Section 11
Original German
Die Fichte’sche Ethik als Vergrößerungsspiegel der Fehler der Kantischen.
Wie in der Anatomie und Zoologie dem Schüler manche Dinge nicht so augenfällig an Präparaten und Naturprodukten werden, wie an Kupferstichen, welche dieselben mit einiger Uebertreibung darstellen; so kann ich Dem, welchem, nach der in den obigen Paragraphen gegebenen Kritik, die Nichtigkeit der Kantischen Grundlage der Ethik noch nicht vollkommen eingeleuchtet hätte, als ein Mittel zur Verdeutlichung dieser Erkenntniß Fichte’s „System der Sittenlehre“ empfehlen.
Wie nämlich im alten deutschen Puppenspiel dem Kaiser, oder sonstigen Helden, alle Mal der Hanswurst beigegeben war, welcher Alles, was der Held gesagt oder gethan hatte, nachher in seiner Manier und mit Uebertreibung wiederholte; so steht hinter dem großen Kant der Urheber der Wissenschaftslehre, richtiger Wissenschaftsleere. Wie dieser Mann seinen, dem Deutschen philosophischen Publico gegenüber ganz passenden und zu billigenden Plan, mittelst einer philosophischen Mystifikation Aufsehn zu erregen, um in Folge desselben seine und der Seinigen Wohlfahrt zu begründen, vorzüglich dadurch ausführte, daß er Kanten in allen Stücken überbot, als dessen lebendiger Superlativ auftrat und durch Vergrößerung der hervorstechenden Theile ganz eigentlich eine Karikatur der Kantischen Philosophie zu Stande brachte; so hat er dieses auch in der Ethik geleistet. In seinem „System der Sittenlehre“ finden wir den kategorischen Imperativ herangewachsen zu einem despotischen Imperativ: das absolute Soll, die gesetzgebende Vernunft und das Pflichtgebot haben sich entwickelt zu einem moralischen Fatum, einer unergründlichen Nothwendigkeit, daß das Menschengeschlecht gewissen Maximen streng gemäß handle (S. 308–309), als woran, nach den moralischen Anstalten zu urtheilen, sehr viel gelegen seyn muß, obwohl man nirgends eigentlich erfährt was, sondern nur so viel sieht, daß wie den Bienen ein Trieb einwohnt, gemeinschaftlich Zellen und einen Stock zu bauen, so in den Menschen angeblich ein Trieb liegen soll, gemeinschaftlich eine große, streng moralische Weltkomödie aufzuführen, zu welcher wir die bloßen Drahtpuppen wären und nichts weiter; wiewohl mit dem bedeutenden Unterschiede, daß der Bienenstock denn doch wirklich zu Stande kommt, hingegen statt der moralischen Weltkomödie in der That eine höchst unmoralische aufgeführt wird. So sehen wir denn hier die imperative Form der Kantischen Ethik, das Sittengesetz und absolute Soll, weiter geführt, bis ein System des moralischen Fatalismus daraus geworden, dessen Ausführung bisweilen in das Komische übergeht.12
Wenn in Kants Ethik ein gewisser moralischer Pedantismus zu spüren ist; so giebt, bei Fichte, die lächerlichste moralische Pedanterei reichen Stoff zur Satire. Man lese z. B., S. 407–409, die Entscheidung des bekannten kasuistischen Exempels, wo von zwei Menschenleben eines verloren werden muß. Ebenso finden wir alle Fehler Kants in den Superlativ gesteigert: z. B. S. 199: „Den Trieben der Sympathie, des Mitleids, der Menschenliebe zufolge zu handeln ist schlechthin nicht moralisch, sondern insofern gegen die Moral.“! — S. 402: „Die Triebfeder der Dienstfertigkeit muß nie eine unbesonnene Gutherzigkeit seyn, sondern der deutlich gedachte Zweck, die Kausalität der Vernunft so viel als möglich zu befördern.“ — Zwischen jenen Pedantereien guckt nun aber Fichte's eigentliche philosophische Rohheit, — wie sie zu erwarten ist bei einem Mann, dem das Lehren nie Zeit zum Lernen gelassen hat, — augenfällig hervor, indem er das liberum arbitrium indifferentiae ernstlich aufstellt und mit den gemeinsten Gründen befestigt (S. 160, 173, 205, 208, 237, 259, 261). — Wer noch nicht vollkommen überzeugt ist, daß das Motiv, obgleich durch das Medium der Erkenntniß einwirkend, eine Ursache ist, wie jede andere, folglich die selbe Nothwendigkeit des Erfolgs, wie jede andere, mit sich führt, daher alle menschlichen Handlungen streng nothwendig erfolgen, — der ist noch philosophisch roh und nicht in den Elementen der philosophischen Erkenntniß unterrichtet. Die Einsicht in die strenge Nothwendigkeit der menschlichen Handlungen ist die Gränzlinie, welche die philosophischen Köpfe von den andern scheidet: und an dieser angelangt zeigte Fichte deutlich, daß er zu den andern gehörte. Daß er dann wieder, Kants Spur nachgehend (S. 303), Dinge sagt, die mit obigen Stellen in geradem Widerspruch stehen, beweist, wie so viele andere Widersprüche in seinen Schriften, nur, daß er, als Einer, dem es mit Erforschung der Wahrheit nie Ernst war, gar keine feste Grundüberzeugung hatte; wie sie denn zu seinen Zwecken auch ganz und gar nicht nöthig war. Nichts ist lächerlicher, als daß man diesem Mann die strengste Konsequenz nachgerühmt hat, indem man seinen pedantischen, triviale Dinge breit demonstrirenden Ton richtig dafür annahm.
