Chapter IV, 4
Original German
Inzwischen ist durch den Augustinus und seinen Streit mit Manichäern und Pelagianern die Philosophie zum Bewußtsein unsers Problems erwacht. Von nun an wurde es ihr, durch die Scholastiker, allmählich deutlicher, wovon Buridans Sophisma und die oben angeführte Stelle Dantes Zeugnis ablegen. — Wer aber zuerst der Sache auf den Grund gekommen, ist, allem Anschein nach, Thomas Hobbes, dessen diesem Gegenstand eigens gewidmete Schrift: Quaestiones de libertate et necessitate, contra Doctorem Branhallum, 1656 erschien: sie ist jetzt selten. Jn englischer Sprache findet sie sich in Th. Hobbes moral and political works, ein Band in Folio, London 1750, S. 469 ff., woraus ich folgende Hauptstelle hersetze. S. 483:
6 Nothing takes a beginning from itself; but from the action of some other immediate agent, without itself. Therefore, when first a man has an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will; the cause of his will is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. So that, whereas it is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said, the will is also necessarily caused by other things, whereof it disposes not, it follows that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.
7 I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needfull to the producing of the effect. The same is also a necessary cause: for, if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat, which was needfull to the producing of it; and so the cause was not sufficient. But if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect; then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause. Hence it is manifest, that whatever is produced, is produced necessarily. For whatsoever is produced has had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been: and therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated.
8 That ordinary definition of a free agent (namely that a free agent is that, which, wenn all things are present, which are needfull to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it) implies a contradiction and is Nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be sufficient, that is to say necessary, and yet the effect shall not follow. —
S. 485. Every accident, how contingent soever it seem, or how voluntary soever it be, is produced necessarily ∗).
∗) 6. Nichts fängt von selbst an, sondern jedes durch die Einwirkung irgend einer andern, außer ihm gelegenen unmittelbaren Ursache. Daher, wenn jetzt ein Mensch etwas wünscht oder will, was er unmittelbar vorher nicht wünschte, noch wollte; so ist die Ursache seines Wollens nicht dies Wollen selbst, sondern etwas anderes, nicht von ihm Abhängendes. Demnach, da der Wille unstreitig die notwendige Ursache der willkürlichen Handlungen ist, und, dem eben Gesagten zufolge, der Wille notwendig verursacht wird, durch andere von ihm unabhängige Dinge; so folgt, daß alle willkürlichen Handlungen notwendige Ursachen haben, also necessitiert sind.
7 Als eine zureichende Ursache erkenne ich die an, welcher nichts abgeht von dem, was zur Hervorbringung der Wirkung nötig ist. Eine solche aber ist zugleich eine notwendige Ursache. Denn wenn es möglich wäre, daß eine zureichende Ursache ihre Wirkung nicht hervorbrächte; so müßte ihr etwas zur Hervorbringung dieser Nötiges gefehlt haben: dann aber war die Ursache nicht zureichend. Wenn es aber unmöglich ist, daß eine zureichende Ursache ihre Wirkung nicht hervorbrächte; dann ist eine zureichende Ursache auch eine notwendige Ursache. Hieraus folgt offenbar, daß alles was hervorgebracht wird, notwendig hervorgebracht wird. Denn alles was hervorgebracht ist, hat eine zureichende Ursache gehabt, die es hervorbrachte; sonst wäre es nie entstanden: also sind auch die willkürlichen Handlungen necessitiert.
8 Jene gewöhnliche Definition eines frei Handelnden (daß es nämlich ein solches wäre, welches, wenn alles zur Hervorbringung der Wirkung Nötige beisammen wäre, diese dennoch auch nicht hervorbringen könnte) enthält einen Widerspruch und ist Unsinn; da sie besagt, daß eine Ursache zureichend, d. i. notwendig sein und die Wirkung doch ausbleiben könne.
S. 485. „Jede Begebenheit, so zufällig sie scheinen, oder so willkürlich sie sein mag, erfolgt notwendig.“
In seinem berühmten Buche De cive, c. 1, § 7, sagt er: Fertur unusquisque ad appetitionem ejus, quod sibi bonum, et ad fugam ejus, quod sibi malum est, maxime autem maximi malorum naturalium, quae est mors; idque necessitate quadam naturae non minore, quam qua fertur lapis deorsum.
