither be suspected, when I give the strongest assurances, nor be thought powerless to defend you; and I ask you to join us with confidence.

3 “And if anyone is reluctant through some private fear that I may hand the city over to a particular party, let him trust me above all.

4 “For I have not come to take sides in civil strife, nor would I consider the freedom I bring genuine if I set aside your ancestral constitution and enslaved the many to the few, or the few to the whole people.

5 “That would be harsher than foreign rule, and we Lacedaemonians would earn no gratitude for our labors, but blame rather than honor and renown. The very charges on which we make war against the Athenians would be seen to attach to us, and more hatefully than to men who had made no display of virtue.

6 “For men of standing, to gain an advantage by plausible deceit is more shameful than by open force. Open force proceeds by a claim to the strength that fortune has bestowed; deceit, by the plotting of an unjust mind.

Chapter 87

1 “Such care do we take over matters in which our greatest interests are at stake. Beyond our oaths, you could have no stronger assurance than deeds which, examined in the light of our words, compel the conviction that it is also in our interest to act as I have said.

2 “But if, despite these assurances, you say that you cannot join us; if you claim that your goodwill entitles you to turn us away without suffering harm, that freedom does not seem safe for you, and that it is right to offer it to those who can accept it but to force it on no one unwilling—then I shall call the gods and heroes of this land to witness that I have come for your good and cannot persuade you, and shall try to compel you by ravaging your territory.

3 “I shall not then consider myself in the wrong, but justified by two compelling necessities: the interest of the Lacedaemonians, who must not, if you refuse to join us, be harmed by the money you send to Athens despite your goodwill toward us; and that of the Greeks, who must not be prevented by you from escaping slavery.

4 “Otherwise we could have no reasonable ground for acting so; nor ought we Lacedaemonians to liberate the unwilling except for the sake of some common good.

5 “Nor, again, do we aspire to empire. Rather, in our eagerness to put an end to the empire of others, we would wrong the greater number if, while bringing autonomy to all, we overlooked your opposition.

6 “Consider these things well. Strive to be the first to lead the Greeks toward freedom and to lay up imperishable renown; preserve your own possessions from harm, and invest your whole city with the most glorious name.”

Chapter 88

1 So much Brasidas said. After much had first been said on both sides, the Acanthians voted in secret. Persuaded by Brasidas' speech and afraid for their crop, the majority decided to revolt from Athens. They bound him by the oaths the Lacedaemonian authorities had sworn when they sent him out—that whatever allies he won over should be autonomous—and then admitted the army.

2 Not long afterward Stagirus, another colony of Andros, joined in the revolt. These were the events of that summer.

Chapter 89

1 At the very beginning of the following winter, when the arrangements for the betrayal of places in Boeotia to the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes were under way, Demosthenes was to arrive with the fleet at Siphae, and Hippocrates at Delium. But there was a mistake over the days on which the two were to take the field. Demosthenes sailed to Siphae too early, with Acarnanians and many allies from that region aboard his ships, and achieved nothing: the plot had been disclosed by Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanoteus, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they in turn told the Boeotians.

2 All the Boeotians came to the rescue—Hippocrates was not yet in their territory troubling them—and Siphae and Chaeronea were occupied in advance. When those conducting the plot learned of the mistake, they made no move within the cities.

Chapter 90

1 Hippocrates, meanwhile, raised the entire Athenian population, citizens themselves, resident aliens, and whatever foreigners were present, and reached Delium later, when the Boeotians had already withdrawn from Siphae. He encamped his army and fortified Delium [the sanctuary of Apollo] in the following manner.

2 They dug a trench around the sanctuary and temple, throwing up the excavated earth to serve as a wall. They drove in stakes alongside, cut down the vines around the sanctuary and threw them in, together with stones and bricks taken from demolished buildings nearby; by every means they raised the rampart's height. They erected wooden towers where needed and where no sanctuary building stood, for the colonnade that had been there had fallen down.

3 They began on the third day after leaving home and worked that day, the fourth, and until the midday meal on the fifth.

4 Then, when most of the work was finished, the army went on ahead about ten stades from Delium on its way home. Most of the light troops continued their march at once, while the hoplites grounded their arms and rested. Hippocrates remained behind, posting guards and arranging for the unfinished work on the outer fortification to be completed as required.

Chapter 91

1 During these days the Boeotians were assembling at Tanagra. When contingents from every city had arrived and they learned that the Athenians were moving homeward, the other Boeotarchs—there are eleven in all—were against fighting, since the enemy were no longer in Boeotia; for the Athenians were just about within the borders of Oropian territory when they grounded their arms. But Pagondas son of Aeoladas, Boeotarch from Thebes together with Arianthides son of Lysimachides, and himself holding the chief command, wished to give battle and thought it better to take the risk. He summoned the men by companies, so that they should not all leave their arms at once, and urged the Boeotians to advance against the Athenians and fight, speaking as follows.

Chapter 92

1 “Men of Boeotia, the thought should never have entered the mind of any of us commanders that it would be wrong to fight the Athenians if we happened to find them no longer in Boeotia. They crossed from the neighboring country and built a fort within Boeotia in order to ravage it. Surely they are enemies wherever they are found, and wherever they came from to commit their acts of war.

2 “If anyone has thought it safer to refrain, let him now change his mind. Those whose own country is under attack cannot calculate their precautions in the same way as a man who keeps his own possessions secure and voluntarily attacks another in pursuit of more.

3 “It is your ancestral custom to resist an invading army of foreigners alike on your own soil and on your neighbors'. Against the Athenians, who are also our immediate neighbors, this is all the more necessary.

4 “For every people, to be a match for its neighbors is to be free. Against these men, who seek to enslave not only those nearby but even distant peoples, how can we fail to carry the struggle to its utmost limit? We have an example in the Euboeans across the water and in most of the rest of Greece: we know their condition under Athenian rule. We must recognize that, whereas other peoples fight their neighbors over boundaries, for us, if we are defeated, one indisputable boundary will be fixed around our entire country.

5 “For they will force their way in and possess what is ours. So much more dangerous than other neighbors are these men to us. Those who attack their neighbors with the confidence of strength, as the Athenians now do, generally march with less fear against a man who stays quiet and defends himself only on his own land; they are less ready to hold down one who meets them beyond his borders and, when opportunity offers, begins the war himself.

6 “We have experienced this in our own dealings with them. By defeating them at Coronea, when they had occupied our country during our civil strife, we secured for Boeotia great freedom from fear, which has lasted to this day.

7 “Remembering this, we older men must match our former deeds, while the younger, sons of fathers who then proved their valor, must strive not to disgrace the excellence that is theirs by inheritance. Let us trust that the god whose sanctuary they have unlawfully fortified and now occupy will be on our side, and trust in the favorable omens of our sacrifices. Let us close with these men and show them that, though they may gain what they covet by attacking those who will not resist, from men whose noble resolve is always to fight for their own country's freedom and never unjustly to enslave another's, they will not depart without a contest.”

Chapter 93

1 With this exhortation Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to advance against the Athenians. He quickly set the army in motion and led it forward, for the day was already late. When he came near their army, he halted in a position where a hill between them concealed each side from the other, and drew up his forces and prepared for battle.

2 When Hippocrates, who was still at Delium, received word that the Boeotians were advancing, he sent orders to the army to form its line, and himself joined it not long afterward. He left about three hundred cavalry at Delium, both to guard it against any attack and to watch for an opportunity to fall upon the Boeotians during the battle.

3 The Boeotians posted a force to oppose these men. When their arrangements were complete, they appeared over the hill and grounded their arms in their intended battle order: about seven thousand hoplites, more than ten thousand light troops, a thousand cavalry, and five hundred peltasts.

4 The Thebans and the men of their district held the right wing; in the center were the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the others around the lake; the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians held the left. Cavalry and light troops stood on either wing. The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep; the others adopted whatever depth each contingent chose.

5 Such were the forces and deployment of the Boeotians.

Chapter 94

1 The Athenian hoplites, equal in number to their opponents, formed eight deep along the whole line, with cavalry on either wing. No light troops equipped as an organized force were present, nor had the city raised any. Those who had joined the invasion had been many times more numerous than the enemy's light troops; many had followed without arms, since there had been a general levy of citizens and foreigners present in the city. But they had set off home at the first opportunity, and only a few were there for the battle.

2 When they had taken their places and were about to engage, Hippocrates the general passed along the Athenian line, encouraging the men with these words.

Chapter 95

1 “Athenians, my exhortation will be brief, but for brave men it carries the same force, and serves more as a reminder than an appeal.

2 “Let none of you imagine that, because we are on foreign soil, we are taking so great a risk without good reason. On their soil we shall be fighting for ours. If we win, the Peloponnesians will never invade your country without these men's cavalry; in a single battle you acquire this land and make your own more securely free.

3 “Advance against them, then, as befits your city, which each of you proudly claims as his homeland, foremost among the Greeks; and as befits your fathers, who defeated these men in battle with Myronides at Oenophyta and once held Boeotia.”

Chapter 96

1 Hippocrates was still delivering this exhortation and had reached only the middle of the line, with no time to go farther, when the Boeotians, after another brief encouragement from Pagondas, sang the paean and advanced down the hill. The Athenians advanced to meet them, and the two sides clashed at a run.

2 The extreme wings of neither army came to close quarters: both were held back by the same obstacle, the watercourses. The rest were locked in fierce battle, shield thrust against shield.

3 The Boeotian left, as far as the center, was being defeated by the Athenians, who pressed the troops there hard, and the Thespians above all. The troops drawn up beside them had withdrawn, leaving them encircled in a narrow space; those Thespians who died were cut down defending themselves at close quarters. Some Athenians, too, confused in the encircling movement, failed to recognize one another and killed their own men.

4 The Boeotians on this side, then, were defeated and took refuge with the part of their army still fighting. But on the right, where the Thebans stood, they were overcoming the Athenians, pushing them back little by little at first and following them up.

5 As their left was hard pressed, Pagondas sent two squadrons of cavalry around the hill out of sight. When these suddenly appeared over the crest, the victorious Athenian wing, thinking another army was coming against them, was thrown into fear.

6 Now, under the pressure of this alarm on one side and of the Thebans following and breaking through their ranks on the other, the entire Athenian army took to flight.

7 Some made for Delium and the sea, others toward Oropus, others toward Mount Parnes, and others wherever each saw some hope of safety.

8 The Boeotians pursued and killed them, especially the cavalry, both their own and the Locrians who had come to their aid just as the rout began. But night overtook the battle, making it easier for the mass of the fugitives to escape.

9 The next day the men at Oropus and those at Delium sailed home, leaving a garrison at Delium, which despite everything they still held.

Chapter 97

1 The Boeotians set up a trophy, recovered their own dead, stripped those of the enemy, and, leaving a guard, withdrew to Tanagra, where they laid plans for an assault on Delium.

2 An Athenian herald on his way to recover the dead met a Boeotian herald. The latter turned him back, saying that he would accomplish nothing until he himself had returned from his mission. He then appeared before the Athenians and delivered the Boeotians' message: they had acted unjustly in transgressing the established customs of the Greeks.

3 For it was a rule observed by all that those invading one another's territory should leave its sanctuaries untouched. Yet the Athenians had fortified Delium and were living in it, and everything that men do on unconsecrated ground was being done there. They were even drawing water for their use from a source which the Boeotians themselves were forbidden to touch except for the ritual washing of hands in sacrifices.

4 Therefore the Boeotians, on behalf of the god and themselves, calling upon the deities who shared his altar and upon Apollo, gave the Athenians notice to leave the sanctuary and take away what belonged to them.

Chapter 98

1 When the herald had said this, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Boeotians and declared that they had done the sanctuary no wrong, nor would they willingly harm it in future. They had not entered it for that purpose in the first place, but to defend themselves from it more effectively against those who wronged them.

2 The established rule among the Greeks was that whoever held power over any territory, great or small, always possessed its sanctuaries as well, tending them with such observances as they could manage in addition to those customary there.

3 Indeed, the Boeotians themselves, and most others who had forcibly displaced a people and occupied its land, had first come upon sanctuaries belonging to strangers and now possessed them as their own.

4 They too, had they been able to conquer more of Boeotian territory, would have held it; as matters stood, they would not willingly abandon the portion they occupied, for they regarded it as their own.

5 As for the water, they had drawn on it under necessity—a necessity they had not wantonly brought upon themselves, but had been forced to accept in defending themselves against the Boeotians, who had first invaded their country.

6 It was entirely reasonable that an act constrained by war and some terrible exigency should receive pardon even from the god. Altars themselves offered refuge for involuntary offenses, and the name of lawlessness belonged to wrongs committed without necessity, not to those who ventured on some act under the pressure of misfortune.

7 Far greater impiety lay with those who demanded the sanctuaries in exchange for returning the dead than with those who refused to purchase, at the price of sanctuaries, what was their due.

8 They demanded a clear answer: not whether they might recover their dead on withdrawing from Boeotian land—for they were no longer on Boeotian land, but on land they had won by the spear—but whether they might do so under a truce according to ancestral custom.

Chapter 99

1 The Boeotians replied that if the Athenians were in Boeotia, they should leave Boeotian territory and take away what belonged to them; if they were on their own land, they must judge for themselves what to do. Their reasoning was that Oropia, where the dead happened to lie because the battle had been fought on the border, was subject to Athens, and that the Athenians could not recover the bodies from them by force; yet they would not, of course, grant a truce concerning Athenian territory either. The reply that they should “leave Boeotian territory and recover what they demanded” seemed a suitably worded reply. On hearing it, the Athenian herald departed without success.

Chapter 100

1 The Boeotians immediately summoned javelin throwers and slingers from the Malian Gulf. Reinforcements had also reached them after the battle: two thousand Corinthian hoplites, the Peloponnesian garrison troops who had left Nisaea, and Megarians as well. They marched against Delium and assaulted the fortification; after trying other means, they brought up the engine that captured it, constructed as follows.

2 They sawed a great beam in two, hollowed out its entire length, and fitted the halves precisely together again to form a tube. At its end they suspended a cauldron by chains, and an iron nozzle extended downward from the beam into it. Much of the rest of the timber was also sheathed in iron.

3 They brought it up on wagons from a distance toward the wall, at the point where vine branches and timber had chiefly been used in its construction. When it was close, they inserted great bellows into the end of the beam nearest them and blew.

4 The blast, passing through the airtight tube into the cauldron, which contained burning coals, sulfur, and pitch, raised a great flame and set the wall alight. No one could remain on it any longer; the defenders abandoned it and fled, and in this way the fortification was captured.

5 Some of the garrison were killed, and two hundred were taken prisoner; most of the rest embarked on the ships and were conveyed home.

Chapter 101

1 Delium was taken on the seventeenth day after the battle. Not long afterward the Athenian herald, knowing nothing of what had happened, came once more concerning the dead; the Boeotians now returned them and no longer gave the same answer.

2 In the battle the Boeotians lost a little fewer than five hundred men, and the Athenians a little fewer than a thousand, together with Hippocrates the general; many light-armed troops and baggage carriers were also killed.

3 A short time after this battle, Demosthenes too, whose attempt at Siphae had failed when he sailed there in connection with the planned betrayal, made a landing in Sicyonian territory. He had his army aboard the ships—Acarnanians and Agraeans, and four hundred Athenian hoplites.

4 Before all the ships had come in, the Sicyonians rallied, routed those who had landed, and pursued them to their ships, killing some and taking others alive. They set up a trophy and returned the dead under a truce.

5 At about the time of the events at Delium, Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, also died, having campaigned against the Triballians and been defeated in battle. Seuthes son of Sparadocus, his nephew, succeeded him as king of the Odrysians and of the rest of Thrace over which Sitalces had ruled.

Chapter 102

1 That same winter Brasidas, with the allies in Thrace, marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon.

2 Aristagoras of Miletus, fleeing King Darius, had earlier attempted to settle the site on which the city now stands, but had been driven out by the Edonians. Thirty-two years later the Athenians also tried, sending ten thousand settlers drawn from their own people and any others who wished to go; these were destroyed by the Thracians at Drabescus.

3 In the twenty-ninth year after that, the Athenians came again, sending Hagnon son of Nicias to found the colony. They expelled the Edonians and established themselves at this place, which had previously been called Nine Ways.

4 Their base was Eion, a trading port they held on the coast at the river's mouth, twenty-five stades from the present city. Hagnon named the city Amphipolis because the Strymon flows around it on both sides [because it surrounds it]; he enclosed it with a long wall running from river to river, and founded the settlement in a conspicuous position facing both the sea and the mainland.

Chapter 103

1 Against this city, then, Brasidas set out from Arnae in Chalcidice and marched with his army. Toward evening he reached Aulon and Bormiscus, where Lake Bolbe empties into the sea; after supper he continued through the night.

2 The weather was stormy, with a little snow falling, which only spurred him on: he wished to escape the notice of everyone in Amphipolis except those who were betraying it.

3 There were Argilian settlers in the city—the Argilians are colonists from Andros—and others who were helping to bring this about, some at the urging of Perdiccas, others of the Chalcidians.

4 The Argilians were especially active. Living close by, always an object of Athenian suspicion, and plotting against the place, they had been negotiating for some time with their fellow citizens settled there to secure its surrender when the opportunity presented itself and Brasidas arrived. They now admitted him into their own city, revolted from Athens, and that night brought his army to the bridge over the river before dawn.

5 The town lies some distance from the crossing, and at that time no walls extended down to it as they do now; only a small guard had been stationed there. Brasidas easily overpowered it, assisted by the treachery, the storm, and the surprise of his attack; he crossed the bridge and immediately gained possession of the property of the Amphipolitans living outside the walls throughout the territory.

Chapter 104

1 His crossing came as a sudden shock to those in the city. Many of the people outside were being captured, while others were fleeing inside the walls; the Amphipolitans fell into great confusion, all the more because they distrusted one another.

2 It is said that, had Brasidas chosen not to turn his army to plunder but to advance directly on the city, he would probably have taken it.

3 Instead, after overrunning the country outside, he encamped his army and remained inactive, since nothing was being accomplished for him inside as he had expected.

4 Meanwhile, the opponents of the traitors had sufficient numerical strength to prevent the immediate opening of the gates. Together with Eucles, the general sent from Athens to guard the place, they sent to the other general in the Thracian region, Thucydides son of Olorus, who wrote this history, calling on him to come to their aid. He was near Thasos, an island colonized from Paros, about half a day's voyage from Amphipolis.

5 On receiving the message he sailed with all speed, taking the seven ships that happened to be at hand. His chief hope was to reach Amphipolis before it yielded at all; failing that, he intended to secure Eion first.

Chapter 105

1 Meanwhile Brasidas, fearing the relief fleet from Thasos and learning that Thucydides possessed rights to work the gold mines in that part of Thrace, which made him one of the most influential men on the mainland, pressed to secure the city first if he could. He feared that on Thucydides' arrival the mass of the Amphipolitans would no longer submit, hoping that he would preserve them by gathering allied forces from the sea and from Thrace.

2 He therefore offered moderate terms of agreement, proclaiming that any Amphipolitan or Athenian within the city who wished might remain in possession of his property with a full and equal share of civic rights; anyone unwilling to stay might depart within five days, taking his possessions with him.

Chapter 106

1 On hearing this the majority changed their minds, especially since only a small part of the citizen body was Athenian, while most were of mixed origin, and many of those captured outside had relatives within. Against the prospect they feared, the proclamation seemed just. The Athenians would gladly leave, believing themselves exposed to greater danger than the others, and not expecting prompt relief; the rest would not be deprived of their city or their equal standing, and were being released from danger beyond all expectation.

2 Those working with Brasidas therefore began openly to argue for these terms, seeing that the majority had changed sides and no longer heeded the Athenian general present. An agreement was made, and Brasidas was admitted on the terms he had proclaimed.

3 Thus they surrendered the city. Thucydides and his ships reached Eion late that same day.

4 Brasidas had only just secured Amphipolis, and came within a night of taking Eion as well; for if the ships had not arrived so swiftly to relieve it, it would have fallen at dawn.

Chapter 107

1 After this Thucydides put Eion in order to make it secure both against an immediate attack by Brasidas and for the future, receiving those who chose to come down from the upper city under the agreement.

2 Brasidas suddenly sailed down the river against Eion with many boats, hoping to seize the headland projecting from the wall and so command the entrance to the harbor; he also attempted an attack by land at the same time. Repulsed on both sides, he turned to organizing affairs around Amphipolis.

3 Myrcinus, an Edonian city, joined him after Pittacus, king of the Edonians, had been killed by the sons of Goaxis and by Brauro, his own wife. Not long afterward Galepsus and Oesyme joined him too; these are Thasian colonies. Perdiccas, who arrived immediately after the capture, also helped him settle these affairs.

Chapter 108

1 The loss of Amphipolis filled the Athenians with great alarm, especially because the city was valuable to them for its shipments of shipbuilding timber and its revenue. Moreover, the Lacedaemonians, with Thessalians to conduct them, had previously been able to march as far as the Strymon against the Athenian allies, but without control of the bridge they could not have advanced farther: above it the river broadens into a lake of great extent, while the approaches toward Eion were guarded by triremes. Now further advance had become easy, [they thought]. They also feared that their allies would revolt.

2 For Brasidas showed moderation in his other dealings, and in his speeches everywhere declared that he had been sent out to liberate Hellas.

3 When the cities subject to Athens learned of the capture of Amphipolis, of the terms he offered, and of his mildness, they were greatly stirred toward revolt. They sent heralds to him in secret, urging him to come on to them, each eager to be the first to break away.

4 They believed they could do so safely, underestimating Athenian power by the full measure that later became clear. Their judgments rested more on the uncertainty of desire than on the security of foresight; for people habitually entrust what they long for to unreflecting hope, and thrust aside what they dislike with imperious reasoning.

5 At the same time the Athenians had recently suffered their blow in Boeotia, and Brasidas was making seductive rather than truthful claims: that at Nisaea the Athenians had refused battle against his army alone. These things emboldened the cities and made them confident that no force would come against them.

6 Above all, the immediate pleasure of the prospect, and the chance of making their first attempt while the Lacedaemonians were eager for action, left them ready to run every risk. On learning of this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the cities, such as they could provide at short notice and in winter. Brasidas sent to Lacedaemon urging the dispatch of an additional army, and himself made preparations to build triremes on the Strymon.

7 The Lacedaemonians did not meet his requests, partly because of jealousy among their leading men, and partly because they preferred to recover the men taken on the island and end the war.

Chapter 109

1 During the same winter the Megarians captured and razed to the ground their long walls, which the Athenians had held; and Brasidas, after taking Amphipolis, marched with his allies against the region called Acte.

2 It projects seaward from the King's canal, and ends in Athos, a lofty mountain reaching into the Aegean Sea.

3 Its cities include Sane, a colony from Andros beside the canal itself, facing the sea toward Euboea, and the other towns of Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium.

4 These are inhabited by mixed peoples of bilingual barbarians, with a small Chalcidian element as well. Most are Pelasgian—Tyrrhenians who once inhabited Lemnos and Athens—and there are also Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians. They live in small towns.

5 Most of them joined Brasidas, but Sane and Dium resisted, and he remained with his army and ravaged their land.

Chapter 110

1 When they would not submit, he immediately marched against Torone in Chalcidice, which was held by the Athenians. A few men were inviting him there, ready to surrender the city. Arriving with his army while it was still night, close to daybreak, he took up a position by the sanctuary of the Dioscuri, about three stades from the city.

2 His arrival escaped the rest of the Toronaeans and the Athenian garrison. But those working with him knew that he would come; a few had secretly gone out ahead and were watching for his approach. When they knew he was there, they brought in among themselves seven light-armed men carrying daggers—only these, out of the twenty originally detailed, had not been afraid to enter, and their leader was Lysistratus of Olynthus. Slipping through the seaward wall undetected, they climbed up and killed the guards at the highest watchpost, for the city lay against a hill, and broke through the postern facing Canastraeum.

Chapter 111

1 Brasidas advanced a little and kept the main army still, but sent a hundred peltasts ahead so that, when a gate was opened and the agreed signal raised, they could be the first to rush in.

2 As time passed they wondered at the delay and gradually drew close to the city. Inside, the Toronaeans making the arrangements with those who had entered, once the postern had been broken through and the gates by the marketplace opened by cutting the bar, first led some of the men around and admitted them through the postern. They meant to strike sudden terror into the unsuspecting people of the city from behind and from both sides. Then they raised the fire signal as agreed, and admitted the rest of the peltasts through the gates by the marketplace.

Chapter 112

1 When Brasidas saw the signal, he set his army in motion and rushed forward at a run. They raised a shout together, throwing the people in the city into great terror.

2 Some burst straight in through the gates; others climbed along squared beams that happened to be leaning against a fallen section of wall under reconstruction, for hauling up stones.

3 Brasidas and the main body immediately turned uphill toward the heights of the city, wishing to capture it wholly and securely; the rest scattered alike in every direction.

Chapter 113

1 As the city was being taken, most of the Toronaeans, knowing nothing of the plot, fell into confusion; but the conspirators and those who favored their actions at once joined the men who had entered.

2 About fifty Athenian hoplites happened to be sleeping in the marketplace. When they became aware of the attack, a few were killed in close combat; of the rest, some escaped on foot, while others fled aboard the two ships on guard and reached the safety of the fort at Lecythus. The Athenians had occupied and held this point of the city, which projects into the sea and is cut off by a narrow isthmus.

3 Those Toronaeans who were friendly to them also took refuge there with them.

Chapter 114

1 When day had come and the city was securely held, Brasidas proclaimed to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians that anyone who wished might come out, recover his property, and live as a citizen without fear. He also sent a herald to the Athenians, ordering them to leave Lecythus under a truce with their possessions, since it belonged to the Chalcidians.

2 They refused to abandon it, but asked him to grant them a day's truce to recover their dead. He granted two. During these days he strengthened the houses nearby, while the Athenians strengthened their own positions.

3 He then assembled the Toronaeans and spoke much as he had at Acanthus. It was unjust, he said, either to think the men who had helped him capture the city inferior citizens or traitors—for they had acted not to enslave it, nor under the persuasion of money, but for the city's welfare and freedom—or for those who had taken no part to think they would not enjoy equal treatment. He had not come to ruin either the city or any individual.

4 That was why he had made his proclamation to those who had taken refuge with the Athenians: he considered them no worse for their friendship with Athens. Once they had experience of his side [the Lacedaemonians], he believed they would feel no less goodwill toward them, but far more, in proportion to the greater justice of their conduct; their present fear came from lack of experience.

5 He urged them all to prepare to be steadfast allies, and to understand that from now on they would be held responsible for any wrongdoing. As for the past, it was not his side that had been wronged: rather, they themselves had suffered at the hands of others stronger than they were, and any opposition they had offered was pardonable.

Chapter 115

1 After speaking in this way and reassuring them, Brasidas began his assaults on Lecythus when the truce expired. The Athenians defended themselves from a weak fortification and from houses furnished with battlements.

2 For one day they repelled the attackers. On the next, the enemy were about to bring up an engine from which they intended to throw fire onto the wooden barricades, and the army was already advancing. At the point where they thought the engine most likely to be brought up, and which was most vulnerable to attack, the Athenians erected a wooden tower on a house to oppose it. They carried up many amphoras and large jars of water, together with great stones, and many men climbed up as well.

3 The house, burdened beyond its strength, suddenly collapsed with a great crash. Those Athenians nearby who could see what had happened were distressed rather than frightened; but those farther off, and especially those at the greatest distance, thought the position had already been taken at that point and rushed in flight toward the sea and the ships.

Chapter 116

1 Brasidas, noticing that they were abandoning the battlements and seeing what was happening, immediately drove his army forward, captured the fortification, and killed everyone he caught inside.

2 Thus the Athenians abandoned the place and crossed to Pallene in boats and ships. There is a sanctuary of Athena in Lecythus, and Brasidas had proclaimed before the assault that he would give thirty minas of silver to the first man to mount the wall. Believing that the capture had been achieved by some power other than human, he paid the thirty minas into the goddess's sanctuary, then demolished and cleared Lecythus and consecrated the whole of it as sacred ground.

3 For the rest of the winter he settled affairs in the places he held and plotted against the others. With the passing of winter, the eighth year of the war came to an end.

Chapter 117

1 At the opening of the next summer, with the coming of spring, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians immediately concluded a year's armistice. The Athenians believed that Brasidas would then detach no further possessions from them before they could prepare at leisure, and that, if matters went well for them, they might also reach a wider settlement. The Lacedaemonians believed that the Athenians felt the very fears they had anticipated, and that once they had experienced a respite from misery and hardship they would be more eager for reconciliation, returning the prisoners and concluding a treaty for a longer period as well.

2 For they attached greater importance to recovering their men while Brasidas was still successful. If he advanced farther and brought the balance of power level, they would lose their men, and in facing the Athenians on equal terms would have to run risks even to prevail.

3 The following armistice was therefore concluded between them and their allies.

Chapter 118

1 “Concerning the sanctuary and oracle of Pythian Apollo, we resolve that anyone who wishes may have access without fraud or fear, according to ancestral laws.

2 “The Lacedaemonians and the allies present approve these terms; they declare that they will send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians and do all they can to persuade them.

3 “Concerning the god's wealth, we shall take care to discover the wrongdoers, acting rightly and justly according to ancestral laws—you, we, and any others who wish to join us, all observing ancestral laws.

4 “On these matters the Lacedaemonians and the other allies have resolved as stated. They have further resolved that, if the Athenians make a truce, each side shall remain in its own territory, retaining what we now hold. Those in Coryphasium shall remain within Buphras and Tomeus. Those in Cythera shall not enter the territory of the alliance: neither we theirs nor they ours. Those in Nisaea and Minoa shall not cross the road running from the gates by the shrine of Nisus to the sanctuary of Poseidon, and from the sanctuary of Poseidon straight to the bridge leading to Minoa; neither shall the Megarians and their allies cross this road. The Athenians shall retain the island they captured, and neither side shall enter the other's territory. The Athenians shall also retain whatever they now hold in Troezen, in accordance with the agreement made with them.

5 “In using the sea along their own territory and that of their alliance, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall sail in no warship, but in other oared vessels of no more than five hundred talents' carrying capacity.

6 “Heralds, embassies, and as many attendants as may be thought fit shall have safe conduct to the Peloponnese and Athens, going and returning by land and sea, on matters concerning the end of the war and the settlement of claims.

7 “During this period neither you nor we shall receive deserters, whether free or slave.

8 “You shall submit to legal judgment at our suit, and we at yours, according to ancestral practice, settling disputed claims by law without war.

9 “These are the resolutions of the Lacedaemonians and their allies. If anything better or more just occurs to you, come to Lacedaemon and explain it; neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies will reject any just proposal you make.

10 “Those who come shall come with full authority, just as you require of us. The truce shall last one year.”

11 “Resolved by the people. Acamantis held the prytany; Phaenippus was secretary; Niciades presided. Laches moved: For the good fortune of the Athenians, an armistice shall be concluded on the terms to which the Lacedaemonians and their allies consent and have agreed before the people.

12 “The armistice shall last one year, beginning on this day, the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion.

13 “During this period ambassadors and heralds shall pass between the two sides to discuss the terms on which the war may be ended.

14 “The generals and prytanes shall convene an assembly, with peace as its first business … The Athenians shall deliberate on whatever proposals the embassy submits for ending the war. The embassies now present shall immediately swear before the people that they will faithfully abide by the truce for the year.”

Chapter 119

1 “The Lacedaemonians and their allies concluded this agreement [and swore to it] with the Athenians and their allies on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius at Lacedaemon.

2 “The following concluded the agreement and made the truce: for the Lacedaemonians, Taurus son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus son of Periclidas, and Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas; for the Corinthians, Aeneas son of Ocytus and Euphamidas son of Aristonymus; for the Sicyonians, Damotimus son of Naucrates and Onasimus son of Megacles; for the Megarians, Nicasus son of Cecalus and Menecrates son of Amphidorus; for the Epidaurians, Amphias son of Eupaidas; for the Athenians, the generals Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus.”

3 Such was the armistice that was concluded, and throughout its duration they met continually to discuss a more comprehensive peace.

Chapter 120

1 Around these days, while the negotiations were proceeding, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians and went over to Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they come from Pellene in the Peloponnese: their first settlers, sailing home from Troy, were driven to this place by the storm that overtook the Achaeans, and settled there.

2 After their revolt Brasidas crossed by night to Scione, with a friendly trireme sailing ahead while he followed at a distance in a small boat. If he encountered any vessel larger than his boat, the trireme was to defend him; if an enemy trireme appeared, he thought it would turn against the warship rather than the smaller craft, and he would escape in the interval.

3 Once across, he called an assembly of the Scionaeans and spoke as he had at Acanthus and Torone. He added that they deserved the highest praise: although Pallene was cut off at the isthmus by the Athenians holding Potidaea, and they were virtually islanders, they had advanced toward freedom of their own accord, and had not been too timid to act for their manifest good until necessity overtook them. This was a sign that they would courageously face any other trial, however great. If affairs turned out as he intended, he would regard them as the Lacedaemonians' truest and most faithful friends, and honor them in other ways as well.

Chapter 121

1 The Scionaeans were uplifted by his words, and all alike took courage, even those who had previously disliked what was being done. They resolved to sustain the war wholeheartedly, gave Brasidas a splendid welcome in every respect, and publicly crowned him with a golden crown as the liberator of Greece; in private they came up to him and bound ribbons about him as though he were a victorious athlete.

2 Leaving them a garrison for the moment, he crossed back, and not long afterward brought over a larger force, intending to attempt Mende and Potidaea with their help. He thought the Athenians would come to the rescue as they would to an island, and wanted to forestall them; he also had negotiations under way for the betrayal of these cities.

Chapter 122

1 He was about to attack these cities when the men announcing the armistice arrived to see him in a trireme: Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the Lacedaemonians.

2 The army crossed back to Torone, while the envoys informed Brasidas of the agreement, and all the Lacedaemonian allies in Thrace accepted what had been done.

3 Aristonymus approved the arrangements in all other respects, but when he discovered by reckoning the days that the Scionaeans had revolted after the agreement, he declared that they would not be covered by the truce. Brasidas argued vigorously to the contrary, maintaining that they had revolted before it, and refused to give up the city.

4 When Aristonymus reported the matter at Athens, the Athenians were immediately ready to march against Scione. The Lacedaemonians, however, sent envoys to say that this would violate the truce; trusting Brasidas, they claimed the city and were prepared to submit the dispute over it to arbitration.

5 The Athenians would not risk arbitration, but wished to march as soon as possible. They were enraged that even people who were, in effect, islanders now presumed to revolt from them, trusting in the Lacedaemonians' land power, which could be of no use to them.

6 The truth about the revolt did in fact favor the Athenians' claim: the Scionaeans had revolted two days after the agreement. At once, on Cleon's motion, they passed a decree to capture Scione and put its people to death. Leaving other matters alone, they prepared for this undertaking.

Chapter 123

1 Meanwhile Mende, a city in Pallene and a colony of Eretria, revolted from them. Brasidas accepted its people too, thinking that he did no wrong even though they had plainly come over during the armistice; for he in turn accused the Athenians of violating the truce in certain respects.

2 This made the Mendaeans bolder: they saw that Brasidas was willing, and inferred from his conduct over Scione that he would not abandon them. At the same time, the few men among them who were negotiating the revolt, now that they were on the point of acting, would no longer draw back. Fearing for themselves if they were exposed, they forced the majority to act against its will.

3 As soon as the Athenians heard, they were still more enraged, and made preparations against both cities.

4 Expecting their fleet, Brasidas secretly evacuated the women and children of Scione and Mende to Olynthus in Chalcidice, and sent the two cities five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian peltasts, with Polydamidas in command of them all. Together they made their preparations, expecting the Athenians to arrive shortly.

Chapter 124

1 Meanwhile Brasidas and Perdiccas made a second joint expedition against Arrhabaeus into Lyncus. Perdiccas led the forces of the Macedonians under his rule and hoplites from the Greeks settled among them; Brasidas, besides the Peloponnesians he still had with him, brought Chalcidians, Acanthians, and contingents from the other allies according to their several strengths. The Greek hoplites numbered about three thousand in all; the Macedonian and Chalcidian cavalry accompanying them amounted to nearly a thousand, and there was also a large body of barbarians.

2 They invaded Arrhabaeus' territory and, finding the Lyncestians encamped to oppose them, encamped opposite in their turn.

3 The infantry on either side held a hill, with a plain between them, and the cavalry of both armies first rode down into it and fought. Then the Lyncestian hoplites came forward first from their hill with their cavalry, ready to fight; Brasidas and Perdiccas brought their own troops forward to meet them, engaged, and routed the Lyncestians. They killed many, while the rest escaped to the heights and remained inactive.

4 After this they set up a trophy and waited two or three days for the Illyrians who were due to arrive as mercenaries in Perdiccas' service. Perdiccas then wanted to advance against Arrhabaeus' villages rather than remain where they were. Brasidas, however, was anxious about Mende, fearing that the Athenians might sail there first and do it harm; and, with the Illyrians still absent, he was unwilling to advance and preferred to withdraw.

Chapter 125

1 While they were disputing this, word came that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas and joined Arrhabaeus. Both now thought it best to retreat, afraid of the Illyrians' warlike reputation; but their disagreement had left them without any settled decision on when to depart. Night came on, and the Macedonians and the mass of barbarians suddenly took fright, as large armies are apt to fall into panic for no clear reason. Believing that many times the number who had actually come were advancing against them and were almost upon them, they broke into sudden flight toward home. Perdiccas knew nothing of it at first; when he discovered it, they compelled him to leave before he could see Brasidas, for their camps lay far apart.

2 At dawn Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had gone ahead and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were about to attack. He too assembled his hoplites, formed them into a square with the mass of light troops inside, and prepared to retreat.