Die vollkommenste Entwickelung jenes Systems des moralischen Fatalismus Fichte's findet man in seiner letzten Schrift: „Die Wissenschaftlehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse dargestellt“, Berlin 1810, — welche den Vorzug hat, nur 46 S. 12° stark zu seyn und doch seine ganze Philosophie in nuce zu enthalten, weshalb sie allen Denen zu empfehlen ist, welche ihre Zeit für zu kostbar halten, als daß sie mit den in Christian-Wolffischer Breite und Langweiligkeit abgefaßten und eigentlich auf Täuschung, nicht auf Belehrung des Lesers abgesehenen größeren Produktionen dieses Mannes vergeudet werden dürfte. In dieser kleinen Schrift also heißt es S. 32: „Die Anschauung einer Sinnenwelt war nur dazu da, daß an dieser Welt das Ich als absolut sollendes sich sichtbar würde.“ — S. 33 kommt gar „das Soll der Sichtbarkeit des Soll“, und S. 36 „ein Soll des Ersehens, daß ich soll“. — Dahin also hat, als exemplar vitiis imitabile, die imperative Form der Ethik Kants, mit ihrem unerwiesenen Soll, das sie als ein gar bequemes που στω sich erbat, gleich nach Kanten geführt.
Uebrigens stößt alles hier Gesagte Fichte's Verdienst nicht um, welches darin besteht, die Philosophie Kants, dieses späte Meisterstück des menschlichen Tiefsinns, bei der Nation, unter der es auftrat, verdunkelt, ja, verdrängt zu haben, durch windbeutelnde Superlative, durch Extravaganzen und den unter der Larve des Tiefsinns auftretenden Unsinn seiner „Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre“, und hiedurch der Welt unwiderleglich gezeigt zu haben, welches die Kompetenz des Deutschen philosophischen Publikums sei; da er es die Rolle eines Kindes spielen ließ, dem man ein kostbares Kleinod aus den Händen lockt, indem man ihm ein Nürnberger Spielzeug dafür hinhält. Sein dadurch erlangter Ruhm lebt, auf Kredit, noch heute fort, und noch heute wird Fichte stets neben Kant genannt, als noch so Einer (Ἡρακλῆς καὶ πίθηκος! — i. e. Hercules et simia!), ja, oft über ihn gestellt.13 Daher hat auch sein Beispiel jene von gleichem Geiste beseelten und mit gleichem Erfolge gekrönten Nachfolger in der Kunst philosophischer Mystifikation des Deutschen Publikums hervorgerufen, die Jeder kennt und von denen ausführlich zu reden, hier nicht der Ort ist; obwohl ihre respektiven Meinungen noch immer von den Philosophieprofessoren lang und breit dargelegt und ernsthaft diskutirt werden; als ob man es wirklich mit Philosophen zu thun hätte. Fichten also ist es zu verdanken, daß lukulente Akten da sind, um einst revidirt zu werden vor dem Richterstuhle der Nachwelt, diesem Kassationshofe der Urtheile der Mitwelt, welcher, zu fast allen Zeiten, für das ächte Verdienst Das hat seyn müssen, was das Jüngste Gericht für die Heiligen ist.
