Chapter IV, 1
Original German
IV. Vorgänger.
Zum Beleg der obigen Behauptung über das Urteil aller tiefen Denker hinsichtlich unsers Problems, will ich von den großen Männern, welche sich in diesem Sinne ausgesprochen haben, einige in Erinnerung bringen.
Zuvörderst, um diejenigen zu beruhigen, welche etwan glauben könnten, daß Religionsgründe der von mir verfochtenen Wahrheit entgegenständen, erinnere ich daran, daß schon Jeremias (10, 23) gesagt hat: „Des Menschen Thun stehet nicht in seiner Gewalt, und stehet in niemandes Macht, wie er wandele, oder seinen Gang richte.“ Besonders aber berufe ich mich auf Luther, welcher in einem eigens dazu geschriebenen Buche, De servo arbitrio, mit seiner ganzen Heftigkeit die Willensfreiheit bestreitet. Ein paar Stellen daraus reichen hin, seine Meinung zu charakterisieren, die er natürlich nicht mit philosophischen, sondern mit theologischen Gründen unterstützt. Ich citiere sie nach der Ausgabe von Seb. Schmidt, Straßburg 1707. — Daselbst S. 145 heißt es: Quare simul in omnium cordibus scriptum invenitur, liberum arbitrium nihil esse; licet obscuretur tot disputationibus contrariis et tanta tot virorum auctoritate. — S. 214: Hoc loco admonitos velim liberi arbitrii tutores, ut sciant, sese esse abnegatores Christi, dum asserunt liberum arbitrium. — S. 220: Contra liberum arbitrium pugnabunt Scripturae testimonia, quotquot de Christo loquuntur. At ea sunt innumerabilia, imo tota Scriptura. Ideo, si Scriptura judice causam agimus, omnibus modis vicero, ut ne jota unum aut apex sit reliquus, qui non damnet dogma liberi arbitrii. —
Jetzt zu den Philosophen. Die Alten sind hier nicht ernstlich in Betracht zu ziehen, da ihre Philosophie, gleichsam noch im Stande der Unschuld, die zwei tiefsten und bedenklichsten Probleme der neuern Philosophie noch nicht zum deutlichen Bewußtsein gebracht hatte, nämlich die Frage nach der Freiheit des Willens und die nach der Realität der Außenwelt, oder dem Verhältnis des Jdealen zum Realen. Wie weit übrigens das Problem von der Freiheit des Willens den Alten klar geworden, kann man ziemlich ersehen aus des Aristoteles Ethica Nicom., III, c. 1—8, wo man finden wird, daß sein Denken darüber im wesentlichen bloß die physische und die intellektuelle Freiheit betrifft, daher er stets nur von ἑκουσιον και ἀκουσιον redet, willkürlich und frei als einerlei nehmend. Das sehr viel schwerere Problem der moralischen Freiheit hat sich ihm noch nicht dargestellt, obgleich allerdings bisweilen seine Gedanken bis dahin reichen, besonders Eth. Nicom., II, 2, und III, 7, wo er aber in den Fehler verfällt, den Charakter aus den Thaten abzuleiten, statt umgekehrt. Ebenso kritisiert er sehr fälschlich die oben von mir angeführte Ueberzeugung des Sokrates: an andern Stellen aber hat er diese wieder zu der seinigen gemacht, z. B. Nicom., X, 10: τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει (quod igitur a natura tribuitur, id in nostra potestate non esse, sed, ab aliqua divina causa profectum, inesse in iis, qui revera sunt fortunati, perspicuum est). Mox: Δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον το αἰσχρόν (Mores igitur ante quodammodo insint oportet, ad virtutem accommodati, qui honestum amplectantur, turpitudineque offendantur); welches mit der oben von mir beigebrachten Stelle stimmt, wie auch mit Ethica magna, I, 11. Οὐκ ἔσται ὁ προαιρούμενος εἶναι σπουδαιότατος, ἄν μὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις ὑπάρξῃ, βελτίων μέντοι ἔσται (non enim ut quisque voluerit, erit omnium optimus, nisi etiam natura