3 He assigned the youngest men to rush out against the enemy wherever they attacked, and intended himself to take the rear with three hundred picked men, turning as he withdrew to resist and beat back the foremost of the pursuing enemy.

4 Before the enemy came close, he briefly addressed his soldiers with the following encouragement.

Chapter 126

1 “Men of the Peloponnese, if I did not suspect that you were alarmed at being left alone, and at the numbers and barbarian character of the advancing enemy, I would not combine instruction with encouragement in this way. As it is, I shall try, with a brief reminder and exhortation, to convince you of the most important points concerning our friends' desertion and the enemy's numbers.

2 “For you ought to be good soldiers not through the presence of allies on each occasion, but through your own valor, and to fear no multitude of others. You do not even come from states in which the many rule the few, but rather the few rule the many, having won their ascendancy by nothing other than superiority in battle.

3 “As for the barbarians whom you now fear through inexperience, you must learn that they will not prove formidable: you can judge from your previous fighting against some of them alongside the Macedonians, and from what I infer and know from the reports of others.

4 “For when an enemy is in reality weak but reputed strong, true knowledge of him gives those resisting him greater confidence; whereas an enemy with some solid advantage would be attacked more boldly by those who did not know of it beforehand.

5 “These men make a terrifying show of preparing to attack, to those unfamiliar with them. Their numbers are frightening to the eye, the volume of their shouting is unbearable, and the brandishing of weapons in the air carries an appearance of menace. But they are not the same when they close with men who stand their ground against all this. They have no ordered ranks and so feel no shame at abandoning a position under pressure; retreat and advance alike bring them honor, leaving their courage beyond scrutiny. Indeed, fighting in which each man is his own master is best suited to give him a respectable excuse for saving himself. They consider it safer to frighten you without danger to themselves than to come to close quarters; otherwise they would have chosen the latter course rather than the former.

6 “You can plainly see that all the terror they inspire beforehand amounts to little in action, though it overwhelms the eye and ear. Stand firm against it as it comes on, and then, when the moment offers, withdraw again in order and formation: you will reach safety sooner, and learn for the future that when men face the first assault of such mobs, these boast of their courage with distant threats, lingering rather than attacking; but when men give way to them, they are quick to display their valor in the safety of pursuit.”

Chapter 127

1 With this encouragement Brasidas began to withdraw his army. Seeing it, the barbarians pressed on with loud shouting and uproar, thinking that he was fleeing and that they would catch and destroy him.

2 But the detachments rushed out to meet them wherever they attacked, and Brasidas himself with his picked men stood his ground against their pursuit. Contrary to their expectation, his troops resisted the first onslaught; thereafter they met and beat back each attack, and withdrew when the enemy paused. The main body of the barbarians then left Brasidas' Greeks alone in the open country. Leaving a detachment to follow and attack them, the rest ran after the fleeing Macedonians, killing any they encountered, and hurried ahead to occupy the narrow entrance into Arrhabaeus' territory between two hills, knowing that Brasidas had no other way of retreat. As he was already approaching the difficult stretch of road itself, they moved around him to cut him off.

Chapter 128

1 Brasidas saw their intention and ordered his three hundred to run toward the hill he thought the easier of the two to take, each man as fast as he could, without keeping formation, and try to dislodge the barbarians already there before the larger force encircling them could also reach the spot.

2 They charged and overpowered the men on the hill, and the main body of the Greeks could now march toward it more easily. The barbarians were frightened by the rout of their men from the height at this point, and did not pursue much farther, thinking that the Greeks were already near the frontier and had escaped.

3 Having secured the heights in his turn, Brasidas now advanced in greater safety and arrived that same day at Arnissa, the first place in Perdiccas' dominions.

4 The soldiers themselves, angry at the Macedonians' premature retreat, unyoked and slaughtered any of their ox teams they came upon along the road, and appropriated any baggage they found abandoned, as was likely to happen in a frightened withdrawal by night.

5 From this time Perdiccas first regarded Brasidas as an enemy. Thereafter he felt a hatred of the Peloponnesians at odds with his usual sympathies, given his relations with the Athenians; setting aside the demands of his own interests, he worked to find the quickest way of coming to terms with the latter and ridding himself of the former.

Chapter 129

1 On withdrawing from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found that the Athenians already held Mende. He remained where he was, thinking himself no longer able to cross to Pallene and bring help, and kept Torone under guard.

2 For at about the time of the events in Lyncus the Athenians had sailed against Mende and Scione, as they had been preparing to do, with fifty ships, ten of them Chian, a thousand of their own hoplites, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and peltasts from their other allies in the region. Their generals were Nicias son of Niceratus and Nicostratus son of Diitrephes.

3 Sailing from Potidaea, they put in by the sanctuary of Poseidon and advanced against the Mendaeans. These, together with three hundred Scionaeans who had come to help and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred hoplites in all, and their commander Polydamidas, happened to be encamped outside the city on a strong hill.

4 Nicias, with a hundred and twenty light troops from Methone, sixty picked Athenian hoplites, and all the archers, tried to climb the hill by a path, but was wounded by the defenders and could not force his way up. Nicostratus took a longer approach by another route with all the rest of the army, and in advancing against the hill, which was difficult to attack, fell into great confusion. The entire Athenian army came close to defeat.

5 Since the Mendaeans and their allies would not yield that day, the Athenians withdrew and encamped; when night fell the Mendaeans retired into the city.

Chapter 130

1 The next day the Athenians sailed around to the side facing Scione, captured the suburb, and ravaged the land all day without anyone coming out against them; there was also some civil strife in the city. During the following night the three hundred Scionaeans withdrew to their own home.

2 On the succeeding day Nicias advanced with half the army, ravaging the land as he went toward the Scionaean frontier, while Nicostratus with the remainder took up a position against the city by the upper gates, on the road to Potidaea.

3 The Mendaeans and their auxiliaries happened to be stationed under arms inside the wall at this point. Polydamidas drew them up for battle and urged the Mendaeans to make a sortie.

4 One of the popular party, speaking in the spirit of their factional quarrel, answered that he would not go out and had no wish to fight. As he spoke, Polydamidas seized him by the arm and roughly handled him. At once the people took up their arms in a fury and advanced against the Peloponnesians and those who had joined them in acting against the popular interest.

5 They attacked and routed them, partly through the suddenness of the clash, partly because the gates were being opened to the Athenians and the defenders took fright: they thought the attack had been arranged beforehand with them.

6 Those who were not killed at once fled to the acropolis, which they had held before. The Athenians—Nicias had by now returned and was also close to the city—rushed into Mende with their entire army and plundered it as a place taken by storm, since it had not been opened to them under an agreement. The generals could scarcely restrain them from killing the inhabitants as well.

7 After this they told the Mendaeans to govern themselves as before and to try among themselves any whom they considered responsible for the revolt. They cut off those in the acropolis with walls running down to the sea on either side, and posted a guard. Once they had secured affairs at Mende, they marched against Scione.

Chapter 131

1 The Scionaeans and Peloponnesians came out to meet them and took position on a strong hill before the city. Unless the enemy captured it, they could not build a wall around Scione.

2 The Athenians attacked it with all their strength, dislodged its defenders in battle, and encamped. After setting up a trophy, they prepared to build their enclosing wall.

3 Not long afterward, when work was already under way, the auxiliaries besieged in the acropolis at Mende forced their way past the guard by the sea and arrived by night. Most of them slipped past the army before Scione and entered the city.

Chapter 132

1 While Scione was being walled in, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian generals and reached an agreement with the Athenians. This was prompted by his hostility toward Brasidas over the retreat from Lyncus; he had begun negotiations at the time of that retreat.

2 The Lacedaemonian Ischagoras was then about to bring an army overland to Brasidas. Nicias urged Perdiccas, now that they had come to terms, to give the Athenians some clear proof of his fidelity; Perdiccas himself also no longer wanted Peloponnesians coming into his territory. He therefore enlisted his guest-friends in Thessaly—he always cultivated the leading men—and blocked the army and its preparations, so that they did not even attempt to pass through Thessaly.

3 Ischagoras himself, however, together with Ameinias and Aristeus, reached Brasidas: the Lacedaemonians had sent them to inspect affairs. They also took men of military age out of Sparta, contrary to law, to appoint them governors of the cities rather than entrust these to whoever happened to be available. Brasidas appointed Clearidas son of Cleonymus at Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas son of Hegesander at Torone.

Chapter 133

1 During the same summer the Thebans demolished the wall of Thespiae, accusing the city of siding with Athens. They had always wanted to do this, but their opportunity was now easier, since the flower of the Thespian people had perished in the battle against the Athenians.

2 That same summer the temple of Hera at Argos burned down. Chrysis, the priestess, had placed a lighted lamp near the garlands and fallen asleep, so that everything caught fire and burned before she noticed.

3 Chrysis fled that very night to Phlius, in fear of the Argives. Under the established law they appointed another priestess, named Phaeinis. At the time of her flight Chrysis' priesthood had extended through eight years and half the ninth of this war.

4 By the close of summer Scione had been completely enclosed by a wall; the Athenians left a guard before it and withdrew with the rest of their army.

Chapter 134

1 In the following winter the Athenians and Lacedaemonians remained inactive because of the armistice, but the Mantineans and Tegeans, with their respective allies, fought at Laodocium in Oresthis, and the victory was disputed. Each side routed the wing facing it, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi.

2 There were, however, many dead on both sides; the battle was closely balanced, and night put an end to the action. The Tegeans bivouacked on the field and immediately set up a trophy, while the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion and raised a rival trophy later.

Chapter 135

1 As the same winter drew to its end and spring was already near, Brasidas also made an attempt on Potidaea. He approached by night and set a ladder against the wall, escaping notice up to that point: the ladder was placed in the interval after the bell had passed along and before the man passing it along returned. But the defenders discovered them immediately afterward, before they could climb up, and he quickly withdrew his army again without waiting for daylight.

2 The winter ended, and the ninth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Chapter 1

1 In the following summer, around the time when the grain was coming into ear, ten Syracusan ships and the same number of Locrian ships sailed to Messene in Sicily and took control of it. The people there had invited them in, and Messene broke away from the Athenians.

2 The Syracusans acted mainly because they saw that the place offered a way into Sicily. They feared that the Athenians might one day use it as a base to attack them with a larger force. The Locrians acted out of hostility toward the people of Rhegium. They wanted to attack them from both sides and defeat them.

3 At the same time, the Locrians had invaded the territory of Rhegium with their whole army to stop its people from helping the Messenians. Exiles from Rhegium who were living among the Locrians also helped bring about the invasion. Rhegium had been divided by civil strife for a long time and was currently unable to defend itself against the Locrians. This made them all the more ready to attack.

4 After laying waste to the land, the Locrian land forces withdrew. But the ships stayed to guard Messene. Other ships were being fitted out and were to make their base there too and carry on the war from there.

Chapter 2

1 Around the same time in the spring, before the grain was fully grown, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica. Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, led them. They established themselves there and laid waste to the land.

2 The Athenians sent the forty ships to Sicily, as they had been preparing to do, along with the two remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. Pythodorus, the third general, had already gone ahead to Sicily.

3 They also told these generals to look after the Corcyraeans in the city as they sailed past. Exiles in the mountain were raiding them. Sixty Peloponnesian ships had sailed there to support the men in the mountain. There was a severe famine in the city, and the Peloponnesians thought they could easily take control.

4 Demosthenes had held no public office since his return from Acarnania. At his own request, they gave him permission to use these ships around the Peloponnese if he wished.

Chapter 3

1 As they sailed along the coast of Laconia, they learned that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra. Eurymedon and Sophocles wanted to hurry there. But Demosthenes urged them to put in at Pylos first, do what was needed, and then continue their voyage. They objected, but a storm happened to come up and drove the ships into Pylos.

2 Demosthenes immediately called for the place to be fortified. This was why he had sailed with them. He pointed out that there was plenty of timber and stone. The place was naturally strong, and both it and a large stretch of the surrounding country were uninhabited. Pylos is about four hundred stades from Sparta, in what was once Messenian territory. The Lacedaemonians call it Coryphasium.

3 They replied that the Peloponnese had plenty of deserted headlands, if he wanted to occupy them and make the city spend money. But he thought this place had special advantages over others. It had a harbor, and the Messenians had originally belonged there and spoke the same language as the Lacedaemonians. Using it as a base, they could do the Lacedaemonians a great deal of harm. They would also be reliable guards for the place.

Chapter 4

1 He could not persuade either the generals or the soldiers, even after he later discussed the plan with the commanders of the infantry divisions. So he did nothing while the weather kept them from sailing. Eventually the soldiers themselves, with nothing to do, felt the urge to gather around the site and fortify it.

2 They began work without having any tools for cutting stone. Instead, they picked up stones and carried them over, fitting each one into place however it would go. Where they needed mortar, they had no containers, so they carried it on their backs. They bent forward to keep it in place as much as possible and clasped their hands behind them to stop it from falling off.

3 They hurried in every possible way to finish the most vulnerable points before the Lacedaemonians could arrive to oppose them. Most of the site was naturally strong and needed no wall.

Chapter 5

1 The Lacedaemonians happened to be celebrating a festival. When they heard the news, they took little notice. They thought that once they came out against the Athenians, these would either leave rather than face them or be easily taken by force. They were also held back to some extent because their army was still in Attica.

2 In six days the Athenians fortified the landward side of the site and the other points that most needed it. They left Demosthenes there with five ships to guard it. With the greater part of the fleet, they hurried on toward Corcyra and Sicily.

Chapter 6

1 When the Peloponnesians in Attica learned that Pylos had been occupied, they hurried home. The Lacedaemonians and King Agis thought that the situation at Pylos directly concerned them. Also, they had invaded early, while the grain was still green, and most of the army was short of food. A storm more severe than was usual for the season also came up and caused the troops hardship.

2 Several causes thus combined to make them withdraw sooner and to make this invasion the shortest of all. They stayed in Attica for fifteen days.

Chapter 7

1 Around the same time, the Athenian general Simonides gathered a few Athenians from the garrisons and a large force of local allies. With help from traitors inside, he took Eion in Thrace, a colony of Mende that was hostile to Athens. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans immediately came to its aid. He was driven out and lost many of his soldiers.

Chapter 8

1 After the Peloponnesians had withdrawn from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the nearest perioeci immediately marched to help at Pylos. The other Lacedaemonians were slower to advance, since they had only just returned from another campaign.

2 They also sent word throughout the Peloponnese for help to come to Pylos as quickly as possible. They sent for their sixty ships at Corcyra too. These were hauled across the isthmus of Leucas and reached Pylos without being noticed by the Athenian ships at Zacynthus. The land army was already there.

3 While the Peloponnesians were still sailing toward him, Demosthenes managed to send out two ships ahead of them. These were to tell Eurymedon and the Athenians aboard the ships at Zacynthus to come, because the position was in danger.

4 The ships sailed off quickly with Demosthenes' message. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians prepared to attack the fort by land and sea. They expected to take it easily, since it had been built in a hurry and had only a few defenders inside.

5 They also expected the Athenian ships from Zacynthus to come to its aid. If they had not taken the fort before then, they planned to block the harbor entrances too, so that the Athenians could not anchor inside it.

6 The island called Sphacteria stretches along the harbor and lies close to it. This makes the harbor sheltered and its entrances narrow. At the entrance beside Pylos and the Athenian fort, two ships can pass abreast. At the entrance toward the rest of the mainland, eight or nine can pass. The whole island was wooded and had no paths because it was uninhabited. It was about fifteen stades long.

7 They intended to close the entrances with ships packed closely together, their bows facing outward. They feared that the Athenians might use the island as a base against them, so they sent hoplites across to it and stationed others along the mainland.

8 In this way, they thought, both the island and the mainland would be hostile territory for the Athenians, with no place for them to land. The seaward coast of Pylos itself, outside the harbor entrance, had no harbors, so the Athenians would have no base there from which to help their own men. The Lacedaemonians themselves would probably take the position by siege without risking a sea battle or any other danger. There was no grain inside, and it had been occupied with very little preparation.

9 Once they had decided on this plan, they drew lots among all the companies and sent the selected hoplites across to the island. Other men had already crossed earlier in rotation. The last group, who were also the men cut off there, numbered four hundred and twenty, with their attendant Helots. Their commander was Epitadas son of Molobrus.

Chapter 9

1 Demosthenes saw that the Lacedaemonians were about to attack with their ships and land army together, and made his own preparations. He hauled the remaining triremes from those left with him up beneath the fort and put a stockade around them. He armed their sailors with poor shields, mostly made of wicker. There was no way to get weapons in an uninhabited place. Even these shields came from a Messenian pirate ship with thirty oars and a small boat that happened to arrive. Among these Messenians were also about forty hoplites, whom he used along with the others.

2 He stationed most of the men, both armed and unarmed, at the best-fortified and strongest points of the site on the landward side. He told them to defend it against the land army if it attacked. He himself selected sixty hoplites from the whole force and a few archers, and went outside the wall toward the sea. This was where he most expected the enemy to try to land. The ground was rough and rocky and faced the open sea. But the wall was weakest there, so he thought they would be eager to force their way in at that point.

3 The Athenians had not expected ever to be defeated at sea, and for that reason had not built a strong wall there. If the enemy forced a landing, the position would be open to capture.

4 So he went down to the water's edge at this point and stationed his hoplites there to keep the enemy out if he could. He encouraged them with these words.

Chapter 10

1 “Men who have joined me in facing this danger, in a crisis like this none of you should try to look clever by calculating every danger surrounding us. Instead, face the enemy confidently, without too much thought. That is how you may win. When things reach a crisis like ours, there is very little room for calculation. What is needed is to take the risk as quickly as possible.

2 “I can also see that most of the advantages are on our side, if we are willing to stand our ground. We must not let their numbers terrify us into throwing away the stronger position we already hold.

3 “I count the difficulty of approaching the place as one of our advantages. It helps us if we stay. But if we retreat, the ground will be easy to cross despite its difficulties, because no one will be stopping the enemy. And the enemy will be more dangerous to us because, once ashore, they will find it hard to retreat, even if we press them back. They are easiest to fight off while still aboard their ships. Once they have landed, they are on equal terms with us.

4 “We should not be too afraid of their numbers either. However many there are, only a few will fight at a time, since it is hard to bring ships in to shore. This is not a larger army fighting on land under the same conditions as we are. They are attacking from ships, and many things at sea have to go right for them at the right moment.

5 “So I think their difficulties make up for our small numbers. You are Athenians, and your experience of landing troops against an enemy has taught you this: if a defender stands firm and does not retreat in fear of the waves and the frightening sight of ships sailing in, he can never be forced back. I ask you now to stand firm yourselves. Fight them off at the very edge of the surf, and save both ourselves and this position.”

Chapter 11

1 After this encouragement from Demosthenes, the Athenians felt more confident. They went farther down and took up their positions at the very edge of the sea.

2 The Lacedaemonians advanced and attacked the fort with their land army and, at the same time, with their forty-three ships. Their fleet commander, the Spartan Thrasymelidas son of Cratesicles, sailed with them. He attacked at the very point Demosthenes had expected.

3 The Athenians defended themselves on both sides, against attacks from land and sea. The enemy divided their ships into small groups because there was no room for more to approach. They attacked in turns, resting between attacks. They made every effort and shouted encouragement to each other, hoping somehow to drive the defenders back and take the fort.

4 Brasidas stood out more than anyone. He was commanding a trireme. He saw that, because of the difficult ground, the ship commanders and helmsmen were hesitating even where a landing seemed possible. They were taking care not to wreck their ships. He shouted that they should not spare a few pieces of wood and let the enemy keep a fort they had built in their country. He urged them to smash their own ships if necessary to force a landing. He called on the allies not to hesitate to give their ships to the Lacedaemonians in this crisis, in return for the great benefits they had received. They should run the ships ashore, get off them by any means, and overcome both the men and their position.

Chapter 12

1 He urged the others on in this way and made his own helmsman run the ship ashore. Then he moved onto the gangway. As he tried to land, the Athenians drove him back. He received many wounds and fainted. He fell into the ship's outrigger, and his shield slipped into the sea. It washed ashore, and the Athenians picked it up. Later they used it for the victory trophy they set up to mark this attack.

2 The others tried hard, but they could not land. The ground was difficult, and the Athenians stood firm without giving way at all.

3 Their fortunes had been reversed so completely that Athenians were defending a position on land—Laconian land at that—against an attack by sea. Lacedaemonians were landing from ships to attack Athenians on their own soil, which had become enemy territory. At that time, the prevailing view was that the Lacedaemonians were above all a land power with the best infantry, while the Athenians were a sea power with by far the strongest navy.

Chapter 13

1 After attacking throughout that day and part of the next, they stopped. On the third day they sent some of their ships along the coast to Asine to get timber for siege engines. They hoped to take the wall facing the harbor with these engines. It was high, but that was the easiest place to land.

2 Meanwhile the Athenian ships arrived from Zacynthus, forty in all. Some of the guard ships from Naupactus and four Chian ships had joined them to help.

3 They saw both the mainland and the island crowded with hoplites, and the enemy ships staying inside the harbor instead of sailing out. They did not know where to anchor. So for the moment they sailed to the nearby uninhabited island of Prote and spent the night there. The next day they prepared for a sea battle and put out. If the enemy were willing to sail out against them, they would fight in open water. Otherwise they would sail into the harbor themselves.

4 The enemy neither put out to meet them nor carried out their plan to block the entrances. Instead, they stayed on shore, manning their ships and preparing to fight inside the harbor if anyone sailed in. It was a large harbor.

Chapter 14

1 Once the Athenians saw this, they rushed at them through both entrances. Most of the ships were already afloat and facing them with their bows. The Athenians attacked these and put them to flight. In a short pursuit they damaged many and captured five, one of them with its crew. They rammed the other ships, which had taken refuge by the shore. Some were struck while still being manned, before they could put out. The Athenians also tied towlines to some empty ships and began pulling them away after their crews had fled.

2 The Lacedaemonians saw this and were deeply distressed by the disaster, especially because their men were being cut off on the island. They rushed to help, waded into the sea with their weapons, seized the ships, and pulled against the Athenians. Each man felt that things would be held up unless he personally took part in the action.

3 There was great confusion, and in the struggle over the ships each side's usual way of fighting was reversed. In their eagerness and alarm, the Lacedaemonians were practically fighting a sea battle from the land. The Athenians had the upper hand and wanted to make the most of their present good fortune. They were fighting a land battle from their ships.

4 After much hard fighting and many wounds on both sides, they separated. The Lacedaemonians saved the empty ships, apart from those captured at the start.

5 Both sides returned to their camps. The Athenians set up a victory trophy, gave back the enemy dead, and took possession of the wrecks. They immediately began sailing around the island and keeping watch over it, since the men there were now cut off. The Peloponnesians on the mainland, now reinforced from all their communities, stayed in position at Pylos.

Chapter 15

1 When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, the Lacedaemonians treated it as a great disaster. They decided that the authorities should go down to the camp, see things for themselves, and immediately decide what to do.

2 They saw that they could not help the men on the island. They did not want to risk the men either dying of hunger or being overwhelmed and captured by a larger force. So they decided to arrange a truce over Pylos with the Athenian generals, if these were willing, and send envoys to Athens to negotiate a settlement. They would try to get their men back as quickly as possible.

Chapter 16

1 The generals accepted the proposal, and a truce was made on these terms. The Lacedaemonians were to bring to Pylos and hand over to the Athenians the ships they had fought with and all the warships in Laconia. They were not to attack the fort by land or sea. The Athenians were to allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send fixed rations of kneaded barley meal to the men on the island: two Attic choenices for each man, along with two cotylae of wine and some meat. Each servant was to receive half these amounts. These supplies were to be brought in under Athenian supervision, and no boat was to slip in secretly. The Athenians were to keep watch over the island just as closely as before, but without landing on it. They were not to attack the Peloponnesian army by land or sea.

2 If either side broke any part of these terms, however small, the truce would end at once. It was to last until the Lacedaemonian envoys returned from Athens. The Athenians were to send them there in a trireme and bring them back again. On their return, the truce would end, and the Athenians were to give back the ships in the same condition as when they received them.

3 The truce was made on these terms. The ships, about sixty in all, were handed over, and the envoys were sent off. When they reached Athens, they spoke as follows.

Chapter 17

1 “Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to negotiate about the men on the island. We want to persuade you to accept a settlement that benefits you and, at the same time, preserves as much dignity for us in our misfortune as the present situation allows.

2 “Our speech is longer than usual, but this is not a departure from our custom. At home we use few words when few are enough. But we use more when the occasion calls for us to explain something important and use words to achieve what is needed.

3 “Do not receive our words with hostility, or feel that we are teaching you because you lack understanding. Think of them instead as a reminder to people who already know how to make a good decision.

4 “You can put your present good fortune to good use. You can keep what you have gained and add honor and a good reputation. You need not make the mistake of people who are unused to good fortune. Because their present success has come as a surprise, they keep reaching out in the hope of getting more.

5 “People who have experienced the most changes of fortune, both good and bad, have the best reason to distrust success. Given our experience, this should apply especially to your city and to us.

Chapter 18

1 “Look at our present misfortunes and recognize the truth of this. We have the highest standing among the Greeks, yet we have come to you. Before, we thought we had more power to grant others what we are now here to ask you for.

2 “This did not happen because we lacked power, or because we gained more power and became arrogant. We had our usual resources but made a mistake in judgment. Anyone is equally liable to do the same.

3 “So you should not assume that fortune will always be on your side because your city is strong now and has gained these additional advantages.

4 “Sensible people put their gains somewhere safe against an uncertain future. Those same people would also handle misfortunes more intelligently. They recognize that war does not stay within whatever limits someone chooses for his own part in it. Instead, events go where chance takes them. Such people make the fewest mistakes because they do not become overconfident and get carried away when the war goes well. They are most likely to end it while their luck is good.

5 “Athenians, this is a good time for you to do that with us. Otherwise, if you reject our advice and later suffer a setback—and there are many ways that could happen—people may think that even your present successes were due to luck. Yet you have the chance to leave behind an enduring reputation for strength and good judgment without taking a risk.

Chapter 19

1 “The Lacedaemonians invite you to make a treaty and end the war. We offer peace, an alliance, and close friendship and ties between us in other ways too. In return, we ask for the men on the island. We think it better for both sides not to take a gamble on their fate: they might force their way out if some chance of rescue arose, or they might instead be forced into submission by the siege and captured.

2 “We believe that bitter hostilities can be ended most securely in this way. It is not by retaliating, gaining the upper hand in most of the fighting, and then forcing an unequal settlement on the enemy and binding him to it by oaths. Rather, when you have the power to do that, you should choose fairness, outdo him in generosity, and agree to more moderate terms than he expected.

3 “The enemy then feels that he owes you generosity in return, rather than retaliation for being forced to submit. His sense of shame makes him readier to keep the agreement he has made.

4 “People are more likely to act this way toward their bitterest enemies than toward those with whom they have only ordinary disagreements. It is human nature to give way gladly in return to those who freely yield, but to risk everything against overbearing demands, even against one's own better judgment.

Chapter 20

1 “If there was ever a good time for both of us to reach a settlement, it is now. We should act before something beyond repair happens to us in the meantime. That would force us to add a lasting personal hatred of you to our hostility as a state, while you would lose the benefits we now offer.

2 “Let us come to terms while the outcome is still undecided. You can gain a good reputation and our friendship. We can settle our misfortune on reasonable terms before anything disgraceful happens. Let us choose peace instead of war for ourselves and give the other Greeks relief from their suffering. They will give you the greater credit for this. They are caught up in a war, and it is unclear which side started it. But if it ends—and you now have the greater power to bring this about—they will give you their thanks.

3 “If you decide to do this, you can become firm friends with the Lacedaemonians. They themselves have made the offer, and you will have done them a favor rather than forced them to submit.

4 “Consider how many benefits this is likely to bring. If you and we agree, you know that the rest of the Greeks, being weaker, will show us the greatest respect.”

Chapter 21

1 That was what the Lacedaemonians said. They thought the Athenians had previously wanted a treaty but that Lacedaemonian opposition had prevented it. Now that peace was being offered, they expected the Athenians to accept it gladly and give back the men.

2 But the Athenians believed that, with the men on the island in their power, they could already make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians whenever they wished. They wanted more.

3 Cleon son of Cleaenetus encouraged them most. At that time he was a popular leader with more influence over the people than anyone else. He persuaded them to give this answer: the men on the island must first surrender their weapons and themselves and be brought to Athens. Once they were there, the Lacedaemonians must give back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea. They had not gained these places in war. They had received them under the previous agreement, when the Athenians had given them up because of their misfortunes and their greater need for a treaty at that time. After returning them, the Lacedaemonians could recover their men and make a treaty for whatever period both sides thought suitable.

Chapter 22

1 They did not argue against this answer. Instead, they asked the Athenians to choose representatives to meet with them. These would discuss each point, listening as well as speaking, and quietly reach agreement wherever they could persuade one another.

2 At this Cleon attacked them fiercely. He said he had already known that they had no fair proposal in mind. Now it was clear: they would say nothing to the people, but wanted to meet with a small group of men. If they had anything reasonable in mind, he told them to say it to everyone.

3 The Lacedaemonians saw that they could not speak before the people about any concessions their misfortune might make them willing to offer. If they offered these and failed to reach agreement, their allies might turn against them. They also saw that the Athenians would not accept the settlement they proposed on reasonable terms. So they left Athens without achieving anything.

Chapter 23

1 As soon as they returned, the truce at Pylos ended. The Lacedaemonians demanded their ships back, as agreed. But the Athenians refused to return them. They complained of an attack on their fort in breach of the truce and of other incidents that seemed unimportant. They insisted that the agreement said that any breach at all would end the truce. The Lacedaemonians disputed this and called the withholding of the ships an injustice. They went away and resumed the war.

2 Both sides fought hard around Pylos. During the day, the Athenians constantly sailed two ships around the island in opposite directions. At night their whole fleet lay around it, except on the seaward side when the wind was blowing. Twenty ships also arrived from Athens to help with the blockade, bringing the total to seventy. The Peloponnesians kept their camp on the mainland and attacked the wall. They watched for any chance to rescue their men.

Chapter 24

1 Meanwhile in Sicily, the Syracusans and their allies brought up the rest of the fleet they were preparing to join the ships guarding Messene.

2 They conducted the war from Messene. The Locrians urged them on more than anyone, because of their hatred of the people of Rhegium. The Locrians had also invaded their territory with their full force.

3 They wanted to try a sea battle. They saw that the Athenians had few ships there, and they had heard that the larger fleet that was supposed to come was blockading the island.

4 If they won control at sea, they hoped to take Rhegium easily by attacking it with troops and ships. Their position would then be strong. Rhegium, on the tip of Italy, lies close to Messene in Sicily. With both places in their hands, the Athenians would have no base for their ships and could not control the strait.

5 The strait is the stretch of sea between Rhegium and Messene, where Sicily is closest to the mainland. This is the place called Charybdis, through which Odysseus is said to have sailed. It is narrow, and the water pours into it from two great seas, the Tyrrhenian and the Sicilian, creating strong currents. It was therefore quite reasonably considered dangerous.

Chapter 25

1 Here in the strait, late in the day, the Syracusans and their allies were forced into a sea battle over a ship making the crossing. They put out with a little more than thirty ships against sixteen Athenian ships and eight from Rhegium.

2 The Athenians defeated them, and they quickly sailed away, each as best it could, to their respective camps at Messene and Rhegium. They lost one ship. Nightfall ended the action.

3 After this the Locrians left the territory of Rhegium. The ships of the Syracusans and their allies gathered at Peloris, in the territory of Messene, and anchored there. Their land army was there too.

4 The Athenians and the men of Rhegium sailed up, saw the ships without their crews, and attacked. But a grappling hook caught one of their own ships, and they lost it. Its crew swam away.

5 After this the Syracusans boarded their ships and moved along the coast toward Messene using a towline. The Athenians attacked again, but the Syracusans turned their bows out to sea and rammed first. The Athenians lost another ship.

6 The Syracusans thus reached the harbor at Messene without getting the worse of either the coastal passage or the sea battle that took place during it.

7 The Athenians then heard that Archias and his supporters were betraying Camarina to the Syracusans, and sailed there. Meanwhile the people of Messene attacked neighboring Naxos, a Chalcidian city, with their whole force by land and their fleet at the same time.

8 On the first day they forced the Naxians inside their walls and laid waste to their territory. On the next day they sailed around to the Acesines River and devastated the land there, while their land army advanced toward the city.

9 Meanwhile large numbers of Sicels were coming down over the heights to help against the men of Messene. When the Naxians saw them, they took courage. They encouraged one another by saying that the people of Leontini and their other Greek allies were coming to their aid. They suddenly rushed out of the city and attacked the men of Messene. They routed them and killed over a thousand. The rest had difficulty getting home, for the non-Greeks also attacked them on the roads and killed most of them.

10 The ships put in at Messene and later separated, each returning home. The people of Leontini and their allies, together with the Athenians, immediately attacked Messene, taking advantage of its weakened state. The Athenians attacked the harbor with their ships, while the land army attacked the city.

11 The men of Messene came out with some Locrians under Demoteles, who had been left as a garrison after the disaster. Their sudden attack routed most of the army from Leontini and killed many men. When the Athenians saw this, they landed from their ships to help. They fell on the men of Messene while these were in confusion and chased them back into the city. They set up a victory marker and withdrew to Rhegium.

12 After this the Greeks in Sicily continued their land campaigns against one another without the Athenians.

Chapter 26

1 At Pylos the Athenians were still blockading the Lacedaemonians on the island. The Peloponnesian army on the mainland stayed in its position.

2 The blockade was hard work for the Athenians because they lacked food and water. There was only one spring, in the stronghold of Pylos itself, and it was small. Most of the men dug through the pebbles along the shore and drank the sort of water one would expect to find there.

3 They were also crowded into a small camp. There was no anchorage for the ships, so they took turns bringing their crews ashore for food, while the others lay at anchor offshore.

4 The unexpected length of the blockade was especially discouraging. They had thought they would force the men to surrender within a few days, since they were on a deserted island and had only brackish water to drink.

5 The reason was that the Lacedaemonians had announced that anyone willing should take ground grain, wine, cheese, or any other food useful during a siege to the island. They offered high payments and promised freedom to any Helot who got supplies through.

6 Others took the risk of bringing supplies, but the Helots did so most of all. They sailed from whatever point in the Peloponnese they could and reached the seaward side of the island while it was still night.

7 They especially watched for a wind that would carry them in. It was easier to evade the triremes on guard when a wind blew from the open sea, since the ships could not maintain their stations around the island. The supply boats could make their landing without concern for damage: their value had been guaranteed in money, so the men simply ran them aground. The hoplites kept watch at the island's landing places. Those who risked coming in calm weather were caught.

8 Swimmers also came through the harbor underwater. They towed skins on a thin cord, carrying poppy seed mixed with honey and crushed flaxseed. At first they escaped notice, but later guards were posted against them.

9 Each side tried every device it could: one to get food in, the other to prevent any supplies getting through unnoticed.

Chapter 27

1 When the people at Athens learned that their army was suffering and food was reaching the men on the island, they were at a loss. They feared that winter would come before the blockade ended. They saw that bringing supplies around the Peloponnese would become impossible. The place was deserted, and even in summer they could not send enough supplies around to it. Nor could they maintain the naval blockade, since there were no harbors there. Either they would have to abandon their guard and let the men survive, or the men would wait for stormy weather and sail away in the boats that brought them food.

2 Above all, they were afraid of the Lacedaemonians. They thought these must have some strong grounds for confidence, since they no longer sent heralds to negotiate with them. They regretted not accepting the peace agreement.

3 Cleon realized that they blamed him for blocking the agreement. He said that the men bringing the reports were not telling the truth. The men who had arrived suggested that, if the Athenians did not believe them, they should send observers. The Athenians chose Cleon himself, along with Theagenes, for this job.

4 Cleon realized that he would have to give the same report as the men he had accused, or else contradict them and be exposed as a liar. He also saw that the Athenians were now more inclined to send out an expedition. So he urged them not to send observers or waste time and miss their chance. If they thought the reports were true, they should sail against the men on the island.

5 He pointed at Nicias son of Niceratus, who was a general. Cleon was his enemy and was criticizing him. He said that, if the generals were real men, it would be easy to sail there with a force and capture the men on the island. He himself would do it, if he were in command.

Chapter 28

1 Some Athenians shouted at Cleon to ask why he did not sail there now, if he thought it so easy. Nicias heard them and saw that Cleon was attacking him. He told Cleon to take whatever force he wanted and make the attempt, as far as the generals were concerned.

2 At first Cleon thought Nicias was only making a verbal offer, and he was ready to accept. But when he realized that Nicias really meant to hand over the command, he backed away. He said that Nicias, not he, was the general. He was frightened now: he had not thought Nicias would dare to give way to him.

3 Nicias repeated his offer and gave up his command at Pylos, calling the Athenians as witnesses. As crowds tend to do, the more Cleon tried to avoid the voyage and take back his words, the more they urged Nicias to hand over the command and shouted at Cleon to sail.

4 So, unable to find any escape from what he had said, Cleon agreed to sail. He came forward and said he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians. He would sail without taking anyone from the city itself. Instead he would take the Lemnians and Imbrians who were there, the peltasts who had come to help from Aenus and elsewhere, and four hundred archers. With these men added to the troops at Pylos, he said, within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedaemonians back alive or kill them on the spot.

5 The Athenians laughed a little at his reckless talk. Still, the more sensible among them were pleased. They reckoned that one of two good things would happen. Either they would be rid of Cleon, which they expected more, or their judgment would prove wrong and he would capture the Lacedaemonians for them.

