Chapter IV, 2

On the other hand, however, three considerations moved him to defend the freedom of the will:

1 His opposition to the Manichaeans, against whom the books De lib. arb. are expressly directed, because they denied free will and assumed another primal source of evil as well as of ills. He already alludes to them in the last chapter of the book De animae quantitate: “Free will has been given to the soul, and those who try to undermine it with frivolous reasonings are so blind that, etc.”

2 The natural illusion I have exposed, by which “I can do what I will” is taken for freedom of the will, and “voluntary” is taken as immediately identical with “free”: De lib. arb. I, 12. “For what lies so much within the will as the will itself?”

3 The need to bring man’s moral responsibility into harmony with the justice of God. For a most serious difficulty did not escape Augustine’s acuteness, one whose removal is so hard that, as far as I know, all later philosophers, with the exception of three, whom we shall therefore examine more closely at once, have preferred to creep softly around it, as though it did not exist. Augustine, on the other hand, states it quite unreservedly, with noble candor, right in the opening words of the books De lib. arb.: “Tell me, I pray you: is God not the author of evil?”—And then at greater length, right in the second chapter: “But the mind is troubled by this: if sins come from these souls which God created, and those souls from God, how are sins not, after a short interval, traced back to God?” To which the interlocutor replies: “What you have just said plainly is what torments me enough when I think of it.”—This most disquieting consideration Luther took up again and brought out with all the vehemence of his eloquence, De servo arbitrio, S. 144: “But that God must be such a one as imposes necessity on us by his own freedom, natural reason itself is compelled to confess.—If foreknowledge and omnipotence are granted, it follows naturally, by irrefutable consequence, that we have not been made by ourselves, and neither live nor do anything, but through his omnipotence.——The foreknowledge and omnipotence of God are in diametrical conflict with our free will.—All men are compelled by inevitable consequence to admit that we are made not by our own will but by necessity; that thus we do not do what we please, by right of free will, but as God has foreknown and acts, by infallible and immutable counsel and power: and so on.”

We find Vanini, at the beginning of the 17th century, wholly filled with this insight. It is the core and soul of his persistent revolt against theism—a revolt concealed, under the pressure of the age, as cleverly as possible. On every occasion he returns to it and never tires of setting it out from the most varied points of view. For example, in his Amphitheatrum aeternae providentiae, exercitatio 16, he says: “If God wills sins, then he does them: for it is written, ‘Whatever he willed, he has done.’ If he does not will them, they are nonetheless committed: he must therefore be called improvident, or powerless, or cruel, since he either does not know how, or is unable, or neglects to bring about what he wills.————The philosophers say: if God did not want the worst and most nefarious actions to flourish in the world, he would doubtless, with a single nod, banish and sweep away all outrages beyond the bounds of the world: for which of us can resist the divine will? How are crimes committed against God’s will, if even in the act of sinning he furnishes the wicked with strength? Besides, if man falls contrary to God’s will, God will be inferior to man, who opposes him and prevails. From this they deduce: God desires this world just as it is; had he wanted a better one, he would have a better one.”—And in exercitatio 44 it reads: “An instrument is moved as it is directed by its principal; but our will in its operations stands as an instrument, God as the principal agent: therefore if it operates badly, this must be imputed to God.———Our will depends wholly on God, not only as to motion but also as to substance: hence there is nothing that can truly be imputed to it, neither on the side of substance nor of operation, but everything to God, who has so formed the will and so moves it.————Since the essence and motion of the will are from God, the operations of the will, whether good or bad, must be ascribed to him, if the will stands to him as an instrument.” But with Vanini one must keep in view that he consistently employs the stratagem of putting forward his real opinion, in the person of an opponent, as the one he abhors and wants to refute, and of demonstrating it convincingly and thoroughly; in order then, in his own person, to oppose it with shallow reasons and lame arguments and thereupon to depart in triumph, as if the business had been well done—relying on the malice of his reader. By this craftiness he deceived even the highly learned Sorbonne, which, taking all that for good coin, trustingly set its imprimatur before his most godless writings. With all the heartier joy it saw him, three years later, burned alive, after his blasphemous tongue had first been cut out. For this, after all, is the truly forceful argument of the theologians, and since it has been taken from them, matters have gone very much backward.

Among philosophers in the narrower sense, if I am not mistaken, Hume is the first who did not creep around the grave difficulty first raised by Augustine, but sets it out openly—without, however, mentioning Augustine or Luther, let alone Vanini—in his Essay on Liberty and Necessity, where it says, toward the end: “The ultimate author of all our volitions is the creator of the world, who first set this immense machine in motion and placed all beings in that particular position from which every subsequent event must follow by unavoidable necessity. Human actions, therefore, either can have no baseness at all, since they proceed from so good a cause, or, if they have any baseness, they must implicate our creator in the same guilt, since he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. For just as a man who has fired a mine is answerable for all the consequences, whether the fuse he used was long or short, so wherever a continuous chain of necessary causes is fixed, that Being, finite or infinite, who produces the first is likewise the author of all the rest ∗).” He makes an attempt to resolve this difficulty, but admits at the end that he considers it insoluble.

∗) A translation of this and the other English passages will be welcome to many German readers:

“The ultimate originator of all our acts of will is the creator of the world, who first set this immeasurable machine in motion and brought all beings into the particular situation from which every later occurrence had to follow with unavoidable necessity. For this reason human actions are either capable of no wickedness at all, since they proceed from so good a cause; or else, if they can be bad in any way, they involve our creator in the same guilt, since he is, by general acknowledgment, their ultimate cause, their originator. For as a man who sets off a mine is responsible for all its consequences, whether the sulfur fuse was long or short, so, wherever an unbroken linkage of necessarily operating causes stands firm, the being, whether finite or infinite, that brings about the first is also the originator of all the rest.”

