Section 10
Original German
Kants Lehre vom intelligibeln und empirischen Charakter. — Theorie der Freiheit.
Nachdem ich, im Dienste der Wahrheit, auf die Kantische Ethik Angriffe gethan habe, welche nicht, wie die bisherigen, nur die Oberfläche treffen, sondern sie in ihrem tiefsten Grunde unterwühlen, scheint mir die Gerechtigkeit zu fordern, daß ich nicht von ihr scheide, ohne Kants größtes und glänzendstes Verdienst um die Ethik in Erinnerung gebracht zu haben. Dieses besteht in der Lehre vom Zusammenbestehen der Freiheit mit der Nothwendigkeit, welche er zuerst in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (S. 533–554 der ersten und S. 561–582 der fünften Auflage) vorträgt, jedoch eine noch deutlichere Darstellung davon in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (vierte Auflage, S. 169–179; R., S. 224–231) giebt.
Hobbes zuerst, dann Spinoza, dann Hume, auch Hollbach im Syst. d. la nat., und endlich am ausführlichsten und gründlichsten Priestley, hatten die vollkommene und strenge Nothwendigkeit der Willensakte, bei eintretenden Motiven, so deutlich bewiesen und außer Zweifel gestellt, daß sie den vollkommen demonstrirten Wahrheiten beizuzählen ist: daher nur Unwissenheit und Rohheit von einer Freiheit in den einzelnen Handlungen des Menschen, einem libero arbitrio indifferentiae, zu reden fortfahren konnte. Auch Kant nahm, in Folge der unwiderleglichen Gründe dieser Vorgänger, die vollkommene Nothwendigkeit der Willensakte als eine ausgemachte Sache, an welcher kein Zweifel mehr obwalten konnte; wie dies alle die Stellen beweisen, in welchen er allein vom theoretischen Gesichtspunkt aus von der Freiheit redet. Dabei bleibt es jedoch wahr, daß unsere Handlungen von einem Bewußtseyn der Eigenmächtigkeit und Ursprünglichkeit begleitet sind, vermöge dessen wir sie als unser Werk erkennen und Jeder, mit untrüglicher Gewißheit, sich als den wirklichen Thäter seiner Thaten und für dieselben moralisch verantwortlich fühlt. Da nun aber die Verantwortlichkeit eine Möglichkeit anders gehandelt zu haben, mithin Freiheit, auf irgend eine Weise, voraussetzt; so liegt im Bewußtseyn der Verantwortlichkeit mittelbar auch das der Freiheit. Zur Lösung dieses aus der Sache selbst hervorgehenden Widerspruches ward nun Kants tiefsinnige Unterscheidung zwischen Erscheinung und Ding an sich, welche der innerste Kern seiner ganzen Philosophie und eben deren Hauptverdienst ist, der endlich gefundene Schlüssel.
Das Individuum, bei seinem unveränderlichen, angeborenen Charakter, in allen seinen Aeußerungen durch das Gesetz der Kausalität, die hier, als durch den Intellekt vermittelt, Motivation heißt, streng bestimmt, ist nur die Erscheinung. Das dieser zum Grunde liegende Ding an sich ist, als außer Raum und Zeit befindlich, frei von aller Succession und Vielheit der Akte, Eines und unveränderlich. Seine Beschaffenheit an sich ist der intelligible Charakter, welcher in allen Thaten des Individui gleichmäßig gegenwärtig und in ihnen allen, wie das Petschaft in tausend Siegeln, ausgeprägt, den in der Zeit und Succession der Akte sich darstellenden, empirischen Charakter dieser Erscheinung bestimmt, die daher in allen ihren Aeußerungen, welche von den Motiven hervorgerufen werden, die Konstanz eines Naturgesetzes zeigen muß; weshalb alle ihre Akte streng nothwendig erfolgen. Hiedurch war nun auch jene Unveränderlichkeit, jene unbiegsame Starrheit des empirischen Charakters jedes Menschen, welche denkende Köpfe von jeher wahrgenommen hatten (während die übrigen meinten, durch vernünftige Vorstellungen und moralische Vermahnungen sei der Charakter eines Menschen umzugestalten), auf einen rationellen Grund zurückgeführt, mithin auch für die Philosophie festgestellt und diese dadurch mit der Erfahrung in Einklang gebracht; so daß sie nicht länger beschämt wurde von der Volksweisheit, welche jene Wahrheit längst ausgesprochen hatte in dem Spanischen Sprichwort: Lo que entra con el capillo, sale con la mortaja (Das was mit der Kindermütze hineinkommt, geht mit dem Leichentuche wieder heraus), oder: Lo que en la leche se mama, en la mortaja se derrama (Was mit der Milch eingesogen wird, wird ins Leichentuch wieder ausgegossen).