Chapter 29

1 Cleon settled everything in the assembly, and the Athenians voted to send him out. He chose Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, to join him in command, and quickly set sail.

2 He chose Demosthenes because he had heard that he was planning a landing on the island. The soldiers were suffering from the lack of resources at their position. They felt more like the besieged than the besiegers and were eager to risk a battle. The fact that the island had burned also gave Demosthenes more confidence.

3 Previously, most of the island had been wooded, with no paths because it had always been uninhabited. This worried him, and he thought it gave the enemy an advantage. Even if he landed a large army, they could attack from cover and hurt it. The woods would keep the enemy's mistakes and preparations from being as clear to his men. But every mistake his own army made would be visible. The enemy could therefore make surprise attacks wherever they wanted, since the choice of when to attack would be theirs.

4 If he forced his way into the thick woods to meet them, he thought their smaller force, familiar with the ground, would be stronger than his larger force, which did not know it. His own army, large as it was, might be destroyed without its men knowing what was happening. They would not be able to see where they needed to help one another.

Chapter 30

1 These thoughts weighed on him especially because of his disaster in Aetolia, which had been partly caused by the woods.

2 But because space was so short, the soldiers had been forced to put in at the edges of the island to prepare their midday meal, posting guards for protection. Someone accidentally set fire to a small patch of the woods. Then a wind came up, and before they realized it, most of the woods had burned down.

3 Demosthenes could now see the Lacedaemonians more clearly and saw that there were more of them than he had thought. Previously he had suspected that the food was being brought in for a smaller number. He also saw that the island was easier to land on. So he began preparing the attack, believing that the Athenians now had a more worthwhile target and should make a greater effort. He sent for troops from the nearby allies and made his other preparations.

4 Cleon sent a messenger ahead to tell Demosthenes he was coming, and arrived at Pylos with the troops he had requested. Once together, they first sent a herald to the camp on the mainland. They invited the commanders there, if they wished, to avoid a battle by ordering the men on the island to surrender themselves and their weapons to the Athenians. The men would be held under reasonable guard until a broader settlement was reached.

Chapter 31

1 The Lacedaemonians rejected this offer, and the Athenians waited one day. The next night they put all their hoplites aboard a few ships and sailed out. Shortly before dawn they landed on both sides of the island, from the open sea and from the harbor. There were about eight hundred hoplites, and they ran toward the first guard post on the island.

2 The enemy had been stationed as follows. About thirty hoplites were at this first post. Most of the men, with their commander Epitadas, held the center of the island, where the ground was most level and the water was. A small detachment guarded the far end facing Pylos. This had steep cliffs above the sea and was very difficult to attack by land. There was also an old defensive wall there, made of loosely fitted stones. They thought it would be useful if they were forced to retreat. These were their positions.

Chapter 32

1 The Athenians immediately killed the guards at the first post they rushed, some still in their beds and others picking up their weapons. The landing had gone unnoticed, since the guards thought the ships were sailing to their usual stations for the night blockade.

2 At dawn the rest of the army began landing too. All the men from a little over seventy ships came ashore except the lowest bank of rowers, each with whatever equipment he had. There were also eight hundred archers and at least as many peltasts. The Messenians who had come to help landed too, along with all the other men holding positions around Pylos, except the guards on the wall.

3 On Demosthenes' orders they spread out in groups of two hundred or more, and sometimes fewer, taking the highest ground. This was meant to leave the enemy surrounded and as helpless as possible. They would not know which way to turn and face an attack, but would be caught between large forces. If they advanced against the men in front, those behind would shoot at them. If they turned against those on one side, the troops on either side of them would attack.

4 Whichever way they moved, the enemy would always be behind them. These lightly armed men were the hardest to deal with. They could fight at long range with arrows, javelins, stones, and slings, and it was impossible to come to grips with them. Even when they ran away they kept the advantage, and when their opponents retreated they pressed after them. This was the plan Demosthenes had in mind when he first proposed the landing, and these were the arrangements he made in the battle.

Chapter 33

1 Epitadas and the main body of troops on the island saw that the first guard post had been destroyed and an army was advancing against them. They formed up and advanced against the Athenian hoplites, wanting to fight at close quarters. The hoplites were directly in front of them, while the light troops were on their flanks and behind them.

2 But they could not reach the hoplites or use their own fighting experience. The light troops kept them back with missiles from both sides, while the hoplites stayed still instead of advancing to meet them. Wherever the light troops pressed them hardest, they charged and drove them away. But the light troops turned back and continued fighting. Their equipment was light, so they could easily get a head start when they ran away. The ground was difficult and rough because it had previously been uninhabited, and the Lacedaemonians could not pursue them there in heavy armor.

Chapter 34

1 For a short time they skirmished like this. Then the Lacedaemonians could no longer rush out quickly against attacks. The light troops noticed that their defense was now slower. The sight of their own force, many times larger than the enemy's, had given them most of their confidence. They were also getting used to their opponents and no longer found them so frightening. They had not immediately suffered the losses they had expected when they first landed, intimidated by the thought that they were going to face Lacedaemonians. Now they looked down on them, raised a shout, and rushed at them together. They hurled stones, arrows, and javelins, each using whatever he had at hand.

2 The shouting and the rush together threw the men into confusion: they were not used to this kind of fighting. Great clouds of dust rose from the recently burned woods. With arrows and stones flying from so many men through the dust, they could not see what was in front of them.

3 The fighting now became very difficult for the Lacedaemonians. Their felt headgear did not stop the arrows, and their spears had been broken by the blows they took. They had no way to use their skills. They could not see ahead, and the enemy's louder shouting kept them from hearing their own orders. Danger surrounded them, and they had no hope of finding a way to defend themselves and survive.

Chapter 35

1 At last, with many men now wounded because they were constantly moving about in the same area, they closed ranks and moved to the defensive position at the far end of the island. It was not far away, and their own guards were there.

2 As soon as they gave way, the light troops pressed after them with even louder shouts, full of confidence. Any Lacedaemonians caught during the retreat were killed. But most escaped to the defensive position. With the guards already there, they formed a line along every part where an attack was possible, ready to defend it.

3 The Athenians followed. The strength of the position prevented them from going around and surrounding the enemy, so they advanced from the front and tried to drive them back.

4 For a long time, through most of the day, both sides held on, worn out by the fighting, thirst, and sun. The Athenians tried to drive the enemy from the high ground; the Lacedaemonians tried not to give way. The Lacedaemonians found it easier to defend themselves than before, since they were not being surrounded on their flanks.

Chapter 36

1 When the fighting seemed to have no end, the Messenian general came to Cleon and Demosthenes and said they were struggling for nothing. If they would give him some of the archers and light troops, he would take them around behind the enemy by whatever route he could find. He thought he could force a way in.

2 He was given the men he had asked for and started from a concealed position so that the enemy would not see him. He climbed along the cliffs of the island wherever he could find a way through. The Lacedaemonians had trusted the strength of the ground here and left it unguarded. With great difficulty he worked his way around unnoticed, then suddenly appeared on the heights behind them. The surprise stunned the Lacedaemonians, while the Athenians were greatly encouraged at seeing what they had hoped for.

3 The Lacedaemonians were now being attacked from both sides. To compare a small event with a great one, they were in the same situation as the men at Thermopylae. Those men had been destroyed when the Persians went around them by the path. Here too, caught between two attacks, the Lacedaemonians could hold out no longer. They were few fighting many, and their bodies were weak from lack of food. They began falling back, and the Athenians now controlled the approaches.

Chapter 37

1 Cleon and Demosthenes realized [that] if the Lacedaemonians gave way even a little further, their own army would kill them. They stopped the battle and held their men back. They wanted to bring the Lacedaemonians to Athens alive, if hearing an offer might soften their resolve and persuade them to surrender their weapons, giving in to the terror of their present position.

2 They had a herald announce that, if they wished, they could surrender themselves and their weapons to the Athenians, who would decide what to do with them.

Chapter 38

1 When they heard this, most lowered their shields and waved their hands to show that they accepted the offer. The fighting stopped. Cleon and Demosthenes then met for talks with Styphon son of Pharax, who represented the enemy. Of their previous commanders, Epitadas, the first in command, was dead. Hippagretes, appointed next after him, was lying among the dead, still alive but taken for dead. Styphon himself had been appointed third in command under the law, to take over if anything happened to the other two.

2 Styphon and the men with him said they wanted to send a herald to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to ask what they should do.

3 The Athenians would not let any of them go. Instead, they themselves called for heralds from the mainland. After questions had passed back and forth two or three times, the last man to cross from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland gave this message: “The Lacedaemonians tell you to decide for yourselves about your own situation, without doing anything dishonorable.” After discussing it among themselves, the men surrendered their weapons and themselves.

4 The Athenians kept them under guard that day and the following night. The next day the Athenians set up a victory marker on the island and made their other preparations to sail. They divided the prisoners among the trireme captains to guard. The Lacedaemonians sent a herald and brought their dead back across.

5 These were the numbers killed and taken alive on the island. In all, four hundred and twenty hoplites had crossed over. Of these, two hundred and ninety-two were brought back alive; the rest were killed. About one hundred and twenty of the survivors were Spartans. Not many Athenians were killed, since the battle was not fought at close quarters.

Chapter 39

1 The men on the island were under siege for seventy-two days in all, from the sea battle to the battle on the island.

2 For about twenty of those days, while the envoys were away negotiating the truce, they received regular supplies of food. For the rest of the time they lived on what people secretly brought in by sea. Some grain and other food were still found on the island when it was taken. Their commander Epitadas had given each man less than the available supplies allowed.

3 The Athenians and Peloponnesians then withdrew their armies from Pylos and returned home. Cleon's promise, crazy as it had seemed, came true. He brought the men back within twenty days, just as he had undertaken to do.

Chapter 40

1 Of all the events of the war, this was the one that most surprised the Greeks. They had thought that neither hunger nor any other pressure would make the Lacedaemonians surrender their weapons. Instead, they expected them to keep their weapons and die fighting as best they could.

2 They could hardly believe that the men who surrendered were of the same quality as those who died. Later, one of the Athenian allies spitefully asked a prisoner from the island whether the men on their side who had died were the brave ones. He answered that a spindle—meaning an arrow—would be worth a great deal if it could tell brave men from the rest. He meant that stones and arrows killed whoever happened to be hit.

Chapter 41

1 When the men had been brought to Athens, the Athenians decided to keep them in chains until an agreement was reached. If the Peloponnesians invaded their territory before then, they would bring the prisoners out and kill them.

2 They stationed a garrison at Pylos. The Messenians from Naupactus sent the most suitable of their own men there, treating it as their homeland, since Pylos is in what was once Messenian territory. These men raided Laconia and did very great damage, helped by speaking the same language as the inhabitants.

3 The Lacedaemonians had no previous experience of raids and this kind of warfare. Helots were deserting, and they feared that unrest in their territory might spread further. They found the situation hard to bear. Although they did not want the Athenians to see this, they sent envoys to them and tried to recover Pylos and the prisoners.

4 But the Athenians wanted greater gains. The envoys came repeatedly, and the Athenians sent them away without achieving anything. These were the events at Pylos.

Chapter 42

1 Immediately afterward, in the same summer, the Athenians attacked Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand of their own hoplites, and two hundred cavalry carried in horse transports. Their allies from Miletus, Andros, and Carystus went with them. Nicias son of Niceratus commanded, with two other generals.

2 They sailed in and reached the beach between Chersonesus and Rheitus at dawn. Above this spot stands the Solygean hill. Long ago the Dorians established themselves on it and fought the Corinthians in the city, who were Aeolians. A village called Solygea now stands on the hill. From the beach where the ships landed, this village is twelve stades away, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty.

3 The Corinthians had received advance information from Argos that the Athenian force was coming. They had gone to the Isthmus well beforehand, all except those who lived outside the Isthmus. Five hundred of their men were also away on garrison duty in Ambracia and Leucas. All the others kept watch to see where the Athenians would land.

4 The Athenians sailed in during the night without being noticed. When signals were raised to inform the Corinthians, they left half their men at Cenchreae in case the Athenians went toward Crommyon. The others hurried to meet the attack.

Chapter 43

1 Battus, one of their generals—two were present at the battle—took a company to guard the village of Solygea, which had no walls. Lycophron engaged the enemy with the remaining troops.

2 The Corinthians first attacked the Athenian right wing, which had just landed in front of Chersonesus, and then the rest of the army as well. The fighting was fierce and entirely hand to hand.

3 The Athenian right wing, including the Carystians, who were stationed at the outer end of the line, met the Corinthians and drove them back with difficulty. The Corinthians retreated to a dry-stone wall, since the whole area sloped upward. From their higher position they threw stones, then sang the battle song and advanced again. The Athenians met them, and the fighting was again hand to hand.

4 A Corinthian company came to help its own left wing. It routed the Athenian right and chased it down to the sea. But the Athenians and Carystians turned back from the ships and advanced again.

5 The rest of both armies kept fighting without a break. The fighting was especially fierce on the Corinthian right, where Lycophron faced the Athenian left and held it off. They expected the Athenians to try to reach the village of Solygea.

Chapter 44

1 For a long time they held their ground, neither side giving way. But the Athenians received valuable help from their cavalry, while the other side had no cavalry. Eventually the Corinthians were routed. They withdrew to the hill, grounded their weapons, and stayed there without coming down again.

2 Most of the Corinthian losses in this retreat were on the right wing, where their general Lycophron also died. The rest of the army was not pursued far and did not flee in haste. Once forced back, it withdrew to the higher ground and took up a position there.

3 When the Corinthians no longer came forward to fight, the Athenians stripped the enemy dead and collected their own. They immediately set up a victory monument.

4 The half of the Corinthian force stationed at Cenchreae, guarding against an Athenian voyage to Crommyon, could not see the battle because Mount Oneum blocked their view. But when they saw the dust and [when] they realized what was happening, they immediately came to help. The older Corinthians in the city also came to help when they learned what had happened.

5 The Athenians saw all these men approaching and thought they were reinforcements coming from the neighboring Peloponnesian communities. They hurried back to their ships with the captured equipment and their own dead, except for two whom they could not find and left behind.

6 They boarded their ships and crossed to the nearby islands. From there they sent a herald and recovered the bodies they had left behind under a truce. Two hundred and twelve Corinthians died in the battle, and a little fewer than fifty Athenians.

Chapter 45

1 The Athenians left the islands and sailed that same day to Crommyon in Corinthian territory. It is a hundred and twenty stades from the city. They anchored, destroyed the crops and property in the area, and camped for the night.

2 The next day they first sailed along the coast to Epidaurian territory and made a landing there. Then they reached Methana, between Epidaurus and Troezen. They cut off the peninsula by building a wall across its isthmus, [where Methone stands,] and established a fort. From then on they used it to raid the territories of Troezen, Halieis, and Epidaurus. Once they had finished fortifying the place, they sailed home with their fleet.

Chapter 46

1 At about the same time, while these events were taking place, Eurymedon and Sophocles left Pylos with the Athenian fleet bound for Sicily. They reached Corcyra and joined the people in the city in an attack on the Corcyraeans established on Mount Istone. These were the men who had crossed over after the earlier civil strife, taken control of the countryside, and done great damage.

2 The attackers stormed and captured their fort. The defenders fled together to some higher ground and agreed to surrender their mercenaries. They themselves would hand over their weapons and leave the Athenian people to decide their fate.

3 The generals took them across to the island of Ptychia to be kept under guard until they could be sent to Athens. The agreement protected them, but stipulated that if anyone was caught trying to escape, the agreement would be canceled for all of them.

4 The leaders of the Corcyraean people feared that the Athenians might not put the men to death when they arrived. So they devised the following plan.

5 They secretly sent friends to persuade a few of the men on the island to escape. These friends had been instructed to speak as though they meant well. They were to say that the prisoners' best course was to escape as quickly as possible, and that they would prepare a boat for them. For, they claimed, the Athenian generals were about to hand the prisoners over to the Corcyraean people.

Chapter 47

1 The men were persuaded. A boat was arranged, and they were caught sailing away. The agreement was canceled, and all the prisoners were handed over to the Corcyraeans.

2 The Athenian generals did a great deal to help bring this about. They made it clear that, since they themselves were sailing to Sicily, they did not want other men to take the prisoners to Athens and win the credit for bringing them. This made the excuse for canceling the agreement secure and gave those who had planned the scheme greater confidence to carry it out.

3 The Corcyraeans took charge of the prisoners and shut them in a large building. Later they brought them out twenty at a time, tied to one another, and led them between two lines of hoplites drawn up on either side. Whenever one of these men recognized a personal enemy, he struck and stabbed him. Men carrying whips walked alongside and made those moving too slowly quicken their pace.

Chapter 48

1 They brought out and killed about sixty men in this way without those inside the building realizing it. The prisoners thought the men were being taken away to be moved somewhere else. But when they understood and someone told them what was happening, they called on the Athenians and asked them to kill them themselves, if that was what they wanted. They refused to leave the building any longer and said they would do all they could to stop anyone from entering.

2 The Corcyraeans had no intention of forcing their way through the doors either. They climbed onto the building's roof, broke it open, and threw down tiles and shot arrows at the men below.

3 The prisoners defended themselves as best they could, while most also began killing themselves. They pushed the arrows shot at them into their throats. They hanged themselves with cords from some beds that happened to be in the building, or with strips torn from their clothes. Night fell during the ordeal. Through most of it, they died in every possible way, killing themselves or being hit by the men above.

4 When day came, the Corcyraeans piled the bodies in layers on wagons and took them outside the city. They sold into slavery all the women who had been captured in the fort.

5 This was how the Corcyraeans from the mountain were killed by the people. The civil strife had been widespread, and this brought it to an end, at least for the duration of this war. No significant part of the other side was left.

6 The Athenians sailed on to Sicily, their original destination, and fought alongside their allies there.

Chapter 49

1 At the end of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made a joint expedition against Anactorium, a Corinthian city at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf. They captured it through betrayal. After expelling [the Corinthians], the Acarnanians themselves occupied the place, bringing settlers from all their communities. The summer ended.

Chapter 50

1 In the following winter, Aristides son of Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian ships sent to collect money from the allies, arrested a Persian named Artaphernes at Eion on the Strymon. He was traveling from the king to Lacedaemon.

2 When he was brought to Athens, the Athenians translated his letters from the Assyrian script and read them. Among many other things, their main message to the Lacedaemonians was that the king did not understand what they wanted. Many envoys had come, but none said the same thing. If they wanted to make a clear proposal, they should send men to him with the Persian.

3 Later the Athenians sent Artaphernes to Ephesus in a trireme, along with envoys of their own. There the envoys learned that King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes had recently died—his death occurred about this time—and returned home.

Chapter 51

1 In the same winter, the Chians tore down their new wall at the Athenians' orders. The Athenians suspected that they were planning a revolt. The Chians did, however, obtain pledges from the Athenians and the strongest assurance they could that no change in their status would be planned. The winter ended, and the seventh year of this war, which Thucydides wrote about, came to an end.

Chapter 52

1 At the very beginning of the following summer there was a partial eclipse of the sun around the new moon. There was also an earthquake early in the same month.

2 The exiles from Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, most of them operating from the mainland, hired mercenaries from the Peloponnese and gathered others locally. They captured Rhoeteum, but gave it back unharmed after receiving two thousand Phocaean staters.

3 After this they attacked Antandrus and captured the city through betrayal. Their plan was to free the other cities known as the Actaean cities, which the Mytilenaeans had formerly controlled but the Athenians now held, and above all Antandrus. They would strengthen Antandrus and use it as a base. Ships could easily be built there, since timber was available locally and Mount Ida stood close by; other equipment was also readily available. From there they could easily attack nearby Lesbos and take control of the Aeolian towns on the mainland. They were preparing to carry out these plans.

Chapter 53

1 In the same summer the Athenians attacked Cythera with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, a few cavalry, and allied troops from Miletus and some other places. Their generals were Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus.

2 Cythera is an island off Laconia, opposite Malea. Its people are Lacedaemonians of the perioeci class. Every year an official called the Cytherodices went over from Sparta. The Lacedaemonians also regularly sent a garrison of hoplites and took great care of the island.

3 It was a stopping place for their merchant ships coming from Egypt and Libya. It also reduced the damage pirates could do to Laconia from the sea, the only direction from which the country was open to their attacks. The whole of it faces the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

Chapter 54

1 When the Athenian force arrived, ten ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites captured the coastal town called Scandea. The rest of the army landed on the side of the island facing Malea and advanced toward the Cytherians' city [on the coast]. They immediately found the whole Cytherian force drawn up there.

2 In the battle that followed, the Cytherians stood their ground for a short time. Then they were routed and fled to the upper city. Later they agreed with Nicias and his fellow commanders to let the Athenians decide their fate, provided they were not put to death.

3 Nicias had already held discussions with some of the Cytherians. Because of this, the terms of the agreement were settled more quickly and more favorably for them, both for the moment and for the future. Otherwise the Athenians would have removed the Cytherians from their homes, since they were Lacedaemonians and their island lay so close to Laconia.

4 After the agreement, the Athenians took over Scandea, the town by the harbor, and established a garrison on Cythera. Then they sailed to Asine, Helos, and most of the places along the coast. For about seven days they made landings, camped wherever the opportunity arose, and destroyed crops and property in the countryside.

Chapter 55

1 The Lacedaemonians saw that the Athenians held Cythera and expected them to make similar landings in their territory. They nowhere opposed them with their whole force. Instead they sent garrisons around the country, assigning as many hoplites as each place needed. In other respects, too, they were very much on their guard. They feared that there might be some disturbance of their political order. The disaster on the island had been unexpected and severe. Pylos and Cythera were occupied, and on every side they faced warfare that moved quickly and gave no warning.

2 As a result, they departed from their usual practice and raised a force of four hundred cavalry, as well as archers. They became more reluctant than ever to take military action. Their existing way of preparing for war did not fit the naval struggle they now faced, especially against the Athenians. To the Athenians, not attempting something always meant falling short of what they thought they could achieve.

3 At the same time, so many unexpected blows of fortune had fallen on them so quickly that they were deeply shaken. They feared that they might suffer another disaster like the one on the island.

4 This made them less willing to risk battle. They thought that any move they made would go wrong. They had not been used to failure before, and this had now made them lose confidence in their own judgment.

Chapter 56

1 So, when the Athenians were destroying property along their coast, the Lacedaemonians mostly stayed still. Whenever a landing took place near a garrison, its men thought they were outnumbered and were in this state of mind. Only one garrison, near Cotyrta and Aphroditia, offered resistance. It rushed at the scattered mass of lightly armed troops and put them to flight. But when the hoplites stood against it, it withdrew again. A few of its men were killed and some weapons captured. The Athenians set up a victory monument and sailed back to Cythera.

2 From there they sailed around to Epidaurus Limera. After destroying property in part of its territory, they reached Thyrea. This lies in the region called Cynuria, on the border between Argive and Laconian territory. The Lacedaemonians controlled it and had given it to the Aeginetans to live in after their expulsion. This was partly in return for the help the Aeginetans had given them at the time of the earthquake and the Helot revolt. It was also because, even while subject to Athens, the Aeginetans had always supported the Lacedaemonian point of view.

Chapter 57

1 While the Athenians were still approaching by sea, the Aeginetans abandoned the wall they were building on the coast. They withdrew to the upper city where they lived, about ten stades from the sea.

2 One of the Lacedaemonian garrisons stationed around the country had been helping them build the wall. Despite the Aeginetans' pleas, these men refused to go inside the city walls with them. They thought it dangerous to shut themselves in. Instead they withdrew to the higher ground and stayed still, thinking they were not strong enough to fight.

3 Meanwhile the Athenians landed, immediately advanced with their whole army, and captured Thyrea. They burned the city and looted everything in it. They returned to Athens with all the Aeginetans who had not been killed in the fighting and with Tantalus son of Patrocles, the Lacedaemonian commander stationed among them. He had been wounded and captured alive.

4 They also brought a few men from Cythera whom they thought it safer to remove. The Athenians decided to place these men on the islands. The other Cytherians were to stay in their own country and pay four talents in tribute. They decided to kill all the captured Aeginetans because of their long-standing hostility, and to put Tantalus in chains with the other Lacedaemonians captured on the island.

Chapter 58

1 In the same summer in Sicily, the people of Camarina and Gela first made a truce with one another. Then the other Sicilian Greeks also met at Gela, with envoys from every city, and began talks to see whether they could reach a settlement. Many views were expressed on both sides. Each side argued and pressed its claims wherever it thought it was being treated unfairly. Hermocrates son of Hermon, a Syracusan, spoke to the gathering as follows. He did more than anyone else to persuade them.

Chapter 59

1 “Fellow Sicilian Greeks, I do not speak as a citizen of one of the smallest cities, or of one suffering the most from the war. I want to set out publicly what I believe is the best policy for Sicily as a whole.

2 “Why should anyone give a long speech listing all the hardships of war to people who already know them? It is not ignorance of these hardships that drives anyone to war. Nor does fear stop anyone who thinks he will gain something. Some people think the gains will outweigh the dangers. Others are willing to face those dangers rather than accept an immediate loss.

3 “But if either side chooses the wrong moment to act in this way, advice to make peace can be useful.

4 “It could be extremely valuable to us too, if we listened to it now. Each of us began the war thinking we would improve our own position. Now we are trying to settle our differences through argument. And if we cannot manage to go home on equal terms, we will go to war again.

Chapter 60

1 “But we must understand that, if we are sensible, this meeting will not just deal with our separate interests. It will decide whether we can still save the whole of Sicily from what I judge to be an Athenian plot against it. We should regard the Athenians as a much stronger reason to settle these disputes than anything I can say. They have the greatest power among the Greeks and are here with a few ships, watching for our mistakes. Under the legitimate name of an alliance, they make their natural hostility look respectable and turn it to their own advantage.

2 “We choose war and call them in, although they are men who attack even those who do not call them. We harm ourselves at our own expense and at the same time help extend their empire. Once they see us worn out, they will naturally come here with a larger fleet and try to bring this whole country under their rule.

Chapter 61

1 “If we are sensible, each of us should bring allies into our own country and take on risks to gain what we do not have, rather than to damage what we already possess. We should recognize that civil strife does more than anything else to destroy our cities and Sicily. All of us who live here are under threat together, yet we are divided city by city.

2 “Once we recognize this, individuals must settle their differences with individuals, and cities with cities. We must try to save the whole of Sicily together. No one should imagine that only the Dorians among us are enemies of the Athenians, while the Chalcidian population is safe because of its Ionian kinship with them.

3 “They are not attacking us out of hostility to one of the two ethnic groups into which we are divided. They want the good things in Sicily that we all possess together.

4 “They have shown this now in responding to the appeal of the Chalcidian people. Those people had never helped them as allies. Yet the Athenians eagerly offered them more support than their obligations under the treaty required.

5 “It is quite understandable that the Athenians should pursue these gains and plan ahead. I do not blame those who want to rule, but those who are too ready to submit. Human nature has always been to rule those who give way and to defend against those who attack.

6 “But we are at fault if we know this and still fail to take the right precautions. Each of us should have come here having decided that our first priority is to deal properly, all together, with our common danger.

7 “The quickest way to get rid of it would be to reach an agreement with one another. The Athenians are not operating from their own country, but from the country of those who invited them. In this way we end our differences without trouble, through peace rather than by meeting war with war. Those who were invited here came under a respectable pretext to do wrong. They can leave without achieving anything, with a sound reason for going.

Chapter 62

1 “If we make the right decision, then, this is the great advantage we gain in dealing with the Athenians.

2 “But everyone agrees that peace is best. Why shouldn't we make peace among ourselves too? Suppose one of us is doing well and another badly. Don't you think peace, rather than war, would end the trouble for the one and help preserve the good fortune of the other? Peace also makes honors and public distinction less risky. It has many other benefits that someone could discuss at length, just as people discuss warfare. Think about these things. Don't dismiss what I say. Instead, each of you should use it to look ahead to your own safety.

3 “And if anyone feels sure he will achieve something through justice or force, he should not be bitterly disappointed if things turn out otherwise. He should remember how many people before him have sought to punish those who wronged them, while others hoped to use their power to gain more. The first group not only failed to get revenge but did not even survive. The second, instead of gaining more, ended up losing what they already had.

4 “Revenge does not succeed just because the person seeking it has been wronged. Nor is strength reliable just because it gives someone confidence. The uncertainty of the future has the greatest influence on events. Nothing is more likely to upset our plans, yet it also proves very useful. When both sides are equally afraid, we act more carefully toward one another.

Chapter 63

1 “So let us now take both dangers seriously: our fear of an unknown future that cannot be predicted, and the Athenians, whose presence already threatens us. Let us accept that these obstacles are reason enough for our plans to fall short of what each of us thought he would achieve. Let us send the enemy now facing us out of our country. Above all, let us make a lasting settlement among ourselves. If we cannot do that, let us make a truce for as long as possible and put off our private disputes until later.

2 “In short, we must realize this. If you listen to me, each of us will have a free city. We will control our own affairs and repay those who help or harm us on equal terms, according to our ability. If you reject my advice and submit to others, there will be no question of getting revenge on anyone. Even if we are very lucky, we will be forced to become friends with our worst enemies and fall out with people we should not oppose.

Chapter 64

1 “As I said at the start, I represent the greatest city here, and I am more likely to attack someone else than to have to defend myself. Even so, I think I should look ahead and make concessions. I should not hurt my opponents so much that I suffer even greater harm myself. Nor should I be so foolishly set on winning that I think I control fortune, which I do not rule, as fully as I control my own judgment. Instead, I should give way as far as is reasonable.

2 “I ask the rest of you to do the same as I do. Make these concessions to one another, rather than have your enemies force them on you.

3 “There is nothing shameful in relatives giving way to relatives, whether a Dorian gives way to Dorians or a Chalcidian to his own people. In any case, we are neighbors who share a single country surrounded by the sea, and we all have the same name: Sicilians. We will fight, I suppose, when circumstances lead us to. But we will also settle our differences again on our own, by discussing them together.

4 “If we are sensible, we will always unite to fight off invaders from outside our people. When any one of us is harmed, we are all in danger. In the future we will never bring in outsiders as allies or as mediators.

5 “By doing this, we will not deny Sicily either of two benefits now: freedom from the Athenians and freedom from war among ourselves. In the future we will live in it on our own as a free country, less exposed to plots by others.”

Chapter 65

1 The Sicilians accepted what Hermocrates had said. They agreed among themselves to end the war, with each side keeping what it held. Camarina was to have Morgantina in return for paying Syracuse a fixed sum of money.

2 The allies of the Athenians called in the Athenian officials and told them they would make a settlement, and that the truce would include them too. The officials approved. The agreement was made, and afterward the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily.

3 When the generals returned, the Athenians at home sentenced two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, to exile. They fined the third, Eurymedon. The charge was that they could have conquered Sicily but had taken bribes to withdraw.

4 Their success at the time made the Athenians think nothing should stand in their way. They thought they could achieve both easy and more difficult goals equally well, whether their preparations were extensive or inadequate. The reason was that most of their successes had exceeded reasonable expectations, making their hopes grow stronger.

Chapter 66

1 During the same summer, the Megarians in the city were under pressure from two sides. The Athenians were waging war against them and regularly invaded their land twice a year with their whole army. Their own exiles at Pegae were also causing serious trouble through raids. These men had been driven out by the people during civil strife. The Megarians began discussing among themselves whether they should take the exiles back, rather than let the city be ruined from both sides.

2 The friends of the exiles heard about this talk. They too began arguing, more openly than before, that this proposal should be followed.

3 The leaders of the people realized that these hardships would make it impossible for the people to keep supporting them. In fear, they began talks with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes. They wanted to hand over the city. They thought this would be less dangerous for them than the return of the men they had expelled. First they agreed that the Athenians should capture the Long Walls. These ran for about eight stades from the city to Nisaea, its harbor. This would stop the Peloponnesians from coming to help from Nisaea, where they alone provided the garrison to keep Megara securely under their control. Then the leaders would try to hand over the upper city as well. Once the walls were taken, the city would be more likely to come over.

Chapter 67

1 Once both sides had settled the arrangements and made their practical preparations, the Athenians sailed after dark to Minoa, the Megarians' island. They had six hundred hoplites commanded by Hippocrates. These men took up a position in a pit from which clay had been dug to make bricks for the walls. It was not far from the walls.

2 The lightly armed Plataeans and other patrol troops with Demosthenes, the other general, hid in ambush at the sanctuary of Enyalius, which was even closer. No one knew about their presence that night except the men who needed to know.

3 Just before dawn, the Megarians who were betraying the city put the following plan into action. For a long time they had arranged for the gates to be opened as part of this routine. With the commander's permission, they would take a small boat with oars on both sides down through the ditch on a cart at night, launch it, and sail out as raiders. Before daylight they would bring it back on the cart and take it through the gates into the walls. Their purpose was to keep their patrols hidden from the Athenians on Minoa, since no boat would be visible in the harbor.

4 Now the cart was already at the gates. When these were opened as usual for the boat, the Athenians saw it and ran from their hiding places. This was the agreed signal. They wanted to get there before the gates were closed again, while the cart was still in the gateway and prevented them from being shut. At the same time, the Megarians working with them killed the guards at the gates.

5 The Plataeans and patrol troops with Demosthenes were the first to run in, at the spot where the victory monument now stands. The Peloponnesians nearest to them had noticed what was happening. Fighting just inside the gates, the Plataeans defeated those who came to help and secured the gates for the Athenian hoplites advancing behind them.

Chapter 68

1 After this, each group of Athenians that came inside moved onto the wall.

2 At first a few of the Peloponnesian guards stood their ground and fought back. Some were killed. Most of them, however, fled. They were frightened by the enemy's sudden night attack and by the Megarian traitors fighting against them. They thought all the Megarians had betrayed them.

3 As it happened, the Athenian herald had also announced, on his own initiative, that any Megarian who wanted to could come and take his place under arms with the Athenians. When the guards heard this, they did not wait any longer. Convinced that the whole population was attacking them, they took refuge in Nisaea.

4 At dawn the walls had already been captured, and the Megarians inside the city were in confusion. The men who had negotiated with the Athenians, together with a large number of others who knew about the plan, said they should open the gates and go out to fight.

5 They had agreed that the Athenians would rush in as soon as the gates were opened. They themselves would be easy to recognize, because they would cover themselves with oil, so that they would not be harmed. Opening the gates was now safer for them. The four thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred cavalry from Eleusis had also arrived as agreed, after marching through the night.

6 They had already oiled themselves and were near the gates when someone who knew about the plot revealed it to the other side. These men gathered in a body and came up. They said there must be no attack outside the walls. They had never dared to do that before, even when they were stronger. Nor should they put the city in obvious danger. If anyone refused to listen, the fighting would take place right there. They gave no sign that they knew about the plot. They simply insisted that their advice was best, and stayed on guard at the gates. As a result, the plotters could not carry out their plan.

Chapter 69

1 The Athenian generals realized that something had gone wrong and that they could not take the city by force. They immediately began building a wall around Nisaea. They thought that, if they captured it before any reinforcements arrived,

2 Megara too would surrender sooner. Iron tools, stonemasons, and the other things they needed arrived quickly from Athens. They started from the wall they held and built a cross-wall on the side facing Megara. From there the army divided up the work of digging a ditch and building walls down to the sea on either side of Nisaea. They used stones and bricks from the suburb. They cut down trees and brushwood to make palisades wherever these were needed. The houses in the suburb themselves served as defenses once battlements had been added.

3 They worked for the whole of that day. By late afternoon the next day the wall was almost complete. Those inside Nisaea were frightened. They had no supply of food, since they had been getting it each day from the upper city. They did not think the Peloponnesians would come to help quickly, and they regarded the Megarians as enemies. So they agreed with the Athenians to hand over their weapons and be released, each man paying a fixed sum. The Athenians could do whatever they wanted with the Lacedaemonians—the commander and any others who were there.

4 They accepted these terms and came out. The Athenians broke the connection between the Long Walls and the city of Megara, took possession of Nisaea, and made their other preparations.

Chapter 70

1 At this time Brasidas son of Tellis, a Lacedaemonian, happened to be near Sicyon and Corinth preparing an expedition to the Thracian coast. When he learned that the walls had been taken, he feared for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and worried that Megara might be captured. He sent word to the Boeotians, telling them to meet him quickly with an army at Tripodiscus. This was a village in Megarian territory below Mount Geraneia. He himself went there with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian hoplites, four hundred from Phlius, six hundred from Sicyon, and as many of his own troops as had already assembled. He thought he would reach Nisaea before it was taken.

2 He arrived at Tripodiscus at night and learned that Nisaea had fallen. Before his presence became known, he chose three hundred men from the army and approached the city of Megara. The Athenians, who were near the sea, did not notice him. His stated purpose was to make an attempt on Nisaea, and he meant to do so in practice as well if he could. But his main aim was to enter Megara and secure it. He asked the Megarians to let his men in, saying he hoped to recover Nisaea.

Chapter 71

1 The two factions at Megara were afraid. One feared that Brasidas would bring back the exiles and expel them. The other feared that the people, alarmed at that very prospect, would attack them. The city might then be destroyed by fighting within it, with the Athenians waiting close by. So they did not admit him. Both sides thought they should stay quiet and wait to see what happened.

2 Both expected a battle between the Athenians and the army that had come to help. They thought it would be safer to join the side they favored once it had won. When Brasidas failed to persuade them, he returned to the rest of his army.

Chapter 72

1 The Boeotians arrived at dawn. Even before Brasidas sent his message, they had decided to help Megara, since the danger concerned them too. Their whole army was already at Plataea. When the messenger arrived, they were all the more determined. They sent two thousand two hundred hoplites and six hundred cavalry, and went home with the rest.

