Chapter IV, 6
Original German
Nach diesen seinen nächsten Vorgängern darf es uns nicht wundern, daß Kant die Notwendigkeit, mit welcher der empirische Charakter durch die Motive zu Handlungen bestimmt wird, als eine, wie bei ihm, so auch bei andern bereits ausgemachte Sache nahm und sich nicht damit aufhielt, sie von neuem zu beweisen. Seine „Jdeen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte“ hebt er so an: „Was man sich auch in metaphysischer Absicht für einen Begriff von der Freiheit des Willens machen möge; so sind doch die Erscheinungen desselben, die menschlichen Handlungen, ebensowohl, als jede andere Naturbegebenheit, nach allgemeinen Naturgesetzen bestimmt.“ — Jn der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (S. 548 der ersten, oder S. 577 der fünften Auflage) sagt er: „Weil der empirische Charakter selbst aus den Erscheinungen als Wirkung, und aus der Regel derselben, welche Erfahrung an die Hand gibt, gezogen werden muß; so sind alle Handlungen des Menschen, in der Erscheinung, aus seinem empirischen Charakter und den mitwirkenden andern Ursachen nach der Ordnung der Natur bestimmt: und wenn wir alle Erscheinungen seiner Willkür bis auf den Grund erforschen könnten; so würde es keine einzige menschliche Handlung geben, die wir nicht mit Gewißheit vorhersagen und aus ihren vorhergehenden Bedingungen als notwendig erkennen könnten. Jn Ansehung dieses empirischen Charakters gibt es also keine Freiheit, und nach diesem können wir doch allein den Menschen betrachten, wenn wir lediglich beobachten und, wie es in der Anthropologie geschieht, von seinen Handlungen die bewegenden Ursachen physiologisch erforschen wollen.“ — Ebendaselbst S. 798 der ersten, oder S. 826 der fünften Auflage heißt es: „Der Wille mag auch frei sein, so kann dies doch nur die intelligible Ursache unsers Wollens angehen. Denn, was die Phänomene der Aeußerungen desselben, d. i. die Handlungen betrifft, so müssen wir, nach einer unverletzlichen Grundmaxime, ohne welche wir keine Vernunft im empirischen Gebrauch ausüben können, sie niemals anders, als alle übrigen Erscheinungen der Natur, nämlich nach unwandelbaren Gesetzen derselben erklären.“ — Ferner in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, S. 177 der vierten Auflage, oder S. 230 der Rosenkranzischen: „Man kann also einräumen, daß, wenn es für uns möglich wäre, in eines Menschen Denkungsart, so wie sie sich durch innere sowohl, als äußere Handlungen zeigt, so tiefe Einsicht zu haben, daß jede, auch die mindeste Triebfeder dazu uns bekannt würde, ingleichen alle auf diese wirkenden äußeren Veranlassungen, man eines Menschen Verhalten auf die Zukunft, mit Gewißheit, so wie eine Mond- oder Sonnenfinsternis ausrechnen könnte.“
Hieran aber knüpft er seine Lehre vom Zusammenbestehen der Freiheit mit der Notwendigkeit, vermöge der Unterscheidung des intelligibeln Charakters vom empirischen, auf welche Ansicht, da ich mich gänzlich zu ihr bekenne, ich weiter unten zurückkommen werde. Kant hat sie zweimal vorgetragen, nämlich in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, S. 532—554 der ersten, oder S. 560—582 der fünften Auflage, noch deutlicher aber in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, S. 169—179 der vierten Auflage, oder S. 224—231 der Rosenkranzischen: diese überaus tief gedachten Stellen muß jeder lesen, der eine gründliche Erkenntnis von der Vereinbarkeit der menschlichen Freiheit mit der Notwendigkeit der Handlungen erlangen will. —
Von den Leistungen aller dieser edeln und ehrwürdigen Vorgänger unterscheidet gegenwärtige Abhandlung des Gegenstandes sich bis hieher hauptsächlich in zwei Punkten: erstlich dadurch, daß ich, auf Anleitung der Preisfrage, die innere Wahrnehmung des Willens im Selbstbewußtsein, von der äußern streng gesondert und jede von beiden für sich betrachtet habe, wodurch die Aufdeckung der Quelle der auf die meisten Menschen so unwiderstehlich wirkenden Täuschung allererst möglich geworden; zweitens dadurch, daß ich den Willen im Zusammenhange mit der gesamten übrigen Natur in Betracht gezogen habe, was keiner vor mir gethan, und wodurch allererst der Gegenstand mit derjenigen Gründlichkeit, methodischen Einsicht und Ganzheit, deren er fähig ist, abgehandelt werden konnte.