exstiterit: melior quidem recte erit). Jn gleichem Sinn behandelt Aristoteles die Frage nach der Willensfreiheit in der Ethica magna, I, 9—18, und Ethica Eudemia, II, 6—10, wo er dem eigentlichen Problem noch etwas näher kommt: doch ist alles schwankend und oberflächlich. Es ist überall seine Methode, nicht direkt auf die Sachen einzugehen, analytisch verfahrend; sondern, synthetisch, aus äußern Merkmalen Schlüsse zu ziehen: statt einzudringen, um zum Kern der Dinge zu gelangen, hält er sich an äußere Kennzeichen, sogar an Worte. Diese Methode führt leicht irre und, bei tiefern Problemen, nie zum Ziele. Hier nun bleibt er vor dem vermeintlichen Gegensatz zwischen dem Notwendigen und dem Willkürlichen, ἀναγκαιον και ἑκουσιον, stehen, wie vor einer Mauer: über diese hinaus aber liegt erst die Einsicht, daß das Willkürliche gerade als solches notwendig ist, vermöge des Motivs, ohne welches ein Willensakt so wenig wie ohne ein wollendes Subjekt möglich ist, und welches Motiv eine Ursache ist, so gut wie die mechanische, von der es nur im Unwesentlichen sich unterscheidet; sagt er doch selbst (Eth. Eudem., II, 10): ἡ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα μία τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν (nam id, cujus gratia, una e causarum numero est). Daher eben ist jener Gegensatz zwischen dem Willkürlichen und Notwendigen ein grundfalscher; wenn es gleich vielen angeblichen Philosophen noch heute ebenso geht wie dem Aristoteles.
Schon ziemlich deutlich legt das Problem der Willensfreiheit Cicero dar, im Buche De fato, c. 10 et c. 17. Der Gegenstand seiner Abhandlung führt allerdings sehr leicht und natürlich darauf hin. Er selbst hält es mit der Willensfreiheit: aber wir sehen, daß schon Chrysippos und Diodoros sich das Problem, mehr oder weniger deutlich, zum Bewußtsein gebracht haben müssen. — Beachtenswert ist auch das dreißigste Totengespräch des Lukianos, zwischen Minos und Sostratos, welches die Willensfreiheit und mit ihr die Verantwortlichkeit leugnet.
Aber gewissermaßen ist bereits das vierte Buch der Makkabäer, in der Septuaginta (bei Luther fehlt es), eine Abhandlung über die Willensfreiheit; sofern es sich zur Aufgabe macht, den Beweis zu führen, daß die Vernunft (λογισμος) die Kraft besitzt, alle Leidenschaften und Affekte zu überwinden, und dies belegt durch die jüdischen Märtyrer im zweiten Buch.
Die älteste mir bekannte, deutliche Erkenntnis unsers Problems zeigt sich bei Clemens Alexandrinus, indem er (Strom. I, § 17) sagt: οὔτε δὲ οἱ ἐπαινοι, οὔτε οἱ ψογοι, οὐδ’ αἱ τιμαι, οὐδ’ αἱ κολασεις, δικαιαι, μη της ψυχης ἐχουσης την ἐξουσιαν της ὁρμης και ἀφορμης, ἀλλ’ ἀκουσιου της κακιας οὐσης (nec laudes, nec vituperationes, nec honores, nec supplicia justa sunt, si anima non habeat liberam potestatem et appetendi et abstinendi, sed sit vitium involuntarium): dann, nach einem sich auf früher Gesagtes beziehenden Zwischensatz: ἱν’ ὁτι μαλιστα ὁ θεος μεν ἡμιν κακιας ἀναιτιος (ut vel maxime quidem Deus nobis non sit causa vitii). Dieser höchst beachtenswerte Nachsatz zeigt, in welchem Sinne die Kirche sogleich das Problem faßte, und welche Entscheidung sie, als ihrem Interesse gemäß, sofort anticipierte. — Beinahe 200 Jahre später finden wir die Lehre vom freien Willen bereits ausführlich behandelt von Nemesius, in seinem Werke De natura hominis, Kap. 35 am Ende, und Kap. 39—41. Die Freiheit des Willens wird hier ohne weiteres mit der Willkür, oder Wahlentscheidung, identifiziert und demnach eifrigst behauptet und dargethan. Doch ist es immer schon eine Ventilation der Sache.