2 The whole force had now assembled, with no fewer than six thousand hoplites. The Athenian hoplites were drawn up near Nisaea and the sea, but their lightly armed troops were scattered across the plain. The Boeotian cavalry fell on these troops unexpectedly and drove them toward the sea. Until then, no reinforcements had come to the Megarians from anywhere.

3 The Athenian cavalry rode out to meet them and joined the fight. A long cavalry battle followed, in which each side claims it did no worse than the other.

4 The Athenians killed the Boeotian cavalry commander and a few others who rode right up to Nisaea, and stripped their bodies. They kept control of these bodies, returned them under a truce, and set up a victory monument. But neither side had gained a clear advantage in the battle as a whole when they separated. The Boeotians went back to their own army and the Athenians to Nisaea.

Chapter 73

1 After this, Brasidas and his army moved closer to the sea and the city of Megara. They took up a suitable position, formed their battle line, and waited. They expected the Athenians to attack them and knew that the Megarians were waiting to see which side won.

2 They thought this served them well in both respects. They would not attack first or willingly start a dangerous battle. But since they had openly shown their readiness to defend themselves, they could fairly count the result as a victory without a fight. At the same time, this would work in their favor with the Megarians too.

3 If they had not been seen coming to help, the outcome would not even have been uncertain. They would clearly have lost the city at once, just as if they had been defeated. As things stood, the Athenians might choose not to fight, and they would then achieve what they had come for without a battle. This was what happened.

4 The Athenians came out and formed their line beside the Long Walls. They too waited, since the other side was not attacking. Their generals calculated that the risks were not equal. They had already achieved most of their aims. If they started a battle against a larger army, victory would give them Megara, but defeat would mean losses among the best of their hoplite force. For their opponents, by contrast, each contingent represented only part of their total forces and even of the army present. It was reasonable for them to be willing to take the risk. Both sides waited for a time, and neither made a move. Then the Athenians withdrew first to Nisaea, and afterward the Peloponnesians went back to where they had started. The Megarian friends of the exiles now felt more confident, treating Brasidas as the winner since the Athenians were no longer willing to fight. They opened the gates to Brasidas himself and the commanders from the various cities. After admitting them, they began discussions. By now the men who had negotiated with the Athenians were terrified.

Chapter 74

1 Later, after the allies had dispersed to their own cities, Brasidas himself returned to Corinth. He continued preparing the expedition to the Thracian coast that he had originally set out to make.

2 The Athenians also went home. Of the Megarians inside the city, those who had been most involved in the dealings with Athens knew they had been discovered and immediately slipped away. The others discussed matters with the friends of the exiles and brought back the men from Pegae. They required them to swear binding oaths that they would not take revenge for the past, but would make the best decisions for the city.

3 But once the returning exiles held office, they held a review of the men under arms. They separated the companies and picked out about a hundred men from among their enemies and those thought to have been most involved in the dealings with Athens. They forced the people to vote openly on these men. Once they had been condemned, they killed them and made the city's government a very narrow oligarchy.

4 This change of government, brought about through civil strife by a very small group, lasted an exceptionally long time.

Chapter 75

1 During the same summer the Mytilenaeans were about to fortify Antandrus, as they had planned. The Athenian generals commanding the ships that collected money, Demodocus and Aristides, were near the Hellespont. Their third colleague, Lamachus, had sailed into the Black Sea with ten ships. When the first two learned about the preparations at Antandrus, they were alarmed. They feared it might become another Anaea, the base opposite Samos. Samian exiles had settled there and helped the Peloponnesians with their navy by sending them helmsmen. They also caused trouble among the Samians in the city and took in those who left it. So the generals gathered an army from the allies and sailed to Antandrus. They defeated the troops who came out to fight them and recaptured the place.

2 Not long afterward Lamachus, who had sailed into the Black Sea, lost his ships after anchoring in the river Cales in the territory of Heraclea. Rain fell upstream, and the resulting flood swept down without warning. He and his army traveled on foot through the territory of the Bithynian Thracians, who live on the Asian side of the sea. They reached Chalcedon, a Megarian colony at the entrance to the Black Sea.

Chapter 76

1 During the same summer, immediately after withdrawing from Megarian territory, the Athenian general Demosthenes arrived at Naupactus with forty ships.

2 Some men in the Boeotian cities were working with him and Hippocrates on a plan for Boeotia. They wanted to change the existing system and introduce democracy, as at Athens. Mainly at the suggestion of Ptoeodorus, an exile from Thebes, they made the following arrangements.

3 Some men were going to betray Siphae, a coastal town in the territory of Thespiae on the Crisaean Gulf. Others from Orchomenus were offering to hand over Chaeronea, which was under the authority of Orchomenus. Orchomenus had formerly been called Minyan and was now called Boeotian. The Orchomenian exiles were particularly active in the scheme and were hiring men from the Peloponnese. Chaeronea lies at the edge of Boeotia, next to the district of Phanotis in Phocis. Some Phocians were involved as well.

4 The Athenians were to seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo in the territory of Tanagra facing Euboea. All these actions were to take place at the same time on a fixed day. This would prevent the Boeotians from gathering their whole force to defend Delium. Instead, each would have to deal with unrest at home.

5 They hoped that if the attempt succeeded and Delium was fortified, it would be easy to bring affairs in Boeotia around to their advantage. Even if there was no immediate change in the Boeotian governments, things would not stay as they were. These places would be occupied, the land would be raided, and each group would have a refuge close by. In time, the Athenians would come to help the rebels, while their opponents would be unable to unite their forces.

Chapter 77

1 These were the preparations for the plot. Hippocrates intended to march into Boeotia with a force from Athens when the time came. He sent Demosthenes ahead with the forty ships to Naupactus. Demosthenes was to gather an army of Acarnanians and the other allies from that area and sail to Siphae, which was to be handed over. They had fixed a day on which these actions were to take place together.

2 When Demosthenes arrived, he found that all the other Acarnanians had forced Oeniadae to join the Athenian alliance. He himself called up the entire allied force in the area. First he campaigned against Salynthius and the Agraeans and won them over. Then he made the rest of his preparations, ready to reach Siphae when the time came.

Chapter 78

1 At about the same time that summer, Brasidas was marching toward the Thracian coast with seventeen hundred hoplites. He reached Heraclea in Trachis and sent a messenger ahead to his friends at Pharsalus, asking them to guide him and his army through. Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, who represented the interests of the Chalcidians, came to Melitaea in Achaea. Only then did he continue his march.

2 Other Thessalians also guided him, including Niconidas from Larisa, a friend of Perdiccas. It was not easy to pass through Thessaly without a guide in any circumstances, and certainly not with an armed force. Throughout Greece, passing through a neighbor's territory without permission was regarded with suspicion. Besides, the mass of the Thessalian people had always been friendly to the Athenians.

3 If Thessaly had been governed under equal laws rather than by powerful families, he would never have got through. Even as things were, some men who opposed his guides met him at the river Enipeus during his march and tried to stop him. They said he was acting wrongly by passing through without the consent of the whole community.

4 His guides said they would not take him through against the Thessalians' wishes. He had arrived unexpectedly, and they were escorting him as his friends. Brasidas himself also said that he was passing through as a friend of Thessaly and its people. He was taking his army against the Athenians, who were his enemies, not against the Thessalians. He knew of no hostility between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians that should prevent either from using the other's land. He would not go on now against their wishes—indeed, he could not—but he thought he should not be stopped.

5 After hearing this, the men went away. At his guides' urging, Brasidas pressed on at speed without delay, before a larger force could gather to stop him. On the very day he left Melitaea he reached Pharsalus and camped by the river Apidanus. From there he went to Phacium and then into Perrhaebia.

6 At this point his Thessalian guides went home. The Perrhaebians, who were subjects of the Thessalians, took him to Dium in Perdiccas' kingdom. This small Macedonian town lies below Olympus, on the side facing Thessaly.

Chapter 79

1 In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before anyone could prepare to stop him. He reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice.

2 Perdiccas and those in the Thracian region who had rebelled against Athens had brought the army out of the Peloponnese. They were alarmed by the Athenians' success. The Chalcidians thought the Athenians would attack them first. Their neighboring cities that had not rebelled also secretly helped bring the army there. Perdiccas was not openly at war with Athens. But he too was afraid because of his old disputes with the Athenians. Above all, he wanted to bring Arrhabaeus, king of the Lyncestians, under his control.

3 The Lacedaemonians' difficulties at the time made it easier for them to bring an army out of the Peloponnese.

Chapter 80

1 The Athenians were pressing hard on the Peloponnese, especially on Lacedaemonian territory. The Lacedaemonians thought their best hope of drawing them away was to send an army against their allies and cause trouble in return. This was especially promising because the allies were ready to support the army and were calling for their help in rebelling.

2 They also wanted an excuse to send some of the Helots away. They feared that, with Pylos occupied, the Helots might take advantage of the present situation to revolt.

3 Fear of the Helots' defiance and their numbers had also led them to do the following. Most Lacedaemonian policies had always been mainly concerned with guarding against the Helots. They announced that any Helots who thought they had served them best in the wars should present themselves for selection, with the promise of freedom. This was a test. They believed that those whose pride led them to claim that they deserved to be freed before anyone else would also be the most likely to attack them.

4 They selected about two thousand. These men put on wreaths and went around the sanctuaries as freed men. Not long afterward, the Lacedaemonians made them disappear. No one knew how each of them was killed.

5 So on this occasion they gladly sent seven hundred Helot hoplites with Brasidas. He recruited the rest of his men in the Peloponnese with an offer of pay and led them out.

Chapter 81

1 Brasidas himself was very eager to go, and the Lacedaemonians sent him. The Chalcidians were also keen to have him. In Sparta he was thought to be energetic in everything he did. Once he went abroad, he proved extremely valuable to the Lacedaemonians.

2 For the immediate future, his fair and reasonable treatment of the cities brought most of them over in revolt. He captured some places through betrayal. This gave the Lacedaemonians places to exchange for the recovery of their own when they wanted a settlement, as they later did. It also gave the Peloponnese relief from the war. Later, in the war that followed the events in Sicily, the courage and good judgment Brasidas showed at this time did more than anything else to make Athens' allies eager to turn to the Lacedaemonians. Some had experienced these qualities themselves; others believed what they had heard about them.

3 He was the first to go abroad, and he was thought to be a good man in every way. He left behind a firm expectation that the others were like him too.

Chapter 82

1 At this time, then, when the Athenians heard of his arrival in the Thracian region, they declared Perdiccas an enemy. They thought he was responsible for Brasidas' passage. They also increased their watch over their allies in that region.

Chapter 83

1 Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, on a campaign against his neighbor Arrhabaeus, son of Bromerus and king of the Lyncestian Macedonians. He had a dispute with him and wanted to conquer him.

2 But when Perdiccas and Brasidas reached the entrance to Lyncus with the army, Brasidas said he wanted to approach Arrhabaeus first and talk to him before going to war. He hoped to make him an ally of the Lacedaemonians if he could.

3 Arrhabaeus had also made some approaches through heralds. He was ready to submit the dispute to Brasidas as a neutral judge. The Chalcidian envoys who were there also urged Brasidas not to remove Perdiccas' troubles for him. They wanted Perdiccas to be more eager to help with their own affairs as well.

4 Besides, Perdiccas' representatives at Lacedaemon had said something to the effect that he would make many of the places around him their allies. For this reason, Brasidas thought it right to deal with Arrhabaeus in the common interest rather than in Perdiccas' alone.

5 Perdiccas said he had not brought Brasidas to judge his disputes, but to destroy whichever enemies he pointed out. Brasidas would be treating him unfairly if he met with Arrhabaeus while Perdiccas was supporting half the army.

6 Despite Perdiccas' opposition and the disagreement between them, Brasidas met Arrhabaeus. What Arrhabaeus said persuaded him, and he took the army away before it invaded the country. After this, Perdiccas paid for a third of the army's supplies instead of half, because he thought he had been treated unfairly.

Chapter 84

1 Still in the same summer, Brasidas immediately marched against Acanthus, a colony of Andros. He had Chalcidian troops with him. It was shortly before the grape harvest.

2 The people of Acanthus were divided over whether to admit him. Those working with the Chalcidians to bring him in were opposed by the people. But their crops were still outside the walls, and the majority feared for them. Brasidas persuaded them to let him in alone and hear him before deciding. They admitted him, and he addressed the people as follows. For a Lacedaemonian, he was not a bad speaker.

Chapter 85

1 “People of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me and this army to carry out the reason we gave at the start of the war. We said we would fight the Athenians to free Hellas.

2 “Do not blame us if we have been slow to arrive. We were mistaken about the war back home. We hoped to defeat the Athenians quickly on our own, without exposing you to danger. Now that we have had the chance, we have come here and will try to defeat them with your help too.

3 “But I am surprised that you have shut your gates against me, and that my arrival may not be welcome to you.

4 “We Lacedaemonians thought we were coming to people who were already our allies in spirit, even before we actually arrived, and who would welcome us. That is why we took this great risk, traveling for many days through foreign country and putting all our energy into it.

5 “It would be a terrible thing if you have something else in mind, or if you intend to oppose your own freedom and that of the other Greeks.

6 “It is not just that you yourselves are resisting. People in the other places I approach will be less likely to join me. They will be troubled that you, the first people I came to, did not accept me, although your city is important and you are thought to be sensible. I will have no convincing explanation to offer. People will think either that the freedom I offer is unjust, or that I have arrived too weak and powerless to protect you against the Athenians if they attack.

7 “Yet when [I] brought this army I now command to help Nisaea, the Athenians refused to fight us, although they had more men. So they are not likely to send an army by sea against you as large as the one they had at Nisaea.

Chapter 86

1 “I have come not to harm the Greeks but to free them. I have bound the Lacedaemonian authorities by the most solemn oaths that any allies I bring over will govern themselves. At the same time, we do not mean to force or trick you into becoming our allies. Just the opposite: we mean to be your allies against the Athenians who have enslaved you.

2 “So, since I give you the strongest assurances, I ask you not to suspect me or think me powerless to protect you. I ask you to join us with confidence.

3 “If anyone is holding back because of some private fear that I might hand the city over to a particular group, he should feel more confident than anyone.

4 “I have not come to take sides in civil strife. Nor would I think I was bringing genuine freedom if I set aside your traditional arrangements and enslaved the majority to the few, or the minority to the whole people.

5 “That would be harder to bear than foreign rule. We Lacedaemonians would receive no thanks for our efforts. Instead of honor and a good reputation, we would get blame. We would plainly be earning the very accusations on which we base our war against the Athenians. And we would be hated more for them than someone who had made no claim to good conduct.

6 “For people with a reputation to maintain, taking advantage through deception that looks respectable is more shameful than doing so by open force. The use of force rests on a claim to the strength that chance has given; deception rests on a deliberately dishonest scheme.

Chapter 87

1 “That is how carefully we look after our most important interests. Apart from the oaths, you could have no stronger assurance than this: compare our actions with our words, and you must conclude that it is also in our interest to act as I have said.

2 “But suppose that, despite these assurances, you say you cannot join us. Suppose you claim to be friendly and ask to be left alone without suffering harm. You may say that freedom seems dangerous to you, that it is right to offer it only to those who can accept it, and that no one should be forced to take it against their will. In that case, I will call the local gods and heroes to witness that I have come to help you but cannot persuade you. Then I will try to force you by laying waste your land.

3 “I will not think that I am then acting unjustly. I will think I also have reasonable grounds because of two needs. First, if you do not join us, the Lacedaemonians must not be harmed by the money you send the Athenians, despite your goodwill toward us. Second, you must not stop the Greeks from escaping slavery.

4 “Otherwise we would have no reasonable grounds for doing this. We Lacedaemonians have no right to free people against their will except for some common good.

5 “Nor are we seeking an empire. Instead, we are working to end the empire of others. We would wrong the greater number if, while offering everyone self-government, we let you stand in the way.

6 “Think carefully about this. Try to be the first to begin the Greeks' freedom and win a reputation that lasts forever. At the same time, keep your own property safe and give your whole city the finest possible name.”

Chapter 88

1 That was what Brasidas said. After much discussion on both sides, the Acanthians voted in secret. Brasidas' persuasive speech and fear for their crops led the majority to decide to rebel against the Athenians. They made him pledge himself to the oaths the Lacedaemonian authorities had sworn before sending him out: any allies he brought over would govern themselves. Only then did they admit the army.

2 Not long afterward, Stagirus, another colony of Andros, joined the revolt. These were the events of that summer.

Chapter 89

1 At the very beginning of the following winter, the plans to hand places in Boeotia over to the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes were going ahead. Demosthenes was to arrive at Siphae with the ships, and Hippocrates at Delium. But there was a mistake over the days on which the two were to campaign. Demosthenes sailed to Siphae too early, with Acarnanians and many of the allies from that region on board his ships. He achieved nothing because Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanoteus, had revealed the plot. He had told the Lacedaemonians, and they had told the Boeotians.

2 All the Boeotians came to help, since Hippocrates had not yet entered their country to cause trouble. They occupied Siphae and Chaeronea before the Athenians could reach them. When the conspirators realized the mistake, they made no move in the cities.

Chapter 90

1 Hippocrates called out the whole Athenian population: citizens, resident foreigners, and any other foreigners who were there. He reached Delium later, after the Boeotians had already withdrawn from Siphae. He encamped his army and fortified Delium [the sanctuary of Apollo] in the following way.

2 They dug a ditch in a circle around the sanctuary and the temple. They piled the excavated earth into a wall, driving stakes in alongside it. They cut down the vines around the sanctuary and threw them in, along with stones and bricks from nearby houses they pulled down. They used every possible means to raise the defenses. They also put up wooden towers wherever these were useful and there was no sanctuary building already standing. The colonnade that had once been there had fallen down.

3 Counting from their departure from home, they started work on the third day. They worked that day, the fourth day, and until lunchtime on the fifth.

4 Then, when most of the work was finished, the army moved ahead about ten stades from Delium on its way home. Most of the light troops went straight on, but the hoplites halted and rested with their weapons grounded. Hippocrates stayed behind to organize the guards and finish whatever work on the outer defenses still needed doing.

Chapter 91

1 During these days the Boeotians were gathering at Tanagra. Once the troops from all the cities were there, they learned that the Athenians were moving homeward. The other Boeotarchs did not agree to fight, since the Athenians were no longer in Boeotia. There are eleven Boeotarchs in all. The Athenians had in fact halted near the borders of the territory of Oropus. But Pagondas, son of Aeoladas, wanted to fight and thought it better to take the risk. He was a Boeotarch for Thebes along with Arianthides, son of Lysimachides, and it was his turn to command. He called the men over company by company, so that they would not all leave their weapons at once. He urged the Boeotians to advance against the Athenians and fight, speaking as follows.

Chapter 92

1 “Men of Boeotia, none of us commanders should even have considered it wrong to fight the Athenians if we happened to catch them outside Boeotia. They have come from the neighboring country and built a fort inside Boeotia, and they intend to destroy our country. They are surely our enemies wherever we catch them, and in the place they came from to attack us.

2 “If anyone thought it safer not to fight, let him change his mind now. Someone whose own country is being attacked cannot take the same cautious approach as someone whose possessions are safe and who chooses to attack another country because he wants more.

3 “It is your tradition to resist an invading foreign army, whether it is in your own country or in your neighbors' territory. This is all the more necessary with the Athenians, who are also our immediate neighbors.

4 “For everyone, freedom from neighboring cities depends on equal strength. And these people try to enslave not only those nearby but also those far away. How can we fail to fight them with every effort? We have examples in the Euboeans across the water and most of the rest of Hellas: we can see how they stand in relation to Athens. We must recognize this difference. Other peoples fight their neighbors over the boundaries of their land. But if we are defeated, one boundary will be fixed for our entire country, and we will have no say about it.

5 “They will force their way in and hold what is ours. That is how much more dangerous they are to live beside than other people. Those who attack their neighbors with the confidence of superior strength, as the Athenians do now, generally feel less fear about invading someone who stays quiet and defends himself only on his own land. They are less ready to try to dominate someone who goes beyond his borders to meet them and, when the opportunity comes, starts the war himself.

6 “We have had experience of this with these very people. When they occupied our country during our civil strife, we defeated them at Coronea. That victory has given Boeotia great security right up to the present.

7 “We must remember this. The older men must match their earlier achievements. The younger men, whose fathers proved brave on that occasion, must try not to disgrace their families' courage. We must trust that the god will be on our side: they have fortified his sanctuary against sacred law and are occupying it. We must also trust the favorable signs we see in the sacrifices we have offered. Let us advance against these men and show them this: when they attack people who will not resist, they may gain what they want. But they will not get away without a fight from men whose pride is always to keep their own country free in battle and not to enslave the country of others unjustly.”

Chapter 93

1 With this encouragement, Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to advance against the Athenians. He quickly got the army moving, since it was already late in the day. When he came close to the Athenian army, he halted in a position where a hill between them kept the two armies from seeing each other. He then arranged his forces and prepared for battle.

2 When Hippocrates, who was at Delium, received word that the Boeotians were advancing, he sent orders to the army to form up. He joined it himself not long afterward. He left about three hundred cavalry at Delium, both to guard it if anyone attacked and to watch for a chance to attack the Boeotians during the battle.

3 The Boeotians stationed troops to oppose these cavalry. When their arrangements were complete, they appeared over the hill and halted with their weapons grounded, in the formation they intended to fight in. They had about seven thousand hoplites, over ten thousand light troops, a thousand cavalry, and five hundred peltasts.

4 The Thebans and those who shared their district held the right wing. In the center were the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the others who lived around the lake. The Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians held the left wing. Cavalry and light troops were stationed on each wing. The Thebans formed up twenty-five shields deep. The others used whatever depth suited each contingent.

5 These were the Boeotians' forces and their arrangement.

Chapter 94

1 The Athenian hoplites formed up eight deep across the whole army. Their numbers matched those of the enemy hoplites, and they had cavalry on each wing. They had no properly equipped force of light troops there. The city had never organized one. The light troops who had joined the invasion were many times more numerous than the enemy's. Many men had followed without weapons, since there had been a general mobilization of citizens and foreigners who were present. But they had been the first to start for home, so only a few were there for the battle.

2 When they had taken their positions and were about to engage, Hippocrates, the general, went along the Athenian lines encouraging the men. He spoke as follows.

Chapter 95

1 “Athenians, my words of encouragement will be brief. But for brave men they are just as effective as a longer speech. They are more a reminder than an order.

2 “None of you should think that we are taking this great risk in a foreign country for no good reason. We will be fighting on their land to defend our own. If we win, the Peloponnesians will never invade your country without the cavalry of these men. In a single battle you can win this country and make your own more securely free.

3 “So advance against them in a way worthy of our city, which each of you is proud to call his home, the foremost city among the Greeks. Be worthy too of your fathers, who defeated these men in battle with Myronides at Oenophyta and once held Boeotia.”

Chapter 96

1 Hippocrates was still giving this encouragement. He had gone only halfway along the army and had no time to reach the rest. Pagondas had also spoken a few quick words of encouragement to his men on the spot. The Boeotians sang their battle hymn and advanced down the hill. The Athenians advanced to meet them and charged into contact at a run.

2 The outermost troops of both armies did not come to blows. Both had the same problem: streams blocked their way. The rest were locked in fierce fighting, pushing shield against shield.

3 The Athenians were defeating the Boeotian left wing and the troops as far as the center. They pressed hard on the troops there, especially the Thespians. The men stationed alongside the Thespians had withdrawn, leaving them surrounded in a small space. Those Thespians who died were cut down while resisting hand to hand. Some Athenians also became confused as they encircled the enemy, failed to recognize one another, and killed each other.

4 The Boeotians on this side were defeated and fled toward the part of their army that was still fighting. But their right wing, where the Thebans were, was beating the Athenians. They pushed them back, slowly at first, and followed them up.

5 Because their left wing was in trouble, Pagondas had sent two cavalry units out of sight around the hill. When they suddenly appeared, the victorious Athenian wing panicked, thinking that another army was coming against it.

6 Both wings now gave way. This alarm, together with the Thebans' pursuit and their breaking through the Athenian line, put the whole Athenian army to flight.

7 Some fled toward Delium and the sea, others toward Oropus, and others toward Mount Parnes. The rest went wherever each thought he had some hope of safety.

8 The Boeotians pursued and killed them. The cavalry did the most killing, both the Boeotians' own and the Locrians who had arrived to help just as the rout began. But night fell during the pursuit, making it easier for most of the fleeing men to escape.

9 The next day, those at Oropus and those at Delium went home by sea. They left a garrison at Delium, which they still held despite the defeat.

Chapter 97

1 The Boeotians set up a victory trophy, recovered their own dead, and stripped the enemy dead. They left a guard and withdrew to Tanagra, where they planned an attack on Delium.

2 An Athenian herald on his way to arrange the recovery of the dead met a Boeotian herald. The Boeotian turned him back, saying he would achieve nothing until the Boeotian himself had returned. Then he went before the Athenians and delivered the Boeotians' message. They said the Athenians had acted wrongly by breaking the established customs of the Greeks.

3 It was the rule for everyone invading another people's country to leave its sanctuaries untouched. But the Athenians had fortified Delium and were living in it. Everything people did on ordinary, unconsecrated ground was going on there. They were even drawing water for their own use that the Boeotians were forbidden to touch except to wash their hands for sacrifices.

4 So, on behalf of the god and themselves, the Boeotians called on the divine powers who shared the altar, and on Apollo, and ordered the Athenians to leave the sanctuary and take away what belonged to them.

Chapter 98

1 After the herald had said this, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Boeotians. They said they had done no wrong to the sanctuary and would not deliberately damage it in the future. They had not entered it for that purpose in the first place. They wanted to use it as a base from which to defend themselves against those who were wronging them.

2 The custom among the Greeks, they said, was that whoever controlled a piece of land, large or small, also took possession of its sanctuaries. They cared for these with whatever observances they could manage in addition to the customary ones.

3 The Boeotians themselves, like most other peoples who had driven someone out by force and occupied their land, had first taken over sanctuaries belonging to others. They now owned them as their own.

4 If the Athenians themselves had been able to conquer more of Boeotian territory, they would have kept it. As things stood, they would not willingly leave the part they occupied, because they regarded it as their own.

5 They had drawn the water out of necessity. They had not brought this necessity on themselves through reckless aggression. The Boeotians had invaded their land first, and in defending themselves they were forced to use it.

6 It was only reasonable to expect even the god to forgive anything done under the pressure of war or some terrible danger. Altars were, after all, a refuge for people who had done wrong unintentionally. The charge of breaking sacred law applied to those who did evil without being forced to, not to those whom misfortune drove to take such risks.

7 The Boeotians were acting far more irreverently by demanding the sanctuaries in exchange for returning the dead than the Athenians were by refusing to use sacred places to recover what was due to them.

8 They asked the Boeotians to give them a clear answer about recovering their dead under a truce, as ancestral custom allowed. This was not a request made on condition that they leave Boeotian land. They were no longer on land belonging to the Boeotians, but on land they had won by force of arms.

Chapter 99

1 The Boeotians replied that if the Athenians were in Boeotia, they should leave Boeotian land and take away what was theirs. If they were on their own land, they could decide for themselves what to do. Their reasoning was that the territory of Oropus belonged to Athens as a dependency. The dead were lying there because the battle had taken place on the border, but the Athenians could not recover them by force against the Boeotians' will. On the other hand, the Boeotians did not intend to grant a truce for land supposedly belonging to the Athenians. They thought it more respectable to answer, “Leave our land and recover what you are asking for.” The Athenian herald heard this and left without achieving anything.

Chapter 100

1 The Boeotians immediately sent for javelin throwers and slingers from the Malian Gulf. Two thousand Corinthian hoplites had also come to help them after the battle, along with the Peloponnesian garrison troops who had left Nisaea and some Megarians. With these forces they marched against Delium and attacked the fort. They tried other methods as well, but brought up the following machine, which captured it.

2 They sawed a large beam in half, hollowed it out along its whole length, and fitted the halves back together closely to make a tube. At its far end they hung a cauldron on chains. An iron nozzle ran down from the beam and pointed into the cauldron. A considerable length of the rest of the wood was also covered in iron.

3 They brought it up from a distance on wagons toward the part of the wall built mostly of vine branches and timber. When it was close, they fitted large bellows into the end of the beam nearest them and pumped them.

4 The air passed through the airtight tube into the cauldron, which held burning charcoal, sulfur, and pitch. It produced a great flame and set fire to the wall. No one could stay on it any longer. The defenders abandoned it and fled, and this was how the fort was captured.

5 Some of the garrison were killed, and two hundred were taken prisoner. Most of the rest boarded the ships and were carried home.

Chapter 101

1 Delium was captured on the seventeenth day after the battle. Not long afterward the Athenian herald came back again about the dead, unaware of what had happened. The Boeotians returned them and no longer gave the same answer.

2 Slightly fewer than five hundred Boeotians died in the battle. The Athenian dead numbered slightly fewer than a thousand, including the general Hippocrates. Large numbers of light troops and baggage carriers also died.

3 A little after this battle, Demosthenes also made a landing in Sicyonian territory. When he had sailed to Siphae earlier, the plan to have it betrayed to him had failed. He still had his army aboard the ships: Acarnanians, Agraeans, and four hundred Athenian hoplites.

4 Before all the ships had arrived, the Sicyonians came to meet the attack. They routed those who had landed and chased them back to the ships, killing some and capturing others alive. They set up a victory monument and returned the dead under a truce.

5 Around the same time as the events at Delium, Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, also died. He had marched against the Triballians and been defeated in battle. His nephew Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, became king of the Odrysians and of the rest of the Thracian territory Sitalces had ruled.

Chapter 102

1 That same winter, Brasidas took his allies in Thrace and marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the Strymon River.

2 Aristagoras of Miletus had earlier tried to settle the site where the city now stands while fleeing from King Darius. But the Edonians drove him out. Thirty-two years later the Athenians tried as well. They sent ten thousand settlers, including their own citizens and anyone else who wished to go. The Thracians destroyed them at Drabescus.

3 In the twenty-ninth year after that, the Athenians came again. They sent Hagnon, son of Nicias, to found the colony. They drove out the Edonians and settled this site, which had previously been called Nine Roads.

4 They used Eion as their base. They held this trading port on the coast at the river's mouth, twenty-five stades from the present city. Hagnon named the city Amphipolis because the Strymon flowed around it on both sides [because it enclosed it]. He blocked off the space with a long wall running from one part of the river to the other, and founded the city on a site clearly visible from both the sea and the mainland.

Chapter 103

1 Brasidas set out against Amphipolis with his army from Arnae in Chalcidice. Around evening he reached Aulon and Bormiscus, where Lake Bolbe drains into the sea. After the men had eaten, he continued through the night.

2 The weather was stormy, with a little snow. This made him all the more eager to press on. He wanted to reach Amphipolis without anyone knowing, except those who were betraying it to him.

3 Some Argilians lived in the city—the Argilians were colonists from Andros—and they and others were helping with the plan. Some were acting at Perdiccas' urging, others at that of the Chalcidians.

4 The Argilians were especially active. They lived nearby, had always been distrusted by the Athenians, and had long been plotting against the place. When the opportunity came with Brasidas' arrival, they had already been negotiating for some time with their fellow citizens living in Amphipolis about handing over the city. That night they admitted Brasidas into their own city and broke with Athens. Before dawn they brought his army to the bridge over the river.

5 The city is some distance from the crossing. At that time its walls did not extend down to the bridge as they do now, and only a small guard was posted there. Brasidas easily overpowered it. Betrayal helped him, as did the bad weather and the unexpected attack. He crossed the bridge and immediately took control of the property of the Amphipolitans living outside the walls, throughout the whole district.

Chapter 104

1 The crossing took the people in the city by surprise. Many of those outside were being captured, while others were escaping inside the wall. The Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion, especially since they also distrusted one another.

2 It is said that Brasidas would probably have taken the city if he had chosen to advance on it immediately instead of allowing his army to turn to plundering.

3 Instead, after overrunning the land outside, he made camp and waited. Events inside were not turning out as he had expected.

4 The opponents of the traitors were strong enough in numbers to prevent the gates from being opened immediately. Together with Eucles, the general who had come from Athens to guard the city, they sent to the other general in Thrace, Thucydides, son of Olorus, who wrote this history. He was near Thasos, an island colonized by the Parians, about half a day's sail from Amphipolis. They asked him to come to their aid.

5 When he heard this, he immediately sailed with the seven ships that happened to be available. His first aim was to reach Amphipolis before it surrendered. Failing that, he wanted to secure Eion before the enemy could take it.

Chapter 105

1 Meanwhile, Brasidas feared the arrival of help by sea from Thasos. He also learned that Thucydides owned the rights to work the gold mines in that part of Thrace, and because of this was one of the most influential men on the mainland. He hurried to secure the city before Thucydides could arrive, if possible. Otherwise the majority of the Amphipolitans might refuse to come over to him. They might hope that Thucydides would gather an allied force by sea and another from Thrace and keep them safe.

2 He therefore offered moderate terms. He proclaimed that any Amphipolitan or Athenian in the city who wished could stay, keeping his property and enjoying equal civic rights. Anyone unwilling to stay could leave within five days, taking his belongings.

Chapter 106

1 When the majority heard this, they began to change their minds. This was all the more so because only a small part of the citizen population was Athenian. Most were of mixed origins, and many of those captured outside had relatives inside. Given their fears, they thought the offer fair. The Athenians would be glad to leave. They thought they faced greater danger than the others and did not expect help to arrive soon. The rest would not lose their city and would keep equal rights, while unexpectedly escaping danger.

2 Those working with Brasidas now argued openly for his terms. They could see that the majority had changed sides and would no longer listen to the Athenian general present. So an agreement was made, and they admitted Brasidas on the terms he had proclaimed.

3 That was how they surrendered the city. Thucydides and his ships sailed into Eion late that same day.

4 Brasidas had only just taken Amphipolis, and Eion escaped capture by only a night's margin. If the ships had not come to its aid quickly, it would have been taken at dawn.

Chapter 107

1 After this, Thucydides organized affairs at Eion so that it would be secure both against an immediate attack by Brasidas and in the future. He also admitted those who chose to move down from Amphipolis under the agreement.

2 Brasidas suddenly sailed down the river against Eion with many boats. He hoped to seize the point projecting from the wall and so control the entrance to the harbor. He also tried an attack by land at the same time. Both attacks were driven back, and he turned to putting affairs at Amphipolis in order.

3 The Edonian city of Myrcinus came over to him after Pittacus, the Edonian king, was killed by the sons of Goaxis and by his own wife, Brauro. Not long afterward Galepsus and Oesyme joined him too. These were colonies of the Thasians. Perdiccas also arrived immediately after the capture of Amphipolis and helped organize these developments.

Chapter 108

1 The capture of Amphipolis greatly alarmed the Athenians. The city was valuable to them for its shipments of shipbuilding timber and its financial income. There was also the problem of access to their allies. With Thessalian guides, the Lacedaemonians could travel as far as the Strymon, but without control of the bridge they could not get farther. Upstream the river formed a large lake stretching a long way, while the approaches toward Eion were guarded by triremes. Now, however, passage had become easy, [they thought]. They also feared that their allies might revolt.

2 Brasidas behaved moderately in other ways too, and everywhere he spoke he declared that he had been sent to free Hellas.

3 The cities subject to Athens heard about the capture of Amphipolis, the terms Brasidas offered, and his mild behavior. This strongly encouraged them to revolt. They secretly sent heralds to him, asking him to come to them. Each wanted to be the first to break away.

4 They thought they could do so safely. They badly underestimated the power Athens later proved to have. Their judgments rested more on uncertain wishes than on sound foresight. People generally hand over what they want to unthinking hope, and dismiss what they dislike with reasoning that accepts no challenge.

5 The Athenians had also recently suffered their defeat in Boeotia. Brasidas made attractive but untrue claims that the Athenians had refused to fight him at Nisaea when he had only his own army with him. This encouraged the cities, and they believed no force would come against them.

6 Most importantly, they were ready to take any risk because of the immediate pleasure of revolt and because this would be their first chance to try it while the Lacedaemonians were eager to help. The Athenians realized this and sent out garrisons to the cities, as far as they could at short notice and in winter. Brasidas sent to Lacedaemon to press for additional troops. He himself began preparing to build triremes on the Strymon.

7 The Lacedaemonians did not meet his request. This was partly because their leading men were jealous of him, and partly because they preferred to recover their men from the island and end the war.

Chapter 109

1 That same winter, the Megarians captured and completely demolished their Long Walls, which the Athenians had held. After taking Amphipolis, Brasidas marched with his allies against the region called Acte.

2 Acte projects out beyond the King's canal. Its high mountain, Athos, ends at the Aegean Sea.

3 Its cities include Sane, a colony of Andros beside the canal itself, facing the sea toward Euboea. The others are Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium.

4 These are inhabited by a mixture of non-Greek peoples who speak two languages. There is also a small Chalcidian population. Most are Pelasgians, descended from the Tyrrhenians who once lived in Lemnos and Athens. There are also Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians. They live in small towns.

5 Most of them went over to Brasidas, but Sane and Dium resisted. He stayed with his army and laid waste to their territory.

Chapter 110

1 When they would not give in, he immediately marched against Torone in Chalcidice, which the Athenians held. A few men were inviting him there and were ready to hand over the city. He arrived with his army while it was still night, near dawn, and took up a position by the shrine of the Dioscuri, about three stades from the city.

2 The rest of the people of Torone and the Athenian garrison did not know he was there. But those working with him knew he was coming. A few had secretly gone out and were watching for his approach. Once they realized he had arrived, they brought seven lightly armed men with daggers inside to join them. Of the twenty men originally assigned, only these seven had not been too afraid to enter. Their leader was Lysistratus of Olynthus. They slipped through the wall facing the open sea without being noticed. Since the city stood on a hillside, they climbed up, killed the guards at the highest watchpost, and broke through the small gate facing Canastraeum.