Jetzt noch ein paar Worte über einige Schriftsteller, die nach Kant geschrieben haben, welche ich jedoch nicht als meine Vorgänger betrachte.
Von der soeben belobten, höchst wichtigen Lehre Kants, über den intelligibeln und empirischen Charakter, hat eine erläuternde Paraphrase Schelling geliefert, in seiner „Untersuchung über die menschliche Freiheit“, S. 465—471. Diese Paraphrase kann, durch die Lebhaftigkeit ihres Kolorits, dienen, manchem die Sache faßlicher zu machen, als die gründliche, aber trockene Kantische Darstellung es vermag. Inzwischen darf ich derselben nicht erwähnen, ohne zur Ehre der Wahrheit und Kants zu rügen, daß Schelling hier, wo er eine der wichtigsten und bewunderungswürdigsten, ja meines Erachtens, die tiefsinnigste aller Kantischen Lehren vorträgt, nicht deutlich ausspricht, daß, was er jetzt darlegt, dem Inhalte nach, Kanten angehört, vielmehr sich so ausdrückt, daß die allermeisten Leser, als welchen der Jnhalt der weitläuftigen und schwierigen Werke des großen Mannes nicht genau gegenwärtig ist, wähnen müssen, hier Schellings eigene Gedanken zu lesen. Wie sehr hierin der Erfolg der Absicht entsprochen hat, will ich nur durch einen Beleg aus vielen zeigen. Noch heutigentages sagt ein junger Professor der Philosophie in Halle, Hr. Erdmann, in seinem Buche von 1837, betitelt „Leib und Seele“, S. 101: „wenn auch Leibniz, ähnlich wie Schelling in seiner Abhandlung über die Freiheit, die Seele vor aller Zeit sich bestimmen läßt“ u. s. w. Schelling steht also hier zu Kant in der glücklichen Lage des Amerigo zum Columbus: mit seinem Namen wird die fremde Entdeckung gestempelt. Er hat es aber auch seiner Klugheit und nicht dem Zufall zu danken. Denn er hebt, S. 465, an: „Ueberhaupt hat erst der Jdealismus die Lehre von der Freiheit in dasjenige Gebiet erhoben“ u. s. w., und nun folgen unmittelbar die Kantischen Gedanken. Also statt hier, der Redlichkeit gemäß, zu sagen Kant, sagt er klüglich der Jdealismus: unter diesem vieldeutigen Ausdruck wird jedoch hier jeder Fichtes und Schellings erste, Fichtianische Philosophie verstehen, nicht aber Kants Lehre; da dieser gegen die Benennung Jdealismus für seine Philosophie protestiert (z. B. Prolegomena, S. 51, und S. 155, Rosenkr.), und sogar seiner zweiten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, S. 274, eine „Widerlegung des Jdealismus“ eingefügt hatte. Auf der folgenden Seite erwähnt nun Schelling sehr klüglich, in einer beiläufigen Phrase, den „Kantischen Begriff“, um nämlich die zu beschwichtigen, welche schon wissen, daß es Kantischer Reichtum ist, den man hier so pomphaft als eigene Ware auskramt. Dann aber wird noch gar S. 472, aller Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit zum Trotz, gesagt, Kant hätte sich nicht zu derjenigen Ansicht in der Theorie erhoben, u. s. w., während aus den beiden oben von mir zum Nachlesen empfohlenen, unsterblichen Stellen Kants jeder deutlich sehen kann, daß gerade diese Ansicht ihm allein ursprünglich angehört, welche ohne ihn noch tausend solche Köpfe, wie die Herren Fichte und Schelling nimmermehr zu fassen fähig gewesen wären. Da ich hier von der Abhandlung Schellings zu sprechen hatte, durfte ich über diesen Punkt nicht schweigen, sondern habe nur meine Pflicht erfüllt gegen jenen großen Lehrer der Menschheit, der ganz allein neben Goethe der gerechte Stolz der deutschen Nation ist, indem ich was unwidersprechlich ihm allein angehört ihm vindiziere; — zumal in einer Zeit, von der ganz eigentlich Goethes Wort gilt: „das Knabenvolk ist Herr der Bahn“. — Uebrigens hat Schelling, in derselben Abhandlung ebensowenig Anstand genommen, die Gedanken, ja, die Worte Jakob Böhmes sich zuzueignen, ohne seine Quelle zu verraten.