Aber das völlig entwickelte Bewußtsein unsers Problems, mit allem, was daran hängt, finden wir zuerst beim Kirchenvater Augustinus, der deshalb, obwohl weit mehr Theolog, als Philosoph, hier in Betracht kommt. Sogleich jedoch sehen wir ihn durch dasselbe in merkliche Verlegenheit und unsicheres Schwanken versetzt, welches ihn bis zu Inkonsequenzen und Widersprüchen führt, in seinen drei Büchern De libero arbitrio. Einerseits will er nicht, wie Pelagius, der Freiheit des Willens so viel einräumen, daß dadurch die Erbsünde, die Notwendigkeit der Erlösung und die freie Gnadenwahl aufgehoben würde, mithin der Mensch durch eigene Kräfte gerecht und der Seligkeit würdig werden könnte. Er gibt sogar in dem Argumento in libros de lib. arb. ex Lib. I, c. 9, Retractationum desumto zu verstehen, daß er für diese Seite der Kontroverse (die Luther später so heftig verfocht) noch mehr gesagt haben würde, wenn jene Bücher nicht vor dem Auftreten des Pelagius geschrieben wären, gegen dessen Meinung er alsdann das Buch De natura et gratia abfaßte. Jnzwischen sagt er schon De lib. arb. III, 18: Nunc autem homo non est bonus, nec habet in potestate, ut bonus sit, sive non videndo qualis esse debeat, sive videndo et non volendo esse, qualem debere esse se videt. — Mox: vel ignorando non habet liberum arbitrium voluntatis ad eligendum quid recte faciat; vel resistente carnali consuetudine, quae violentia mortalis successionis quodammodo naturaliter inolevit, videat quid recte faciendum sit, et velit, nec possit implere: und im erwähnten Argumento: Voluntas ergo ipsa, nisi gratia Dei liberatur a servitute, qua facta est serva peccati, et, ut vitia superet, adjuvetur, recte pieque vivi non potest a mortalibus.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the German, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
IV. Predecessors.
In support of my claim above concerning the judgment of all profound thinkers on our problem, I will call to mind a few of the great men who have spoken in this sense.
First, to reassure those who might perhaps believe that religious grounds stand against the truth I defend, I recall that Jeremiah (10, 23) already said: “A person’s doings do not lie within his own power, and it lies in no one’s might how he walks or directs his steps.” But I appeal above all to Luther, who in a book written expressly for the purpose, De servo arbitrio, attacks freedom of the will with all his vehemence. A few passages from it suffice to characterize his view, which he supports, naturally, not with philosophical but with theological grounds. I cite them from the edition of Seb. Schmidt, Strasbourg 1707.—There, S. 145, we read: “Thus it is found written, all at once, in the hearts of all that free will is nothing, though this is obscured by so many opposing disputations and by the great authority of so many men.”—S. 214: “At this point I would have the defenders of free will take warning, that they may know they are deniers of Christ when they assert free will.”—S. 220: “All the testimonies of Scripture that speak of Christ will fight against free will. But these are innumerable—indeed, the whole of Scripture. Therefore, if we plead the case with Scripture as judge, I shall have prevailed in every way, so that not one iota or tittle remains that does not condemn the doctrine of free will.”—
Now to the philosophers. The ancients need not be considered seriously here, since their philosophy, still in a state of innocence, as it were, had not yet brought to distinct consciousness the two deepest and most troubling problems of modern philosophy: the question of the freedom of the will and the question of the reality of the external world, or the relation of the ideal to the real. How far the problem of the freedom of the will had become clear to the ancients, incidentally, can be seen fairly well from Aristotle’s Ethica Nicom., III, c. 1–8, where one will find that his thinking on the subject essentially concerns only physical and intellectual freedom, which is why he speaks only of the voluntary and the involuntary (hekousion and akousion), taking “voluntary” and “free” as one and the same. The far more difficult problem of moral freedom has not yet presented itself to him, although his thoughts do at times reach that far, especially Eth. Nicom., II, 2, and III, 7, where, however, he falls into the error of deriving character from deeds instead of the reverse. Likewise he criticizes