Diese Lehre Kants vom Zusammenbestehen der Freiheit mit der Nothwendigkeit halte ich für die größte aller Leistungen des menschlichen Tiefsinns. Sie, nebst der transscendentalen Aesthetik, sind die zwei großen Diamanten in der Krone des Kantischen Ruhmes, der nie verhallen wird. — Bekanntlich hat Schelling, in seiner Abhandlung über die Freiheit, eine durch ihr lebhaftes Kolorit und anschauliche Darstellung für Viele faßlichere Paraphrase jener Lehre Kants gegeben, welche ich loben würde, wenn Schelling die Redlichkeit gehabt hätte, dabei zu sagen, daß er hier Kants Weisheit, nicht seine eigene, vorträgt, wofür ein Theil des philosophischen Publikums sie noch heute hält.
Nun kann man aber diese Kantische Lehre und das Wesen der Freiheit überhaupt auch dadurch sich faßlicher machen, daß man sie mit einer allgemeinen Wahrheit in Verbindung setzt, als deren bündigsten Ausdruck ich einen von den Scholastikern öfter ausgesprochenen Satz ansehe: operari sequitur esse; d. h. jedes Ding in der Welt wirkt nach dem wie es ist, nach seiner Beschaffenheit, in welcher daher alle seine Aeußerungen schon potentiâ enthalten sind, actu aber eintreten, wann äußere Ursachen sie hervorrufen; wodurch denn eben jene Beschaffenheit selbst sich kund giebt. Diese ist der empirische Charakter, hingegen dessen innerer, der Erfahrung nicht zugängliche, letzte Grund ist der intelligible Charakter, d. h. das Wesen an sich dieses Dinges. Der Mensch macht hierin keine Ausnahme von der übrigen Natur: auch er hat seinen unveränderlichen Charakter, der jedoch ganz individuell und bei Jedem ein anderer ist. Dieser ist eben empirisch für unsere Auffassung, aber eben deshalb nur Erscheinung: was er hingegen seinem Wesen an sich selbst nach seyn mag, heißt der intelligible Charakter. Seine sämmtlichen Handlungen, ihrer äußern Beschaffenheit nach durch die Motive bestimmt, können nie anders als diesem unveränderlichen individuellen Charakter gemäß ausfallen: wie Einer ist, so muß er handeln. Daher ist dem gegebenen Individuo, in jedem gegebenen einzelnen Fall, schlechterdings nur eine Handlung möglich: operari sequitur esse. Die Freiheit gehört nicht dem empirischen, sondern allein dem intelligibeln Charakter an. Das operari eines gegebenen Menschen ist von Außen durch die Motive, von Innen durch seinen Charakter nothwendig bestimmt: daher Alles, was er thut, nothwendig eintritt. Aber in seinem Esse, da liegt die Freiheit. Er hätte ein anderer seyn können: und in dem, was er ist, liegt Schuld und Verdienst. Denn Alles, was er thut, ergiebt sich daraus von selbst, als ein bloßes Korollarium. — Durch Kants Theorie werden wir eigentlich von dem Grundirrthum zurückgebracht, der die Nothwendigkeit ins Esse und die Freiheit ins Operari verlegte, und werden zu der Erkenntniß geführt, daß es sich gerade umgekehrt verhält. Deshalb betrifft die moralische Verantwortlichkeit des Menschen zwar zunächst und ostensibel Das, was er thut, im Grunde aber Das, was er ist; da, dieses vorausgesetzt, sein Thun, beim Eintritt der Motive, nie anders ausfallen konnte, als es ausgefallen ist. Aber so strenge auch die Nothwendigkeit ist, mit welcher, bei gegebenem Charakter, die Thaten von den Motiven hervorgerufen werden; so wird es dennoch Keinem, selbst dem nicht, der hievon überzeugt ist, je einfallen, sich dadurch diskulpiren und die Schuld auf die Motive wälzen zu wollen: denn er erkennt deutlich, daß hier, der Sache und den Anlässen nach, also objective, eine ganz andere, sogar eine entgegengesetzte Handlung sehr wohl möglich war, ja, eingetreten