Außer dieser Paraphrase Kantischer Gedanken enthalten jene „Untersuchungen über die Freiheit“ nichts, was dienen könnte, uns neue oder gründliche Aufklärungen über dieselbe zu verschaffen. Dies kündigt sich auch schon gleich anfangs durch die Definition an: die Freiheit sei „ein Vermögen des Guten und Bösen“. Für den Katechismus mag eine solche Definition tauglich sein: in der Philosophie aber ist damit nichts gesagt und folglich auch nichts anzufangen. Denn Gutes und Böses sind weit davon entfernt, einfache Begriffe (notiones simplices) zu sein, die, an sich selbst klar, keiner Erklärung, Feststellung und Begründung bedürften. Ueberhaupt handelt nur ein kleiner Teil jener Abhandlung von der Freiheit: ihr Hauptinhalt ist vielmehr ein ausführlicher Bericht über einen Gott, mit welchem der Herr Verfasser intime Bekanntschaft verrät, da er uns sogar dessen Entstehung beschreibt; nur ist zu bedauern, daß er mit keinem Worte erwähnt, wie er denn zu dieser Bekanntschaft gekommen sei. Den Anfang der Abhandlung macht ein Gewebe von Sophismen, deren Seichtigkeit jeder erkennen wird, der sich durch die Dreistigkeit des Tons nicht einschüchtern läßt.
Seitdem und infolge dieses und ähnlicher Erzeugnisse ist nun in der deutschen Philosophie an der Stelle deutlicher Begriffe und redlichen Forschens „intellektuale Anschauung“ und „absolutes Denken“ getreten: Jmponieren, Verdutzen, Mystifizieren, dem Leser durch allerlei Kunstgriffe Sand in die Augen streuen, ist die Methode geworden, und durchgängig leitet statt der Einsicht die Absicht den Vortrag. Durch welches alles denn die Philosophie, wenn man sie noch so nennen will, mehr und mehr und immer tiefer hat sinken müssen, bis sie zuletzt die tiefste Stufe der Erniedrigung erreichte in der Ministerkreatur Hegel: dieser, um die durch Kant errungene Freiheit des Denkens wieder zu ersticken, machte nunmehr die Philosophie, die Tochter der Vernunft und künftige Mutter der Wahrheit, zum Werkzeug der Staatszwecke, des Obskurantismus und protestantischen Jesuitismus: um aber die Schmach zu verhüllen und zugleich die größtmöglichste Verdummung der Köpfe herbeizuführen, zog er den Deckmantel des hohlsten Wortkrams und des unsinnigsten Gallimathias, der jemals, wenigstens außer dem Tollhause, gehört worden, darüber.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the German, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
After these, his nearest predecessors, it need not surprise us that Kant took the necessity with which the empirical character is determined to actions by motives as a matter already settled, with him as with others, and did not pause to prove it anew. He opens his “Ideas for a General History” thus: “Whatever concept one may form of the freedom of the will for metaphysical purposes, its appearances, human actions, are determined by universal laws of nature just as much as any other natural occurrence.”—In the Critique of Pure Reason (S. 548 of the first, or S. 577 of the fifth edition) he says: “Because the empirical character itself must be drawn from the appearances as effect, and from the rule of these which experience supplies, all actions of the human being, in appearance, are determined from his empirical character and the other cooperating causes according to the order of nature; and if we could investigate all the appearances of his power of choice to the very bottom, there would be no single human action that we could not predict with certainty and recognize as necessary from its preceding conditions. With regard to this empirical character, therefore, there is no freedom, and it is only in accordance with it that we can consider the human being if we merely observe and, as happens in anthropology, want to investigate physiologically the moving causes of his actions.”—In the same work, S. 798 of the first, or S. 826 of the fifth edition, we read: “The will may well be free, but this can concern only the intelligible cause of our willing. For as to the phenomena of its manifestations, that is, actions, we must, in accordance with an inviolable fundamental maxim without which we can exercise no reason in empirical use, never explain them otherwise than all the other appearances of nature, namely according to their unchangeable laws.”—Further, in the Critique of Practical Reason, S. 177 of the fourth edition, or S. 230 of the Rosenkranz edition: “One may therefore grant that if it were possible for us to have so deep an insight into a person’s way of thinking, as it shows itself through inner as well as outer actions, that every incentive to it, even the slightest, became known to us, together with all the external occasions acting upon it, one could calculate a person’s future conduct with certainty, just as one calculates a lunar or solar eclipse.”