quite wrongly the conviction of Socrates that I cited above; in other places, however, he has made it his own again, e.g. Nicom., X, 10: “Now what comes from nature is clearly not up to us, but is present, through certain divine causes, in those who are truly fortunate” (“What is bestowed by nature is plainly not in our power, but, proceeding from some divine cause, is present in those who are truly fortunate”). Shortly after: “Character must therefore somehow exist beforehand, congenial to virtue, loving what is noble and loathing what is base” (“Dispositions, then, must in some way be present beforehand, suited to virtue, such as embrace the honorable and are offended by the shameful”); which agrees with the passage I adduced above, as also with Ethica magna, I, 11: “One who chooses to be the best will not be so unless nature too is present, though he will be better” (“For one will not be the best of all simply as he may wish, unless nature too has provided it; he will, however, rightly be better”). In the same sense Aristotle treats the question of the freedom of the will in the Ethica magna, I, 9–18, and the Ethica Eudemia, II, 6–10, where he comes somewhat closer to the real problem; yet everything is wavering and superficial. It is his method everywhere not to go directly into the matters themselves, proceeding analytically, but rather, synthetically, to draw conclusions from outward marks; instead of penetrating to reach the core of things, he holds to external indications, even to words. This method easily leads astray and, with deeper problems, never reaches its goal. Here he comes to a halt before the supposed opposition between the necessary and the voluntary (anankaion and hekousion), as before a wall; but only beyond this wall lies the insight that the voluntary is necessary precisely as such, by virtue of the motive, without which an act of will is as little possible as without a willing subject, and which motive is a cause no less than the mechanical kind, from which it differs only in what is inessential; indeed he himself says (Eth. Eudem., II, 10): “for that for the sake of which is one of the causes” (“for that for whose sake a thing is done is one of the number of causes”). That is precisely why this opposition between the voluntary and the necessary is fundamentally false, even though many would-be philosophers still fare today just as Aristotle did.
Cicero presents the problem of the freedom of the will already quite clearly, in the book De fato, c. 10 and c. 17. The subject of his treatise, to be sure, leads to it very easily and naturally. He himself sides with freedom of the will; but we see that Chrysippus and Diodorus must already have become conscious of the problem, more or less distinctly.—Also noteworthy is Lucian’s thirtieth Dialogue of the Dead, between Minos and Sostratus, which denies freedom of the will and, with it, responsibility.
But in a certain sense the Fourth Book of Maccabees, in the Septuagint (in Luther it is missing), is already a treatise on freedom of the will, insofar as it sets itself the task of proving that reason (logismos) has the power to overcome all passions and emotions, and supports this with the Jewish martyrs in the second book.
The oldest clear recognition of our problem known to me appears in Clement of Alexandria, when he says (Strom. I, § 17): “Neither praises nor reproaches, neither honors nor punishments are just, if the soul does not have the power of impulse and aversion, but vice is involuntary” (“neither praises, nor reproaches, nor honors, nor punishments are just, if the soul does not have free power both of seeking and of abstaining, but vice is involuntary”); then, after an intervening clause referring to what was said earlier: “so that above all God, at least, is not the cause of vice in us” (“so that, most of all, God may not be the cause of vice for us”). This highly noteworthy concluding clause shows in what sense the Church at once grasped the problem and what decision, as suiting its interest, it immediately anticipated.—Almost 200 years later we find the doctrine of free will already treated at length by Nemesius, in his work De natura hominis, Kap. 35 at the end, and Kap. 39–41. Freedom of the will is here identified outright with the power of choice, or elective decision, and accordingly asserted and demonstrated with the greatest zeal. Yet it is at any rate already an airing of the matter.