Chapter 111

1 Brasidas advanced a little and waited with the main army. He sent a hundred peltasts ahead. They were to run in first when a gate was opened and the agreed signal was raised.

2 As time passed, the peltasts became puzzled and gradually moved close to the city. Inside, the Toronaeans working on the plan and the men who had entered made their preparations. The small gate had been broken through, and the gates by the marketplace were being opened after their bar was cut. First they led some men around and brought them in through the small gate. They wanted to cause sudden panic among the unsuspecting people in the city by attacking from behind and from both sides. Then they raised the agreed fire signal and admitted the rest of the peltasts through the gates by the marketplace.

Chapter 112

1 Brasidas saw the signal, got his army moving, and ran forward. The men all shouted together, terrifying the people inside the city.

2 Some immediately rushed in through the gates. Others climbed over square beams that happened to be leaning against a collapsed section of wall under repair. The beams were there for hauling up stones.

3 Brasidas and the main body immediately turned toward the upper, higher parts of the city. He wanted to take it completely and hold it securely. The remaining troops spread out everywhere.

Chapter 113

1 As Torone was being taken, most of its people had no idea what was happening and were thrown into confusion. But those involved in the plot, and those who approved of it, immediately joined the men who had entered.

2 About fifty Athenian hoplites happened to be sleeping in the marketplace. When they realized what was happening, a few were killed in close fighting. The rest escaped safely to the fort at Lecythus, some going on foot and others taking refuge aboard the two ships on guard duty. The Athenians had occupied this fort themselves. It was a headland projecting from the city into the sea, cut off at a narrow isthmus.

3 The Toronaeans who supported them also fled to join them there.

Chapter 114

1 When daylight came and the city was securely in his hands, Brasidas made a proclamation to the Toronaeans who had fled with the Athenians. Any who wished could come back to their property and live as citizens without fear. He sent a herald to the Athenians, telling them to leave Lecythus under a truce and take their belongings, because the place belonged to the Chalcidians.

2 They refused to leave but asked for a one-day truce to recover their dead. He granted two days. During this time he strengthened the neighboring houses, and the Athenians strengthened their own positions.

3 He called a meeting of the Toronaeans and spoke much as he had at Acanthus. He said they should not think worse of the men who had worked with him to capture the city, or regard them as traitors. They had not acted to enslave the city or because they had been bribed. They had acted for its good and its freedom. Nor should those who had taken no part think they would be treated less well. He had not come to harm either the city or any individual.

4 That was why he had made his proclamation to those who had fled to the Athenians. He thought no worse of them for their friendship with Athens. Once they had experience of his side [the Lacedaemonians], he believed they would be no less friendly to them, but much more so, because they acted with much greater fairness. For now, lack of experience made them afraid.

5 He told everyone to prepare to be dependable allies. From now on they would be held responsible for any wrongdoing. But as for the past, it was not his side that had been wronged. Rather, the Toronaeans themselves had suffered at the hands of others more powerful than they were. If they had opposed him, they could be forgiven.

Chapter 115

1 After saying this and reassuring them, Brasidas began attacking Lecythus once the truce had expired. The Athenians defended themselves from a poor wall and from houses fitted with battlements.

2 They held off the attack for one day. The next day the enemy planned to bring up a machine from which they intended to throw fire onto the wooden defenses. The army was already approaching. At the spot where the Athenians thought the machine was most likely to be brought up, and where their position was most open to attack, they built a wooden tower on top of a house. They carried up many jars and large storage pots of water, along with large stones. Many men also climbed onto it.

3 The house suddenly collapsed under the excessive weight, making a tremendous noise. The Athenians nearby who saw what had happened were more upset than frightened. But those farther away, especially the most distant, thought the position had already been captured there. They rushed to escape to the sea and the ships.

Chapter 116

1 Brasidas noticed them abandoning the battlements and saw what was happening. He immediately brought his army forward, captured the fort, and killed everyone he found inside.

2 This was how the Athenians abandoned the place. They crossed to Pallene in boats and warships. There was a sanctuary of Athena in Lecythus, and before the attack Brasidas had happened to promise thirty minas of silver to the first man to get onto the wall. He now thought that something beyond human action had caused its capture. He therefore paid the thirty minas into the goddess's sanctuary. He demolished and cleared Lecythus and set the whole area aside as sacred land.

3 For the rest of the winter he put the places he held in order and made plans against the others. With the end of winter, the eighth year of the war came to an end.

Chapter 117

1 At the very beginning of spring in the following summer season, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians made a one-year truce. The Athenians thought Brasidas would then be unable to get any more of their subjects to revolt before they could prepare without interference. At the same time, if things went well for them, they might reach a more general agreement. The Lacedaemonians believed these were the things the Athenians feared, as indeed they did. They thought that once the Athenians had experienced a break from suffering and hardship, they would be more eager for a settlement. They would return the prisoners and agree to a longer peace.

2 The Lacedaemonians put a higher value on recovering their men while Brasidas was still successful. If he made further progress and brought the two sides' strength into balance, they were likely to lose the men. They would then have to risk an evenly matched struggle with the Athenians to win.

3 The truce between them and their allies was therefore made on the following terms.

Chapter 118

1 “Concerning the sanctuary and oracle of Pythian Apollo, we agree that anyone who wishes may use them without deception or fear, according to ancestral laws.

2 “The Lacedaemonians and the allies present agree to this. They say they will send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians and do all they can to persuade them as well.

3 “Concerning the god's property, we must take care to discover those who have wronged him. Both you and we, and any others who wish to join us, must act correctly and justly according to ancestral laws. All must follow ancestral laws.

4 “The Lacedaemonians and the other allies have agreed to these provisions on those subjects. If the Athenians make a truce, the Lacedaemonians and the other allies also agree to the following. Each side is to remain in its own territory, keeping what we now hold. Those at Coryphasium must stay within Buphras and Tomeus. Those in Cythera must not enter our allied territory. Neither we nor they may enter the other's territory. Those at Nisaea and Minoa must not cross the road from the gates beside the shrine of Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, and from that temple straight to the bridge leading to Minoa. The Megarians and their allies must not cross this road either. The Athenians are to keep the island they captured. Neither side may cross over to the other side's territory. The positions in Troezen are to remain as they now are, in accordance with the agreement made with the Athenians.

5 “The Lacedaemonians and their allies may use the sea along their own coasts and those of their allies. They may not sail in warships, but may use other oared vessels with a carrying capacity of up to five hundred talents.

6 “Heralds and embassies, with as many attendants as they think appropriate, are to have safe passage to and from the Peloponnese and Athens, by land and sea, to discuss ending the war and settling disputes.

7 “During this period, neither you nor we may receive deserters, whether free people or slaves.

8 “You must submit to legal proceedings brought by us, and we to proceedings brought by you, according to ancestral practice. Disputed matters must be settled through legal judgment without war.

9 “The Lacedaemonians and their allies agree to these terms. If you think anything could be better or fairer, come to Lacedaemon and explain it. Neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies will reject any fair proposals you make.

10 “Those who come must have full authority, just as you require of us. The truce will last one year.”

11 “The people approved this resolution. The tribe Acamantis held the presidency, Phaenippus was secretary, and Niciades was chairman. Laches proposed: With good fortune for the Athenians, a truce is to be made on the terms the Lacedaemonians and their allies accept and have agreed to in the assembly.

12 “The truce is to last one year, beginning today, the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion.

13 “During this period, embassies and heralds are to travel between the two sides and hold discussions about how the war can be ended.

14 “The generals and presiding officials are to call an assembly, and the Athenians are to give first consideration to peace … in response to any embassy that comes to discuss ending the war. The embassies now present must immediately swear before the people that they will keep to the truce for the year.”

Chapter 119

1 “The Lacedaemonians and their allies agreed to these terms [and swore to keep them] with the Athenians and their allies on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius at Lacedaemon.

2 “The following men made the agreement and concluded the truce: for the Lacedaemonians, Taurus son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus son of Periclidas, and Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas; for the Corinthians, Aeneas son of Ocytus and Euphamidas son of Aristonymus; for the Sicyonians, Damotimus son of Naucrates and Onasimus son of Megacles; for the Megarians, Nicasus son of Cecalus and Menecrates son of Amphidorus; for the Epidaurians, Amphias son of Eupaidas; and for the Athenians, the generals Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus.”

3 This was how the truce came about. Throughout it, the two sides kept meeting to discuss a more lasting peace treaty.

Chapter 120

1 During these same days, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians and joined Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they came from Pellene in the Peloponnese. Their first settlers were sailing home from Troy when the storm that struck the Achaeans drove them to this place, and they settled there.

2 After their revolt, Brasidas sailed across to Scione at night. A friendly trireme sailed ahead, while he followed some distance behind in a small, fast boat. His plan was that, if he met a vessel larger than his small boat, the trireme would protect him. If an enemy trireme appeared, he thought it would turn against his warship rather than the smaller boat. Meanwhile he would escape safely.

3 After crossing over, he called the Scionaeans together and repeated what he had said at Acanthus and Torone. He also said that they deserved the highest praise. The Athenians held Potidaea and had cut off Pallene at the isthmus, so the Scionaeans were effectively islanders. Even so, they had moved toward freedom of their own accord. They had not timidly waited to be forced to act for what was clearly their own good. This showed that they would also face other very great dangers bravely. If things went as he hoped, he would regard them as the Lacedaemonians' most genuinely faithful friends and honor them in other ways as well.

Chapter 121

1 His words lifted the Scionaeans' spirits and gave them all confidence, including those who had previously opposed what was happening. They resolved to support the war enthusiastically. Besides giving Brasidas a warm welcome in other ways, they publicly crowned him with a gold crown as the man who was freeing Hellas. As individuals, they came up to him and tied ribbons around him as if he were a victorious athlete.

2 For the moment, he left a small garrison with them and crossed back. Not long afterward he brought a larger force across. He wanted to attack Mende and Potidaea with the Scionaeans' help. He expected the Athenians to come to the rescue, as they would to an island, and wanted to act first. He was also negotiating with people in these cities who were planning to betray them to him.

Chapter 122

1 He was about to make his attempt on these cities when the men announcing the truce arrived to see him in a trireme. They were Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the Lacedaemonians.

2 The army crossed back to Torone, and the envoys told Brasidas about the agreement. All the Lacedaemonians' allies in the Thracian region accepted what had been done.

3 Aristonymus approved the arrangements in other respects. But when he calculated the dates and realized that the Scionaeans had revolted after the truce, he said they would not be covered by it. Brasidas argued at length that they had revolted earlier, and he refused to give up the city.

4 When Aristonymus reported the situation to Athens, the Athenians were immediately ready to march against Scione. The Lacedaemonians sent envoys to say that this would break the truce. Trusting Brasidas' account, they claimed the city and were willing to submit the dispute over it to arbitration.

5 The Athenians did not want to risk arbitration. They wanted to attack as quickly as possible. They were angry that even people who were effectively on islands now thought they could revolt from Athens, trusting in the Lacedaemonians' land power, which could not help them.

6 The facts about the revolt actually supported the Athenians' claim more strongly: the Scionaeans had revolted two days after the truce. The Athenians immediately passed a decree, on Cleon's proposal, to capture the Scionaeans and put them to death. They left other matters alone and prepared for this operation.

Chapter 123

1 Meanwhile Mende, a city in Pallene and a colony of the Eretrians, revolted from them. Brasidas accepted its people too. He did not think he was doing wrong, even though they had clearly joined him during the truce. He himself accused the Athenians of breaking the treaty in certain respects.

2 This made the Mendaeans more confident about acting. They saw that Brasidas was willing to receive them, and his conduct toward Scione showed them that he would not abandon them. At the same time, the small group organizing the revolt, now that the moment for action had come, refused to back down. Afraid that they themselves would be exposed, they forced the majority to act against its wishes.

3 As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they became much angrier still and prepared to attack both cities.

4 Expecting their fleet to arrive, Brasidas moved the children and women of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans to safety at Olynthus in Chalcidice. He sent the cities five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian peltasts, with Polydamidas in command of them all. They made their defensive preparations together, expecting the Athenians to arrive shortly.

Chapter 124

1 Meanwhile Brasidas and Perdiccas marched together against Arrhabaeus into Lyncus for a second time. Perdiccas brought the Macedonian force under his control and hoplites from the Greeks living there. Brasidas brought his remaining Peloponnesians, Chalcidians, Acanthians, and troops from each of the other allies according to its strength. Altogether there were about three thousand Greek hoplites. The Macedonian and Chalcidian cavalry accompanying them totaled nearly a thousand. There was also a large body of other non-Greek troops.

2 They invaded Arrhabaeus' territory and found the Lyncestians camped opposite them. They too settled into camp facing the enemy.

3 The infantry on each side held a hill, with a plain between them. First the cavalry of both sides rode down onto the plain and fought. Then the Lyncestian hoplites came down from their hill first, joining their cavalry and preparing to fight. Brasidas and Perdiccas led their own troops forward to meet them. They fought and routed the Lyncestians, killing many of them. The rest escaped to the higher ground and stayed there without further action.

4 After this, they set up a trophy and waited for two or three days. They were expecting the Illyrians whom Perdiccas had hired and who were due to arrive. Then Perdiccas wanted to advance against Arrhabaeus' villages rather than stay where they were. But Brasidas was worried about Mende. He feared that the Athenians might sail there before he did and harm it. With the Illyrians still absent as well, he was unwilling to advance and preferred to retreat.

Chapter 125

1 While they were arguing about this, news came that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas and joined Arrhabaeus. Both commanders now thought they should retreat, because they feared the Illyrians, who were warlike people. But because of their disagreement they had settled nothing about when to start. Night fell, and the Macedonians and the mass of non-Greek troops suddenly panicked. Large armies often take fright like this for no clear reason. They imagined that the approaching enemy was many times stronger than it really was and was about to arrive. They suddenly took flight and headed home. Perdiccas did not notice at first. When he realized what was happening, they forced him to leave before seeing Brasidas. Their camps were a long way apart.

2 At dawn Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had already left and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were about to attack. He drew his hoplites together in a square, put the mass of lightly armed troops in the center, and prepared to retreat.

3 He assigned the youngest men to rush out wherever the enemy attacked them. He himself planned to follow at the rear with three hundred picked men. As he withdrew, he would turn to face and fight off the first of the enemy to press the attack.

4 Before the enemy came close, he quickly gave his soldiers this encouragement:

Chapter 126

1 “Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect that you were frightened because we have been left alone and the approaching enemy are non-Greeks in great numbers, I would not be giving you an explanation as well as encouragement. As it is, I will briefly remind you of a few things and offer some advice. I will try to convince you of the most important points about our friends' departure and the enemy's numbers.

2 “You should be good soldiers because of your own courage, not because allies happen to be with you. Nor should you fear any number of other men. You do not come from states where the many rule the few. Instead, the few rule the many, and they gained their power by nothing other than victory in battle.

3 “You are afraid of these non-Greeks now because you do not know them. But you must learn that they will not be formidable opponents. You can judge from the fighting you have already done against some of them alongside the Macedonians. I judge this too, and know it from what others have told me.

4 “When an enemy's strength is more apparent than real, learning the truth about it gives those defending themselves greater confidence. But against an enemy with some solid advantage, a man would act more boldly if he did not know about it beforehand.

5 “These men are frightening to anyone unfamiliar with them while their attack is still to come. Their numbers look terrifying, the volume of their shouting is unbearable, and their pointless waving of weapons has a threatening effect. But when they close with men who stand their ground against all this, they are not the same. They have no fixed formation that would make them ashamed to leave their position when pressed. Retreating and attacking bring them equal credit, so their courage is never put to the test. When each man fights as he chooses, he can very easily find a respectable excuse for saving himself. They think that frightening you without taking risks is more reliable than fighting you hand to hand. Otherwise they would have chosen to fight instead.

6 “You can clearly see that all the terror they cause in advance amounts to little in practice. It is what you see and hear that makes it overwhelming. Stand your ground against their attack, and then, when the time is right, pull back again in good order and in formation. You will reach safety sooner, and you will know in the future that, against men who withstand their first attack, mobs like these boast about their courage with threats from a distance, without getting on with it. But if anyone gives way to them, they are quick to show how brave they are by chasing him, when they can do so safely.”

Chapter 127

1 After giving this advice, Brasidas began to withdraw his army. When the non-Greeks saw it, they pressed forward with loud shouting and uproar. They thought he was running away and that they would catch and destroy him.

2 But wherever they attacked, the men assigned to rush out met them, while Brasidas himself stood against them with his picked troops. Contrary to the enemy's expectations, the Greeks held off the first charge. After that, they faced and fought the enemy whenever it advanced and withdrew whenever it stopped. Most of the non-Greeks then stopped attacking Brasidas' Greeks in the open ground. They left a small force to follow and harass them. The rest ran after the fleeing Macedonians, killing any they met. They also hurried ahead to occupy the narrow entrance into Arrhabaeus' territory between two hills. They knew Brasidas had no other route for retreat. As he approached this difficult stretch of road, they began to surround him, intending to cut him off.

Chapter 128

1 Brasidas realized this and ordered the three hundred men with him to run toward whichever of the hills he thought would be easier to capture. Each man was to run as fast as he could, without keeping formation. They were to try to drive off the non-Greeks already on it before the larger force surrounding them could reach that point too.

2 They attacked and defeated the men on the hill. The main body of the Greek army could now make its way toward it more easily. The non-Greeks were frightened by the rout of their men from the high ground there. They stopped following the Greeks any farther, thinking that they were already at the border and had escaped.

3 Once Brasidas had secured the high ground, he marched more safely. That same day he reached Arnissa, the first place in Perdiccas' kingdom.

4 His soldiers were angry that the Macedonians had retreated ahead of them. Along the road they came across Macedonian ox teams and equipment that had been left behind, as was likely in a frightened retreat at night. They unyoked and slaughtered the oxen and took the equipment for themselves.

5 From this point Perdiccas first began to regard Brasidas as an enemy. From then on he felt an unusual hatred for the Peloponnesians, considering his relations with the Athenians. He put aside his urgent interests and worked to make peace with the Athenians as quickly as possible and get rid of the Peloponnesians.

Chapter 129

1 When Brasidas returned from Macedonia to Torone, he found that the Athenians already held Mende. He stayed where he was, thinking it was now impossible to cross to Pallene and bring help. Instead, he kept Torone under guard.

2 For about the same time as the events in Lyncus, the Athenians had sailed against Mende and Scione, as they had been preparing to do. They had fifty ships, ten of them from Chios, a thousand of their own hoplites, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and other peltasts from the local allies. Their generals were Nicias son of Niceratus and Nicostratus son of Diitrephes.

3 They sailed from Potidaea, put in near the temple of Poseidon, and advanced against the Mendaeans. The Mendaeans, three hundred Scionaeans who had come to help them, and the Peloponnesian mercenaries—seven hundred hoplites altogether—with their commander Polydamidas, happened to be camped outside the city on a strong hill.

4 Nicias took a hundred and twenty lightly armed Methonaeans, sixty picked Athenian hoplites, and all the archers, and tried to go up a path on the hill. But the defenders wounded him, and he could not force his way through. Nicostratus brought all the rest of the army by a longer route against another part of the hill. It was difficult to attack, and his force fell into serious confusion. The whole Athenian army came close to defeat.

5 The Mendaeans and their allies did not give way that day, so the Athenians withdrew and camped. When night fell, the Mendaeans went back into the city.

Chapter 130

1 The next day the Athenians sailed around to the side facing Scione and captured the suburb. They spent the whole day ravaging the land, and no one came out against them. There was also some civil strife in the city. The following night the three hundred Scionaeans went home.

2 On the next day Nicias advanced with half the army toward the Scionaean border, ravaging the land as he went. Nicostratus took the rest and settled in front of the city by the upper gates, where the road leads toward Potidaea.

3 The Mendaeans and the hired troops happened to be stationed inside the wall at this point. Polydamidas drew them up for battle and urged the Mendaeans to march out.

4 One of the men from the people's party, speaking in opposition as a member of the rival faction, told him that he would not go out and did not want to fight. At this refusal, Polydamidas grabbed him with his hand and manhandled him. The people immediately picked up their weapons in fury and advanced against the Peloponnesians and those who had worked with them against the people's interests.

5 They attacked and routed them. Their opponents were caught by the sudden fighting and also frightened when the gates were opened to the Athenians. They thought the attack had been arranged with the Athenians beforehand.

6 Those who were not killed at once fled to the acropolis, which they had already been holding. The Athenians rushed into Mende. Nicias had now returned and was also outside the city. Since the city had not been opened to them under an agreement, the whole army looted it as if they had taken it by force. The generals could barely stop them from killing the inhabitants as well.

7 After this they told the Mendaeans to govern themselves as they had before. They were to hold their own trials of anyone they thought responsible for the revolt. The Athenians shut off the men in the acropolis with a wall on either side running down to the sea, and posted a guard. Once they had secured Mende, they moved against Scione.

Chapter 131

1 The Scionaeans and the Peloponnesians came out to meet them and took up a position on a strong hill in front of the city. Unless the Athenians captured it, they could not surround the city with a wall.

2 The Athenians attacked the hill in full force and drove off its defenders in battle. They made camp, set up a trophy, and prepared to build the wall around the city.

3 Not long afterward, when they were already at work, the hired troops besieged in the acropolis at Mende forced their way past the guard beside the sea and arrived by night. Most of them slipped past the army outside Scione and got into the city.

Chapter 132

1 While the Athenians were building the wall around Scione, Perdiccas sent a herald to their generals and made an agreement with Athens. His hostility toward Brasidas over the retreat from Lyncus was the reason. He had started the negotiations immediately after that retreat.

2 At this time Ischagoras the Lacedaemonian was about to lead an army overland to Brasidas. Now that Perdiccas had made his agreement, Nicias told him to give the Athenians some clear proof that he would keep it. Perdiccas himself also no longer wanted Peloponnesians coming into his country. He therefore enlisted his friends in Thessaly, where he always dealt with the leading men, and blocked the army and its preparations. They did not even attempt to pass through Thessaly.

3 Ischagoras, Ameinias, and Aristeus themselves did, however, reach Brasidas. The Lacedaemonians had sent them to inspect the situation. They also brought some of their own men of military age out of Sparta, contrary to the law, to put them in command of the cities rather than leave these to just anyone. Brasidas appointed Clearidas son of Cleonymus at Amphipolis and Pasitelidas son of Hegesander at Torone.

Chapter 133

1 During the same summer the Thebans demolished the wall of Thespiae, accusing its people of supporting Athens. They had always wanted to do this. It had become easier now because the best of the Thespians had been killed in the battle against the Athenians.

2 That same summer the temple of Hera at Argos burned down. Chrysis, the priestess, had put a burning lamp near the garlands and then fallen asleep. Everything caught fire and burned down without her noticing.

3 Afraid of the Argives, Chrysis fled immediately that night to Phlius. Following the established law, they appointed another priestess, named Phaeinis. When Chrysis fled, she had served through eight years of this war and half the ninth.

4 By the end of the summer, the wall around Scione was completely finished. The Athenians left a force to guard it and withdrew with the rest of the army.

Chapter 134

1 During the following winter the Athenians and Lacedaemonians remained inactive because of the truce. But the Mantineans and Tegeans, with the allies of each, fought at Laodocium in Oresthis. The outcome was disputed. Each side routed the wing facing it, and both set up trophies and sent captured armor to Delphi.

2 There were, however, heavy losses on both sides, and the battle was very evenly matched. Nightfall ended the fighting. The Tegeans camped on the battlefield and immediately set up a trophy. The Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion and later set up a rival trophy.

Chapter 135

1 Toward the end of the same winter, when spring was already close, Brasidas also made an attempt on Potidaea. He approached at night and put a ladder against the wall, remaining undetected up to that point. The ladder went up in the gap after the bell had been carried past, before the man passing it on returned. But the defenders noticed at once, before his men could climb up. He quickly led his army away again without waiting for daylight.

2 The winter ended, and the ninth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Chapter 1

1 Next summer, about the time of the corn's coming into ear, ten Syracusan and as many Locrian vessels sailed to Messina, in Sicily, and occupied the town upon the invitation of the inhabitants; and Messina revolted from the Athenians.

2 The Syracusans contrived this chiefly because they saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, and feared that the Athenians might hereafter use it as a base for attacking them with a larger force; the Locrians because they wished to carry on hostilities from both sides of the Strait and to reduce their enemies, the people of Rhegium.

3 Meanwhile, the Locrians had invaded the Rhegian territory with all their forces, to prevent their succoring Messina, and also at the instance of some exiles from Rhegium who were with them; the long factions by which that town had been torn rendering it for the moment incapable of resistance, and thus furnishing an additional temptation to the invaders.

4 After devastating the country the Locrian land forces retired, their ships remaining to guard Messina, while others were being manned for the same destination to carry on the war from thence.

Chapter 2

1 About the same time in the spring, before the corn was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica under Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat down and laid waste the country.

2 Meanwhile the Athenians sent off the forty ships which they had been preparing to Sicily, with the remaining generals Eurymedon and Sophocles;

3 their colleague Pythodorus having already preceded them thither. These had also instructions as they sailed by to look to the Corcyraeans in the town, who were being plundered by the exiles in the mountain. To support these exiles sixty Peloponnesian vessels had lately sailed, it being thought that the famine raging in the city would make it easy for them to reduce it.

4 Demosthenes also, who had remained without employment since his return from Acarnania, applied and obtained permission to use the fleet, if he wished it, upon the coast of Peloponnese.

Chapter 3

1 Off Laconia they heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, upon which Eurymedon and Sophocles wished to hasten to the island, but Demosthenes required them first to touch at Pylos and do what was wanted there, before continuing their voyage. While they were making objections, a squall chanced to come on and carried the fleet into Pylos.

2 Demosthenes at once urged them to fortify the place, it being for this that he had come on the voyage, and made them observe there was plenty of stone and timber on the spot, and that the place was strong by nature, and together with much of the country round unoccupied; Pylos, or Coryphasium, as the Lacedaemonians call it, being about forty-five miles distant from Sparta, and situated in the old country of the Messenians.

3 The commanders told him that there was no lack of desert headlands in Peloponnese if he wished to put the city to expense by occupying them. He, however, thought that this place was distinguished from others of the kind by having a harbour close by; while the Messenians, the old natives of the country, speaking the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, could do them the greatest mischief by their incursions from it, and would at the same time be a trusty garrison.

Chapter 4

1 After speaking to the captains of companies on the subject, and failing to persuade either the generals or the soldiers, he remained inactive with the rest from stress of weather; until the soldiers themselves wanting occupation were seized with a sudden impulse to go round and fortify the place.

2 Accordingly they set to work in earnest, and having no iron tools, picked up stones, and put them together as they happened to fit, and where mortar was needed, carried it on their backs for want of hods, stooping down to make it stay on, and clasping their hands together behind to prevent it falling off;

3 sparing no effort to be able to complete the most vulnerable points before the arrival of the Lacedaemonians, most of the place being sufficiently strong by nature without further fortification.

Chapter 5

1 Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians were celebrating a festival, and also at first made light of the news, in the idea that whenever they chose to take the field the place would be immediately evacuated by the enemy or easily taken by force; the absence of their army before Athens having also something to do with their delay.

2 The Athenians fortified the place on the land side, and where it most required it, in six days, and leaving Demosthenes with five ships to garrison it, with the main body of the fleet hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

Chapter 6

1 As soon as the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of Pylos, they hurried back home; the Lacedaemonians and their king Agis thinking that the matter touched them nearly. Besides having made their invasion early in the season, and while the corn was still green, most of their troops were short of provisions: the weather also was unusually bad for the time of year, and greatly distressed their army.

2 Many reasons thus combined to hasten their departure and to make this invasion a very short one; indeed they only stayed fifteen days in Attica.

Chapter 7

1 About the same time the Athenian general Simonides getting together a few Athenians from the garrisons, and a number of the allies in those parts, took Eion in Thrace, a Mendaean colony and hostile to Athens, by treachery, but had no sooner done so than the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans came up and beat him out of it, with the loss of many of his soldiers.

Chapter 8

1 On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica the Spartans themselves and the nearest of the Perioeci at once set out for Pylos, the other Lacedaemonians following more slowly as they had just come in from another campaign.

2 Word was also sent round Peloponnese to come up as quickly as possible to Pylos; while the sixty Peloponnesian ships were sent for from Corcyra and being dragged by their crews across the isthmus of Leucas, passed unperceived by the Athenian squadron at Zacynthus, and reached Pylos, where the land forces had arrived before them.

3 Before the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in, Demosthenes found time to send out unobserved two ships to inform Eurymedon and the Athenians on board the fleet at Zacynthus of the danger of Pylos and to summon them to his assistance.

4 While the ships hastened on their voyage in obedience to the orders of Demosthenes, the Lacedaemonians prepared to assault the fort by land and sea, hoping to capture with ease a work constructed in haste, and held by a feeble garrison.

5 Meanwhile, as they expected the Athenian ships to arrive from Zacynthus, they intended, if they failed to take the place before, to block up the entrance of the harbour to prevent their being able to anchor inside it.

6 For the island of Sphacteria, stretching along in a line close in front of the harbour, at once makes it safe and narrows its entrances, leaving a passage for two ships on the side nearest Pylos and the Athenian fortifications, and for eight or nine on that next the rest of the mainland: for the rest, the island was entirely covered with wood, and without paths through not being inhabited, and about one mile and five furlongs in length.

7 The inlets the Lacedaemonians meant to close with a line of ships placed close together, with their prows turned towards the sea, and, meanwhile, fearing that the enemy might make use of the island to operate against them, carried over some heavy infantry thither, stationing others along the coast.

8 By this means the island and the continent would be alike hostile to the Athenians, as they would be unable to land on either; and the shore of Pylos itself outside the inlet towards the open sea having no harbour, and, therefore, presenting no point which they could use as a base to relieve their countrymen, they, the Lacedaemonians, without sea-fight or risk would in all probability become masters of the place, occupied, as it had been on the spur of the moment, and unfurnished with provisions.

9 This being determined, they carried over to the island the heavy infantry, drafted by lot from all the companies. Some others had crossed over before in relief parties, but these last who were left there were four hundred and twenty in number, with their Helot attendants, commanded by Epitadas, son of Molobrus.

Chapter 9

1 Meanwhile Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians about to attack him by sea and land at once, himself was not idle. He drew up under the fortification and enclosed in a stockade the galleys remaining to him of those which had been left him, arming the sailors taken out of them with poor shields made most of them of osier, it being impossible to procure arms in such a desert place, and even these having been obtained from a thirty-oared Messenian privateer and a boat belonging to some Messenians who happened to have come to them. Among these Messenians were forty heavy infantry, whom he made use of with the rest.

2 Posting most of his men, unarmed and armed, upon the best fortified and strong points of the place towards the interior, with orders to repel any attack of the land forces, he picked sixty heavy infantry and a few archers from his whole force, and with these went outside the wall down to the sea, where he thought that the enemy would most likely attempt to land. Although the ground was difficult and rocky, looking towards the open sea, the fact that this was the weakest part of the wall would, he thought, encourage their ardor,

3 as the Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had here paid little attention to their defences, and the enemy if he could force a landing might feel secure of taking the place.

4 At this point, accordingly, going down to the water's edge, he posted his heavy infantry to prevent, if possible, a landing, and encouraged them in the following terms:—

Chapter 10

1 ‘Soldiers and comrades in this adventure, I hope that none of you in our present strait will think to show his wit by exactly calculating all the perils that encompass us, but that you will rather hasten to close with the enemy, without staying to count the odds, seeing in this your best chance of safety. In emergencies like ours calculation is out of place; the sooner the danger is faced the better.

2 To my mind also most of the chances are for us, if we will only stand fast and not throw away our advantages, overawed by the numbers of the enemy.

3 One of the points in our favour is the awkwardness of the landing. This, however, only helps us if we stand our ground. If we give way it will be practicable enough, in spite of its natural difficulty, without a defender; and the enemy will instantly become more formidable from the difficulty he will have in retreating, supposing that we succeed in repulsing him, which we shall find it easier to do, while he is on board his ships, than after he has landed and meets us on equal terms.

4 As to his numbers, these need not too much alarm you. Large as they may be he can only engage in small detachments, from the impossibility of bringing to. Besides, the numerical superiority that we have to meet is not that of an army on land with everything else equal, but of troops on board ship, upon an element where many favorable accidents are required to act with effect.

5 I therefore consider that his difficulties may be fairly set against our numerical deficiencies, and at the same time I charge you, as Athenians who know by experience what landing from ships on a hostile territory means, and how impossible it is to drive back an enemy determined enough to stand his ground and not to be frightened away by the surf and the terrors of the ships sailing in, to stand fast in the present emergency, beat back the enemy at the water's edge, and save yourselves and the place.’

Chapter 11

1 Thus encouraged by Demosthenes, the Athenians felt more confident, and went down to meet the enemy, posting themselves along the edge of the sea.

2 The Lacedaemonians now put themselves in movement and simultaneously assaulted the fortification with their land forces and with their ships, forty-three in number, under their admiral, Thrasymelidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spartan, who made his attack just where Demosthenes expected.

3 The Athenians had thus to defend themselves on both sides, from the land and from the sea; the enemy rowing up in small detachments, the one relieving the other—it being impossible for many to bring to at once—and showing great ardor and cheering each other on, in the endeavor to force a passage and to take the fortification.

4 He who most distinguished himself was Brasidas. Captain of a galley, and seeing that the captains and steersmen, impressed by the difficulty of the position, hung back even where a landing might have seemed possible, for fear of wrecking their vessels, he shouted out to them, that they must never allow the enemy to fortify himself in their country for the sake of saving timber, but must shiver their vessels and force a landing; and bade the allies, instead of hesitating in such a moment to sacrifice their ships for Lacedaemon in return for her many benefits, to run them boldly aground, land in one way or another, and make themselves masters of the place and its garrison.

Chapter 12

1 Not content with this exhortation, he forced his own steersman to run his ship ashore, and stepping on to the gangway, was endeavoring to land, when he was cut down by the Athenians, and after receiving many wounds fainted away. Falling into the bows, his shield slipped off his arm into the sea, and being thrown ashore was picked up by the Athenians, and afterwards used for the trophy which they set up for this attack.

2 The rest also did their best, but were not able to land, owing to the difficulty of the ground and the unflinching tenacity of the Athenians.

3 It was a strange reversal of the order of things for Athenians to be fighting from the lands and from Laconian land too, against Lacedaemonians coming from the sea; while Lacedaemonians were trying to land from shipboard in their own country, now become hostile, to attack Athenians, although the former were chiefly famous at the time as an inland people and superior by land, the latter as a maritime people with a navy that had no equal.

Chapter 13

1 After continuing their attacks during that day and most of the next, the Peloponnesians desisted, and the day after sent some of their ships to Asine for timber to make engines, hoping to take by their aid, in spite of its height, the wall opposite the harbour, where the landing was easiest.

2 At this moment the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus arrived, now numbering fifty sail, having been reinforced by some of the ships on guard at Naupactus and by four Chian vessels.

3 Seeing the coast and the island both crowded with heavy infantry, and the hostile ships in harbour showing no signs of sailing out, at a loss where to anchor, they sailed for the moment to the desert island of Prote, not far off, where they passed the night. The next day they got under weigh in readiness to engage in the open sea if the enemy chose to put out to meet them, being determined in the event of his not doing so to sail in and attack him.

4 The Lacedaemonians did not put out to sea, and having omitted to close the inlets as they had intended remained quiet on shore, engaged in manning their ships and getting ready, in the case of any one sailing in, to fight in the harbour, which is a fairly large one.

Chapter 14

1 Perceiving this, the Athenians advanced against them by each inlet, and falling on the enemy's fleet, most of which was by this time afloat and in line, at once put it to flight, and giving chase as far as the short distance allowed, disabled a good many vessels, and took five, one with its crew on board; dashing in at the rest that had taken refuge on shore, and battering some that were still being manned, before they could put out, and lashing on to their own ships and towing off empty others whose crews had fled.

2 At this sight the Lacedaemonians, maddened by a disaster which cut off their men on the island, rushed to the rescue, and going into the sea with their heavy armour, laid hold of the ships and tried to drag them back, each man thinking that success depended on his individual exertions.

3 Great was the melee, and quite in contradiction to the naval tactics usual to the two combatants; the Lacedaemonians in their excitement and dismay being actually engaged in a sea-fight on land, while the victorious Athenians, in their eagerness to push their success as far as possible, were carrying on a land-fight from their ships.

4 After great exertions and numerous wounds on both sides they separated, the Lacedaemonians saving their empty ships, except those first taken;

5 and both parties returning to their camp, the Athenians set up a trophy, gave back the dead, secured the wrecks, and at once began to cruise round and jealously watch the island, with its intercepted garrison, while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, whose contingents had now all come up, stayed where they were before Pylos.

Chapter 15

1 When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, the disaster was thought so serious that the Lacedaemonians resolved that the authorities should go down to the camp, and decide on the spot what was best to be done.

2 There seeing that it was impossible to help their men, and not wishing to risk their being reduced by hunger or overpowered by numbers, they determined, with the consent of the Athenian generals, to conclude an armistice at Pylos and send envoys to Athens to obtain a convention, and to endeavor to get back their men as quickly as possible.

Chapter 16

1 The generals accepting their offers, an armistice was concluded upon the terms following:— That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylos and deliver up to the Athenians the ships that had fought in the late engagement, and all in Laconia that were vessels of war, and should make no attack on the fortification either by land or by sea. That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send to the men in the island a certain fixed quantity of corn ready kneaded, that is to say, two quarts of barley meal, one pint of wine, and a piece of meat for each man, and half the same quantity for a servant. That this allowance should be sent in under the eyes of the Athenians, and that no boat should sail to the island except openly. That the Athenians should continue to guard the island the same as before, without however landing upon it, and should refrain from attacking the Peloponnesian troops either by land or by sea.