To this, however, he links his doctrine of how freedom can coexist with necessity, by virtue of the distinction between the intelligible character and the empirical. Since I wholly profess that view, I shall return to it further below. Kant set it out twice: in the Critique of Pure Reason, S. 532–554 of the first, or S. 560–582 of the fifth edition, and still more clearly in the Critique of Practical Reason, S. 169–179 of the fourth edition, or S. 224–231 of the Rosenkranz edition. These profoundly thought passages must be read by everyone who wants to gain a thorough understanding of how human freedom is compatible with the necessity of actions.—
From the achievements of all these noble and venerable predecessors, the present treatment of the subject differs so far chiefly in two points. First, guided by the prize question, I have strictly separated the inner perception of the will in self-consciousness from the outer, and considered each of the two by itself; only in this way did it become possible to uncover the source of the illusion that works so irresistibly on most people. Second, I have considered the will in connection with all the rest of nature, which no one before me has done; only in this way could the subject be treated with the thoroughness, methodical insight and completeness of which it is capable.
Now a few more words about some writers who have written since Kant, but whom I do not regard as my predecessors.
Schelling has supplied an explanatory paraphrase of Kant’s supremely important doctrine, just praised, concerning the intelligible and empirical character, in his “Inquiry into Human Freedom,” S. 465–471. By the vividness of its coloring, this paraphrase can help make the matter more accessible to some than Kant’s thorough but dry presentation can. Yet I cannot mention it without censuring, for the honor of truth and of Kant, that Schelling, here where he presents one of the most important and admirable of Kant’s doctrines—in my view the most profound of them all—does not state plainly that what he now sets out belongs, as to its content, to Kant. Instead he expresses himself so that the great majority of readers, who do not have the contents of the great man’s voluminous and difficult works exactly in mind, must suppose they are reading Schelling’s own thoughts. How fully the result has matched the intention here I will show by just one proof among many. Even today a young professor of philosophy at Halle, Mr. Erdmann, says in his book of 1837, titled “Body and Soul,” S. 101: “even if Leibniz, similarly to Schelling in his treatise on freedom, lets the soul determine itself before all time,” etc. Schelling thus stands to Kant here in the fortunate position of Amerigo to Columbus: the foreign discovery is stamped with his name. But he has his cleverness to thank for it, not chance. For he begins, S. 465: “In general, it was idealism that first raised the doctrine of freedom to that domain,” etc., and now the Kantian thoughts follow immediately. So instead of saying Kant here, as honesty demands, he shrewdly says idealism. Under this ambiguous expression, however, everyone will understand Fichte’s and Schelling’s first, Fichtean philosophy, not Kant’s doctrine, since Kant protested against the name idealism for his philosophy (e.g., Prolegomena, S. 51, and S. 155, Rosenkr.) and even inserted a “Refutation of Idealism” into the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, S. 274. On the following page Schelling very shrewdly mentions the “Kantian concept” in a passing phrase, namely to placate those who already know that it is Kantian wealth that is being so pompously unpacked here as his own merchandise. But then, on S. 472, in defiance of all truth and justice, it is even said that Kant had not risen to that view in theory, etc., whereas from the two immortal passages of Kant that I recommended above for reading, anyone can see plainly that precisely this view originally belongs to him alone—a view that a thousand such minds as Messrs. Fichte and Schelling would never have been capable of grasping without him. Since I had to speak here of Schelling’s treatise, I could not keep silent on this point, but have merely done my duty toward that great teacher of humanity who, alone beside Goethe, is the just pride of the German nation, by vindicating for him what indisputably belongs to him alone—the more so in a time to which Goethe’s saying applies with perfect precision: “the tribe of boys is master of the course.”—Moreover, in the same treatise Schelling has made no more scruple of appropriating the thoughts, indeed the words, of Jakob Böhme without disclosing his source.