12 Zum Beleg des Gesagten will ich hier nur einigen wenigen Stellen Raum gestatten. S. 196: „Der sittliche Trieb ist absolut, er fordert schlechthin, ohne allen Zweck außer ihm selbst.“ — S. 232: „Nun soll, zufolge des Sittengesetzes, das empirische Zeitwesen ein genauer Abdruck des ursprünglichen Ich werden.“ — S. 308: „Der ganze Mensch ist Vehikul des Sittengesetzes.“ — S. 342: „Ich bin nur Instrument, bloßes Werkzeug des Sittengesetzes, schlechthin nicht Zweck.“ — S. 343: „Jeder ist Zweck als Mittel, die Vernunft zu realisiren: dies ist der letzte Endzweck seines Daseyns: dazu allein ist er da, und wenn dies nicht geschehen sollte, so braucht er überhaupt nicht zu seyn.“ — S. 347: „Ich bin Werkzeug des Sittengesetzes in der Sinnenwelt!“ — S. 360: „Es ist Verordnung des Sittengesetzes, den Leib zu ernähren, die Gesundheit desselben zu befördern: es versteht sich, daß dies in keinem Sinne und zu keinem andern Zweck geschehen darf, als um ein tüchtiges Werkzeug zur Beförderung des Vernunftzwecks zu seyn.“ — (Vergl. S. 371) S. 376: „Jeder menschliche Leib ist Werkzeug zur Beförderung des Vernunftzwecks: daher muß die höchstmögliche Tauglichkeit jedes Werkzeugs dazu mir Zweck seyn: ich muß sonach Sorgfalt für Jeden tragen.“ — Dies ist seine Ableitung der Menschenliebe! — S. 377: „Ich kann und darf für mich selbst nur sorgen, lediglich weil und in wiefern ich ein Werkzeug des Sittengesetzes bin.“ — S. 388: „Einen Verfolgten mit Gefahr des eigenen Lebens zu vertheidigen, ist absolute Schuldigkeit: — sobald Menschenleben in Gefahr ist, habt ihr nicht mehr das Recht, auf die Sicherheit eures eigenen zu denken.“ — S. 420: „Es giebt gar keine Ansicht meines Nebenmenschen auf dem Gebiete des Sittengesetzes, als die, daß er sei ein Werkzeug der Vernunft.“
13 Ich belege dieses durch eine Stelle aus der allerneuesten philosophischen Litteratur. Herr Feuerbach, ein Hegelianer (c’est tout dire) läßt sich in seinem Buche „P. Bayle, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie“, 1838, S. 80, also vernehmen: „Noch erhabener als Kants sind aber Fichte's Ideen, die er in seiner Sittenlehre und zerstreut in seinen übrigen Schriften aussprach. Das Christenthum hat an Erhabenheit nichts, was es den Ideen Fichte's an die Seite stellen könnte.“
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition, including its quotations, author’s notes, prize question and judgment. Source-language reviewed.
Fichte's Ethics as a Magnifying Mirror for the Errors of Kant's.
Just as, in anatomy and zoology, certain things are less apparent to the student in preparations and natural specimens than in engravings that portray them with some exaggeration, so I can recommend Fichte's "System of Ethics" to anyone who, after the critique given in the preceding sections, has not yet fully grasped the worthlessness of Kant's foundation of ethics, as a means of making this insight clear.