Gleich nach Hobbes sehen wir den Spinoza von derselben Ueberzeugung durchdrungen. Seine Lehre in diesem Punkte zu charakterisieren, werden ein paar Stellen hinreichen:
Eth., P. I, prop. 32. Voluntas non potest vocari causa libera, sed tantum necessaria. — Coroll. 2. Nam voluntas, ut reliqua omnia, causa indiget, a qua ad operandum certo modo determinatur.
Ibid., P. II, scholium ultimum. Quod denique ad quartam objectionem (de Buridani asina) attinet, dico, me omnino concedere, quod homo in tali aequilibrio positus (nempe qui nihil aliud percipit quam sitim et famem, talem cibum et talem potum, qui aeque ab eo distant) fame et siti peribit.
Ibid., P. III, prop. 2. Schol. Mentis decreta eadem necessitate in mente oriuntur, ac ideae rerum actu existentium. Qui igitur credunt, se ex libero mentis decreto loqui vel tacere, vel quidquam agere, oculis apertis somniant. — Epist. 62. Unaquaeque res necessario a causa externa aliqua determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione. Ex. gr. lapis a causa externa, ipsum impellente, certam motus quantitatem accipit, qua postea moveri necessario perget. Concipe jam lapidem, dum moveri pergit, cogitare et scire, se quantum potest, conari, ut moveri pergat. Hic sane lapis, quandoquidem sui tantummodo conatus est conscius et minime indifferens, se liberrimum esse et nulla alia de causa in motu perseverare credet, quam quia vult. Atque haec humana illa libertas est, quam omnes habere jactant, et quae in hoc solo consistit, quod homines sui appetitus sint conscii, et causarum, a quibus determinantur, ignari. — — His, quaenam mea de libera et coacta necessitate, deque ficta humana libertate sit sententia, satis explicui.
Ein beachtenswerter Umstand aber ist es, daß Spinoza zu dieser Einsicht erst in seinen letzten (d. i. vierziger) Jahren gelangt ist, nachdem er früher, im Jahr 1665, als er noch Cartesianer war, in seinen Cogitatis metaphysicis, c. 12, die entgegengesetzte Meinung entschieden und lebhaft verteidigt und sogar im geraden Widerspruch mit dem soeben angeführten Scholio ultimo Partis II, hinsichtlich des Buridanschen Sophismas gesagt hatte: si enim hominem loco asinae ponamus in tali aequilibrio positum, homo, non pro re cogitante, sed pro turpissimo asino erit habendus, si fame et siti pereat.
Dieselbe Meinungsveränderung und Bekehrung werde ich weiter unten von zwei andern großen Männern zu berichten haben. Dies beweist, wie schwierig und tiefliegend die rechte Einsicht in unser Problem ist.
Hume, in seinem Essay on liberty and necessity, aus welchem ich bereits oben eine Stelle beizubringen hatte, schreibt mit der klarsten Ueberzeugung von der Notwendigkeit der einzelnen Willensakte, bei gegebenen Motiven, und trägt sie in seiner allgemeinfaßlichen Weise höchst deutlich vor. Er sagt: Thus it appears that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature. Und weiterhin: It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or action of any kind, without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity and his inference from motives to voluntary actions, from character to conduct∗).