But the fully developed consciousness of our problem, with everything attached to it, we find first in the Church Father Augustine, who therefore comes into consideration here, although he is far more theologian than philosopher. Immediately, however, we see it throw him into marked embarrassment and uncertain wavering, which leads him as far as inconsistencies and contradictions, in his three books De libero arbitrio. On the one hand he does not wish, like Pelagius, to concede so much to freedom of the will that original sin, the necessity of redemption and free election by grace would thereby be abolished, and a person could consequently become righteous and worthy of eternal blessedness by his own powers. He even gives it to be understood, in the Argument to the books De lib. arb., taken from Lib. I, c. 9 of the Retractationes, that on this side of the controversy (which Luther later defended so vehemently) he would have said still more had those books not been written before the appearance of Pelagius, against whose opinion he then composed the book De natura et gratia. Meanwhile he says already in De lib. arb. III, 18: “But now man is not good, nor is it in his power to be good, either because he does not see what kind of person he ought to be, or because, seeing it, he is unwilling to be the kind of person he sees he ought to be.”—Soon after: “either through ignorance he has no free choice of the will to choose what he should rightly do; or, carnal habit resisting—which by the violence of mortal succession has in some way grown naturally into him—he sees what should rightly be done, and wills it, and cannot accomplish it”; and in the Argument just mentioned: “Therefore, unless the will itself is freed by God’s grace from the servitude by which it was made a slave of sin, and is helped to overcome its vices, mortals cannot live rightly and piously.”
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English translation, made independently and directly from the German, not from the Musean edition or a published English translation, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
IV. Earlier Thinkers.
To support my claim above about the judgment of all deep thinkers on our problem, I will recall a few of the great men who have spoken in this sense.
First, I want to reassure anyone who might think that religious grounds stand against the truth I am defending. So I remind them that Jeremiah (10, 23) already said: "A person's actions are not within their power, and it is in no one's power how to walk or how to direct their steps." But I appeal above all to Luther. In a book written for exactly this purpose, De servo arbitrio, he attacks freedom of the will with all his vehemence. A few passages from it are enough to show his view. Naturally he supports it not with philosophical reasons but with theological ones. I cite them from the edition of Seb. Schmidt, Strasbourg 1707.—In the same book, S. 145, it says: "At the same time, then, it is found written in the hearts of all that free choice is nothing, even though this is clouded by so many arguments to the contrary and by the great authority of so many men."—S. 214: "At this point I would like those who defend free choice to be warned, so that they know they are deniers of Christ when they assert free choice."—S. 220: "All the testimonies of Scripture that speak of Christ will fight against free choice. And these are countless—indeed, all of Scripture. So if we argue the case with Scripture as judge, I will win in every way, so that not one iota or dot is left that does not condemn the doctrine of free choice."—
Now to the philosophers. The ancients need not be taken seriously here. Their philosophy was still, so to speak, in a state of innocence. It had not yet brought to clear awareness the two deepest and most troubling problems of modern philosophy: the question of the freedom of the will, and the question of the reality of the external world, or the relation of the ideal to the real. We can see fairly well how far the ancients understood the problem of freedom of the will from Aristotle's Ethica Nicom., III, c. 1–8. There one finds that his thinking about it essentially concerns only physical and intellectual freedom. That is why he always speaks only of the voluntary and the involuntary (hekousion kai akousion), treating "voluntary" and "free" as one and the same. The far harder problem of moral freedom has not yet come before him. His thoughts do sometimes reach that far, especially in Eth. Nicom., II, 2, and III, 7. But there he makes the mistake of deriving character from deeds instead of the other way around. He also criticizes quite wrongly the conviction of Socrates that I cited above. Elsewhere, though, he makes that conviction his own again, for example Nicom., X, 10: "Now it is clear that what comes from nature is not up to us, but is present, through some divine causes, in those who are truly fortunate." (So it is clear that what is given by nature is not in our power, but comes from some divine cause and is present in those who are truly fortunate.) Soon after: "So character must somehow already be present, kindred to virtue, loving what is noble and disliking what is shameful." (So there must already be in some way a character suited to virtue, one that embraces the honorable and is offended by the base.) This agrees with the passage I gave above, and also with Ethica magna, I, 11: "A person who chooses to be the best will not be so unless nature is also present, though they will be better." (For not whoever wishes will be the best of all, unless nature has also supplied it. They will, however, rightly be better.) In the same sense Aristotle treats the question of freedom of the will in the Ethica magna, I, 9–18, and in the Ethica Eudemia, II, 6–10. There he comes somewhat closer to the real problem. Yet everything remains wavering and superficial. His method everywhere is not to go straight into the matter and proceed analytically. Instead he proceeds synthetically, drawing conclusions from outward marks. Rather than pressing inward to reach the core of things, he holds to outward signs, even to words. This method easily leads astray, and with deeper problems it never reaches its goal. Here, then, he stops before the supposed opposition between the necessary and the voluntary (anagkaion kai hekousion) as before a wall. Only beyond that wall lies the insight that what is voluntary is necessary precisely as such. It is necessary by virtue of the motive. Without a motive, an act of will is as impossible as it is without a willing subject. And the motive is a cause, just like the mechanical kind, from which it differs only in inessentials. Aristotle himself says (Eth. Eudem., II, 10): "For that for the sake of which is one of the causes." (For that for whose sake something is done is counted among the causes.) That is exactly why the opposition between the voluntary and the necessary is completely false. Yet many so-called philosophers today are still in the same position as Aristotle.