2 That if either party should infringe any of these terms in the slightest particular, the armistice should be at once void. That the armistice should hold good until the return of the Lacedaemonian envoys from Athens—the Athenians sending them thither in a galley and bringing them back again—and upon the arrival of the envoys should be at an end, and the ships be restored by the Athenians in the same state as they received them.

3 Such were the terms of the armistice, and the ships were delivered over to the number of sixty, and the envoys sent off accordingly. Arrived at Athens they spoke as follows:—

Chapter 17

1 ‘Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to try to find some way of settling the affair of our men on the island, that shall be at once satisfactory to your interests, and as consistent with our dignity in our misfortune as circumstances permit.

2 We can venture to speak at some length without any departure from the habit of our country. Men of few words where many are not wanted, we can be less brief when there is a matter of importance to be illustrated and an end to be served by its illustration.

3 Meanwhile we beg you to take what we may say, not in a hostile spirit, nor as if we thought you ignorant and wished to lecture you, but rather as a suggestion on the best course to be taken, addressed to intelligent judges.

4 You can now, if you choose, employ your present success to advantage, so as to keep what you have got and gain honor and reputation besides, and you can avoid the mistake of those who meet with an extraordinary piece of good fortune, and are led on by hope to grasp continually at something further, through having already succeeded without expecting it.

5 While those who have known most vicissitudes of good and bad, have also justly least faith in their prosperity; and to teach your city and ours this lesson experience has not been wanting.

Chapter 18

1 To be convinced of this you have only to look at our present misfortune. What power in Hellas stood higher than we did? and yet we are come to you, although we formerly thought ourselves more able to grant what we are now here to ask.

2 Nevertheless; we have not been brought to this by any decay in our power, or through having our heads turned by aggrandizement; no, our resources are what they have always been, and our error has been an error of judgment, to which all are equally liable.

3 Accordingly the prosperity which your city now enjoys, and the accession that it has lately received, must not make you fancy that fortune will be always with you.

4 Indeed sensible men are prudent enough to treat their gains as precarious, just as they would also keep a clear head in adversity, and think that war, so far from staying within the limit to which a combatant may wish to confine it, will run the course that its chances prescribe; and thus, not being puffed up by confidence in military success, they are less likely to come to grief, and most ready to make peace, if they can, while their fortune lasts.

5 This, Athenians, you have a good opportunity to do now with us, and thus to escape the possible disasters which may follow upon your refusal, and the consequent imputation of having owed to accident even your present advantages, when you might have left behind you a reputation for power and wisdom which nothing could endanger.

Chapter 19

1 The Lacedaemonians accordingly invite you to make a treaty and to end the war, and offer peace and alliance and the most friendly and intimate relations in every way and on every occasion between us; and in return ask for the men on the island, thinking it better for both parties not to stand out the end, on the chance of some favorable accident enabling the men to force their way out, or of their being compelled to succumb under the pressure of blockade.

2 Indeed if great enmities are ever to be really settled, we think it will be, not by the system of revenge and military success, and by forcing an opponent to swear to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when the more fortunate combatant waives these his privileges, to be guided by gentler feelings, conquers his rival in generosity, and accords peace on more moderate conditions than he expected.

3 From that moment, instead of the debt of revenge which violence must entail, his adversary owes a debt of generosity to be paid in kind, and is inclined by honor to stand to his agreement.

4 And men oftener act in this manner towards their greatest enemies than where the quarrel is of less importance; they are also by nature as glad to give way to those who first yield to them, as they are apt to be provoked by arrogance to risks condemned by their own judgment.

Chapter 20

1 To apply this to ourselves: if peace was ever desirable for both parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally, personally as well as politically, and you to miss the advantages that we now offer you.

2 While the issue is still in doubt, and you have reputation and our friendship in prospect, and we the compromise of our misfortune before anything fatal occur, let us be reconciled, and for ourselves choose peace instead of war, and grant to the rest of the Hellenes a remission from their sufferings, for which be sure they will think they have chiefly you to thank. The war that they labour under they know not which began, but the peace that concludes it, as it depends on your decision, will by their gratitude he laid to your door.

3 By such a decision you can become firm friends with the Lacedaemonians at their own invitation, which you do not force from them, but oblige them by accepting.

4 And from this friendship consider the advantages that are likely to follow: when Attica and Sparta are at one, the rest of Hellas, be sure, will remain in respectful inferiority before its heads.’

Chapter 21

1 Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians, their idea being that the Athenians, already desirous of a truce and only kept back by their opposition, would joyfully accept a peace freely offered, and give back the men.

2 The Athenians, however, having the men on the island, thought that the treaty would be ready for them whenever they chose to make it, and grasped at something further.

3 Foremost to encourage them in this policy was Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader of the time and very powerful with the multitude, who persuaded them to answer as follows: First, the men in the island must surrender themselves and their arms and be brought to Athens. Next; the Lacedaemonians must restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia, all places acquired not by arms, but by the previous convention, under which they had been ceded by Athens herself at a moment of disaster, when a truce was more necessary to her than at present. This done they might take back their men, and make a truce for as long as both parties might agree.

Chapter 22

1 To this answer the envoys made no reply, but asked that commissioners might be chosen with whom they might confer on each point, and quietly talk the matter over and try to come to some agreement.

2 Hereupon Cleon violently assailed them, saying that he knew from the first that they had no right intentions, and that it was clear enough now by their refusing to speak before the people, and wanting to confer in secret with a committee of two or three. No! if they meant anything honest let them say it out before all.

3 The Lacedaemonians, however, seeing that whatever concessions they might be prepared to make in their misfortune, it was impossible for them to speak before the multitude and lose credit with their allies for a negotiation which might after all miscarry, and on the other hand, that the Athenians would never grant what they asked upon moderate terms, returned from Athens without having effected anything.

Chapter 23

1 Their arrival at once put an end to the armistice at Pylos, and the Lacedaemonians asked back their ships according to the convention. The Athenians, however, alleged an attack on the fort in contravention of the truce, and other grievances seemingly not worth mentioning, and refused to give them back, insisting upon the clause by which the slightest infringement made the armistice void. The Lacedaemonians, after denying the contravention and protesting against their bad faith in the matter of the ships, went away and earnestly addressed themselves to the war.

2 Hostilities were now carried on at Pylos upon both sides with vigor. The Athenians cruised round the island all day with two ships going different ways; and by night, except on the seaward side in windy weather, anchored round it with their whole fleet, which having been reinforced by twenty ships from Athens come to aid in the blockade, now numbered seventy sail; while the Peloponnesians remained encamped on the continent, making attacks on the fort, and on the look-out for any opportunity which might offer itself for the deliverance of their men.

Chapter 24

1 Meanwhile the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily had brought up to the squadron guarding Messina the reinforcement which we left them preparing, and carried on the war from thence,

2 incited chiefly by the Locrians from hatred of the Rhegians, whose territory they had invaded with all their forces.

3 The Syracusans also wished to try their fortune at sea, seeing that the Athenians had only a few ships actually at Rhegium, and hearing that the main fleet destined to join them was engaged in blockading the island.

4 A naval victory, they thought, would enable them to blockade Rhegium by sea and land, and easily to reduce it; a success which would at once place their affairs upon a solid basis, the promontory of Rhegium in Italy and Messina in Sicily being so near each other that it would be impossible for the Athenians to cruise against them and command the strait.

5 The strait in question consists of the sea between Rhegium and Messina, at the point where Sicily approaches nearest to the continent, and is the Charybdis through which the story makes Ulysses sail; and the narrowness of the passage and the strength of the current that pours in from the vast Tyrrhenian and Sicilian mains, have rightly given it a bad reputation.

Chapter 25

1 In this strait the Syracusans and their allies were compelled to engage, late in the day, about the passage of a boat, putting out with rather more than thirty ships against sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian vessels.

2 Defeated by the Athenians they hastily set off, each for himself, to their own stations at Messina and Rhegium, with the loss of one ship; night coming on before the battle was finished.

3 After this the Locrians retired from the Rhegian territory, and the ships of the Syracusans and their allies united and came to anchor at Cape Pelorus in the territory of Messina, where their land forces joined them.

4 Here the Athenians and Rhegians sailed up, and seeing the ships unmanned, made an attack, in which they in their turn lost one vessel, which was caught by a grappling iron, the crew saving themselves by swimming.

5 After this the Syracusans got on board their ships, and while they were being towed along shore to Messina, were again attacked by the Athenians, but suddenly got out to sea and became the assailants, and caused them to lose another vessel.

6 After thus holding their own in the voyage along shore and in the engagement as above described, the Syracusans sailed on into the harbour of Messina.

7 Meanwhile the Athenians, having received warning that Camarina was about to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, sailed thither; and the Messinese took this opportunity to attack by sea and land with all their forces their Chalcidian neighbor, Naxos.

8 The first day they forced the Naxians to keep their walls, and laid waste their country; the next they sailed round with their ships, and laid waste their land on the river Akesines, while their land forces menaced the city.

9 Meanwhile the Sicels came down from the high country in great numbers, to aid against the Messinese; and the Naxians, elated at the sight, and animated by a belief that the Leontines and their other Hellenic allies were coming to their support, suddenly sallied out from the town, and attacked and routed the Messinese, killing more than a thousand of them; while the remainder suffered severely in their retreat home, being attacked by the barbarians on the road, and most of them cut off.

10 The ships put in to Messina, and afterwards dispersed for their different homes. The Leontines and their allies, with the Athenians, upon this at once turned their arms against the now weakened Messina, and attacked, the Athenians with their ships on the side of the harbour, and the land forces on that of the town.

11 The Messinese, however, sailing out with Demoteles and some Locrians who had been left to garrison the city after the disaster, suddenly attacked and routed most of the Leontine army, killing a great number; upon seeing which the Athenians landed from their ships, and falling on the Messinese in disorder chased them back into the town, and setting up a trophy retired to Rhegium.

12 After this the Hellenes in Sicily continued to make war on each other by land, without the Athenians.

Chapter 26

1 Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos were still besieging the Lacedaemonians in the island, the Peloponnesian forces on the continent remaining where they were.

2 The blockade was very laborious for the Athenians from want of food and water; there was no spring except one in the citadel of Pylos itself, and that not a large one, and most of them were obliged to grub up the shingle on the sea beach and drink such water as they could find.

3 They also suffered from want of room, being encamped in a narrow space; and as there was no anchorage for the ships, some took their meals on shore in their turn, while the others were anchored out at sea.

4 But their greatest discouragement arose from the unexpectedly long time which it took to reduce a body of men shut up in a desert island, with only brackish water to drink, a matter which they had imagined would take them only a few days.

5 The fact was, that the Lacedaemonians had made advertisement for volunteers to carry into the island ground corn, wine, cheese, and any other food useful in a siege; high prices being offered, and freedom promised to any of the Helots who should succeed in doing so.

6 The Helots accordingly were most forward to engage in this risky traffic, putting off from this or that part of Peloponnese, and running in by night on the seaward side of the island.

7 They were best pleased, however, when they could catch a wind to carry them in. It was more easy to elude the look-out of the galleys, when it blew from the seaward, as it became impossible for them to anchor round the island; while the Helots had their boats rated at their value in money, and ran them ashore, without caring how they landed, being sure to find the soldiers waiting for them at the landing-places. But all who risked it in fair weather were taken.

8 Divers also swam in under water from the harbour, dragging by a cord in skins poppy-seed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; these at first escaped notice, but afterwards a look-out was kept for them.

9 In short, both sides tried every possible contrivance, the one to throw in provisions, and the other to prevent their introduction.

Chapter 27

1 At Athens, meanwhile, the news that the army was in great distress, and that corn found its way in to the men in the island caused no small perplexity; and the Athenians began to fear that winter might come on and find them still engaged in the blockade. They saw that the convoying of provisions round Peloponnese would be then impossible. The country offered no resources in itself, and even in summer they could not send round enough. The blockade of a place without harbor could no longer be kept up; and the men would either escape by the siege being abandoned, or would watch for bad weather and sail out in the boats that brought in their corn.

2 What caused still more alarm was the attitude of the Lacedaemonians, who must, it was thought by the Athenians, feel themselves on strong ground not to send them any more envoys; and they began to repent having rejected the treaty.

3 Cleon, perceiving the disfavor with which he was regarded for having stood in the way of the convention, now said that their informants did not speak the truth; and upon the messengers recommending them, if they did not believe them, to send some commissioners to see, Cleon himself and Theagenes were chosen by the Athenians as commissioners.

4 Aware that he would now be obliged either to say what had been already said by the men whom he was slandering, or be proved a liar if he said the contrary, he told the Athenians, whom he saw to be not altogether disinclined for a fresh expedition, that instead of sending commissioners and wasting their time and opportunities, if they believed what was told them, they ought to sail against the men.

5 And pointing at Nicias, son of Niceratus, then general, whom he hated, he tauntingly said that it would be easy, if they had men for generals, to sail with a force and take those in the island, and that if he had himself been in command, he would have done it.

Chapter 28

1 Nicias, seeing the Athenians murmuring against Cleon for not sailing now if it seemed to him so easy, and further seeing himself the object of attack, told him that for all that the generals cared, he might take what force he chose and make the attempt.

2 At first Cleon fancied that this resignation was merely a figure of speech, and was ready to go, but finding that it was seriously meant, he drew back, and said that Nicias, not he, was general, being now frightened, and having never supposed that Nicias would go so far as to retire in his favour.

3 Nicias, however, repeated his offer, and resigned the command against Pylos, and called the Athenians to witness that he did so. And as the multitude is wont to do, the more Cleon shrank from the expedition and tried to back out of what he had said, the more they encouraged Nicias to hand over his command, and clamored at Cleon to go.

4 At last, not knowing how to get out of his words, he undertook the expedition, and came forward and said that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians, but would sail without taking any one from the city with him, except the Lemnians and Imbrians that were at Athens, with some targeteers that had come up from Aenus, and four hundred archers from other quarters. With these and the soldiers at Pylos, he would within twenty days either bring the Lacedaemonians alive, or kill them on the spot.

5 The Athenians could not help laughing at his fatuity, while sensible men comforted themselves with the reflection that they must gain in either circumstance; either they would be rid of Cleon, which they rather hoped, or if disappointed in this expectation, would reduce the Lacedaemonians.

Chapter 29

1 After he had settled everything in the assembly, and the Athenians had voted him the command of the expedition, he chose as his colleague Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, and pushed forward the preparations for his voyage.

2 His choice fell upon Demosthenes because he heard that he was contemplating a descent on the island; the soldiers distressed by the difficulties of the position, and rather besieged than besiegers, being eager to fight it out, while the firing of the island had increased the confidence of the general.

3 He had been at first afraid, because the island having never been inhabited was almost entirely covered with wood and without paths, thinking this to be in the enemy's favour, as he might land with a large force, and yet might suffer loss by an attack from an unseen position. The mistakes and forces of the enemy the wood would in a great measure conceal from him, while every blunder of his own troops would be at once detected, and they would be thus able to fall upon him unexpectedly just where they pleased, the attack being always in their power.

4 If, on the other hand, he should force them to engage in the thicket, the smaller number who knew the country would, he thought, have the advantage over the larger who were ignorant of it, while his own army might be cut off imperceptibly, in spite of its numbers, as the men would not be able to see where to succor each other.

Chapter 30

1 The Aetolian disaster, which had been mainly caused by the wood, had not a little to do with these reflections.

2 Meanwhile, one of the soldiers who were compelled by want of room to land on the extremities of the island and take their dinners, with outposts fixed to prevent a surprise, set fire to a little of the wood without meaning to do so; and as it came on to blow soon afterwards, almost the whole was consumed before they were aware of it. Demosthenes was now able for the first time to see how numerous the

3 Lacedaemonians really were, having up to this moment been under the impression that they took in provisions for a smaller number; he also saw that the Athenians thought success important and were anxious about it, and that it was now easier to land on the island, and accordingly got ready for the attempt, sent for troops from the allies in the neighborhood, and pushed forward his other preparations.

4 At this moment Cleon arrived at Pylos with the troops which he had asked for, having sent on word to say that he was coming. The first step taken by the two generals after their meeting was to send a herald to the camp on the mainland, to ask if they were disposed to avoid all risk and to order the men on the island to surrender themselves and their arms, to be kept in gentle custody until some general convention should be concluded.

Chapter 31

1 On the rejection of this proposition the generals let one day pass, and the next embarking all their heavy infantry on board a few ships, put out by night, and a little before dawn landed on both sides of the island from the open sea and from the harbour, being about eight hundred strong, and advanced with a run against the first post in the island.

2 The enemy had distributed his force as follows:—In this first post there were about thirty heavy infantry; the center and most level part, where the water was, was held by the main body, and by Epitadas their commander; while a small party guarded the very end of the island, towards Pylos, which was precipitous on the sea-side and very difficult to attack from the land, and where there was also a sort of old fort of stones rudely put together, which they thought might be useful to them, in case they should be forced to retreat. Such was their disposition.

Chapter 32

1 The advanced post thus attacked by the Athenians was at once put to the sword, the men being scarcely out of bed and still arming, the landing having taken them by surprise, as they fancied the ships were only sailing as usual to their stations for the night.

2 As soon as day broke, the rest of the army landed, that is to say, all the crews of rather more than seventy ships, except the lowest rank of oars, with the arms they carried, eight hundred archers, and as many targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all the other troops on duty round Pylos, except the garrison on the fort.

3 The tactics of Demosthenes had divided them into companies of two hundred, more or less, and made them occupy the highest points in order to paralyze the enemy by surrounding him on every side and thus leaving him without any tangible adversary, exposed to the cross-fire of their host; plied by those in his rear if he attacked in front, and by those on one flank he moved against those on the other.

4 In short, wherever he went he would have the assailants behind him, and these light-armed assailants, the most awkward of all; arrows, darts, stones, and slings making them formidable at a distance, and there being no means of getting at them at close quarters, as they could conquer flying, and the moment their pursuer turned they were upon him. Such was the idea that inspired Demosthenes in his conception of the descent, and presided over its execution.

Chapter 33

1 Meanwhile the main body of the troops in the island (that under Epitadas), seeing their outpost cut off and an army advancing against them, serried their ranks and pressed forward to close with the Athenian heavy infantry in front of them, the light troops being upon their flanks and rear.

2 However, they were not able to engage or to profit by their superior skill, the light troops keeping them in check on either side with their missiles, and the heavy infantry remaining stationary instead of advancing to meet them; and although they routed the light troops wherever they ran up and approached too closely, yet they retreated fighting, being lightly equipped, and easily getting the start in their flight, from the difficult and rugged nature of the ground, in an island hitherto desert, over which the Lacedaemonians could not pursue them with their heavy armour.

Chapter 34

1 After this skirmishing had lasted some little while, the Lacedaemonians became unable to dash out with the same rapidity as before upon the points attacked, and the light troops, finding that they now fought with less vigor, became more confident. They could see with their own eyes that they were many times more numerous than the enemy; they were now more familiar with his aspect and found him less terrible, the result not having justified the apprehensions which they had suffered, when they first landed in slavish dismay at the idea of attacking Lacedaemonians; and accordingly their fear changing to disdain, they now rushed all together with loud shouts upon them, and pelted them with stones, darts, and arrows, whichever came first to hand.

2 The shouting accompanying their onset confounded the Lacedaemonians, unaccustomed to this mode of fighting; dust rose from the newly-burnt wood, and it was impossible to see in front of one with the arrows and stones flying through clouds of dust from the hands of numerous assailants.

3 The Lacedaemonians had now to sustain a rude conflict; their caps would not keep out the arrows, darts had broken off in the armour of the wounded, while they themselves were helpless for offence, being prevented from using their eyes to see what was before them, and unable to hear the words of command for the hubbub raised by the enemy; danger encompassed them on every side, and there was no hope of any means of defence or safety.

Chapter 35

1 At last, after many had been already wounded in the confined space in which they were fighting, they formed in close order and retired on the fort at the end of the island, which was not far off, and to their friends who held it.

2 The moment they gave way, the light troops became bolder and pressed upon them, shouting louder than ever, and killed as many as they came up with in their retreat, but most of the Lacedaemonian made good their escape to the fort, and with the garrison in it ranged themselves all along its whole extent to repulse the enemy wherever it was assailable.

3 The Athenians pursuing, unable to surround and hem them in, owing to the strength of the ground, attacked them in front and tried to storm the position.

4 For a long time, indeed for most of the day, both sides held out against all the torments of the battle, thirst, and sun, the one endeavoring to drive the enemy from the high ground, the other to maintain himself upon it, it being now more easy for the Lacedaemonians to defend themselves than before, as they could not be surrounded upon the flanks.

Chapter 36

1 The struggle began to seem endless, when the commander of the Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were losing their labour: but that if they would give him some archers and light troops to go round on the enemy's rear by a way he would undertake to find, he thought he could force the approach.

2 Upon receiving what he asked for, he started from a point out of sight in order not to be seen by the enemy, and creeping on wherever the precipices of the island permitted, and where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to the strength of the ground, kept no guard, succeeded after the greatest difficulty in getting round without their seeing him, and suddenly appeared on the high grounding their rear, to the dismay of the surprised enemy and the still greater joy of his expectant friends.

3 The Lacedaemonians thus placed between two fires, and in the same dilemma, to compare small things with great, as at Thermopylae, where the defenders were cut off through the Persians getting round by the path, being now attacked in front and behind, began to give way, and overcome by the odds against them and exhausted from want of food, retreated.The Athenians were already masters of the approaches

Chapter 37

1 when Cleon and Demosthenes perceiving that, if the enemy gave way a single step further, they would be destroyed by their soldiery, put a stop to the battle and held their men back; wishing to take the Lacedaemonians alive to Athens, and hoping that their stubbornness might relax on hearing the offer of terms, and that they might surrender and yield to the present overwhelming danger.

2 Proclamation was accordingly made, to know if they would surrender themselves and their arms to the Athenians to be dealt with at their discretion.

Chapter 38

1 The Lacedaemonians hearing this offer, most of them lowered their shields and waved their hands to show that they accepted it. Hostilities now ceased, and a parley was held between Cleon and Demosthenes and Styphon, son of Pharax, the other side; since Epitadas, the first of the previous commanders, had been killed, and Hippagretas, the next in command, left for dead among the slain, though still alive, and thus the command had devolved upon Styphon according to the law, in case of anything happening to his superiors.

2 Styphon and his companions said they wished to send a herald to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland, to know what they were to do.

3 The Athenians would not let any of them go, but themselves called for heralds from the mainland, and after questions had been carried backwards and forwards two or three times, the last man that passed over from the Lacedaemonians on the continent brought this message: ‘The Lacedaemonians bid you to decide for yourselves so long as you do nothing dishonourable;’ upon which after consulting together they surrendered themselves and their arms.

4 The Athenians, after guarding them that day and night, the next morning set up a trophy in the island, and got ready to sail, giving their prisoners in batches to be guarded by the captains of the galleys; and the Lacedaemonians sent a herald and took up their dead.

5 The number of the killed and prisoners taken in the island was as follows: four hundred and twenty heavy infantry had passed over; three hundred all but eight were taken alive to Athens; the rest were killed. About a hundred and twenty of the prisoners were Spartans. The Athenian loss was small, the battle not having been fought at close quarters.

Chapter 39

1 The blockade in all, counting from the fight at sea to the battle in the island, had lasted seventy-two days.

2 For twenty of these, during the absence of the envoys sent to treat for peace, the men had provisions given them, for the rest they were fed by the smugglers. Corn and other victual was found in the island; the commander Epitadas having kept the men upon half rations.

3 The Athenians and Peloponnesians now each withdrew their forces from Pylos, and went home, and crazy as Cleon's promise was, he fulfilled it, by bringing the men to Athens within the twenty days as he had pledged himself to do.

Chapter 40

1 Nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hellenes so much as this. It was the opinion that no force or famine could make the Lacedaemonians give up their arms, but that they would fight on as they could, and die with them in their hands:

2 indeed people could scarcely believe that those who had surrendered were of the same stuff as the fallen; and an Athenian ally, who some time after insultingly asked one of the prisoners from the island if those that had fallen were men of honor, received for answer that the atraktos—that is, the arrow—would be worth a great deal if it could tell men of honor from the rest; in allusion to the fact that the killed were those whom the stones and the arrow happened to hit.

Chapter 41

1 Upon the arrival of the men the Athenians determined to keep them in prison until the peace, and if the Peloponnesians invaded their country in the interval, to bring them out and put them to death.

2 Meanwhile the defence of Pylos was not forgotten; the Messenians from Naupactus sent to their old country, to which Pylos formerly belonged, some of the likeliest of their number, and began a series of incursions into Laconia, which their common dialect rendered most destructive.

3 The Lacedaemonians, hitherto without experience of incursions or a warfare of the kind, finding the Helots deserting, and fearing the march of revolution in their country, began to be seriously uneasy, and in spite of their unwillingness to betray this to the Athenians began to send envoys to Athens, and tried to recover Pylos and the prisoners.

4 The Athenians, however, kept grasping at more, and dismissed envoy after envoy without their having effected anything. Such was the history of the affair of Pylos.

Chapter 42

1 The same summer, directly after these events, the Athenians made an expedition against the territory of Corinth with eighty ships and two thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and two hundred cavalry on board horse transports, accompanied by the Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians from the allies; under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, with two colleagues.

2 Putting out to sea they made land at daybreak between Chersonese and Rheitus, at the beach of the country underneath the Solygian hill, upon which the Dorians in old times established themselves and carried on war against the Aeolian inhabitants of Corinth, and where a village now stands called Solygia. The beach where the fleet came to is about a mile and a half from the village, seven miles from Corinth, and two and a quarter from the Isthmus.

3 The Corinthians had heard from Argos of the coming of the Athenian armament, and had all come up to the Isthmus long before, with the exception of those who lived beyond it, and also of five hundred who were away in garrison in Ambracia and Leucadia; and they were there in full force watching for the Athenians to land.

4 These last, however, gave them the slip by coming in the dark; and being informed by signals of the fact, the Corinthians left half their number at Cenchreae, in case the Athenians should go against Crommyon, and marched in all haste to the rescue.

Chapter 43

1 Battus, one of the two generals present at the action, went with a company to defend the village of Solygia, which was unfortified; Lycophron remaining to give battle with the rest.

2 The Corinthians first attacked the right wing of the Athenians, which had just landed in front of Chersonese, and afterwards the rest of the army. The battle was an obstinate one, and fought throughout hand to hand.

3 The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians, who had been placed at the end of the line, received and with some difficulty repulsed the Corinthians, who thereupon retreated to a wall upon the rising ground behind, and throwing down the stones upon them, came on again singing the paean, and being received by the Athenians, were again engaged at close quarters.

4 At this moment a Corinthian company having come to the relief of the left wing, routed and pursued the Athenian right to the sea, whence they were in their turn driven back by the Athenians and Carystians from the ships.

5 Meanwhile the rest of the army on either side fought on tenaciously, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron sustained the attack of the Athenian left, which it was feared might attempt the village of Solygia.

Chapter 44

1 After holding on for a long while without either giving way, the Athenians aided by their horse, of which the enemy had none, at length routed the Corinthians, who retired to the hill and halting remained quiet there, without coming down again.

2 It was in this rout of the right wing that they had the most killed, Lycophron their general being among the number. The rest of the army, broken and put to flight in this way without being seriously pursued or hurried, retired to the high ground and there took up its position.

3 The Athenians, finding that the enemy no longer offered to engage them, stripped his dead and took up their own and immediately set up a trophy.

4 Meanwhile, the half of the Corinthians left at Cenchreae to guard against the Athenians sailing on Crommyon, although unable to see the battle for Mount Oneion, found out what was going on by the dust, and hurried up to the rescue; as did also the older Corinthians from the town, upon discovering what had occurred.

5 The Athenians seeing them all coming against them, and thinking that they were reinforcements from the neighbouring Peloponnesians, withdrew in haste to their ships with their spoils and their own dead, except two that they left behind, not being able to find them,

6 and going on board crossed over to the islands opposite, and from thence sent a herald, and took up under truce the bodies which they had left behind. Two hundred and twelve Corinthians fell in the battle, and rather less than fifty Athenians.

Chapter 45

1 Weighing from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to Crommyon in the Corinthian territory, about thirteen miles from the city, and coming to anchor laid waste the country, and passed the night there.

2 The next day, after first coasting along to the territory of Epidaurus and making a descent there, they came to Methana between Epidaurus and Troezen, and drew a wall across and fortified the isthmus of the peninsula, and left a post there from which incursions were henceforth made upon the country of Troezen, Haliae, and Epidaurus. After walling off this spot the fleet sailed off home.

Chapter 46

1 While these events were going on, Eurymedon and Sophocles had put to sea with the Athenian fleet from Pylos on their way to Sicily, and arriving at Corcyra, joined the townsmen in an expedition against the party established on Mount Istone, who had crossed over, as I have mentioned, after the revolution, and become masters of the country, to the great hurt of the inhabitants.

2 Their stronghold having been taken by an attack, the garrison took refuge in a body upon some high ground and there capitulated, agreeing to give up their mercenary auxiliaries, lay down their arms, and commit themselves to the discretion of the Athenian people.

3 The generals carried them across under truce to the island of Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they could be sent to Athens, upon the understanding that if any were caught running away, all would lose the benefit of the treaty.

4 Meanwhile the leaders of the Corcyraean commons, afraid that the Athenians might spare the lives of the prisoners, had recourse to the following stratagem.

5 They gained over some few men on the island by secretly sending friends with instructions to provide them with a boat, and to tell them, as if for their own sakes, that they had best escape as quickly as possible, as the Athenian generals were going to give them up to the Corcyraean people.

Chapter 47

1 These representations succeeding, it was so arranged that the men were caught sailing out in the boat that was provided, and the treaty became void accordingly, and the whole were given up to the Corcyraeans.

2 For this result the Athenian generals were in a great measure responsible; their evident disinclination to sail for Sicily, and thus to leave to others the honour of conducting the men to Athens, encouraged the intriguers in their design and seemed to affirm the truth of their representations.

3 The prisoners thus handed over were shut up by the Corcyraeans in a large building, and afterwards taken out by twenties and led past two lines of heavy infantry, one on each side, being bound together, and beaten and stabbed by the men in the lines whenever any saw pass a personal enemy; while men carrying whips went by their side and hastened on the road those that walked too slowly.

Chapter 48

1 As many as sixty men were taken out and killed in this way without the knowledge of their friends in the building, who fancied they were merely being moved from one prison to another. At last, however, some one opened their eyes to the truth, upon which they called upon the Athenians to kill them themselves, if such was their pleasure, and refused any longer to go out of the building, and said they would do all they could to prevent any one coming in.

2 The Corcyraeans, not liking themselves to force a passage by the doors, got up on the top of the building, and breaking through the roof, threw down the tiles and let fly arrows at them, from which the prisoners sheltered themselves as well as they could.

3 Most of their number, meanwhile, were engaged in dispatching themselves by thrusting into their throats the arrows shot by the enemy, and hanging themselves with the cords taken from some beds, that happened to be there, and with strips made from their clothing; adopting, in short, every possible means of self-destruction, and also falling victims to the missiles of their enemies on the roof. Night came on while these horrors were enacting, and most of it had passed before they were concluded.

4 When it was day the Corcyraeans threw them in layers upon wagons and carried them out of the city. All the women taken in the stronghold were sold as slaves.

5 In this way the Corcyraeans of the mountain were destroyed by the commons; and so after terrible excesses the party strife came to an end, at least as far as the period of this war is concerned, for of one party there was practically nothing left.

6 Meanwhile the Athenians sailed off to Sicily, their primary destination, and carried on the war with their allies there.

Chapter 49

1 At the close of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made an expedition against Anactorium, the Corinthian town lying at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, and took it by treachery; and the Acarnanians themselves sending settlers from all parts of Acarnania occupied the place.Summer was now over.

Chapter 50

1 During the winter ensuing Aristides, son of Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian ships sent to collect money from the allies, arrested at Eion on the Strymon Artaphernes, a Persian, on his way from the king to Lacedaemon.

2 He was conducted to Athens, where the Athenians got his dispatches translated from the Assyrian character and read them. With numerous references to other subjects, they in substance told the Lacedaemonians that the king did not know what they wanted, as of the many ambassadors they had sent him no two ever told the same story; however they were prepared to speak plainly they might send him some envoys with this Persian.

3 The Athenians afterwards sent back Artaphernes in a galley to Ephesus, and ambassadors with him, who heard there of the death of King Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, which took place about that time, and so returned home.

Chapter 51

1 The same winter the Chians pulled down their new wall at the command of the Athenians, who suspected them of meditating an insurrection, after first however obtaining pledges from the Athenians, and security as far as this was possible for their continuing to treat them as before. Thus the winter ended, and with it ended the seventh year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.

Chapter 52

1 In the first days of the next summer there was an eclipse of the sun at the time of new moon, and in the early part of the same month an earthquake.

2 Meanwhile, the Mitylenian and other Lesbian exiles set out, for the most part from the continent, with mercenaries hired in Peloponnese, and others levied on the spot, and took Rhoeteum, but restored it without injury on the receipt of two thousand Phocaean staters.

3 After this they marched against Antandrus and took the town by treachery, their plan being to free Antandrus and the rest of the Actaean towns, formerly owned by Mitylene but now held by the Athenians. Once fortified there, they would have every facility for shipbuilding from the vicinity of Ida and the consequent abundance of timber, and plenty of other supplies, and might from this base easily ravage Lesbos, which was not far off, and make themselves masters of the Aeolian towns on the continent.While these were the schemes of the exiles,

Chapter 53

1 the Athenians in the same summer made an expedition with sixty ships, two thousand heavy infantry, a few cavalry, and some allied troops from Miletus and other parts, against Cythera, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, Nicostratus, son of Diotrephes, and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus.

2 Cythera is an island lying off Laconia, opposite Malea; the inhabitants are Lacedaemonians of the class of the Perioeci; and an officer called the Judge of Cythera went over to the place annually from Sparta. A garrison of heavy infantry was also regularly sent there, and great attention paid to the island,

3 as it was the landing-place for the merchantmen from Egypt and Libya, and at the same time secured Laconia from the attacks of privateers from the sea, at the only point where it is assailable, as the whole coast rises abruptly towards the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

Chapter 54

1 Coming to land here with their armament, the Athenians with ten ships and two thousand Milesian heavy infantry took the town of Scandea, on the sea; and with the rest of their forces landing on the side of the island looking towards Malea, went against the lower town of Cythera, where they found all the inhabitants encamped.

2 A battle ensuing, the Cytherians held their ground for some little while, and then turned and fled into the upper town, where they soon afterwards capitulated to Nicias and his colleagues, agreeing to leave their fate to the decision of the Athenians, their lives only being safe.

3 A correspondence had previously been going on between Nicias and certain of the inhabitants, which caused the surrender to be effected more speedily, and upon terms more advantageous, present and future, for the Cytherians; who would otherwise have been expelled by the Athenians on account of their being Lacedaemonians and their island being so near to Laconia.

4 After the capitulation, the Athenians occupied the town of Scandea near the harbour, and appointing a garrison for Cythera, sailed to Asine, Helus, and most of the places on the sea, and making descents and passing the night on shore at such spots as were convenient, continued ravaging the country for about seven days.

Chapter 55

1 The Lacedaemonians seeing the Athenians masters of Cythera, and expecting descents of the kind upon their coasts, nowhere opposed them in force, but sent garrisons here and there through the country, consisting of as many heavy infantry as the points menaced seemed to require, and generally stood very much upon the defensive. After the severe and unexpected blow that had befallen them in the island, the occupation of Pylos and Cythera, and the apparition on every side of a war whose rapidity defied precaution, they lived in constant fear of internal revolution,

2 and now took the unusual step of raising four hundred horse and a force of archers, and became more timid than ever in military matters, finding themselves involved in a maritime struggle, which their organisation had never contemplated, and that against Athenians, with whom an enterprise unattempted was always looked upon as a success sacrificed.

3 Besides this, their late numerous reverses of fortune, coming close one upon another without any reason, had thoroughly unnerved them, and they were always afraid of a second disaster like that on the island,

4 and thus scarcely dared to take the field, but fancied that they could not stir without a blunder, for being new to the experience of adversity they had lost all confidence in themselves.

Chapter 56

1 Accordingly they now allowed the Athenians to ravage their seaboard, without making any movement, the garrisons in whose neighbourhood the descents were made always thinking their numbers insufficient, and sharing the general feeling. A single garrison which ventured to resist, near Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, struck terror by its charge into the scattered mob of light troops, but retreated, upon being received by the heavy infantry, with the loss of a few men and some arms, for which the Athenians set up a trophy, and then sailed off to Cythera.

2 From thence they sailed round to the Limeran Epidaurus, ravaged part of the country, and so came to Thyrea in the Cynurian territory, upon the Argive and Laconian border. This district had been given by its Lacedaemonian owners to the expelled Aeginetans to inhabit, in return for their good offices at the time of the earthquake and the rising of the Helots; and also because, although subjects of Athens, they had always sided with Lacedaemon.

Chapter 57

1 While the Athenians were still at sea, the Aeginetans evacuated a fort which they were building upon the coast, and retreated into the upper town where they lived, rather more than a mile from the sea.

2 One of the Lacedaemonian district garrisons which was helping them in the work, refused to enter here with them at their entreaty, thinking it dangerous to shut themselves up within the wall, and retiring to the high ground remained quiet, not considering themselves a match for the enemy.

3 Meanwhile the Athenians landed, and instantly advanced with all their forces and took Thyrea. The town they burnt, pillaging what was in it; the Aeginetans who were not slain in action they took with them to Athens, with Tantalus, son of Patrocles, their Lacedaemonian commander, who had been wounded and taken prisoner.