∗) „So ergibt sich, daß die Verbindung zwischen Motiven und willkürlichen Handlungen so regelmäßig und gleichförmig ist, wie die zwischen Ursach und Wirkung in irgend einem Teile der Natur nur sein kann.“ — — — „Es scheint demnach fast unmöglich, weder in der Wissenschaft, noch auch in Handlungen irgend einer Art, etwas zu unternehmen, ohne die Lehre von der Notwendigkeit und jenen Schluß von Motiven auf Willensakte, vom Charakter auf die Handlungsweise, anzuerkennen.“
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the German, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
Meanwhile, through Augustine and his dispute with the Manichaeans and Pelagians, philosophy awoke to consciousness of our problem. From then on it gradually became clearer to philosophy, through the Scholastics, as Buridan’s sophism and the passage from Dante cited above bear witness.—But the first to get to the bottom of the matter was, to all appearances, Thomas Hobbes, whose work devoted expressly to this subject, Quaestiones de libertate et necessitate, contra Doctorem Branhallum, appeared in 1656 and is now rare. In English it is found in Th. Hobbes moral and political works, one folio volume, London 1750, S. 469 ff., from which I set down the following principal passage. S. 483:
6 Nothing takes a beginning from itself, but only from the action of some other immediate agent outside itself. Therefore, when a man first has an appetite or will for something for which he had neither appetite nor will immediately before, the cause of his will is not the will itself but something else, not in his own disposing. So, since it is beyond controversy that the will is the necessary cause of voluntary actions, and since, by what has just been said, the will is also necessarily caused by other things over which it has no disposal, it follows that voluntary actions all have necessary causes and are therefore necessitated.
7 I hold that to be a sufficient cause from which nothing is lacking that is needed to produce the effect. The same is also a necessary cause. For if it were possible for a sufficient cause not to bring forth its effect, then something needed to produce it would be lacking, and so the cause was not sufficient. But if it is impossible for a sufficient cause not to produce its effect, then a sufficient cause is a necessary cause. Hence it is manifest that whatever is produced is produced necessarily. For whatever is produced has had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it would never have been; and therefore voluntary actions too are necessitated.
8 That ordinary definition of a free agent (namely, that a free agent is one which, when everything needed to produce the effect is present, can nevertheless fail to produce it) implies a contradiction and is nonsense, since it amounts to saying that the cause may be sufficient, that is to say necessary, and yet the effect not follow.—
S. 485. Every event, however contingent it may seem or however voluntary it may be, is produced necessarily∗).
∗) 6. Nothing begins of itself, but each thing through the action of some other, immediate cause lying outside it. Hence, when a person now wishes or wills something that he neither wished nor willed immediately before, the cause of his willing is not this willing itself but something else, not dependent on him. Accordingly, since the will is indisputably the necessary cause of voluntary actions, and, according to what has just been said, the will is necessarily caused by other things independent of it, it follows that all voluntary actions have necessary causes and are therefore necessitated.
7 I recognize as a sufficient cause one from which nothing is missing that is needed to produce the effect. Such a cause, however, is at the same time a necessary cause. For if it were possible for a sufficient cause not to bring forth its effect, something needed to produce that effect would have had to be lacking to it; but then the cause was not sufficient. If, however, it is impossible for a sufficient cause not to bring forth its effect, then a sufficient cause is also a necessary cause. From this it plainly follows that everything that is produced is necessarily produced. For everything that has been produced has had a sufficient cause that produced it; otherwise it would never have come into being. Therefore voluntary actions too are necessitated.
8 That common definition of a free agent (namely, that it would be one which, even when everything needed to produce the effect was present together, could still fail to produce it) contains a contradiction and is nonsense, since it says that a cause could be sufficient—that is, necessary—and the effect nevertheless fail to occur.
S. 485. “Every event, however contingent it may seem or however voluntary it may be, occurs necessarily.”
In his famous book De cive, c. 1, § 7, he says: “Everyone is borne toward the pursuit of what is good for him and toward flight from what is bad for him, above all from the greatest of natural evils, which is death; and this by a necessity of nature no less than that by which a stone is borne downward.”
Immediately after Hobbes we see Spinoza permeated by the same conviction. A few passages will suffice to characterize his teaching on this point:
Eth., P. I, prop. 32. “Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.”—Coroll. 2. “For will, like everything else, requires a cause by which it is determined to act in a certain way.”
Ibid., P. II, scholium ultimum. “As for the fourth objection (concerning Buridan’s ass), I say that I grant entirely that a man placed in such an equilibrium (one, that is, who perceives nothing but thirst and hunger, and such food and such drink, which are equally distant from him) will perish of hunger and thirst.”