On the other hand, however, the following three reasons moved him to defend the freedom of the will:

1 His opposition to the Manichaeans. The books De lib. arb. are expressly aimed against them, because they denied free will and assumed another original source of evil, and of ills as well. He already alludes to them in the last chapter of the book De animae quantitate: "Free choice has been given to the soul. Those who try to shake it with trifling reasonings are so blind that, etc."

2 The natural illusion, which I have exposed, by which "I can do what I will" is taken for freedom of the will, and "voluntary" is taken to be at once the same as "free": De lib. arb. I, 12. "For what lies so fully in the will as the will itself?"

3 The need to bring human moral responsibility into agreement with the justice of God. Augustine's sharp mind did not miss a most serious difficulty here. It is so hard to remove that, as far as I know, all later philosophers except three, whom we will therefore look at more closely in a moment, have preferred to tiptoe quietly around it, as though it did not exist. Augustine, by contrast, states it with noble candor, quite plainly, right in the opening words of the books De lib. arb.: "Tell me, please, whether God is not the author of evil?"—And then at greater length, right in the second chapter: "But this troubles the mind: if sins come from these souls that God created, and those souls come from God, how are sins not traced back to God after only a short step?" The other speaker in the dialogue replies: "What you have just said plainly is what torments me quite enough when I think about it."—Luther took up this most troubling reflection again and brought it out with all the vehemence of his eloquence, De servo arbitrio, S. 144. "But natural reason itself is forced to admit that God must be one who imposes necessity on us through God's own freedom.—Once foreknowledge and omnipotence are granted, it follows naturally, by irrefutable consequence, that we were not made by ourselves, and do not live or do anything by ourselves, but through God's omnipotence.——God's foreknowledge and omnipotence stand in direct opposition to our free choice.—All people are forced by inevitable consequence to admit that we do not come to be through our own will but by necessity. So we do not do what we please, by the right of free choice, but as God has foreseen and acts, with infallible and unchangeable counsel and power, etc."

At the start of the 17th century we find Vanini completely filled with this insight. It is the core and soul of his persistent revolt against theism, which, under the pressure of his time, he hid as cleverly as he could. He comes back to it on every occasion and never tires of setting it out from the most varied points of view. For example, in his Amphitheatro aeternae providentiae, exercitatio 16, he says: "If God wills sins, then God does them. For it is written, 'God has done all that God willed.' If God does not will them, they are committed anyway. Then God must be called unforeseeing, or powerless, or cruel, since God either does not know how to get what God wishes, or cannot, or neglects to.————The philosophers say: if God did not want the worst and most wicked actions to flourish in the world, God would undoubtedly wipe out all shameful deeds and drive them beyond the limits of the world with a single nod. For who among us can resist the divine will? How are crimes committed against God's will, if God even supplies the wicked with strength in the very act of sinning? Besides, if a human being falls against the will of God, God will be inferior to the human being, who opposes God and prevails. From this they conclude: God desires this world just as it is. If God wanted a better one, God would have a better one."—And in exercitatio 44 it says: "An instrument is moved as its principal agent directs it. But our will, in its workings, stands as an instrument, and God as the principal agent. So if the will works badly, this must be charged to God.———Our will depends wholly on God, not only as to its motion but also as to its substance. So nothing can truly be charged to the will, neither on the side of substance nor of operation. It is all to be charged to God, who has formed the will in this way and moves it in this way.————Since the essence and the motion of the will come from God, the workings of the will, whether good or bad, must be ascribed to God, if the will stands to God as an instrument." With Vanini, however, one must keep in mind that he uses the same stratagem throughout. In the person of an opponent, he sets out his real opinion as the one he abhors and wants to refute, and he proves it convincingly and thoroughly. Then, in his own person, he opposes it with shallow reasons and lame arguments, and walks off in triumph, as though a job well done—counting on the malice of his reader. By this slyness he even fooled the very learned Sorbonne. It took all of that at face value and trustingly put its Imprimatur on his most godless writings. It watched with all the more heartfelt joy when, three years later, he was burned alive, after his blasphemous tongue had first been cut out. For this, after all, is the theologians' truly powerful argument, and since it has been taken away from them, things have gone very much backward.

Among philosophers in the narrower sense, Hume is, if I am not mistaken, the first who did not tiptoe around the heavy difficulty that Augustine first raised. He states it openly, though without mentioning Augustine or Luther, let alone Vanini. It is in his Essay on liberty and necessity, where, toward the end, it says: "The ultimate author of all our volitions is the creator of the world. The creator first set this immense machine in motion and placed all beings in that particular position from which every later event must follow by unavoidable necessity. So human actions either can have no wrongness at all, since they come from so good a cause, or, if they do have some wrongness, they must involve our creator in the same guilt, since the creator is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. A man who sets off a mine is answerable for all the consequences, whether the fuse he used was long or short. In the same way, wherever a continuous chain of necessary causes is fixed, the Being who produces the first, whether finite or infinite, is also the author of all the rest" ∗). He makes an attempt to solve this difficulty, but admits at the end that he considers it unsolvable.

∗) Some German readers will welcome a translation of this and the other English passages:

"The ultimate author of all our acts of will is the Creator of the world, who first set this immense machine in motion and put all beings into the particular position from which every later event had to follow with unavoidable necessity. For this reason, human actions are either capable of no wickedness at all, because they come from so good a cause; or, if they can be wicked in any way, they involve our Creator in the same guilt, since the Creator is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause, their author. For just as a man who lights a mine is responsible for all the consequences, whether the fuse was long or short, so wherever an unbroken chain of necessarily working causes is fixed, the being, finite or infinite, that brings about the first is also the author of all the rest."