Apart from this paraphrase of Kantian thoughts, those “Inquiries into Freedom” contain nothing that could serve to give us new or thorough clarification of it. This announces itself right at the outset in the definition: freedom is said to be “a capacity for good and evil.” Such a definition may serve for the catechism, but in philosophy it says nothing and therefore gives us nothing to work with. For good and evil are far from being simple concepts (notiones simplices) that, clear in themselves, would need no explanation, fixing and grounding. In general, only a small part of that treatise deals with freedom; its main content is rather a detailed report about a God with whom the honorable author betrays intimate acquaintance, since he even describes this God’s origin. It is only to be regretted that he does not say a single word about how he came by this acquaintance. The treatise opens with a web of sophisms whose shallowness anyone will recognize who does not let himself be intimidated by the boldness of the tone.
Since then, and as a result of this and similar productions, “intellectual intuition” and “absolute thinking” have taken the place of clear concepts and honest inquiry in German philosophy. Overawing, bewildering, mystifying, throwing sand in the reader’s eyes by every sort of trick has become the method, and throughout, design rather than insight guides the exposition. Through all this, philosophy, if one still wishes to call it that, has had to sink lower and lower, until at last it reached the lowest stage of degradation in the ministerial creature Hegel. To stifle again the freedom of thought won by Kant, he now made philosophy, the daughter of reason and future mother of truth, an instrument of state purposes, of obscurantism and Protestant Jesuitism. And to cover the disgrace and at the same time bring about the greatest possible stupefaction of minds, he drew over it the cloak of the hollowest verbiage and the most senseless gibberish ever heard, at least outside the madhouse.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English translation, made independently and directly from the German, not from the Musean edition or a published English translation, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
After these nearest predecessors of his, it should not surprise us that Kant took the necessity with which motives determine the empirical character to actions as a settled matter. It was settled for him and for others too, so he did not stop to prove it again. He opens his "Ideas toward a Universal History" like this: "Whatever idea one may form, for metaphysical purposes, of the freedom of the will, its appearances, human actions, are determined by universal laws of nature, just as much as any other natural event."—In the Critique of Pure Reason (S. 548 of the first edition, or S. 577 of the fifth) he says: "Since the empirical character itself must be drawn from the phenomena as an effect, and from their rule, which experience supplies, all of a person's actions, as phenomena, are determined by their empirical character and the other causes that work with it, according to the order of nature. And if we could investigate all the phenomena of their power of choice down to the ground, there would be no single human action that we could not predict with certainty and recognize as necessary from its preceding conditions. With respect to this empirical character there is therefore no freedom. And only according to this can we consider a person, if we merely observe and, as is done in anthropology, want to investigate the moving causes of their actions physiologically."—In the same work, S. 798 of the first edition, or S. 826 of the fifth, it says: "Even if the will is free, this can concern only the intelligible cause of our willing. As for the phenomena of its expressions, that is, actions, we must by an inviolable basic maxim, without which we can use no reason in its empirical use, never explain them otherwise than all the other phenomena of nature, namely by their unchangeable laws."—Further, in the Critique of Practical Reason, S. 177 of the fourth edition, or S. 230 of Rosenkranz's: "So we can grant the following. Suppose it were possible for us to have so deep an insight into a person's way of thinking, as it shows itself in inner as well as outer actions, that every incentive to it, even the slightest, became known to us, and likewise all the outer occasions acting on these incentives. Then one could calculate a person's future conduct with certainty, just like a lunar or solar eclipse."
Kant ties to this his doctrine that freedom and necessity can exist together. He bases it on the distinction between the intelligible character and the empirical. I fully accept this view, so I will return to it further below. Kant presented it twice: in the Critique of Pure Reason, S. 532–554 of the first edition, or S. 560–582 of the fifth, and still more clearly in the Critique of Practical Reason, S. 169–179 of the fourth edition, or S. 224–231 of Rosenkranz's. These deeply thought passages must be read by everyone who wants a thorough understanding of how human freedom can be reconciled with the necessity of actions.—
Up to here, this treatment of the subject differs from the achievements of all these noble and venerable predecessors chiefly in two points. First, following the guidance of the prize question, I have kept the inner perception of the will in self-consciousness strictly apart from the outer perception, and considered each by itself. Only this made it possible to uncover the source of the illusion that works so irresistibly on most people. Second, I have considered the will in connection with the whole of the rest of nature. No one before me did that. Only this made it possible to treat the subject with the thoroughness, methodical insight, and completeness of which it is capable.