Ibid., P. III, prop. 2. Schol. “The decrees of the mind arise in the mind with the same necessity as the ideas of things actually existing. Those, therefore, who believe that they speak or keep silent, or do anything at all, from a free decree of the mind are dreaming with open eyes.”—Epist. 62. “Each thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and to act in a certain and determinate way. For example, a stone receives from an external cause that impels it a certain quantity of motion, with which it will afterward necessarily continue to move. Imagine now that the stone, while it continues to move, thinks and knows that it is striving, as far as it can, to continue in motion. This stone, since it is conscious only of its own striving and is by no means indifferent, will surely believe that it is perfectly free and that it perseveres in motion for no other reason than that it wills to. And this is that human freedom which all boast of having, and which consists in this alone, that people are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined.”——“With this I have sufficiently explained what my opinion is concerning free and constrained necessity, and concerning the fictitious freedom of human beings.”
A noteworthy circumstance, however, is that Spinoza arrived at this insight only in his last years (that is, in his forties). Earlier, in 1665, while he was still a Cartesian, he had decisively and warmly defended the opposite opinion in his Cogitata metaphysica, c. 12, and had even said, in direct contradiction to the scholium ultimum of Part II just cited, concerning Buridan’s sophism: “For if we put a human being in the place of the ass, placed in such an equilibrium, the human being must be regarded not as a thinking thing but as the most contemptible ass, if he perishes of hunger and thirst.”
I shall have to report the same change of opinion and conversion further on of two other great men. This proves how difficult, and how deeply buried, true insight into our problem is.
Hume, in his Essay on liberty and necessity, from which I have already had to cite a passage above, writes with the clearest conviction of the necessity of individual acts of will given motives, and sets it forth very plainly in his generally accessible manner. He says: “Thus it appears that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between cause and effect in any part of nature.” And further on: “It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage in either science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity and that inference from motives to voluntary actions, from character to conduct.”∗)
∗) “Thus it follows that the connection between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as the connection between cause and effect in any part of nature can possibly be.”———“It therefore seems almost impossible to undertake anything, either in science or in actions of any kind, without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity and that inference from motives to acts of will, from character to mode of conduct.”
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English translation, made independently and directly from the German, not from the Musean edition or a published English translation, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
In the meantime, Augustine and his dispute with the Manichaeans and the Pelagians had awakened philosophy to an awareness of our problem. From then on the Scholastics gradually saw it more clearly, as Buridan's sophism and the passage from Dante quoted above show.—But the first to get to the bottom of the matter was, by all appearances, Thomas Hobbes. He devoted a work specially to this subject, Quaestiones de libertate et necessitate, contra Doctorem Branhallum, which appeared in 1656. It is rare now. In English it can be found in Th. Hobbes moral and political works, one volume in folio, London 1750, S. 469 ff. I give the following main passage from it. S. 483:
6 Nothing takes a beginning from itself. It begins from the action of some other immediate agent outside itself. So when a person first has an appetite or will for something that they had no appetite or will for just before, the cause of that will is not the will itself but something else, which is not theirs to command. Now there is no dispute that the will is the necessary cause of voluntary actions. And what has just been said shows that the will is itself necessarily caused by other things, which it does not control. It follows that voluntary actions all have necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.
7 I hold a cause to be sufficient when nothing is missing that is needed to produce the effect. Such a cause is also a necessary cause. For suppose it were possible for a sufficient cause not to bring forth its effect. Then something needed to produce the effect would be missing, and so the cause was not sufficient. But if it is impossible for a sufficient cause not to produce its effect, then a sufficient cause is a necessary cause. From this it is clear that whatever is produced is produced necessarily. For whatever is produced has had a sufficient cause to produce it; otherwise it would not have come to be. And so voluntary actions are necessitated as well.
8 The ordinary definition of a free agent (namely, that a free agent is one that, when all the things needed to produce the effect are present, can nevertheless fail to produce it) contains a contradiction and is nonsense. It is the same as saying that the cause may be sufficient, that is, necessary, and yet the effect not follow.—
S. 485. Every event, however much a matter of chance it may seem, and however voluntary it may be, is produced necessarily ∗).