seyn würde, wenn nur Er ein Anderer gewesen wäre. Daß aber er, wie es sich aus der Handlung ergiebt, ein Solcher und kein Anderer ist, — das ist es, wofür er sich verantwortlich fühlt: hier, im Esse liegt die Stelle, welche der Stachel des Gewissens trifft. Denn das Gewissen ist eben nur die aus der eigenen Handlungsweise entstehende und immer intimer werdende Bekanntschaft mit dem eigenen Selbst. Daher wird vom Gewissen, zwar auf Anlaß des Operari, doch eigentlich das Esse angeschuldigt. Da wir uns der Freiheit nur mittelst der Verantwortlichkeit bewußt sind; so muß, wo diese liegt, auch jene liegen: also im Esse. Das Operari fällt der Nothwendigkeit anheim. Aber, wie die Andern, so lernen wir auch uns selbst nur empirisch kennen und haben von unserm Charakter keine Kenntniß a priori. Vielmehr hegen wir von diesem ursprünglich eine sehr hohe Meinung, indem das quisque praesumitur bonus, donec probetur contrarium, auch vor dem innern foro gilt.
Anmerkung.
Wer das Wesentliche eines Gedankens auch in ganz verschiedenen Einkleidungen desselben wiederzuerkennen fähig ist, wird mit mir einsehen, daß jene Kantische Lehre vom intelligibeln und empirischen Charakter eine zur abstrakten Deutlichkeit erhobene Einsicht ist, die schon Plato gehabt hat, welcher jedoch, weil er die Idealität der Zeit nicht erkannt hatte, sie nur in zeitlicher Form, mithin bloß mythisch und in Verbindung mit der Metempsychose darlegen konnte. Diese Erkenntniß der Identität beider Lehren wird nun aber sehr verdeutlicht durch die Erläuterung und Ausführung des Platonischen Mythos, welche Porphyrius mit so großer Klarheit und Bestimmtheit gegeben hat, daß die Uebereinstimmung mit der abstrakten Kantischen Lehre bei ihm unverkennbar hervortritt. Aus einer nicht mehr vorhandenen Schrift von ihm hat uns diese Erörterung, in welcher er den hier in Rede stehenden, von Plato, in der zweiten Hälfte des zehnten Buches der Republik gegebenen Mythos, genau und speciell kommentirt, Stobäos in extenso aufbehalten, im zweiten Buch seiner Eklogen, Kap. 8, §§. 37–40, welcher Abschnitt höchst lesenswerth ist. Zur Probe bringe ich daraus den kurzen §. 39 hier bei, damit der theilnehmende Leser angereizt werde, den Stobäus selbst zur Hand zu nehmen. Er wird alsdann erkennen, daß jener Platonische Mythos angesehen werden kann als eine Allegorie der großen und tiefen Erkenntniß, welche Kant, in ihrer abstrakten Reinheit, als Lehre vom intelligibeln und empirischen Charakter aufgestellt hat, und daß folglich diese im Wesentlichen schon vor Jahrtausenden von Plato erlangt war, ja, noch viel höher hinaufreicht, da Porphyrius der Meinung ist, daß Plato sie von den Aegyptern überkommen habe. Nun aber liegt sie schon in der Metempsychosenlehre des Brahmanismus, von welchem, höchst wahrscheinlich, die Weisheit der Aegyptischen Priester abstammt. — Der besagte §. 39 lautet:
Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον βούλημα τοιοῦτ’ ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος· ἔχειν μὲν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τὰς ψυχάς, πρὶν εἰς σώματα καὶ βίους διαφόρους ἐμπεσεῖν, εἰς τὸ ἢ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ἑλέσθαι, ἢ ἄλλον, ὃν, μετὰ ποίας ζωῆς καὶ σώματος οἰκείου τῇ ζωῇ, ἐκτελεσεῖν μέλλει· (καὶ γὰρ λέοντος βίον ἐπ’ αὐτῇ εἶναι ἑλέσθαι, καὶ ἀνδρός). Κἀκεῖνο μέντοι τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, ἅμα τῇ πρὸς τινα τῶν τοιούτων βίων πτώσει, ἐμπεπόδισται. Κατελθοῦσαι γὰρ εἰς τὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀντὶ ψυχῶν ἀπολυτῶν