4 They also took with them a few men from Cythera whom they thought it safest to remove. These the Athenians determined to lodge in the islands: the rest of the Cytherians were to retain their lands and pay four talents' tribute; the Aeginetans captured to be all put to death, on account of the old inveterate feud; and Tantalus to share the imprisonment of the Lacedaemonians taken on the island.

Chapter 58

1 The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and Gela in Sicily first made an armistice with each other, after which embassies from all the other Sicilian cities assembled at Gela to try to bring about a pacification. After many expressions of opinion on one side and the other, according to the griefs and pretensions of the different parties complaining, Hermocrates, son of Hermon, a Syracusan, the most influential man among them, addressed the following words to the assembly:—

Chapter 59

1 ‘If I now address you, Sicilians, it is not because my city is the least in Sicily or the greatest sufferer by the war, but in order to state publicly what appears to me to be the best policy for the whole island.

2 That war is an evil is a proposition so familiar to every one that it would be tedious to develop it. No one is forced to engage in it by ignorance, or kept out of it by fear, if he fancies there is anything to be gained by it. To the former the gain appears greater than the danger, while he latter would rather stand the risk than put up with any immediate sacrifice.

3 But if both should happen to have chosen the wrong moment for acting in this way, advice to make peace would not be unserviceable;

4 and this, if we did but see it, is just what we stand most in need of at the present juncture.I suppose that no one will dispute that we went to war at first, in order to serve our own several interests, that we are now, in view of the same interests, debating how we can make peace; and that if we separate without having as we think our rights, we shall go to war again.

Chapter 60

1 And yet, as men of sense, we ought to see that our separate interests are not alone at stake in the present congress: there is also the question whether we have still time to save Sicily, the whole of which in my opinion is menaced by Athenian ambition; and we ought to find in the name of that people more imperious arguments for peace than any which I can advance, when we see the first power in Hellas watching our mistakes with the few ships that she has at present in our waters, and under the fair name of alliance speciously seeking to turn to account the natural hostility that exists between us.

2 If we go to war, and call in to help us a people that are ready enough to carry their arms even where they are not invited; and if we injure ourselves at our own expense, and at the same time serve as the pioneers of their dominion, we may expect when they see us worn out, that they will one day come with a larger armament, and seek to bring all of us into subjection.

Chapter 61

1 And yet as sensible men, if we call in allies and court danger, it should be in order to enrich our different countries with new acquisitions, and not to ruin what they possess already; and we should understand that the intestine discords which are so fatal to communities generally, will be equally so to Sicily, if we, its inhabitants, absorbed in our local quarrels, neglect the common enemy.

2 These considerations should reconcile individual with individual, and city with city, and unite us in a common effort to save the whole of Sicily. Nor should any one imagine that the Dorians only are enemies of Athens, while the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian blood;

3 the attack in question is not inspired by hatred of one of two nationalities, but by a desire for the good things in Sicily, the common property of us all.

4 This is proved by the Athenian reception of the Chalcidian invitation: an ally who has never given them any assistance whatever, at once receives from them almost more than the treaty entitles him to.

5 That the Athenians should cherish this ambition and practise this policy is very excusable; and I do not blame those who wish to rule, but those who are over ready to serve. It is just as much in men's nature to rule those who submit to them, as it is to resist those who molest them; one is not less invariable than the other.

6 Meanwhile all who see these dangers and refuse to provide for them properly, or who have come here without having made up their minds that our first duty is to unite to get rid of the common peril, are mistaken.

7 The quickest way to be rid of it is to make peace with each other; since the Athenians menace us not from their own country, but from that of those who invited them here. In this way instead of war issuing in war, peace quietly ends our quarrels; and the guests who come hither under fair pretences for bad ends, will have good reason for going away without having attained them.

Chapter 62

1 So far as regards the Athenians such are the great advantages proved inherent in a wise policy.

2 Independently of this, in the face of the universal consent that peace is the first of blessings, how can we refuse to make it amongst ourselves; or do you not think that the good which you have, and the ills that you complain of, would be better preserved and cured by quiet than by war; that peace has its honours and splendours of a less perilous kind, not to mention the numerous other blessings that one might dilate on, with the not less numerous miseries of war? These considerations should teach you not to disregard my words, but rather to look in them every one for his own safety.

3 If there be any here who feels certain either by right or might to effect his object, let not this surprise be to him too severe a disappointment. Let him remember that many before now have tried to chastise a wrongdoer, and failing to punish their enemy have not even saved themselves; while many who have trusted in force to gain an advantage, instead of gaining anything more, have been doomed to lose what they had.

4 Vengeance is not necessarily successful because wrong has been done, or strength sure because it is confident; but the incalculable element in the future exercises the widest influence, and is the most treacherous, and yet in fact the most useful of all things, as it frightens us all equally, and thus makes us consider before attacking each other.

Chapter 63

1 Let us therefore now allow the undefined fear of this unknown future, and the immediate terror of the Athenians' presence to produce their natural impression, and let us consider any failure to carry out the programmes that we may each have sketched out for ourselves as sufficiently accounted for by these obstacles, and send away the intruder from the country; and if everlasting peace be impossible between us, let us at all events make a treaty for as long a term as possible, and put off our private differences to another day.

2 In fine, let us recognize that the adoption of my advice will leave us each citizens of a free state, and as such arbiters of our own destiny, able to return good or bad offices with equal effect; while its rejection will make us dependent on others, and thus not only impotent to repel an insult, but on the most favourable supposition, friends to our direst enemies, and at feud with our natural friends.

Chapter 64

1 For myself, though, as I said at first, the representative of a great city, and able to think less of defending myself than of attacking others, I am prepared to concede something in prevision of these dangers. I am not inclined to ruin myself for the sake of hurting my enemies, or so blinded by animosity as to think myself equally master of my own plans and of fortune which I cannot command; but I am ready to give up anything in reason.

2 I call upon the rest of you to imitate my conduct of your own free will, without being forced to do so by the enemy.

3 There is no disgrace in connections giving way to one another, a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to his brethren; above and beyond this we are neighbors, live in the same country, are girt by the same sea, and go by the same name of Sicilians. We shall go to war again, I suppose, when the time comes, and again make peace among ourselves by means of future congresses;

4 but the foreign invader, if we are wise, will always find us united against him, since the hurt of one is the danger of all; and we shall never, in future, invite into the island either allies or mediators.

5 By so acting we shall at the present moment do for Sicily a double service, ridding her at once of the Athenians, and of civil war, and in future shall live in freedom at home, and be less menaced from abroad.’

Chapter 65

1 Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians took his advice, and came to an understanding among themselves to end the war, each keeping what they had—the Camarinaeans taking Morgantina at a price fixed to be paid to the Syracusans—

2 and the allies of the Athenians called the officers in command, and told them that they were going to make peace and that they would be included in the treaty. The generals assenting, the peace was concluded, and the Athenian fleet afterwards sailed away from Sicily.

3 Upon their arrival at Athens, the Athenians banished Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon for having taken bribes to depart when they might have subdued Sicily.

4 So thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the citizens that nothing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible and impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The secret of this was their general extraordinary success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes.

Chapter 66

1 The same summer the Megarians in the city, pressed by the hostilities of the Athenians, who invaded their country twice every year with all their forces, and harassed by the incursions of their own exiles at Pegae, who had been expelled in a revolution by the popular party, began to ask each other whether it would not be better to receive back their exiles, and free the town from one of its two scourges.

2 The friends of the emigrants perceiving the agitation, now more openly than before demanded the adoption of this proposition;

3 and the leaders of the commons, seeing that the sufferings of the times had tired out the constancy of their supporters, entered in their alarm into correspondence with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates, son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and resolved to betray the town, thinking this less dangerous to themselves than the return of the party which they had banished. It was accordingly arranged that the Athenians should first take the long walls extending for nearly a mile from the city to the port of Nisaea, to prevent the Peloponnesians coming to the rescue from that place, where they formed the sole garrison to secure the fidelity of Megara; and that after this the attempt should be made to put into their hands the upper town, which it was thought would then come over with less difficulty.

Chapter 67

1 The Athenians, after plans had been arranged between themselves and their correspondents both as to words and actions, sailed by night to Minoa, the island off Megara, with six hundred heavy infantry under the command of Hippocrates, and took post in a quarry not far off, out of which bricks used to be taken for the walls;

2 while Demosthenes, the other commander, with a detachment of Plataean light troops and another of Peripoli, placed himself in ambush in the precinct of Enyalius, which was still nearer. No one knew of it, except those whose business it was to know that night.

3 A little before daybreak, the traitors in Megara began to act. Every night for a long time back, under pretence of marauding, in order to have a means of opening the gates, they had been used, with the consent of the officer in command, to carry by night a sculling boat upon a cart along the ditch to the sea, and so to sail out, bringing it back again before day upon the cart, and taking it within the wall through the gates, in order, as they pretended, to baffle the Athenian blockade at Minoa, there being no boat to be seen in the harbour.

4 On the present occasion the cart was already at the gates, which had been opened in the usual way for the boat, when the Athenians, with whom this had been concerted, saw it, and ran at the top of their speed from the ambush in order to reach the gates before they were shut again, and while the cart was still there to prevent their being closed; their Megarian accomplices at the same moment killing the guard at the gates.

5 The first to run in was Demosthenes with his Plataeans and Peripoli, just where the trophy now stands; and he was no sooner within the gates than the Plataeans engaged and defeated the nearest party of Peloponnesians who had taken the alarm and come to the rescue, and secured the gates for the approaching Athenian heavy infantry.

Chapter 68

1 After this, each of the Athenians as fast as they entered went against the wall.

2 A few of the Peloponnesian garrison stood their ground at first, and tried to repel the assault, and some of them were killed but the main body took fright and fled; the night attack and the sight of the Megarian traitors in arms against them making them think that all Megara had gone over to the enemy.

3 It so happened also that the Athenian herald of his own idea called out and invited any of the Megarians that wished, to join the Athenian ranks; and this was no sooner heard by the garrison than they gave way, and, convinced that they were the victims of a concerted attack, took refuge in Nisaea.

4 By daybreak, the walls being now taken and the Megarians in the city in great agitation, the persons who had negotiated with the Athenians, supported by the rest of the popular party which was privy to the plot, said that they ought to open the gates and march out to battle.

5 It had been concerted between them that the Athenians should rush in, the moment that the gates were opened, while the conspirators were to be distinguished from the rest by being anointed with oil, and so to avoid being hurt. They could open the gates with more security, as four thousand Athenian heavy infantry from Eleusis, and six hundred horse, had marched all night, according to agreement, and were now close at hand.

6 The conspirators were all ready anointed and at their posts by the gates when one of their accomplices denounced the plot to the opposite party, who gathered together and came in a body, and roundly said that they must not march out—a thing they had never yet ventured on even when in greater force than at present—or wantonly compromise the safety of the town, and that if what they said was not attended to, the battle would have to be fought in Megara. For the rest, they gave no signs of their knowledge of the intrigue, but stoutly maintained that their advice was the best, and meanwhile kept close by and watched the gates, making it impossible for the conspirators to effect their purpose.

Chapter 69

1 The Athenian generals seeing that some obstacle had arisen, and that the capture of the town by force was no longer practicable, at once proceeded to invest Nisaea, thinking that if they could take it before relief arrived, the surrender of Megara would soon follow.

2 Iron, stone-masons, and everything else required quickly coming up from Athens, the Athenians started from the wall which they occupied, and from this point built a cross wall looking towards Megara down to the sea on either side of Nisaea; the ditch and the walls being divided among the army, stones and bricks taken from the suburb, and the fruit-trees and timber cut down to make a palisade wherever this seemed necessary; the houses also in the suburb with the addition of battlements sometimes entering into the fortification. The whole of this day the work continued,

3 and by the afternoon of the next the wall was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisaea, alarmed by the absolute want of provisions, which they used to take in for the day from the upper town, not anticipating any speedy relief from the Peloponnesians, and supposing Megara to be hostile, capitulated to the Athenians on condition that they should give up their arms, and should each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; their Lacedaemonian commander, and any others of his countrymen in the place, being left to the discretion of the Athenians.

4 On these conditions they surrendered and came out, and the Athenians broke down the long walls at their point of junction with Megara, took possession of Nisaea, and went on with their other preparations.

Chapter 70

1 Just at this time the Lacedaemonian Brasidas, son of Tellis, happened to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, getting ready an army for Thrace. As soon as he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and the safety of Megara, he sent to the Boeotians to meet him as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus, a village so called of the Megarid, under Mount Geraneia, and went himself, with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy infantry, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and such troops of his own as he had already levied, expecting to find Nisaea not yet taken.

2 Hearing of its fall (he had marched out by night to Tripodiscus), he took three hundred picked men from the army, without waiting till his coming should be known, and came up to Megara unobserved by the Athenians, who were down by the sea, ostensibly, and really if possible, to attempt Nisaea, but above all to get into Megara and secure the town. He accordingly invited the townspeople to admit his party, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea.

Chapter 71

1 However, one of the Megarian factions feared that he might expel them and restore the exiles; the other that the commons, apprehensive of this very danger, might set upon them, and the city be thus destroyed by a battle within its gates under the eyes of the ambushed Athenians. He was accordingly refused admittance, both parties electing to remain quiet and await the event;

2 each expecting a battle between the Athenians and the relieving army, and thinking it safer to see their friends victorious before declaring in their favour.Unable to carry his point, Brasidas went back to the rest of the army.

Chapter 72

1 At daybreak the Boeotians joined him. Having determined to relieve Megara, whose danger they considered their own, even before hearing from Brasidas, they were already in full force at Plataea, when his messenger arrived to add spurs to their resolution; and they at once sent on to him two thousand two hundred heavy infantry, and six hundred horse, returning home with the main body.

2 The whole army thus assembled numbered six thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian heavy infantry were drawn up by Nisaea and the sea; but the light troops being scattered over the plain were attacked by the Boeotian horse and driven to the sea, being taken entirely by surprise, as on previous occasions no relief had ever come to the Megarians from any quarter.

3 Here the Boeotians were in their turn charged and engaged by the Athenian horse, and a cavalry action ensued which lasted a long time, and in which both parties claimed the victory.

4 The Athenians killed and stripped the leader of the Boeotian horse and some few of his comrades who had charged right up to Nisaea, and remaining masters of the bodies gave them back under truce, and set up a trophy; but regarding the action as a whole the forces separated without either side having gained a decisive advantage, the Boeotians returning to their army and the Athenians to Nisaea.

Chapter 73

1 After this Brasidas and the army came nearer to the sea and to Megara, and taking up a convenient position, remained quiet in order of battle, expecting to be attacked by the Athenians and knowing that the Megarians were waiting to see which would be the victor.

2 This attitude seemed to present two advantages. Without taking the offensive or willingly provoking the hazards of a battle, they openly showed their readiness to fight, and thus without bearing the burden of the day would fairly reap its honours; while at the same time they effectually served their interests at Megara.

3 For if they had failed to show themselves, they would not have had a chance, but would have certainly been considered vanquished, and have lost the town. As it was, the Athenians might possibly not be inclined to accept their challenge, and their object would be attained without fighting.

4 And so it turned out. The Athenians formed outside the long walls, and the enemy not attacking, there remained motionless; their generals having decided that the risk was too unequal. In fact most of their objects had been already attained; and they would have to begin a battle against superior numbers, and if victorious could only gain Megara, while a defeat would destroy the flower of their heavy soldiery. For the enemy it was different; as even the states actually represented in his army risked each only a part of its entire force, he might well be more audacious. Accordingly after waiting for some time without either side attacking, the Athenians withdrew to Nisaea, and the Peloponnesians after them to the point from which they had set out. The friends of the Megarian exiles now threw aside their hesitation, and opened the gates to Brasidas and the commanders from the different states looking upon him as the victor and upon the Athenians as having declined the battle—and receiving them into the town proceeded to discuss matters with them; the party in correspondence with the Athenians being paralyzed by the turn things had taken.

Chapter 74

1 Afterwards Brasidas let the allies go home, and himself went back to Corinth, to prepare for his expedition to Thrace, his original destination.

2 The Athenians also returning home, the Megarians in the city most implicated in the Athenian negotiation, knowing that they had been detected, presently disappeared; while the rest conferred with the friends of the exiles, and restored the party at Pegae, after binding them under solemn oaths to take no vengeance for the past, and only to consult the real interests of the town.

3 However, as soon as they were in office, they held a review of the heavy infantry, and separating the battalions, picked out about a hundred of their enemies, and of those who were thought to be most involved in the correspondence with the Athenians, brought them before the people, and compelling the vote to be given openly, had them condemned and executed, and established a close oligarchy in the town—

4 a revolution which lasted a very long while, although effected by a very few partisans.

Chapter 75

1 The same summer the Mitylenians were about to fortify Antandrus as they had intended, when Demodocus and Aristides, the commanders of the Athenian squadron engaged in levying subsidies, heard on the Hellespont of what was being done to the place (Lamachus their colleague having sailed with ten ships into the Pontus) and conceived fears of its becoming a second Anaia,—the place in which the Samian exiles had established themselves to annoy Samos, helping the Peloponnesians by sending pilots to their navy, and keeping the city in agitation and receiving all its outlaws. They accordingly got together a force from the allies and set sail, defeated in battle the troops that met them from Antandrus, and retook the place.

2 Not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus, lost his ships at anchor in the river Calex, in the territory of Heraclea, rain having fallen in the interior and the flood coming suddenly down upon them; and himself and his troops passed by land through the Bithynian Thracians on the Asiatic side, and arrived at Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

Chapter 76

1 The same summer the Athenian general, Demosthenes, arrived at Naupactus with forty ships immediately after the return from the Megarid.

2 Hippocrates and himself had had overtures made to them by certain men in the cities in Boeotia, who wished to change the constitution and introduce a democracy as at Athens; Ptoeodorus, a Theban exile, being the chief mover in this intrigue.

3 The seaport town of Siphae, in the bay of Crisae, in the Thespian territory, was to be betrayed to them by one party; Chaeronea (a dependency of what was formerly called the Minyan, now the Boeotian, Orchomenus), to be put into their hands by another from that town, whose exiles were very active in the business, hiring men in Peloponnese. Some Phocians also were in the plot, Chaeronea being the frontier town of Boeotia and close to Phanotis in Phocis.

4 Meanwhile the Athenians were to seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the territory of Tanagra looking towards Euboea; and all these events were to take place simultaneously upon a day appointed, in order that the Boeotians might be unable to unite to oppose them at Delium, being everywhere detained by disturbances at home.

5 Should the enterprise succeed, and Delium be fortified, its authors confidently expected that even if no revolution should immediately follow in Boeotia, yet with these places in their hands, and the country being harassed by incursions, and a refuge in each instance near for the partisans engaged in them, things would not remain as they were, but that the rebels being supported by the Athenians and the forces of the oligarchs divided, it would be possible after a while to settle matters according to their wishes.

Chapter 77

1 Such was the plot in contemplation. Hippocrates with a force raised at home awaited the proper moment to take the field against the Boeotians; while he sent on Demosthenes with the forty ships above mentioned to Naupactus, to raise in those parts an army of Acarnanians and of the other allies, and sail and receive Siphae from the conspirators; a day having been agreed on for the simultaneous execution of both these operations.

2 Demosthenes on his arrival found Oeniadae already compelled by the united Acarnanians to join the Athenian confederacy, and himself raising all the allies in those countries marched against and subdued Salynthius and the Agraeans; after which he devoted himself to the preparations necessary to enable him to be at Siphae by the time appointed.

Chapter 78

1 About the same time in the summer, Brasidas set out on his march for the Thracian places with seventeen hundred heavy infantry, and arriving at Heraclea in Trachis, from thence sent on a messenger to his friends at Pharsalus, to ask them to conduct himself and his army through the country. Accordingly there came to Melitia in Achaia Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, the Chalcidian Proxenus, under whose escort he resumed his march,

2 being accompanied also by other Thessalians, among whom was Niconidas from Larissa, a friend of Perdiccas. It was never very easy to traverse Thessaly without an escort; and throughout all Hellas for an armed force to pass without leave through a neighbour's country, was a delicate step to take. Besides this the Thessalian people had always sympathized with the Athenians.

3 Indeed if instead of the customary close oligarchy there had been a constitutional government in Thessaly, he would never have been able to proceed; since even as it was, he was met on his march at the river Enipeus by certain of the opposite party who forbade his further progress, and complained of his making the attempt without the consent of the nation.

4 To this his escort answered that they had no intention of taking him through against their will; they were only friends in attendance on an unexpected victor. Brasidas himself added that he came as a friend to Thessaly and its inhabitants; his arms not being directed against them but against the Athenians, with whom he was at war, and that although he knew of no quarrel between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians to prevent the two nations having access to each other's territory, he neither would nor could proceed against their wishes; he could only beg them not to stop him.

5 With this answer they went away, and he took the advice of his escort, and pushed on without halting, before a greater force might gather to prevent him. Thus in the day that he set out from Melitia he performed the whole distance to Pharsalus, and encamped on the river Apidanus; and so to Phacium, and from thence to Perrhaebia.

6 Here his Thessalian escort went back, and the Perrhaebians, who are subjects of Thessaly, set him down at Dium in the dominions of Perdiccas, a Macedonian town under Mount Olympus, looking towards Thessaly.

Chapter 79

1 In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before any one could be got ready to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice.

2 The departure of the army from Peloponnese had been procured by the Thracian towns in revolt against Athens and by Perdiccus, alarmed at the successes of the Athenians. The Chalcidians thought that they would be the first objects of an Athenian expedition, not that the neighbouring towns which had not yet revolted did not also secretly join in the invitation; and Perdiccas also had his apprehensions on account of his old quarrels with the Athenians, although not openly at war with them, and above all wished to reduce Arrhabaeus king of the Lyncestians.

3 It had been less difficult for them to get an army to leave Peloponnese, because of the ill fortune of the Lacedaemonians at the present moment.

Chapter 80

1 The attacks of the Athenians upon Peloponnese, and in particular upon Laconia, might, it was hoped, be diverted most effectually by annoying them in return, and by sending an army to their allies, especially as they were willing to maintain it and asked for it to aid them in revolting.

2 The Lacedaemonians were also glad to have an excuse for sending some of the Helots out of the country, for fear that the present aspect of affairs and the occupation of Pylos might encourage them to move.

3 Indeed fear of their numbers and obstinacy even persuaded the Lacedaemonians to the action which I shall now relate, their policy at all times having been governed by the necessity of taking precautions against them. The Helots were invited by a proclamation to pick out those of their number who claimed to have most distinguished themselves against the enemy, in order that they might receive their freedom; the object being to test them, as it was thought that the first to claim their freedom would be the most high spirited and the most apt to rebel.

4 As many as two thousand were selected accordingly, who crowned themselves and went round the temples, rejoicing in their new freedom. The Spartans, however, soon afterwards did away with them, and no one ever knew how each of them perished.

5 The Spartans now therefore gladly sent seven hundred as heavy infantry with Brasidas, who recruited the rest of his force by means of money in Peloponnese.

Chapter 81

1 Brasidas himself was sent out by the Lacedaemonians mainly at his own desire, although the Chalcidians also were eager to have a man so thorough as he had shown himself whenever there was anything to be done at Sparta, and whose after service abroad proved of the utmost use to his country.

2 At the present moment his just and moderate conduct towards the towns generally succeeded in procuring their revolt, besides the places which he managed to take by treachery; and thus when the Lacedaemonians desired to treat, as they ultimately did, they had places to offer in exchange, and the burden of war meanwhile shifted from Peloponnese. Later on in the war, after the events in Sicily, the present valour and conduct of Brasidas, known by experience to some, by hearsay to others, was what mainly created in the allies of Athens a feeling for the Lacedaemonians.

3 He was the first who went out and showed himself so good a man at all points as to leave behind him the conviction that the rest were like him.

Chapter 82

1 Meanwhile his arrival in the Thracian country no sooner became known to the Athenians than they declared war against Perdiccas, whom they regarded as the author of the expedition, and kept a closer watch on their allies in that quarter.

Chapter 83

1 Upon the arrival of Brasidas and his army, Perdiccas immediately started with them and with his own forces against Arrhabaeus, son of Bromerus king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, his neighbour, with whom he had a quarrel and whom he wished to subdue.

2 However, when he arrived with his army and Brasidas at the pass leading into Lyncus, Brasidas told him that before commencing hostilities he wished to go and try to persuade Arrhabaeus to become the ally of Lacedaemon,

3 this latter having already made overtures intimating his willingness to make Brasidas arbitrator between them, and the Chalcidian envoys accompanying him having warned him not to remove the apprehensions of Perdiccas, in order to insure his greater zeal in their cause.

4 Besides, the envoys of Perdiccas had talked at Lacedaemon about his bringing many of the places round him into alliance with them; and thus Brasidas thought he might take a larger view of the question of Arrhabaeus.

5 Perdiccas however retorted that he had not brought him with him to arbitrate in their quarrel, but to put down the enemies whom he might point out to him; and that while he, Perdiccas, maintained half his army it was a breach of faith for Brasidas to parley with Arrhabaeus.

6 Nevertheless Brasidas disregarded the wishes of Perdiccas and held the parley in spite of him, and suffered himself to be persuaded to lead off the army without invading the country of Arrhabaeus; after which Perdiccas, holding that faith had not been kept with him, contributed only a third instead of half of the support of the army.

Chapter 84

1 The same summer, without loss of time, Brasidas marched with the Chalcidians against Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians, a little before vintage.

2 The inhabitants were divided into two parties on the question of receiving him; those who had joined the Chalcidians in inviting him, and the popular party. However, fear for their fruit, which was still out, enabled Brasidas to persuade the multitude to admit him alone, and to hear what he had to say before making a decision; and he was admitted accordingly and appeared before the people, and not being a bad speaker for a Lacedaemonian, addressed them as follows:—

Chapter 85

1 ‘Acanthians, the Lacedaemonians have sent out me and my army to make good the reason that we gave for the war when we began it, viz. that we were going to war with the Athenians in order to free Hellas.

2 Our delay in coming has been caused by mistaken expectations as to the war at home, which led us to hope, by our own unassisted efforts and without your risking anything, to effect the speedy downfall of the Athenians and you must not blame us for this, as we are now come the moment that we were able, prepared with your aid to do our best to subdue them.

3 Meanwhile I am astonished at finding your gates shut against me, and at not meeting with a better welcome.

4 We Lacedaemonians thought of you as allies eager to have us, to whom we should come in spirit even before we were with you in body; and in this expectation undertook all the risks of a march of many days through a strange country, so far did our zeal carry us.

5 It will be a terrible thing if after this you have other intentions, and mean to stand in the way of your own and Hellenic freedom.

6 It is not merely that you oppose me yourselves; but wherever I may go people will be less inclined to join me, on the score that you, to whom I first came—an important town like Acanthus, and prudent men like the Acanthians—refused to admit me. I shall have nothing to prove that the reason which I advance is the true one; it will be said either that there is something unfair in the freedom which I offer, or that I am here in insufficient force and unable to protect you against an attack from Athens.

7 Yet when I went with the army which I now have to the relief of Nisaea, the Athenians did not venture to engage me although in greater force than I; and it is not likely they will ever send across sea against you an army as numerous as they had at Nisaea.

Chapter 86

1 And for myself, I have come here not to hurt but to free the Hellenes, witness the solemn oaths by which I have bound my government that the allies that I may bring over shall be independent; and besides my object in coming is not by force or fraud to obtain your alliance, but to offer you mine to help you against your Athenian masters.

2 I protest, therefore, against any suspicions of my intentions after the guarantees which I offer, and equally so against doubts of my ability to protect you, and I invite you to join me without hesitation.

3 Some of you may hang back because they have private enemies, and fear that I may put the city into the hands of a party: none need be more tranquil than they.

4 I am not come here to help this party or that; and I do not consider that I should be bringing you freedom in any real sense, if I should disregard your constitution, and enslave the many to the few or the few to the many.

5 This would be heavier than a foreign yoke; and we Lacedaemonians instead of being thanked for our pains, should get neither honour nor glory, but contrariwise reproaches. The charges which strengthen our hands in the war against the Athenians would on our own showing be merited by ourselves, and more hateful in us than in those who make no pretensions to honesty;

6 as it is more disgraceful for persons of character to take what they covet by fair-seeming fraud than by open force; the one aggression having for its justification the might which fortune gives, the other being simply a piece of clever roguery.

Chapter 87

1 A matter which concerns us thus nearly we naturally look to most jealously; and over and above the oaths that I have mentioned, what stronger assurance can you have, when you see that our words, compared with the actual facts, produce the necessary conviction that it is our interest to act as we say?

2 If to these considerations of mine you put in the plea of inability, and claim that your friendly feeling should save you from being hurt by your refusal; if you say that freedom, in your opinion, is not without its dangers, and that it is right to offer it to those who can accept it, but not to force it on any against their will, then I shall take the gods and heroes of your country to witness that I came for your good and was rejected, and shall do my best to compel you by laying waste your land.

3 I shall do so without scruple, being justified by the necessity which constrains me, first, to prevent the Lacedaemonians from being damaged by you, their friends, in the event of your non-adhesion, through the monies that you pay to the Athenians; and secondly, to prevent the Hellenes from being hindered by you in shaking off their servitude.

4 Otherwise indeed we should have no right to act as we propose; except in the name of some public interest, what call should we Lacedaemonians have to free those who do not wish it?

5 Empire we do not aspire to: it is what we are labouring to put down; and we should wrong the greater number if we allowed you to stand in the way of the independence that we offer to all.

6 Endeavour, therefore, to decide wisely, and strive to begin the work of liberation for the Hellenes, and lay up for yourselves endless renown, while you escape private loss, and cover your commonwealth with glory.’

Chapter 88

1 Such were the words of Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides of the question, gave their votes in secret, and the majority, influenced by the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by fear for their fruit, decided to revolt from Athens; not however admitting the army until they had taken his personal security for the oaths sworn by his government before they sent him out, assuring the independence of the allies whom he might bring over.

2 Not long after, Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, followed their example and revolted. Such were the events of this summer.

Chapter 89

1 It was in the first days of the winter following that the places in Boeotia were to be put into the hands of Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the latter of whom was to go with his ships to Siphae, the former to Delium. A mistake, however, was made in the days on which they were each to start; and Demosthenes sailing first to Siphae, with the Acarnanians and many of the allies from those parts on board, failed to effect anything, through the plot having been betrayed by Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians.

2 Succours accordingly flocked in from all parts of Boeotia, Hippocrates not being yet there to make his diversion, and Siphae and Chaeronea were promptly secured, and the conspirators, informed of the mistake, did not venture on any movement in the towns.

Chapter 90

1 Meanwhile Hippocrates made a levy in mass of the citizens, resident aliens, and foreigners in Athens, and arrived at his destination after the Boeotians had already come back from Siphae, and encamping his army began to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the following manner.

2 A trench was dug all round the temple and the consecrated ground, and the earth thrown up from the excavation was made to do duty as a wall, in which stakes were also planted, the vines round the sanctuary being cut down and thrown in, together with stones and bricks pulled down from the houses near; every means, in short, being used to run up the rampart. Wooden towers were also erected where they were wanted, and where there was no part of the temple buildings left standing, as on the side where the gallery once existing had fallen in.

3 The work was begun on the third day after leaving home, and continued during the fourth, and till dinner-time on the fifth,

4 when most of it being now finished the army removed from Delium about a mile and a quarter on its way home. From this point most of the light troops went straight on, while the heavy infantry halted and remained where they were; Hippocrates having stayed behind at Delium to arrange the posts, and to give directions for the completion of such part of the outworks as had been left unfinished.

Chapter 91

1 During the days thus employed the Boeotians were mustering at Tanagra, and by the time that they had come in from all the towns, found the Athenians already on their way home. The rest of the eleven Boeotarchs were against giving battle, as the enemy was no longer in Boeotia, the Athenians being just over the Oropian border, when they halted; but Pagondas, son of Aeolidas, one of the Boeotarchs of Thebes (Arianthides, son of Lysimachidas, being the other), and then commander-in-chief, thought it best to hazard a battle. He accordingly called the men to him, company after company, to prevent their all leaving their arms at once, and urged them to attack the Athenians, and stand the issue of a battle, speaking as follows:—

Chapter 92

1 ‘Boeotians, the idea that we ought not to give battle to the Athenians unless we came up with them in Boeotia, is one which should never have entered into the head of any of us, your generals. It was to annoy Boeotia that they crossed the frontier and built a fort in our country; and they are therefore, I imagine, our enemies wherever we may come up with them, and from wheresoever they may have come to act as enemies do.

2 And if any one has taken up with the idea in question for reasons of safety, it is high time for him to change his mind. The party attacked, whose own country is in danger, can scarcely discuss what is prudent with the calmness of men who are in full enjoyment of what they have got, and are thinking of attacking a neighbour in order to get more.

3 It is your national habit, in your country or out of it, to oppose the same resistance to a foreign invader; and when that invader is Athenian, and lives upon your frontier besides, it is doubly imperative to do so.

4 As between neighbours generally, freedom means simply a determination to hold ones own; and with neighbours like these, who are trying to enslave near and far alike, there is nothing for it but to fight it out to the last. Look at the condition of the Euboeans and of most of the rest of Hellas, and be convinced that others have to fight with their neighbours for this frontier or that, but that for us conquest means one frontier for the whole country, about which no dispute can be made, for they will simply come and take by force what we have.

5 So much more have we to fear from this neighbour than from another. Besides, people who, like the Athenians in the present instance, are tempted by pride of strength to attack their neighbours, usually march most confidently against those who keep still, and only defend themselves in their own country, but think twice before they grapple with those who meet them outside their frontier and strike the first blow if opportunity offers.

6 The Athenians have shown us this themselves; the defeat which we inflicted upon them at Coronea, at the time when our quarrels had allowed them to occupy the country, has given great security to Boeotia until the present day.

7 Remembering this, the old must equal their ancient exploits, and the young, the sons of the heroes of that time, must endeavor not to disgrace their native valour; and trusting in the help of the god whose temple has been sacrilegiously fortified, and in the victims which in our sacrifices have proved propitious, we must march against the enemy, and teach him that he must go and get what he wants by attacking some one who will not resist him, but that men whose glory it is to be always ready to give battle for the liberty of their own country, and never unjustly to enslave that of others, will not let him go without a struggle.’

Chapter 93

1 By these arguments Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to attack the Athenians, and quickly breaking up his camp led his army forward, it being now late in the day. On nearing the enemy, he halted in a position where a hill intervening prevented the two armies from seeing each other, and then formed and prepared for action.

2 Meanwhile Hippocrates at Delium, informed of the approach of the Boeotians, sent orders to his troops to throw themselves into line, and himself joined them not long afterwards, leaving about three hundred horse behind him at Delium, at once to guard the place in case of attack, and to watch their opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians during the battle.

3 The Boeotians placed a detachment to deal with these, and when everything was arranged to their satisfaction appeared over the hill, and halted in the order which they had determined on, to the number of seven thousand heavy infantry, more than ten thousand light troops, one thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers.

4 On their right were the Thebans and those of their province, in the center the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the other people around the lake, and on the left the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians, the cavalry and the light troops being at the extremity of each wing. The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep, the rest as they pleased.

5 Such was the strength and disposition of the Boeotian army.

Chapter 94

1 On the side of the Athenians, the heavy infantry throughout the whole army formed eight deep, being in numbers equal to the enemy, with the cavalry upon the two wings. Light troops regularly armed there were none in the army, nor had there ever been any at Athens. Those who had joined in the invasion, though many times more numerous than those of the enemy, had mostly followed unarmed, as part of the levy in mass of the citizens and foreigners at Athens, and having started first on their way home were not present in any number.

2 The armies being now in line and upon the point of engaging, Hippocrates, the general, passed along the Athenian ranks, and encouraged them as follows:—

Chapter 95

1 ‘Athenians, I shall only say a few words to you, but brave men require no more, and they are addressed more to your understanding than to your courage.

2 None of you must fancy that we are going out of our way to run this risk in the country of another. Fought in their territory the battle will be for ours: if we conquer, the Peloponnesians will never invade your country without the Boeotian horse, and in one battle you will win Boeotia and in a manner free Attica.

3 Advance to meet them then like citizens of a country in which you all glory as the first in Hellas, and like sons of the fathers who beat them at Oenophyta with Myronides and thus gained possession of Boeotia.’

Chapter 96

1 Hippocrates had got half through the army with his exhortation, when the Boeotians, after a few more hasty words from Pagondas, struck up the paean, and came against them from the hill; the Athenians advancing to meet them, and closing at a run.

2 The extreme wing of neither army came into action, one like the other being stopped by the water-courses in the way; the rest engaged with the utmost obstinacy, shield against shield.

3 The Boeotian left, as far as the center, was worsted by the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field suffered most severely. The troops alongside them having given way, they were surrounded in a narrow space and cut down fighting hand to hand; some of the Athenians also fell into confusion in surrounding the enemy and mistook and so killed each other.

4 In this part of the field the Boeotians were beaten, and retreated upon the troops still fighting; but the right, where the Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians and shoved them further and further back, though gradually at first.

5 It so happened also that Pagondas, seeing the distress of his left, had sent two squadrons of horse, where they could not be seen, round the hill, and their sudden appearance struck a panic into the victorious wing of the Athenians, who thought that it was another army coming against them.

6 At length in both parts of the field, disturbed by this panic, and with their line broken by the advancing Thebans, the whole Athenian army took to flight.

7 Some made for Delium and the sea, some for Oropus, others for Mount Parnes, or wherever they had hopes of safety,

8 pursued and cut down by the Boeotians, and in particular by the cavalry, composed partly of Boeotians and partly of Locrians, who had come up just as the rout began. Night however coming on to interrupt the pursuit, the mass of the fugitives escaped more easily than they would otherwise have done.