Now a few words about some writers who wrote after Kant, but whom I do not regard as my predecessors.
Schelling has given an explanatory paraphrase of Kant's doctrine of the intelligible and empirical character, which I just praised as highly important. It is in his "Inquiry into Human Freedom," S. 465–471. The liveliness of its coloring can help make the matter easier for some readers to grasp than Kant's thorough but dry presentation can. Still, I cannot mention this paraphrase without protesting, for the honor of truth and of Kant. Schelling is presenting one of the most important and admirable of all Kant's doctrines, and in my view the most profound. Yet he does not say clearly that what he now sets out belongs to Kant as far as its content goes. Instead he words it so that the great majority of readers must suppose they are reading Schelling's own thoughts. Most readers do not have the content of the great man's long and difficult works clearly in mind. I will show how well the result has matched this aim with just one example out of many. Even today a young professor of philosophy in Halle, Mr. Erdmann, says in his book of 1837, titled "Body and Soul," S. 101: "even if Leibniz, similarly to Schelling in his treatise on freedom, lets the soul determine itself before all time," etc. So Schelling stands to Kant in the fortunate position of Amerigo to Columbus: another's discovery is stamped with his name. But he owes this to his cleverness, not to chance. For he begins, S. 465: "In general, it was idealism that first raised the doctrine of freedom into that domain," etc. The Kantian thoughts follow immediately. Honesty would have him say Kant here. Instead he cleverly says idealism. But this expression has many meanings. Everyone here will understand by it Fichte's and Schelling's first, Fichtean philosophy, and not Kant's doctrine. Kant protested against the name idealism for his philosophy (for example Prolegomena, S. 51, and S. 155, Rosenkranz). He even inserted a "Refutation of Idealism" into the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, S. 274. On the following page Schelling very cleverly mentions "the Kantian concept" in a passing phrase. This is to soothe those who already know that the wealth being unpacked so grandly here as his own goods is Kant's. But then, S. 472, against all truth and justice, he even says that Kant had not risen to that view in theory, etc. Yet anyone can see clearly from the two immortal passages of Kant that I recommended above for reading that precisely this view belongs originally to him alone. Without Kant, a thousand more heads like Messrs. Fichte and Schelling would never have been able to grasp it. Since I had to speak here of Schelling's treatise, I could not stay silent on this point. I have only done my duty toward that great teacher of humanity, who, quite alone beside Goethe, is the rightful pride of the German nation. I have claimed for him what undeniably belongs to him alone. This matters all the more in an age to which Goethe's saying truly applies: "the crowd of boys is master of the road."—Besides, in the same treatise Schelling had just as little hesitation in making the thoughts, and even the words, of Jakob Böhme his own, without revealing his source.
Apart from this paraphrase of Kant's thoughts, that "Inquiry into Freedom" contains nothing that could give us new or thorough clarification about freedom. The definition right at the start already announces this: freedom is "a capacity for good and evil." Such a definition may suit the catechism. In philosophy it says nothing, and so nothing can be done with it. For good and evil are far from being simple concepts (notiones simplices) that are clear in themselves and need no explanation, pinning down, or grounding. In general, only a small part of that treatise is about freedom. Its main content is a detailed report about a God with whom the author shows intimate acquaintance, since he even describes God's origin for us. It is only a pity that he does not say in a single word how he came by this acquaintance. The treatise begins with a web of sophisms. Anyone who does not let the boldness of the tone intimidate them will see how shallow they are.
Since then, as a result of this work and others like it, "intellectual intuition" and "absolute thinking" have taken the place of clear concepts and honest inquiry in German philosophy. Impressing, bewildering, and mystifying people, and throwing sand in the reader's eyes by all sorts of tricks, has become the method. All the way through, intention rather than insight guides the presentation. Because of all this, philosophy—if one still wants to call it that—has had to sink more and more, and ever deeper. At last it reached the lowest step of degradation in the minister's creature Hegel. He wanted to smother again the freedom of thought that Kant had won. So he made philosophy, the daughter of reason and future mother of truth, into a tool of the state's purposes, of obscurantism, and of Protestant Jesuitism. And to hide the disgrace, and at the same time to dull people's heads as much as possible, he drew over it the cloak of the emptiest word-mongering and the most senseless gibberish ever heard, at least outside the madhouse.
About this section
Chapter IV, 6 is part of On the Freedom of the Will by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 23 of 28 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.