∗) 6. Nothing starts by itself. Each thing starts through the working of some other, immediate cause that lies outside it. So when a person now wishes or wants something that they neither wished nor wanted just before, the cause of their wanting is not this wanting itself but something else, something that does not depend on them. Now the will is, beyond dispute, the necessary cause of voluntary actions. And, according to what was just said, the will is necessarily caused by other things that are independent of it. It follows that all voluntary actions have necessary causes, and so are necessitated.
7 I recognize as a sufficient cause one that lacks nothing needed to bring about its effect. Such a cause is at the same time a necessary cause. For if it were possible for a sufficient cause not to bring about its effect, then it would have to have lacked something needed to bring that effect about. But then the cause was not sufficient. And if it is impossible for a sufficient cause not to bring about its effect, then a sufficient cause is also a necessary cause. From this it plainly follows that everything that is brought about is brought about necessarily. For everything that has been brought about had a sufficient cause that brought it about; otherwise it would never have come into being. So voluntary actions are necessitated too.
8 That common definition of a free agent (namely, that it would be something which, even when everything needed to bring about the effect is present, could still fail to bring it about) contains a contradiction and is nonsense. For it says that a cause can be sufficient, that is, necessary, and the effect can still fail to appear.
S. 485. "Every event, however accidental it may seem, or however voluntary it may be, happens necessarily."
In his famous book De cive, c. 1, § 7, he says: Everyone is driven to pursue what is good for them and to flee what is bad for them, and above all the greatest of natural evils, which is death; and this happens by a necessity of nature no less than the necessity by which a stone is driven downward.
Right after Hobbes we see Spinoza filled with the same conviction. A few passages will be enough to show what his teaching on this point is:
Eth., P. I, prop. 32. The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.—Coroll. 2. For the will, like everything else, needs a cause by which it is determined to act in a certain way.
Ibid., P. II, scholium ultimum. As for the fourth objection (about Buridan's ass), I say that I fully grant this: a person placed in such a balance (that is, one who perceives nothing but thirst and hunger and a certain food and a certain drink, both equally far from them) will die of hunger and thirst.
Ibid., P. III, prop. 2. Schol. The decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of things that actually exist. So those who believe they speak or keep silent, or do anything at all, from a free decision of the mind are dreaming with their eyes open.—Epist. 62. Each thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and to act in a certain fixed way. For example, a stone receives from an external cause that pushes it a certain quantity of motion, with which it will necessarily keep moving afterward. Now imagine that the stone, while it keeps moving, thinks and knows that it is trying, as much as it can, to keep moving. This stone is conscious only of its own effort and is not at all indifferent. So it will believe that it is perfectly free and that it stays in motion for no other reason than that it wants to. And this is that human freedom which everyone boasts of having, and which consists in this alone: that people are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the causes that determine them.——With this I have explained well enough what my opinion is about free and compelled necessity, and about the invented human freedom.
A remarkable fact, however, is that Spinoza reached this insight only in his last years (that is, in his forties). Earlier, in 1665, when he was still a Cartesian, he had firmly and warmly defended the opposite opinion in his Cogitata metaphysica, c. 12. In direct contradiction to the final scholium of Part II just quoted, he had even said this about Buridan's sophism: If we put a human being in the place of the ass, in such a balance, that human being must be regarded not as a thinking creature but as the most disgraceful of asses, if they die of hunger and thirst.
I will have to report the same change of opinion and conversion about two other great men further below. This proves how difficult and deeply hidden the right insight into our problem is.
Hume, in his Essay on liberty and necessity, from which I already had to quote a passage above, writes with the clearest conviction that individual acts of will are necessary once the motives are given. He presents this very plainly, in his usual manner, which everyone can follow. He says: So it appears that the connection between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as the connection between cause and effect in any part of nature. And further on: It seems almost impossible, then, to take part in science or in action of any kind without accepting the doctrine of necessity and this inference from motives to voluntary actions, from character to conduct∗).
∗) "So it follows that the connection between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as the connection between cause and effect in any part of nature can possibly be."———"So it seems almost impossible to undertake anything, whether in science or in actions of any kind, without accepting the doctrine of necessity and that inference from motives to acts of will, from character to way of acting."
About this section
Chapter IV, 4 is part of On the Freedom of the Will by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 21 of 28 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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