In the old German puppet play, the emperor, or whatever other hero appeared, was always accompanied by the buffoon Hanswurst, who afterward repeated, in his own manner and with exaggeration, everything the hero had said or done; and so, behind the great Kant, stands the originator of the "Wissenschaftslehre"—the "doctrine of knowledge," or, more properly, "Wissenschaftsleere," the "emptiness of knowledge." This man's plan—to attract attention by a philosophical mystification and thereby establish his own and his family's prosperity—was entirely suited to the German philosophical public and, in dealing with it, quite commendable. He carried it out chiefly by outbidding Kant in every respect, presenting himself as Kant's living superlative and, by enlarging the prominent features, producing a caricature of Kantian philosophy in the strictest sense; and he accomplished the same in ethics. In his "System of Ethics" we find the categorical imperative grown into a despotic imperative: the absolute ought, legislative reason, and the command of duty have developed into a moral fate, an unfathomable necessity that the human race act in strict accordance with certain maxims (S. 308–309). Judging by the moral preparations, a great deal must depend on this, although nowhere do we actually learn what. All we see is that, just as bees have an innate drive to build cells and a hive together, human beings supposedly have an innate drive to perform together a great, rigorously moral world comedy, in which we would be mere marionettes and nothing more; though with the significant difference that the beehive really does come into being, whereas, instead of the moral world comedy, a supremely immoral one is actually performed. Here, then, we see the imperative form of Kantian ethics, the moral law and absolute ought, carried further until it has become a system of moral fatalism, whose elaboration sometimes passes into comedy.12
If a certain moral pedantry can be detected in Kant's ethics, in Fichte the most ridiculous moral pedantry provides abundant material for satire. Read, for example, S. 407–409, the decision in the familiar casuistic example in which one of two human lives must be lost. Likewise, we find all Kant's errors raised to the superlative: for example, S. 199: "To act according to the impulses of sympathy, compassion, and human kindness is absolutely not moral, but to that extent contrary to morality."!—S. 402: "The incentive to helpfulness must never be an unreflecting good nature, but the clearly conceived purpose of furthering the causality of reason as much as possible."—Yet amid these pedantries, Fichte's real philosophical crudity—as one would expect in a man whose teaching never left him time to learn—plainly shows through: he seriously asserts freedom of indifferent choice and supports it with the most commonplace arguments (S. 160, 173, 205, 208, 237, 259, 261).—Anyone not yet fully convinced that a motive, though acting through the medium of cognition, is a cause like any other, and consequently entails the same necessity of its effect as any other, so that all human actions occur with strict necessity, is still philosophically crude and unschooled in the elements of philosophical knowledge. Insight into the strict necessity of human actions is the dividing line separating philosophical minds from the rest; and on reaching it, Fichte clearly showed that he belonged to the rest. That he then, following Kant's lead (S. 303), again says things directly contradicting the passages above proves, like so many other contradictions in his writings, only that, as someone never serious about investigating truth, he had no settled fundamental conviction at all; nor was one in the least necessary for his purposes. Nothing is more ridiculous than the praise bestowed on this man for the strictest consistency: his pedantic tone, demonstrating trivialities at length, was duly mistaken for it.
The fullest development of Fichte's system of moral fatalism is found in his last work, "The Doctrine of Knowledge Presented in Its General Outline," Berlin 1810—which has the advantage of being only 46 S. 12° long while containing his entire philosophy in a nutshell. It is therefore recommended to all who consider their time too precious to squander on this man's larger productions, composed with Christian Wolff's prolixity and tediousness and really intended to deceive the reader, not to instruct him. In this little work, then, we read on S. 32: "The intuition of a world of sense existed only so that, in this world, the I might become visible to itself as absolutely subject to an ought."—S. 33 even gives us "the ought of the visibility of the ought," and S. 36 "an ought to perceive that I ought."—This, then, is where, as an example imitable in its faults, the imperative form of Kant's ethics led immediately after Kant, with its unproven ought, which it had begged for as a most convenient place to stand.
For the rest, nothing said here overturns Fichte's achievement: by windbag superlatives, by extravagances, and by the nonsense masquerading as profundity in his "Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Knowledge," he obscured, indeed displaced, Kant's philosophy, that late masterpiece of human depth of thought, among the nation in which it appeared. He thereby showed the world irrefutably just how competent the German philosophical public is, making it play the part of a child coaxed into giving up a precious jewel by the offer of a Nuremberg toy. The fame he thereby acquired lives on to this day, on credit, and to this day Fichte is always named alongside Kant, as another of the same kind (Heracles and an ape!—i. e. Hercules and an ape!), and indeed is often placed above him.13 His example has therefore also called forth those successors in the art of philosophically mystifying the German public, animated by the same spirit and crowned with the same success, whom everyone knows and whom this is not the place to discuss at length; although their respective opinions are still expounded at length and seriously discussed by philosophy professors, as though we really were dealing with philosophers. It is thus to Fichte that we owe the existence of clear documentary evidence to be reviewed one day before the tribunal of posterity, that court of cassation for the judgments of contemporaries, which, in almost every age, has had to be for genuine merit what the Last Judgment is for the saints.