9 The next day the troops at Oropus and Delium returned home by sea, after leaving a garrison in the latter place, which they continued to hold notwithstanding the defeat.

Chapter 97

1 The Boeotians set up a trophy, took up their own dead, and stripped those of the enemy, and leaving a guard over them retired to Tanagra, there to take measures for attacking Delium.

2 Meanwhile a herald came from the Athenians to ask for the dead, but was met and turned back by a Boeotian herald, who told him that he would effect nothing until the return of himself the Boeotian herald, and who then went on to the Athenians, and told them on the part of the Boeotians that they had done wrong in transgressing the law of the Hellenes.

3 Of what use was the universal custom protecting the temples in an invaded country if the Athenians were to fortify Delium and live there, acting exactly as if they were on unconsecrated ground, and drawing and using for their purposes the water which they, the Boeotians, never touched except for sacred uses?

4 Accordingly for the god as well as for themselves, in the name of the deities concerned, and of Apollo, the Boeotians invited them first to evacuate the temple, if they wished to take up the dead that belonged to them.

Chapter 98

1 After these words from the herald, the Athenians sent their own herald to the Boeotians to say that they had not done any wrong to the temple, and for the future would do it no more harm than they could help; not having occupied it originally in any such design, but to defend themselves from it against those who were really wronging them.

2 The law of the Hellenes was that conquest of a country, whether more or less extensive, carried with it possession of the temples in that country, with the obligation to keep up the usual ceremonies, at least as far as possible.

3 The Boeotians and most other people who had turned out the owners of a country, and put themselves in their places by force, now held as of right the temples which they originally entered as usurpers.

4 If the Athenians could have conquered more of Boeotia this would have been the case with them: as things stood, the piece of it which they had got they should treat as their own, and not quit unless obliged.

5 The water they had disturbed under the impulsion of a necessity which they had not wantonly incurred, having been forced to use it in defending themselves against the Boeotians who had first invaded Attica.

6 Besides, anything done under the pressure of war and danger might reasonably claim indulgence even in the eye of the god; or why, pray, were the altars the asylum for involuntary offences? Transgression also was a term applied to presumptuous offenders, not to the victims of adverse circumstances.

7 In short, which were most impious—the Boeotians who wished to barter dead bodies for holy places, or the Athenians who refused to give up holy places to obtain what was theirs by right?

8 The condition of evacuating Boeotia must therefore be withdrawn. They were no longer in Boeotia. They stood where they stood by the right of the sword. All that the Boeotians had to do was to tell them to take up their dead under a truce according to the national custom.

Chapter 99

1 The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia, they must evacuate that country before taking up their dead; if they were in their own territory, they could do as they pleased: for they knew that, although the Oropid where the bodies as it chanced were lying (the battle having been fought on the borders) was subject to Athens, yet the Athenians could not get them without their leave. Besides, why should they grant a truce for Athenian ground? And what could be fairer than to tell them to evacuate Boeotia if they wished to get what they asked? The Athenian herald accordingly returned with this answer, without having accomplished his object.

Chapter 100

1 Meanwhile the Boeotians at once sent for darters and slingers from the Malian gulf, and with two thousand Corinthian heavy infantry who had joined them after the battle, the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisaea, and some Megarians with them, marched against Delium, and attacked the fort, and after divers efforts finally succeeded in taking it by an engine of the following description.

2 They sawed in two and scooped out a great beam from end to end, and fitting it nicely together again like a pipe, hung by chains a cauldron at one extremity, with which communicated an iron tube projecting from the beam, which was itself in great part plated with iron.

3 This they brought up from a distance upon carts to the part of the wall principally composed of vines and timber, and when it was near, inserted huge bellows into their end of the beam and blew with them.

4 The blast passing closely confined into the cauldron, which was filled with lighted coals, sulphur and pitch, made a great blaze, and set fire to the wall, which soon became untenable for its defenders, who left it and fled; and in this way the fort was taken.

5 Of the garrison some were killed and two hundred made prisoners; most of the rest got on board their ships and returned home.

Chapter 101

1 Soon after the fall of Delium, which took place seventeen days after the battle, the Athenian herald, without knowing what had happened, came again for the dead, which were now restored by the Boeotians, who no longer answered as at first.

2 Not quite five hundred Boeotians fell in the battle, and nearly one thousand Athenians, including Hippocrates the general, besides a great number of light troops and camp followers.

3 Soon after this battle Demosthenes, after the failure of his voyage to Siphae and of the plot on the town, availed himself of the Acarnanian and Agraean troops and of the four hundred Athenian heavy infantry which he had on board, to make a descent on the Sicyonian coast.

4 Before however all his ships had come to shore, the Sicyonians came up and routed and chased to their ships those that had landed, killing some and taking others prisoners; after which they set up a trophy, and gave back the dead under truce.

5 About the same time with the affair of Delium took place the death of Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, who was defeated in battle, in a campaign against the Triballi; Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, his nephew, succeeding to the kingdom of the Odrysians, and of the rest of Thrace ruled by Sitalces.

Chapter 102

1 The same winter Brasidas, with his allies in the Thracian places, marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon.

2 A settlement upon the spot on which the city now stands, was before attempted by Aristagoras, the Milesian (when he fled from king Darius), who was however dislodged by the Edonians; and thirty-two years later by the Athenians, who sent thither ten thousand settlers of their own citizens, and whoever else chose to go. These were cut off at Drabescus by the Thracians.

3 Twenty-nine years after, the Athenians returned (Hagnon, son of Nicias, being sent out as a leader of the colony) and drove out the Edonians, and founded a town on the spot, formerly called Ennea-hodoi or Nine Ways.

4 The base from which they started was Eion, their commercial seaport at the mouth of the river, not more than three miles from the present town, which Hagnon named Amphipolis, because the Strymon flows round it on two sides, and he built it so as to be conspicuous from the sea and land alike, running a long wall across from river to river, to complete the circumference.

Chapter 103

1 Brasidas now marched against this town, starting from Arne in Chalcidice. Arriving about dusk at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake of Bolbe runs into the sea, he supped there, and went on during the night.

2 The weather was stormy and it was snowing a little, which encouraged him to hurry on, in order, if possible, to take every one at Amphipolis by surprise, except the party who were to betray it.

3 The plot was carried on by some natives of Argilus, an Andrian colony, residing in Amphipolis, where they had also other accomplices gained over by Perdiccas or the Chalcidians.

4 But the most active in the matter were the inhabitants of Argilus itself, which is close by, who had always been suspected by the Athenians, and had had designs on the place. These men now saw their opportunity arrive with Brasidas, and having for some time been in correspondence with their countrymen in Amphipolis for the betrayal of the town, at once received him into Argilus, and revolted from the Athenians, and that same night took him on to the bridge over the river;

5 where he found only a small guard to oppose him, the town being at some distance from the passage, and the walls not reaching down to it as at present. This guard he easily drove in, partly through there being treason in their ranks, partly from the stormy state of the weather and the suddenness of his attack, and so got across the bridge, and immediately became master of all the property outside; the Amphipolitans having houses all over the quarter.

Chapter 104

1 The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise to the people in the town; and the capture of many of those outside, and the flight of the rest within the wall, combined to produce great confusion among the citizens; especially as they did not trust one another.

2 It is even said that if Brasidas, instead of stopping to pillage, had advanced straight against the town, he would probably have taken it.

3 In fact, however, he established himself where he was and overran the country outside, and for the present remained inactive, vainly awaiting a demonstration on the part of his friends within.

4 Meanwhile the party opposed to the traitors proved numerous enough to prevent the gates being immediately thrown open, and in concert with Eucles, the general, who had come from Athens to defend the place, sent to the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides, son of Olorus, the author of this history, who was at the isle of Thasos, a Parian colony, half a day's sail from Amphipolis, to tell him to come to their relief.

5 On receipt of this message he at once set sail with seven ships which he had with him, in order, if possible, to reach Amphipolis in time to prevent its capitulation, or in any case to save Eion.

Chapter 105

1 Meanwhile Brasidas, afraid of succors arriving by sea from Thasos, and learning that Thucydides possessed the right of working the gold mines in that part of Thrace, and had thus great influence with the inhabitants of the continent, hastened to gain the town, if possible, before the people of Amphipolis should be encouraged by his arrival to hope that he could save them by getting together a force of allies from the sea and from Thrace, and so refuse to surrender.

2 He accordingly offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any of the Amphipolitans and Athenians who chose, might continue to enjoy their property with full rights of citizenship; while those who did not wish to stay had five days to depart, taking their property with them.

Chapter 106

1 The bulk of the inhabitants, upon hearing this, began to change their minds, especially as only a small number of the citizens were Athenians, the majority having come from different quarters, and many of the prisoners outside had relations within the walls. They found the proclamation a fair one in comparison of what their fear had suggested; the Athenians being glad to go out, as they thought they ran more risk than the rest, and further, did not expect any speedy relief, and the multitude generally being content at being left in possession of their civic rights, and at such an unexpected reprieve from danger.

2 The partisans of Brasidas now openly advocated this course, seeing that the feeling of the people had changed, and that they no longer gave ear to the Athenian general present; and thus the surrender was made and Brasidas was admitted by them on the terms of his proclamation.

3 In this way they gave up the city, and late in the same day Thucydides and his ships entered the harbour of Eion,

4 Brasidas having just got hold of Amphipolis, and having been within a night of taking Eion had the ships been less prompt in relieving it, in the morning it would have been his.

Chapter 107

1 After this Thucydides put all in order at Eion to secure it against any present or future attack of Brasidas, and received such as had elected to come there from the interior according to the terms agreed on.

2 Meanwhile Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of boats down the river to Eion to see if he could not seize the point running out from the wall, and so command the entrance; at the same time he attempted it by land, but was beaten off on both sides and had to content himself with arranging matters at Amphipolis and in the neighbourhood.

3 Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him; the Edonian king Pittacus having been killed by the sons of Goaxis and his own wife Brauro; and Galepsus and Oesime, which are Thasian colonies, not long after followed its example. Perdiccas too came up immediately after the capture and joined in these arrangements.

Chapter 108

1 The news that Amphipolis was in the hands of the enemy caused great alarm at Athens. Not only was the town valuable for the timber it afforded for shipbuilding, and the money that it brought in; but also, although the escort of the Thessalians gave the Lacedaemonians a means of reaching the allies of Athens as far as the Strymon, yet as long as they were not masters of the bridge but were watched on the side of Eion by the Athenian galleys, and on the land side impeded by a large and extensive lake formed by the waters of the river, it was impossible for them to go any further. Now, on the contrary, the path seemed open. There was also the fear of the allies revolting,

2 owing to the moderation displayed by Brasidas in all his conduct, and to the declarations which he was everywhere making that he was sent out to free Hellas.

3 The towns subject to the Athenians, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and of the terms accorded to it, and of the gentleness of Brasidas, felt most strongly encouraged to change their condition, and sent secret messages to him, begging him to come on to them; each wishing to be the first to revolt.

4 Indeed there seemed to be no danger in so doing; their mistake in their estimate of the Athenian power was as great as that power afterwards turned out to be, and their judgment was based more upon blind wishing than upon any sound prevision; for it is a habit of mankind to entrust to careless hope what they long for, and to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what they do not fancy.

5 Besides the late severe blow which the Athenians had met with in Boeotia, joined to the seductive, though untrue, statements of Brasidas, about the Athenians not having ventured to engage his single army at Nisaea, made the allies confident, and caused them to believe that no Athenian force would be sent against them.

6 Above all the wish to do what was agreeable at the moment, and the likelihood that they should find the Lacedaemonians full of zeal at starting, made them eager to venture. Observing this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the different towns, as far as was possible at such short notice and in winter; while Brasidas sent despatches to Lacedaemon asking for reinforcements, and himself made preparations for building galleys in the Strymon.

7 The Lacedaemonians however did not send him any, partly through envy on the part of their chief men, partly because they were more bent on recovering the prisoners of the island and ending the war.

Chapter 109

1 The same winter the Megarians took and razed to the foundations the long walls which had been occupied by the Athenians; and Brasidas after the capture of Amphipolis marched with his allies against Acte,

2 a promontory running out from the king's dike with an inward curve, and ending in Athos, a lofty mountain looking towards the Aegean sea.

3 In it are various towns, Sane, an Andrian colony, close to the canal, and facing the sea in the direction of Euboea; the others being Thyssus, Cleone, Acrothoi, Olophyxus,

4 and Dium, inhabited by mixed barbarian races speaking the two languages. There is also a small Chalcidian element; but the greater number are Tyrrheno-Pelasgians once settled in Lemnos and Athens, and Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians; the towns being all small ones.

5 Most of these came over to Brasidas; but Sane and Dium held out and saw their land ravaged by him and his army.

Chapter 110

1 Upon their not submitting, he at once marched against Torone in Chalcidice, which was held by an Athenian garrison, having been invited by a few persons who were prepared to hand over the town. Arriving in the dark a little before daybreak, he sat down with his army near the temple of the Dioscuri, rather more than a quarter of a mile from the city.

2 The rest of the town of Torone and the Athenians in garrison did not perceive his approach; but his partisans knowing that he was coming (a few of them had secretly gone out to meet him), were on the watch for his arrival, and were no sooner aware of it than they took in to them seven light-armed men with daggers, who alone of twenty men ordered on this service dared to enter, commanded by Lysistratus an Olynthian. These passed through the sea wall, and without being seen went up and put to the sword the garrison of the highest post in the town, which stands on a hill, and broke open the postern on the side of Canastraeum.

Chapter 111

1 Brasidas meanwhile came a little nearer and then halted with his main body, sending on one hundred targeteers to be ready to rush in first, the moment that a gate should be thrown open and the beacon lighted as agreed.

2 After some time passed in waiting and wondering at the delay, the targeteers by degrees got up close to the town. The Toronaeans inside at work with the party that had entered, had by this time broken down the postern and opened the gates leading to the marketplace by cutting through the bar, and first brought some men round and let them in by the postern, in order to strike a panic into the surprised townsmen by suddenly attacking them from behind and on both sides at once; after which they raised the fire-signal as had been agreed, and took in by the market gates the rest of the targeteers.

Chapter 112

1 Brasidas seeing the signal told the troops to rise, and dashed forward amid the loud hurrahs of his men, which carried dismay among the astonished townspeople.

2 Some burst in straight by the gate, others over some square pieces of timber placed against the wall (which had fallen down and was being rebuilt) to draw up stones;

3 Brasidas and the greater number making straight uphill for the higher part of the town, in order to take it from top to bottom, and once for all, while the rest of the multitude spread in all directions.

Chapter 113

1 The capture of the town was effected before the great body of the Toronaeans had recovered from their surprise and confusion;

2 but the conspirators and the citizens of their party at once joined the invaders. About fifty of the Athenian heavy infantry happened to be sleeping in the market-place when the alarm reached them. A few of these were killed fighting; the rest escaped, some by land, others to the two ships on the station, and took refuge in Lecythus, a fort garrisoned by their own men in the corner of the town running out into the sea and cut off by a narrow isthmus;

3 where they were joined by the Toronaeans of their party.

Chapter 114

1 Day now arrived, and the town being secured, Brasidas made a proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, to come out, as many as chose, to their homes without fearing for their rights or persons, and sent a herald to invite the Athenians to accept a truce, and to evacuate Lecythus with their property, as being Chalcidian ground.

2 The Athenians refused this offer, but asked for a truce for a day to take up their dead. Brasidas granted it for two days, which he employed in fortifying the houses near, and the Athenians in doing the same to their positions.

3 Meanwhile he called a meeting of the Toronaeans, and said very much what he had said at Acanthus, namely, that they must not look upon those who had negotiated with him for the capture of the town as bad men or as traitors, as they had not acted as they had done from corrupt motives or in order to enslave the city, but for the good and freedom of Torone; nor again must those who had not shared in the enterprise fancy that they would not equally reap its fruits, as he had not come to destroy either city or individual.

4 This was the reason of his proclamation to those that had fled for refuge to the Athenians: he thought none the worse of them for their friendship for the Athenians; he believed that they had only to make trial of the Lacedaemonians to like them as well, or even much better, as acting much more justly: it was for want of such a trial that they were now afraid of them.

5 Meanwhile he warned all of them to prepare to be staunch allies, and for being held responsible for all faults in future: for the past, they had not wronged the Lacedaemonians but had been wronged by others who were too strong for them, and any opposition that they might have offered him could be excused.

Chapter 115

1 Having encouraged them with this address, as soon as the truce expired he made his attack upon Lecythus; the Athenians defending themselves from a poor wall and from some houses with parapets.

2 One day they beat him off; the next the enemy were preparing to bring up an engine against them from which they meant to throw fire upon the wooden defences, and the troops were already coming up to the point where they fancied they could best bring up the engine, and where the place was most assailable; meanwhile the Athenians put a wooden tower upon a house opposite, and carried up a quantity of jars and casks of water and big stones, and a large number of men also climbed up.

3 The house thus laden too heavily suddenly broke down with a loud crash; at which the men who were near and saw it were more vexed than frightened; but those not so near, and still more those furthest off thought that the place was already taken at that point, and fled in haste to the sea and the ships.

Chapter 116

1 Brasidas, perceiving that they were deserting the parapet, and seeing what was going on, dashed forward with his troops, and immediately took the fort, and put to the sword all whom he found in it.

2 In this way the place was evacuated by the Athenians, who went across in their boats and ships to Pallene. Now there is a temple of Athena in Lecythus, and Brasidas had proclaimed in the moment of making the assault, that he would give thirty silver minae to the man first on the wall. Being now of opinion that the capture was scarcely due to human means, he gave the thirty minae to the goddess for her temple, and razed and cleared Lecythus, and made the whole of it consecrated ground.

3 The rest of the winter he spent in settling the places in his hands, and in making designs upon the rest; and with the expiration of the winter the eighth year of this war ended.

Chapter 117

1 In the spring of the summer following, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians made an armistice for a year; the Athenians thinking that they would thus have full leisure to take their precautions before Brasidas could procure the revolt of any more of their towns, and might also, if it suited them, conclude a general peace; the Lacedaemonians divining the actual fears of the Athenians, and thinking that after once tasting a respite from trouble and misery they would be more disposed to consent to a reconciliation, and to give back the prisoners, and make a treaty for the longer period.

2 The great idea of the Lacedaemonians was to get back their men while Brasidas' good fortune lasted: further successes might make the struggle a less unequal one in Chalcidice, but would leave them still deprived of their men, and even in Chalcidice not more than a match for the Athenians and by no means certain of victory.

3 An armistice was accordingly concluded by Lacedaemon and her allies upon the terms following:—

Chapter 118

1 1. As to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, we are agreed that whosoever will shall have access to it, without fraud or fear, according to the usages of his forefathers.

2 The Lacedaemonians and the allies present agree to this, and promise to send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians, and to do their best to persuade them to agree likewise.

3 2. As to the treasure of the god, we agree to exert ourselves to detect all malversators, truly and honestly following the customs of our forefathers, we and you and all others willing to do so, all following the customs of our forefathers.

4 As to these points the Lacedaemonians and the other allies are agreed as has been said. 3. As to what follows, the Lacedaemonians and the other allies agree, if the Athenians conclude a treaty, to remain, each of us in our own territory, retaining our respective acquisitions; the garrison in Coryphasium keeping within Buphras and Tomeus; that in Cythera attempting no communication with the Peloponnesian confederacy, neither we with them, or they with us; that in Nisaea and Minoa not crossing the road leading from the gates of the temple of Nisus to that of Poseidon and from thence straight to the bridge at Minoa; the Megarians and the allies being equally bound not to cross this road, and the Athenians retaining the island they have taken, without any communication on either side; as to Troezen, each side retaining what it has, and as was arranged with the Athenians.

5 4. As to the use of the sea, so far as refers to their own coast and to that of their confederacy, that the Lacedaemonians and their allies may voyage upon it in any vessel rowed by oars and of not more than five hundred talents' tonnage, not a vessel of war.

6 5. That all heralds and embassies, with as many attendants as they please, for concluding the war and adjusting claims, shall have free passage, going and coming, to Peloponnese or Athens by land and by sea.

7 6. That during the truce, deserters whether bond or free shall be received neither by you, nor by us.

8 7. Further, that satisfaction shall be given by you to us and by us to you according to the public law of our several countries,

9 all disputes being settled by law without recourse to hostilities. The Lacedaemonians and allies agree to these articles: but if you have anything fairer or juster to suggest, come to Lacedaemon and let us know; whatever shall be just will meet with no objection either from the Lacedaemonians or from the allies.

10 Only let those who come come with full powers, as you desire us. The truce shall be for one year. Approved by the people.

11 The tribe of Acamantis had the prytany, Phoenippus was secretary, Niciades chairman. Laches moved, in the name of the good luck of the Athenians, that they should conclude the armistice upon the terms agreed upon by the Lacedaemonians and the allies.

12 It was agreed accordingly in the popular assembly, that the armistice should be for one year, beginning that very day, the fourteenth of the month of Elaphebolion;

13 during which time ambassadors and heralds should go and come between the two countries to discuss the bases of a pacification.

14 That the generals and prytanes should call an assembly of the people, in which the Athenians should first consult on the peace, and on the mode in which the embassy for putting an end to the war should be admitted. That the embassy now present should at once take the engagement before the people to keep well and truly this truce for one year.

Chapter 119

1 On these terms the Lacedaemonians concluded with the Athenians and their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Cerastius;

2 the allies also taking the oaths. Those who concluded and poured the libation were Taurus, son of Echetimides, Athenaeus, son of Pericleidas, and Philocharidas, son of Eryxilaidas, Lacedaemonians; Aeneas, son of Aeneas, and Euphamidas, son of Aristonymus, Corinthians; Damotimus, son of Naucrates, and Onasimus, son of Megacles, Sicyonians; Nicasus, son of Cecalus, and Menecrates, son of Amphidorus, Megarians; and Amphias, son of Eupaidas, an Epidaurian; and the Athenian generals Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Autocles, son of Tolmaeus.

3 Such was the armistice, and during the whole of it conferences went on on the subject of a pacification.

Chapter 120

1 In the days in which they were going backwards and forwards to these conferences, Scione, a town in Pallene, revolted from Athens, and went over to Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they are Pallenians from Peloponnese, and that their first founders on their voyage from Troy were carried in to this spot by the storm which the Achaeans were caught in and there settled.

2 The Scionaeans had no sooner revolted than Brasidas crossed over by night to Scione, with a friendly galley ahead and himself in a small boat some way behind; his idea being that if he fell in with a vessel larger than the boat he would have the galley to defend him, while a ship that was a match for the galley, would probably neglect the small vessel to attack the large one, and thus leave him time to escape.

3 His passage effected, he called a meeting of the Scionaeans and spoke to the same effect as at Acanthus and Torone, adding that they merited the utmost commendation in that, in spite of Pallene within the isthmus being cut off by the Athenian occupation of Potidaea and of their own practically insular position, they had of their own free will gone forward to meet their liberty instead of timorously waiting until they had been by force compelled to their own manifest good. This was a sign that they would valiantly undergo any trial, however great; and if he should order affairs as he intended, he should count them among the truest and sincerest friends of the Lacedaemonians, and would in every other way honour them.

Chapter 121

1 The Scionaeans were elated by his language, and even those who had at first disapproved of what was being done catching the general confidence, they determined on a vigorous conduct of the war, and welcomed Brasidas with all possible honours, publicly crowning him with a crown of gold as the liberator of Hellas; while private persons crowded round him and decked him with garlands as though he had been an athlete.

2 Meanwhile Brasidas left them a small garrison for the present and crossed back again, and not long afterwards sent over a larger force, intending with the help of the Scionaeans to attempt Mende and Potidaea before the Athenians should arrive; Scione, he felt, being too like an island for them not to relieve it. He had besides intelligence in the above towns about their betrayal.

Chapter 122

1 In the midst of his designs upon the towns in question, a galley arrived with the commissioners carrying round the news of the armistice, Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the Lacedaemonians.

2 The troops now crossed back to Torone, and the commissioners gave Brasidas notice of the convention. All the Lacedaemonian allies in Thrace accepted what had been done;

3 and Aristonymus made no difficulty about the rest, but finding, on counting the days, that the Scionaeans had revolted after the date of the convention, refused to include them in it. To this Brasidas earnestly objected, asserting that the revolt took place before, and would not give up the town.

4 Upon Aristonymus reporting the case to Athens, the people at once prepared to send an expedition to Scione. Upon this, envoys arrived from Lacedaemon, alleging that this would be a breach of the truce, and laying claim to the town upon the faith of the assertion of Brasidas, and meanwhile offering to submit the question to arbitration.

5 Arbitration, however, was what the Athenians did not choose to risk; being determined to send troops at once to the place, and furious at the idea of even the islanders now daring to revolt, in a vain reliance upon the power of the Lacedaemonians by land.

6 Besides the facts of the revolt were rather as the Athenians contended, the Scionaeans having revolted two days after the convention. Cleon accordingly succeeded in carrying a decree to reduce and put to death the Scionaeans and the Athenians employed the leisure which they now enjoyed in preparing for the expedition.

Chapter 123

1 Meanwhile Mende revolted, a town in Pallene and a colony of the Eretrians, and was received without scruple by Brasidas, in spite of its having evidently come over during the armistice, on account of certain infringements of the truce alleged by him against the Athenians.

2 This audacity of Mende was partly caused by seeing Brasidas forward in the matter and by the conclusions drawn from his refusal to betray Scione; and besides, the conspirators in Mende were few, and, as I have already intimated, had carried on their practices too long not to fear detection for themselves, and not to wish to force the inclination of the multitude.

3 This news made the Athenians more furious than ever, and they at once prepared against both towns.

4 Brasidas expecting their arrival conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans, and sent over to them five hundred Peloponnesian heavy infantry and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, all under the command of Polydamidas.Leaving these two towns to prepare together against the speedy arrival of the Athenians,

Chapter 124

1 Brasidas and Perdiccas started on a second joint expedition into Lyncus against Arrhabaeus; the latter with the forces of his Macedonian subjects, and a corps of heavy infantry composed of Hellenes domiciled in the country; the former with the Peloponnesians whom he still had with him and the Chalcidians, Acanthians, and the rest in such force as they were able. In all there were about three thousand Hellenic heavy infantry, accompanied by all the Macedonian cavalry with the Chalcidians, near one thousand strong, besides an immense crowd of barbarians.

2 On entering the country of Arrhabaeus, they found the Lyncestians encamped awaiting them, and themselves took up a position opposite.

3 The infantry on either side were upon a hill, with a plain between them, into which the horse of both armies first galloped down, and engaged a cavalry action. After this the Lyncestian heavy infantry advanced from their hill to join their cavalry and offered battle; upon which Brasidas and Perdiccas also came down to meet them, and engaged and routed them with heavy loss; the survivors taking refuge upon the heights and there remaining inactive.

4 The victors now set up a trophy and waited two or three days for the Illyrian mercenaries who were to join Perdiccas. Perdiccas then wished to go on and attack the villages of Arrhabaeus, and to sit still no longer; but Brasidas, afraid that the Athenians might sail up during his absence, and of something happening to Mende, and seeing besides that the Illyrians did not appear, far from seconding this wish was anxious to return.

Chapter 125

1 While they were thus disputing, the news arrived that the Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdiccas and had joined Arrhabaeus; and the fear inspired by their warlike character made both parties now think it best to retreat. However, owing to the dispute, nothing had been settled as to when they should start; and night coming on, the Macedonians and the barbarian crowd took fright in a moment in one of those mysterious panics to which great armies are liable; and persuaded that an army many times more numerous than that which had really arrived was advancing and all but upon them, suddenly broke and fled in the direction of home, and thus compelled Perdiccas, who at first did not perceive what had occurred, to depart without seeing Brasidas, the two armies being encamped at a considerable distance from each other.

2 At daybreak Brasidas, perceiving that the Macedonians had gone on, and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were on the point of attacking him, formed his heavy infantry into a square, with the light troops in the center, and himself also prepared to retreat.

3 Posting his youngest soldiers to dash out wherever the enemy should attack them, he himself with three hundred picked men in the rear intended to face about during the retreat and beat off the most forward of their assailants.

4 Meanwhile, before the enemy approached, he sought to sustain the courage of his soldiers with the following hasty exhortation:—

Chapter 126

1 ‘Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect you of being dismayed at being left alone to sustain the attack of a numerous and barbarian enemy, I should just have said a few words to you as usual without further explanation. As it is, in the face of the desertion of our friends and the numbers of the enemy, I have some advice and information to offer, which, brief as they must be, will, I hope, suffice for the more important points.

2 The bravery that you habitually display in war does not depend on your having allies at your side in this or that encounter, but on your native courage; nor have numbers any terrors for citizens of states like yours, in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the few the many, owing their position to nothing else than to superiority in the field.

3 Inexperience now makes you afraid of barbarians; and yet the trial of strength which you had with the Macedonians among them, and my own judgment, confirmed by what I hear from others, should be enough to satisfy you that they will not prove formidable.

4 Where an enemy seems strong but is really weak, a true knowledge of the facts makes his adversary the bolder, just as a serious antagonist is encountered most confidently by those who do not know him. Thus the present enemy might terrify an inexperienced imagination, they are formidable in outward bulk, their loud yelling is unbearable, and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a threatening appearance.

5 But when it comes to real fighting with an opponent who stands his ground, they are not what they seemed; they have no regular order that they should be ashamed of deserting their positions when hard pressed; flight and attack are with them equally honourable, and afford no test of courage; their independent mode of fighting never leaving any one who wants to run away without a fair excuse for so doing. In short, they think frightening you at a secure distance a surer game than meeting you hand to hand; otherwise they would have done the one and not the other.

6 You can thus plainly see that the terrors with which they were at first invested are in fact trifling enough, though to the eye and ear very prominent. Stand your ground therefore when they advance, and again wait your opportunity to retire in good order, and you will reach a place of safety all the sooner, and will know for ever afterwards that rabble such as these, to those who sustain their first attack, do but show off their courage by threats of the terrible things that they are going to do, at a distance, but with those who give way to them are quick enough to display their heroism in pursuit when they can do so without danger.’

Chapter 127

1 With this brief address Brasidas began to lead off his army. Seeing this, the barbarians came on with much shouting and hubbub, thinking that he was flying and that they would over take him and cut him off.

2 But wherever they charged they found the young men ready to dash out against them, while Brasidas with his picked company sustained their onset. Thus the Peloponnesians withstood the first attack, to the surprise of the enemy, and afterwards received and repulsed them as fast as they came on, retiring as soon as their opponents became quiet. The main body of the barbarians ceased therefore to molest the Hellenes with Brasidas in the open country, and leaving behind a certain number to harass their march, the rest went on after the flying Macedonians, slaying those with whom they came up, and so arrived in time to occupy the narrow pass between two hills that leads into the country of Arrhabaeus. They knew that this was the only way by which Brasidas could retreat, and now proceeded to surround him just as he entered the most impracticable part of the road, in order to cut him off.

Chapter 128

1 Brasidas, perceiving their intention, told his three hundred to run on without order, each as quickly as he could, to the hill which seemed easiest to take, and to try to dislodge the barbarians already there, before they should be joined by the main body closing round him.

2 These attacked and overpowered the party upon the hill, and the main army of the Hellenes now advanced with less difficulty towards it; the barbarians being terrified at seeing their men on that side driven from the height, and no longer following the main body, who, they considered, had gained the frontier and made good their escape.

3 The heights once gained, Brasidas now proceeded more securely, and the same day arrived at Arnisa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas.

4 The soldiers, enraged at the desertion of the Macedonians, vented their rage on all their yokes of oxen which they found on the road, and on any baggage which had tumbled off (as might easily happen in the panic of a night retreat), by unyoking and cutting down the cattle and taking the baggage for themselves. From this moment

5 Perdiccas began to regard Brasidas as an enemy and to feel against the Peloponnesians a hatred which could not be congenial to the adversary of the Athenians. However, he departed from his natural interests and made it his endeavour to come to terms with the latter and to get rid of the former.

Chapter 129

1 On his return from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found the Athenians already masters of Mende, and remained quiet where he was, thinking it now out of his power to cross over into Pallene and assist the Mendaeans, but he kept good watch over Torone.

2 For about the same time as the campaign in Lyncus, the Athenians sailed upon the expedition which we left them preparing against Mende and Scione, with fifty ships, ten of which were Chians, one thousand Athenian heavy infantry and six hundred archers, one hundred Thracian mercenaries and some targeteers drawn from their allies in the neighbourhood, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes.

3 Weighing from Potidaea, the fleet came to land opposite the temple of Poseidon, and proceeded against Mende; the men of which town, reinforced by three hundred Scionaeans, with their Peloponnesians auxiliaries, seven hundred heavy infantry in all, under Polydamidas, they found encamped upon a strong hill outside the city.

4 These Nicias, with one hundred and twenty light-armed Methonaeans, sixty picked men from the Athenian heavy infantry, and all the archers, tried to reach by a path running up the hill, but received a wound and found himself unable to force the position; while Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing upon the hill, which was naturally difficult, by a different approach further off, was thrown into utter disorder; and the whole Athenian army narrowly escaped being defeated.

5 For that day, as the Mendaeans and their allies showed no signs of yielding, the Athenians retreated and encamped, and the Mendaeans at nightfall returned into the town.

Chapter 130

1 The next day the Athenians sailed round to the Scione side and took the suburb, and all day plundered the country, without any one coming out against them, partly because of intestine disturbances in the town; and the following night the three hundred Scionaeans returned home.

2 On the morrow Nicias advanced with half the army to the frontier of Scione and laid waste the country; while Nicostratus with the remainder sat down before the town near the upper gate on the road to Potidaea.

3 The arms of the Mendaeans and of their Peloponnesian auxiliaries within the wall happened to be piled in that quarter, where Polydamidas accordingly began to draw them up for battle, encouraging the Mendaeans to make a sortie.

4 At this moment one of the popular party answered him factiously that they would not go out and did not want a war, and for thus answering was dragged by the arm and knocked about by Polydamidas. Hereupon the infuriated commons at once seized their arms and rushed at the Peloponnesians and at their allies of the opposite faction.

5 The troops thus assaulted were at once routed, partly from the suddenness of the conflict and partly through fear of the gates being opened to the Athenians, with whom they imagined that the attack had been concerted.

6 As many as were not killed on the spot took refuge in the citadel, which they had held from the first; and the whole Athenian army, Nicias having by this time returned and being close to the city, now burst into Mende, which had opened its gates without any convention, and sacked it just as if they had taken it by storm, the generals even finding some difficulty in restraining them from also massacring the inhabitants.

7 After this the Athenians told the Mendaeans that they might retain their civil rights, and themselves judge the supposed authors of the revolt; and cut off the party in the citadel by a wall built down to the sea on either side, appointing troops to maintain the blockade. Having thus secured Mende, they proceeded against Scione.

Chapter 131

1 The Scionaeans and Peloponnesians marched out against them, occupying a strong hill in front of the town, which had to be captured by the enemy before they could invest the place.

2 The Athenians stormed the hill, defeated and dislodged its occupants, and having encamped and set up a trophy, prepared for the work of circumvallation.

3 Not long after they had begun their operations, the auxiliaries besieged in the citadel of Mende forced the guard by the sea side and arrived by night at Scione, into which most of them succeeded in entering, passing through the besieging army.

Chapter 132

1 While the investment of Scione was in progress, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian generals and made peace with the Athenians, through spite against Brasidas for the retreat from Lyncus, from which moment indeed he had begun to negotiate.

2 The Lacedaemonian Ischagoras was just then upon the point of starting with an army overland to join Brasidas; and Perdiccas, being now required by Nicias to give some proof of the sincerity of his reconciliation to the Athenians, and being himself no longer disposed to let the Peloponnesians into his country, put in motion his friends in Thessaly, with whose chief men he always took care to have relations, and go effectually stopped the army and its preparation that they did not even try the Thessalians.

3 Ischagoras himself, however, with Araeinias and Aristeus, succeeded in reaching Brasidas; they had been commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to inspect the state of affairs, and brought out from Sparta (in violation of all precedent) some of their young men to put in command of the towns, to guard against their being entrusted to the persons upon the spot. Brasidas accordingly placed Clearidas, son of Cleonymus, in Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas, son of Hegesander, in Torone.

Chapter 133

1 The same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians on the charge of Atticism, having always wished to do so, and now finding it an easy matter, as the flower of the Thespian youth had perished in the battle with the Athenians.

2 The same summer also the temple of Hera at Argos was burnt down, through Chrysis, the priestess, placing a lighted torch near the garlands and then falling asleep, so that they all caught fire and were in a blaze before she observed it.

3 Chrysis that very night fled to Phlius for fear of the Argives, who, agreeably to the law in such a case, appointed another priestess named Phaeinis. Chrysis at the time of her flight had been priestess for eight years of the present war and half the ninth.

4 At the close of the summer the investment of Scione was completed, and the Athenians, leaving a detachment to maintain the blockade, returned with the rest of their army.

Chapter 134

1 During the winter following the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were kept quiet by the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, and their respective allies, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the Oresthid. The victory remained doubtful, as each side routed one of the wings opposed to them, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi.

2 After heavy loss on both sides the battle was undecided, and night interrupted the action; yet the Tegeans passed the night on the field and set up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion and set up theirs afterwards.

Chapter 135

1 At the close of the same winter, in fact almost in spring, Brasidas made an attempt upon Potidaea. He arrived by night, and succeeded in planting a ladder against the wall without being discovered, the ladder being planted just in the interval between the passing round of the bell and the return of the man who brought it back. Upon the garrison, however, taking the alarm immediately afterwards, before his men came up, he quickly led off his troops, without waiting until it was day.

2 So ended the winter and the ninth year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.