γεγονυῖαι ψυχαὶ ζώων, τὸ αὐτεξούσιον φέρουσι οἰκεῖον τῇ τοῦ ζώου κατασκευῇ, καὶ ἐφ’ ὧν μὲν εἶναι πολύνουν καὶ πολύκινητον, ὡς ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπου, ἐφ’ ὧν δὲ ὀλιγοκίνητον καὶ μονότροπον, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν πάντων ζώων. Ἠρτῆσθαι δὲ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῆς κατασκευῆς, κινούμενον μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, φερόμενον δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῆς κατασκευῆς γιγνομένας προθυμίας. (Omnino enim Platonis sententia haec videtur esse: habere quidem animas, priusquam in corpora vitaeque certa genera incidant, vel ejus vel alterius vitae eligendae potestatem, quam in corpore, vitae conveniente, degant [nam et leonis vitam et hominis ipsis licere eligere]; simul vero, cum vita aliqua adepta, libertatem illam tolli. Cum vero in corpora descenderint, et ex liberis animabus factae sint animalium animae, libertatem, animalis organismo convenientem, nanciscuntur; esse autem eam alibi valde intelligentem et mobilem, ut in homine; alibi vero simplicem et parum mobilem, ut fere in omnibus ceteris animalibus. Pendere autem hanc libertatem sic ab animalis organismo, ut per se quidem moveatur, juxta illius autem appetitiones feratur. )
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition, including its quotations, author’s notes, prize question and judgment. Source-language reviewed.
Kant's doctrine of the intelligible and empirical character.—Theory of freedom.
Having, in the service of truth, made attacks on Kantian ethics that do not, like earlier attacks, merely strike its surface but undermine its deepest foundation, I think justice requires that I not take leave of it without recalling Kant's greatest and most brilliant contribution to ethics. This consists in the doctrine of the coexistence of freedom and necessity, which he first sets out in the Critique of Pure Reason (S. 533–554 of the first and S. 561–582 of the fifth edition), but presents still more clearly in the Critique of Practical Reason (fourth edition, S. 169–179; R., S. 224–231).
First Hobbes, then Spinoza, then Hume, also Holbach in Syst. d. la nat., and finally, most fully and thoroughly, Priestley, had so clearly proved and placed beyond doubt the complete and strict necessity of acts of will when motives arise that it must be counted among the fully demonstrated truths. Only ignorance and crudity, therefore, could continue to speak of freedom in individual human actions, of a free will of indifference. Kant too, in consequence of his predecessors' irrefutable arguments, accepted the complete necessity of acts of will as a settled matter, no longer open to doubt, as is proved by all the passages in which he speaks of freedom from the theoretical standpoint alone. Yet it remains true that our actions are accompanied by a consciousness of acting on our own authority and of originating them ourselves, through which we recognize them as our work, and each person feels, with unerring certainty, that he is the actual doer of his deeds and morally responsible for them. But since responsibility presupposes a possibility of having acted otherwise, and thus freedom in some form, the consciousness of responsibility also contains, indirectly, that of freedom. The key, at last discovered, to resolving this contradiction arising from the matter itself was Kant's profound distinction between appearance and thing in itself, the innermost core of his entire philosophy and its chief merit.