12 To substantiate what I have said, I will make room here for just a few passages. S. 196: "The moral drive is absolute; it demands unconditionally, without any end outside itself."—S. 232: "Now, according to the moral law, the empirical being existing in time ought to become an exact impression of the original I."—S. 308: "The whole human being is a vehicle of the moral law."—S. 342: "I am only an instrument, a mere tool of the moral law, absolutely not an end."—S. 343: "Everyone is an end as a means of realizing reason: this is the ultimate end of his existence; for this alone he is here, and if this were not to happen, he need not exist at all."—S. 347: "I am a tool of the moral law in the world of sense!"—S. 360: "It is an ordinance of the moral law to nourish the body and promote its health: it goes without saying that this may be done in no sense and for no other purpose than to be an effective tool for furthering the end of reason."—(Vergl. S. 371) S. 376: "Every human body is a tool for furthering the end of reason: hence the greatest possible fitness of every tool for this purpose must be an end for me; I must therefore care for everyone."—This is his derivation of human kindness!—S. 377: "I can and may care for myself solely because, and insofar as, I am a tool of the moral law."—S. 388: "To defend a persecuted person at the risk of one's own life is an absolute duty:—as soon as human life is in danger, you no longer have the right to think of the safety of your own."—S. 420: "Within the domain of the moral law there is no view of my fellow human being at all except that he is a tool of reason."
13 I substantiate this with a passage from the very latest philosophical literature. Mr. Feuerbach, a Hegelian (that says it all), expresses himself as follows in his book "P. Bayle, A Contribution to the History of Philosophy," 1838, S. 80: "Yet more sublime than Kant's are Fichte's ideas, which he expressed in his ethics and here and there in his other writings. In sublimity, Christianity has nothing it could set beside Fichte's ideas."
Plain English translation
Independent, machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition and its embedded passages. Source-language reviewed.
Fichte's ethics as a magnifying mirror for the faults in Kant's ethics.
In anatomy and zoology, students sometimes see things less clearly in prepared specimens and natural objects than in engravings that exaggerate them a little. In the same way, I can recommend Fichte's "System of Ethics" to anyone who, after the criticism in the sections above, still does not fully see that Kant's foundation for ethics is worthless. It can help make this clear.
In old German puppet plays, the emperor or some other hero always had the clown Hanswurst alongside him. Afterward, the clown repeated everything the hero had said or done, in his own style and with exaggerations. In just this way, behind the great Kant stands the creator of the "Wissenschaftslehre" (Theory of Science), more accurately the "Wissenschaftsleere" (Emptiness of Science). This man's plan was to attract attention through a philosophical deception, and then use that attention to secure his own and his family's well-being. Given the German philosophical public he faced, the plan was entirely suitable and deserves approval. He carried it out mainly by outdoing Kant in every respect, presenting himself as Kant's living superlative. By enlarging Kant's most prominent features, he produced what was quite literally a caricature of Kant's philosophy. He did the same in ethics. In his "System of Ethics," we find that the categorical imperative has grown into a despotic imperative. The absolute ought, reason as lawgiver, and the command of duty have developed into a moral fate: an unfathomable necessity requiring the human race to act in strict accordance with certain maxims (S. 308–309). Judging by the moral arrangements made, a great deal must depend on this, though we never actually learn what. We see only this much: just as bees have an instinct to build cells and a hive together, human beings supposedly have an instinct to perform together a great, strictly moral comedy on the world stage, in which we would be nothing but puppets on strings. There is, however, an important difference: the beehive actually gets built, whereas the comedy actually performed on the world stage is highly immoral instead of moral. Here, then, we see the imperative form of Kant's ethics, its moral law and absolute ought, taken further, until it has become a system of moral fatalism. Its development sometimes turns comic.12
If Kant's ethics shows a certain moral pedantry, Fichte's most ridiculous moral nitpicking offers plenty of material for satire. Read, for example, S. 407–409, where he settles the familiar example from casuistry, in which one of two human lives must be lost. We also find all Kant's faults pushed to their extreme. For example, S. 199: "To act on the impulses of sympathy, compassion, and human kindness is simply not moral, but to that extent opposed to morality."!—S. 402: "The incentive for being helpful must never be thoughtless good-heartedness, but the clearly conceived aim of promoting reason's causal activity as much as possible."—Among these pieces of nitpicking, however, Fichte's real philosophical crudeness plainly shows through—as we might expect from a man whose teaching never left him time to learn. He seriously asserts a will free to choose either way, and supports it with the most commonplace arguments (S. 160, 173, 205, 208, 237, 259, 261).—Anyone who is not yet fully convinced that a motive, though it works through knowledge, is a cause like any other, and therefore brings about its result with the same necessity as any other cause, so that all human actions follow with strict necessity—anyone who has not understood this is still philosophically crude and has not learned the basics of philosophical knowledge. Understanding the strict necessity of human actions is the dividing line between philosophical minds and all the rest. When Fichte reached this line, he clearly showed that he belonged to the rest. Later, again following Kant's lead (S. 303), he says things that directly contradict the passages above. Like so many other contradictions in his writings, this only proves that, because he was never serious about discovering the truth, he had no firm basic conviction at all. Nor did he need one for his purposes. Nothing is more ridiculous than that people have praised this man for the strictest consistency. They simply mistook his pedantic tone, with its long-winded demonstrations of trivial things, for consistency.