Cicero sets out the problem of freedom of the will already fairly clearly, in his book De fato, c. 10 and c. 17. The subject of his treatise does indeed lead to it very easily and naturally. He himself sides with freedom of the will. But we can see that Chrysippus and Diodorus must already have become aware of the problem, more or less clearly.—Also worth noting is Lucian's thirtieth Dialogue of the Dead, between Minos and Sostratus. It denies freedom of the will, and with it responsibility.
But in a certain way the fourth book of Maccabees, in the Septuagint (it is missing in Luther's Bible), is already a treatise on freedom of the will. It sets itself the task of proving that reason (logismos) has the power to overcome all passions and emotions. It supports this with the Jewish martyrs in the second book.
The oldest clear recognition of our problem that I know of appears in Clement of Alexandria. He says (Strom. I, § 17): "Neither praise nor blame, neither honors nor punishments are just, if the soul does not have the power to move toward something and away from it, but vice is involuntary." (Neither praise nor blame, neither honors nor punishments are just, if the soul does not have the free power both to desire and to refrain, but vice is involuntary.) Then, after a clause in between that refers back to something said earlier: "so that, above all, God at least is not to blame for our vice" (so that above all God may not be the cause of vice for us). This highly noteworthy closing clause shows in what sense the Church at once took up the problem, and what decision it immediately anticipated as suiting its interest.—Almost 200 years later we find the doctrine of free will already treated at length by Nemesius, in his work De natura hominis, Kap. 35 at the end, and Kap. 39–41. Here freedom of the will is simply identified with the power of choice, or the decision to choose, and is therefore eagerly asserted and demonstrated. Even so, it is already an airing of the matter.
But we find the fully developed awareness of our problem, with everything connected to it, first in the Church Father Augustine. He was far more a theologian than a philosopher, but for this reason he comes into consideration here. At once, however, we see that the problem puts him into marked embarrassment and uncertain wavering. In his three books De libero arbitrio, this leads him into inconsistencies and contradictions. On the one hand, he does not want to grant as much to freedom of the will as Pelagius did. Doing so would abolish original sin, the need for redemption, and the free election by grace, and so a person could become righteous and worthy of blessedness by their own powers. In the Argumento in libros de lib. arb. ex Lib. I, c. 9, Retractationum desumto, he even lets it be understood that he would have said still more for this side of the controversy (which Luther later defended so fiercely) if those books had not been written before Pelagius appeared. Against the view of Pelagius he then wrote the book De natura et gratia. In the meantime, he already says in De lib. arb. III, 18: "But now a human being is not good, and does not have it in their power to be good, either because they do not see what they ought to be, or because they see it and do not will to be what they see they ought to be." Soon after: "Either through ignorance a person has no free choice of will to choose what to do rightly; or else, when carnal habit resists—a habit that has in some way grown naturally in us through the violent force of mortal succession—they see what should be done rightly, and will it, and cannot carry it out." And in the Argumentum just mentioned: "So unless the will itself is freed by the grace of God from the slavery by which it was made a slave of sin, and is helped to overcome its vices, mortals cannot live rightly and piously."
About this section
Chapter IV, 1 is part of On the Freedom of the Will by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 18 of 28 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.