The individual, with its unalterable, inborn character, strictly determined in all its expressions by the law of causality—which here, being mediated by the intellect, is called motivation—is only the appearance. The thing in itself underlying this appearance, being outside space and time, is free of all succession and multiplicity of acts, one and unalterable. Its constitution in itself is the intelligible character, equally present in all the individual's deeds and impressed upon them all like a signet in a thousand seals. It determines the empirical character of this appearance, which manifests itself in time and in the succession of acts. Hence the appearance must display the constancy of a law of nature in all its expressions, called forth by motives; and all its acts therefore occur with strict necessity. In this way, that unalterability, that inflexible rigidity of every person's empirical character, which thoughtful minds had always perceived—while the rest supposed that a person's character could be transformed through rational representations and moral admonitions—was traced to a rational ground, and thus established for philosophy as well. Philosophy was thereby brought into accord with experience, so that it was no longer put to shame by popular wisdom, which had long expressed that truth in the Spanish proverb: "What enters with the baby's cap leaves with the shroud" (What comes in with the infant's cap goes out again with the burial cloth), or: "What is suckled with the milk is poured out into the shroud" (What is imbibed with the milk is poured out again into the burial cloth).
I regard this doctrine of Kant's concerning the coexistence of freedom and necessity as the greatest of all achievements of profound human thought. It and the Transcendental Aesthetic are the two great diamonds in the crown of Kant's fame, which will never cease to resound.—As is well known, Schelling, in his treatise on freedom, gave a paraphrase of that doctrine of Kant's whose vivid coloring and concrete presentation make it more accessible to many. I would praise it if Schelling had had the honesty to say that he was presenting Kant's wisdom here, not his own, for which part of the philosophical public still takes it today.
But this Kantian doctrine, and the nature of freedom in general, can also be made more comprehensible by connecting them with a universal truth whose most concise expression I find in a proposition often stated by the Scholastics: operari sequitur esse—acting follows being. That is, everything in the world acts according to what it is, according to its constitution, in which all its expressions are therefore already contained potentially, though they emerge in actuality when external causes call them forth; and in this way that very constitution reveals itself. This is the empirical character, while its inward, ultimate ground, inaccessible to experience, is the intelligible character, that is, the essence in itself of the thing. In this respect the human being is no exception to the rest of nature: he too has his unalterable character, though it is wholly individual and different in each person. For our apprehension this character is precisely empirical, but for that very reason only appearance; what it may be in its essence in itself, however, is called the intelligible character. All his actions, determined in their outward constitution by motives, can never turn out otherwise than in accordance with this unalterable individual character: as a person is, so he must act. Thus, for a given individual in any given particular case, only one action is possible at all: acting follows being. Freedom belongs not to the empirical but solely to the intelligible character. A given person's operari, his acting, is necessarily determined from without by motives, from within by his character; hence everything he does occurs necessarily. But in his esse, his being, lies freedom. He could have been someone else; and in what he is lie guilt and merit. For everything he does follows from it of itself, as a mere corollary.—Kant's theory really turns us back from the fundamental error that placed necessity in being and freedom in acting, and leads us to recognize that the relation is exactly the reverse. Thus a person's moral responsibility concerns, at first and ostensibly, what he does, but at bottom what he is; for, given this, his conduct, when the motives arose, could never have turned out otherwise than it did. Yet however strict the necessity with which motives call forth deeds in a given character, it will never occur to anyone, not even to someone convinced of this necessity, to try to exculpate himself by it and shift the blame onto the motives. For he clearly recognizes that, as far as the matter and its occasions were concerned, thus objectively, a quite different, even an opposite action was perfectly possible, and indeed would have occurred if only he had been someone else. But that, as the action reveals, he is such a person and not another—this is what he feels responsible for. Here, in being, lies the spot struck by the sting of conscience. For conscience is nothing but an acquaintance with one's own self, arising from one's own manner of acting and growing ever more intimate. Thus, though acting occasions conscience's accusation, being is what it really accuses. Since we are conscious of freedom only through responsibility, freedom must lie where responsibility lies: in being. Acting falls to necessity. But we come to know ourselves, like others, only empirically, and have no knowledge of our character prior to experience. Rather, we begin by holding a very high opinion of it, since the maxim "Everyone is presumed good until the contrary is proved" holds even before the inward tribunal.