The fullest development of Fichte's system of moral fatalism appears in his last work, "The Theory of Science Presented in Its General Outline," Berlin 1810. It has the advantage of being only 46 S. long, in 12° format, while containing his entire philosophy in a nutshell. I therefore recommend it to anyone who thinks their time too valuable to waste on this man's larger productions. Those are written with Christian Wolff's long-windedness and dullness, and are really designed to deceive the reader, not to teach him. In this little work, then, we read on S. 32: "The intuition of a world of the senses existed only so that, in this world, the I might become visible to itself as absolutely bound by an ought."—On S. 33 we even get "the ought of the visibility of the ought," and on S. 36 "an ought of seeing that I ought."—This, then, is where the imperative form of Kant's ethics led immediately after Kant, as a model whose faults could be imitated. Its unproved ought was something it requested as a very convenient place to stand.
Still, nothing said here takes away Fichte's achievement. It consists in having obscured, and indeed displaced, Kant's philosophy—that late masterpiece of human intellectual depth—among the nation in which it appeared. He did this with blustering superlatives, extravagances, and the nonsense masquerading as depth in his "Foundation of the Entire Theory of Science." In doing so, he showed the world beyond dispute how competent the German philosophical public was: he made it play the part of a child coaxed into handing over a precious jewel by being offered a Nuremberg toy in exchange. The fame he gained this way still lives on credit today. Even today, Fichte is always mentioned alongside Kant as another man of the same kind (Heracles and an ape!—i. e. Hercules and an ape!), and is often ranked above him.13 Because of this, his example also brought forth those successors in the art of philosophically deceiving the German public whom everyone knows. They were driven by the same spirit and crowned with the same success. This is not the place to discuss them at length, although philosophy professors still explain their respective opinions at great length and discuss them seriously, as if they were really dealing with philosophers. So we owe it to Fichte that clear documentary evidence exists, ready to be reviewed one day before the court of posterity. This court overturns the judgments of the present, and in nearly every age it has had to be for genuine merit what the Last Judgment is for the saints.
12 To support what I have said, I will make room here for just a few passages. S. 196: "The moral drive is absolute; it demands unconditionally, without any aim beyond itself."—S. 232: "Now, according to the moral law, the empirical being in time ought to become an exact copy of the original I."—S. 308: "The whole human being is a vehicle of the moral law."—S. 342: "I am only an instrument, a mere tool of the moral law, absolutely not an end."—S. 343: "Everyone is an end as a means of making reason real: this is the final, ultimate aim of his existence. This alone is what he exists for, and if it is not to happen, he need not exist at all."—S. 347: "I am a tool of the moral law in the world of the senses!"—S. 360: "The moral law commands us to nourish the body and promote its health. Of course, this may not be done in any sense or for any purpose other than to be an effective tool for advancing reason's aim."—(Vergl. S. 371) S. 376: "Every human body is a tool for advancing reason's aim. I must therefore aim to make every tool as fit as possible for this task; consequently, I must take care of everyone."—This is how he derives human kindness!—S. 377: "I can and may take care of myself only because, and only insofar as, I am a tool of the moral law."—S. 388: "To defend someone being persecuted, at the risk of one's own life, is an absolute duty:—as soon as a human life is in danger, you no longer have the right to think about the safety of your own."—S. 420: "Within the sphere of the moral law, there is no way of viewing my fellow human being except as a tool of reason."
13 I will support this with a passage from the very latest philosophical literature. Mr. Feuerbach, a Hegelian (that says it all), expresses himself as follows in his book "P. Bayle, A Contribution to the History of Philosophy," 1838, S. 80: "But still more sublime than Kant's are Fichte's ideas, which he expressed in his ethics and here and there in his other writings. Christianity has nothing whose sublimity could be set beside Fichte's ideas."
About this section
Section 11 is part of On the Basis of Morality by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 12 of 24 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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