Note.
Anyone capable of recognizing the essential content of a thought beneath quite different forms of expression will see with me that this Kantian doctrine of intelligible and empirical character is an insight, raised to abstract clarity, that Plato already possessed. Yet because he had not recognized the ideality of time, he could present it only in a temporal form, thus only mythically and in connection with the transmigration of souls. Our recognition of the identity of the two doctrines is greatly clarified by the explanation and elaboration of the Platonic myth that Porphyry gave with such clarity and precision that its agreement with Kant's abstract doctrine emerges unmistakably in his account. Stobaeus has preserved this discussion in full from a work of Porphyry's no longer extant, in the second book of his Eclogues, Kap. 8, §§. 37–40. In it Porphyry comments closely and in detail on the myth in question here, given by Plato in the second half of the tenth book of the Republic; this passage is well worth reading. As a sample I quote its short §. 39, to encourage the interested reader to take up Stobaeus himself. He will then recognize that this Platonic myth can be regarded as an allegory of the great and profound insight that Kant set forth in its abstract purity as the doctrine of intelligible and empirical character; consequently, that Plato had already attained it in its essentials thousands of years ago, and indeed that it reaches back much further still, since Porphyry believes that Plato received it from the Egyptians. But it is already contained in Brahmanism's doctrine of the transmigration of souls, from which the wisdom of the Egyptian priests most probably descends.—The §. 39 in question reads:
"For Plato's entire intention seems to be this: before falling into bodies and differing lives, souls have the power of self-determination to choose this life or another, which they are to live out with a certain form of life and a body suited to that life (for it is in their power to choose the life of a lion or of a human being). Yet that power of self-determination is fettered as soon as they fall into one of these lives. For when they have descended into bodies and, from being unfettered souls, have become the souls of living creatures, they possess a power of self-determination suited to the creature's constitution: in some it is many-sided in thought and movement, as in the human being; in others, limited in movement and confined to a single course, as in almost all other living creatures. This power of self-determination depends upon the constitution: its movement comes from itself, but it is carried along according to the inclinations arising from that constitution." (For Plato's view as a whole seems to be this: before entering bodies and definite kinds of life, souls have the power to choose either this life or another, which they are to live in a body suited to that life [for they may choose the life of a lion as well as that of a human being]; but as soon as a particular life is attained, that freedom is taken away. Once they have descended into bodies and, from being free souls, have become the souls of animals, they acquire a freedom suited to the animal's organic constitution. In some creatures this freedom is highly intelligent and mobile, as in the human being; in others it is simple and little mobile, as in almost all other animals. This freedom depends upon the animal's organic constitution in such a way that, though it moves of itself, it is carried along in accordance with that constitution's appetites.)
Plain English translation
Independent, machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the complete 1860 German edition and its embedded passages. Source-language reviewed.
Kant's account of intelligible and empirical character.—Theory of freedom.
In the service of truth, I have attacked Kant's ethics. Unlike earlier attacks, mine do not merely touch its surface but undermine its deepest foundation. Now justice seems to require that I not leave it without recalling Kant's greatest and most brilliant contribution to ethics. This is his account of how freedom and necessity exist together. He first presents it in the Critique of Pure Reason (S. 533–554 of the first edition and S. 561–582 of the fifth). He gives an even clearer account in the Critique of Practical Reason (fourth edition, S. 169–179; R., S. 224–231).
First Hobbes, then Spinoza, then Hume, also Holbach in Syst. d. la nat., and finally, most fully and thoroughly, Priestley proved the complete and strict necessity of acts of will when motives occur. They established it so clearly and beyond doubt that it must be counted among fully demonstrated truths. Only ignorance and crudeness could therefore keep talking of freedom in a person's individual actions, of a free choice indifferent between alternatives. The irrefutable arguments of these predecessors also led Kant to accept the complete necessity of acts of will as settled beyond any further doubt. This is shown by every passage in which he discusses freedom from the theoretical point of view alone. Yet it remains true that our actions are accompanied by an awareness that we act on our own authority and are the original source of our actions. Through this awareness we recognize them as our work. Each of us feels with unfailing certainty that he is the actual doer of his deeds and morally responsible for them. But responsibility presupposes that we could have acted differently, and thus presupposes freedom in some way. So awareness of responsibility also contains an indirect awareness of freedom. The key to resolving this contradiction, which arises from the subject itself, was finally found in Kant's profound distinction between appearance and the thing in itself. This distinction is the innermost core of his whole philosophy and its chief achievement.
The individual has an unchangeable, inborn character. All its expressions are strictly determined by the law of causality. Here, because causality works through the intellect, it is called motivation. This individual is only the appearance. The thing in itself underlying that appearance lies outside space and time. It is therefore free of any sequence or multiplicity of acts. It is one and unchangeable. Its nature in itself is the intelligible character. This is equally present in all the individual's deeds and imprinted on them all, like a stamp in a thousand seals. It determines the empirical character of this appearance, which shows itself in time and in a sequence of acts. Thus the appearance must show the constancy of a natural law in all its expressions brought about by motives. All its acts therefore occur with strict necessity. This also gave a rational basis to the unchangeable, unbending rigidity of each person's empirical character. Thoughtful minds had always noticed this, while others thought a person's character could be reshaped by reasonable arguments and moral warnings. It was now established for philosophy too, bringing philosophy into agreement with experience. Philosophy no longer had to be put to shame by popular wisdom, which had long expressed this truth in the Spanish proverb: "What comes in with the baby's cap goes out with the burial shroud" (What comes in with the child's cap goes out again with the burial shroud), or: "What is sucked in with milk is spilled out into the burial shroud" (What is taken in with milk is poured out again into the burial shroud).
I consider this account by Kant of how freedom and necessity exist together the greatest achievement of deep human thought. It and the transcendental aesthetic are the two great diamonds in the crown of Kant's fame, which will never fade away.—As is well known, Schelling, in his essay on freedom, gave a paraphrase of this account by Kant. Its vivid coloring and concrete presentation make it easier for many people to grasp. I would praise it if Schelling had had the honesty to say that he was presenting Kant's wisdom here, not his own. Some of the philosophical public still take it for his own today.
We can make both this Kantian account and the nature of freedom in general easier to understand by connecting them with a general truth. I think its most concise expression is a statement often made by the Scholastics: "Acting follows being" (operari sequitur esse). That is, everything in the world acts according to what it is, according to its nature. All its expressions are therefore already potentially contained in that nature. They become actual when outside causes bring them about, and in this way that nature itself becomes known. This is the empirical character. Its inner, ultimate ground, which is inaccessible to experience, is the intelligible character: the thing's nature in itself. Human beings are no exception to the rest of nature here. Each person too has an unchangeable character, but it is entirely individual and different in everyone. For our way of knowing, this character is empirical, and for that very reason it is only appearance. What it may be in its own nature, however, is called the intelligible character. All a person's actions are determined in their outward form by motives. They can never turn out otherwise than in agreement with this unchangeable individual character. A person must act according to what he is. So for any given individual in any given case, only one action is possible: "Acting follows being" (operari sequitur esse). Freedom belongs not to the empirical character but only to the intelligible character. A given person's acting (operari) is necessarily determined from outside by motives and from within by his character. So everything he does happens necessarily. But freedom lies in his being (esse). He could have been a different person. His guilt and merit lie in what he is. For everything he does follows from this of itself, as a mere consequence.—Kant's theory actually brings us back from the basic error that placed necessity in being (esse) and freedom in acting (operari). It leads us to see that the reverse is true. So a person's moral responsibility does, at first and on the surface, concern what he does. At bottom, however, it concerns what he is. Once this is given, his actions, when the motives occurred, could never have turned out differently. Yet however strict the necessity with which motives bring about deeds, given a particular character, no one will ever think of using this to excuse himself and shift the guilt onto the motives. Not even someone convinced of this necessity will do so. He clearly recognizes that, as far as the matter and the circumstances were concerned—that is, objectively—a very different, even opposite action was quite possible. Indeed, it would have occurred if only he had been a different person. But he feels responsible for being this sort of person and not another, as his action reveals.—Here, in being (esse), lies the spot struck by the sting of conscience. For conscience is simply the increasingly intimate acquaintance with one's own self that develops from one's own way of acting. So although acting (operari) gives conscience its occasion, what it actually accuses is being (esse). We are aware of freedom only through responsibility. So where responsibility lies, freedom must lie too: in being (esse). Acting (operari) falls under necessity. But we come to know ourselves, like other people, only through experience. We have no knowledge of our character in advance of experience. In fact, we start out with a very high opinion of it. For the principle "Everyone is presumed good until the opposite is proved" also applies before the inner court.
Note.
Anyone who can recognize the essential point of a thought even when it is expressed in very different forms will see, as I do, that Kant's account of intelligible and empirical character brings an insight already held by Plato to the clarity of abstract thought. But Plato had not recognized the ideal nature of time, so he could present this insight only in a temporal form. He could therefore express it only through myth and in connection with the migration of souls. That the two accounts are identical becomes much clearer through Porphyry's explanation and development of Plato's myth. He presents it so clearly and precisely that its agreement with Kant's abstract account becomes unmistakable. Stobaeus has preserved this discussion in full from a work of Porphyry's that no longer survives. In it, Porphyry gives a detailed and exact commentary on the myth at issue here, which Plato presents in the second half of the tenth book of the Republic. It is in the second book of Stobaeus's Eclogues, Kap. 8, §§. 37–40. This section is very much worth reading. As a sample, I give the short §. 39 here, to encourage the interested reader to take up Stobaeus himself. He will then recognize that this Platonic myth can be seen as an allegory of the great and profound insight that Kant presented in its abstract purity as his account of intelligible and empirical character. So Plato had already reached the essentials of this insight thousands of years ago. It reaches even further back, since Porphyry thinks Plato received it from the Egyptians. But it is already present in the teaching of the migration of souls in Brahmanism, from which the wisdom of the Egyptian priests most probably comes.—The §. 39 just mentioned reads:
"For Plato's overall meaning seems to be this. Before souls enter bodies and different lives, they have the power to choose this course of life or another, which they are to live out with a particular kind of life and a body suited to that life. (For it is in their power to choose the life of a lion or of a human being.) But that power of self-direction is restricted as soon as they enter one of these lives. For when they descend into bodies and become the souls of living creatures instead of unbound souls, they have a power of self-direction suited to the creature's constitution. In some, as in human beings, it is highly intelligent and active. In others, as in almost all other animals, it has little scope for movement and follows a single course. This power of self-direction depends on the constitution. It moves of its own accord, but follows the impulses arising from that constitution." ("For Plato's view as a whole seems to be this. Before souls enter bodies and definite kinds of life, they have the power to choose one life or another, which they are to spend in a body suited to that life [for they are allowed to choose the life of either a lion or a human being]. But as soon as a particular life has been taken on, that freedom is removed. When they descend into bodies and change from free souls into the souls of animals, they acquire a freedom suited to the animal's organism. In some cases, as in human beings, it is very intelligent and mobile. In others, as in almost all other animals, it is simple and has little mobility. This freedom depends on the animal's organism in such a way that it moves on its own, but is carried along according to the organism's appetites.")
About this section
Section 10 is part of On the Basis of Morality by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 11 of 24 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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